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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Organ transplantation and biotechnological research depend on the availability of 
body parts, which necessitates the willing involvement of the public. The rapid 
development of biotechnology has led to a search for an adequate decision-making 
framework for the acquisition, retention and utilisation of body parts. It has also lead 
to disquiet about the commercialisation of research with the source being the only 
participant who is unable to benefit financially. In developing such a framework it is 
necessary to conceptualise the nature of the interest that individuals have in their 
bodies.  
 
The principle of autonomy may form a basis for structuring decision-making and 
weighing conflicting principles. As a society we value autonomy in the sense that a 
competent adult may make decisions about his or her own health care. The concept is 
that of an individual separated from others by a wall of rights. This may be of 
assistance as a basis for formulating competing rights, but this must then be mediated 
with reference to other principles. In this context this thesis applies the concepts of 
property interests to the human body.  
 
The purpose of this research is to consider selected bioethical issues in an attempt to 
formulate a principled approach to issues of consent and control over the body and its 
component parts. It argues that a living person should have a property interest in 
excised body parts during life. There should also be a property interest in the cadaver 
that arises at the point of death, which can be passed to the deceased’s personal 
representative, who would be required to deal with the cadaver in accord with the 
previous instructions of the deceased. However, it does not argue that there are 
property interests in entire living persons.  
 
It does not suggest that property alone is adequate to resolve the issues, but that it 
should operate alongside existing concepts such as autonomy, informed consent and 
privacy. It proposes draft legislation to illustrate the operation of the suggested 
medico-legal framework. 
 
It recognises that any framework should be respectful of Māori cultural values, in 
light of the special position of Māori as tangata whenua, as expressed in the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It argues that the framework allows Māori the freedom to choose collective 
or individualistic decision-making, in recognition of the diversity of values within the 
Māori population.  
 
In addition, it considers areas where public policy might determine that the free 
disposition of this property interest should be restricted to protect vulnerable persons, 
such as incompetent persons and living organ donors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue I find so bizarre is that these guys could claim as theirs something that 
was totally mine, genetically mine. They could claim it for themselves - claim 
ownership - but I couldn’t.1
 
I  PURPOSE OF THESIS 
 
The collection and use of human body tissue has evoked concerns, from 
eighteenth century practices of dissection, through to twentieth century organ 
transplantation and twenty-first century cell line creation and cloning. The inability of 
the law to keep pace with technological advances leads to fears regarding the 
ownership and use of such tissue. As was observed in 1970 by Windeyer J, the law 
marches with medicine, “but in the rear and limping a little.”2  
 
Both private and public value can be attached to the body and its parts. The 
private value of the body relates to a person’s sense of self. As individualism has 
increased, the body has acquired a moral significance, as an extension of the “self”. 
Autonomy has come to be the primary concept in bioethics, reflecting the notion of 
each person as a separate entity. Andrews and Nelkin argue that to be psychologically 
healthy, people need to experience both self-agency, which is the ability to control 
what is done to their bodies, and self-coherence, which is the ability to maintain non-
fragmented whole bodies.3 Thus, they assert that taking or using tissue, without the 
individual’s knowledge or consent, can compromise psychological development and 
emotional well-being.  
 
The public values relate to the economic and social benefits from organ 
transplantation and the technological advances achieved by utilising body parts in 
research. The biotechnology revolution “has become modern alchemy, aiming to 
transmute diseased biological material into gold, and to find the panacea of human 
genetic illness.”4 Market forces and scientific advances in medical research have 
merged, creating tension between the profit-based goals and expectations of the 
market, the scientific expectations of freely shared knowledge, and the expectation 
that sources donate body parts without compensation. This has led to equity 
considerations in apportioning the financial and therapeutic benefit from such 
discoveries. 
 
 There are great benefits for individual recipients from transplantation and 
states wish to implement policies that will result in the harvest of the greatest possible 
number of organs.5 These policies may challenge autonomy because consent of the 
                                                 
1 Comments of John Moore, reported in Adam Stone “The Strange Case of John Moore and the 
Splendid Stolen Spleen” (1996)  
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu:4050/moore.html> (last accessed 10 September 2004). 
2 Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, 395 HCA (Windeyer J). 
3 Lori B Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin “Whose Body Is It Anyway? Disputes Over Body Tissue in a 
Biotechnology Age” (1988) 351 Lancet 53, 54. 
4 Anne Nichols Hill “Note: One Man’s Trash is Another Man’s Treasure, Bioprospecting: Protecting 
the Rights and Interests of Human Donors of Genetic Material” (2002) 5 J Health Care L & Pol’y 259. 
5 In 2005, New Zealand had only 29 organ donors- the lowest figure ever: Give Life “Organ donor 
Rates for 2005 Worst Ever” Scoop Independent News 11 January 2005 <www.scoop.co.nz> (last 
accessed 12 January 2006). 
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source may be lacking, in some strategies, such as presumed consent or where the 
views of the relatives are allowed to prevail over the wishes of the deceased.  
 
Organ donation and research using human biological materials are dependent 
for their continued viability on the participation of the public. As the public and 
private values of body parts may conflict, the purpose of this thesis is to devise a legal 
framework that reconciles such conflicts, while encouraging and supporting organ and 
tissue donation. The rights of living persons over their excised biological materials 
and their prospective rights to control the disposition of their bodies after death raise 
complex legal issues and recent rapid scientific developments relating to the human 
genome necessitate articulation of the legal rights of the person from whom the 
biological material was harvested (the “source”).  
 
The fundamental question relates to which legal principles might best protect 
these interests. Some commentators argue that the law should recognise that sources 
have property rights either in their whole bodies or in excised body parts.6 Others 
argue that such recognition is unjustified at law, or could have a chilling effect on 
research.7 This thesis is intended to relate this ongoing debate to New Zealand 
jurisprudence and, in particular, to suggest a legislative framework that would 
encompass property rights alongside present provisions relating to informed consent 
and privacy, to allow sources to control the collection, retention and use of body parts 
and share in the profits derived from them. This thesis makes an original contribution 
to these conversations by demonstrating draft legislation.8 Supporters of property 
rights have not generally considered how their proposals would be put into effect, 
particularly in the New Zealand context. Although they have acknowledged the need 
to ensure that New Zealand law respects Māori values and customs, commentators 
have not considered how this might be achieved.  
 
Property rights would enable sources who allege that their body parts were 
misappropriated to have civil remedies, such as conversion, and they would be able to 
enter into contractual relationships with researchers to share in the profits made from 
patenting of inventions based on their body parts. However, it is argued that asserting 
that sources have a property interests in excised body parts will not, in itself, solve the 
concerns that have lead to this thesis. For example, it is argued that property must 
exist alongside regulated consent structures and that vulnerable persons may need 
particular legislative protections. 
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Health reviewed the use of human tissue for 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes and on 7 November 2006 the Government 
introduced the Human Tissue Bill (HTB).9 This thesis argues that the bill has 
                                                 
6 B Dickens “The Control of Living Body Materials” (1977) 27 U Toronto L J142, 183; G Dworkin 
and I Kennedy “Human Tissue: rights in the Body and its Parts” [1993] 1 Med L Rev 291, 311; C 
Hammond “Property Rights in Human Corpses and Human Tissue: The Position in Western Australia” 
(2002) 4 U Notre Dame Australia L Rev 97, 113. 
7 L Skene “Proprietary Rights in Human Bodies, Body Parts and Tissue” (2002) 22 Legal Studies 102, 
123—127. 
8 Chapter 8 contains selected sections of a proposed statute. 
9 The Human Tissue Bill provides a framework for regulating the collection, storage and use of tissue 
and organs, primarily from the deceased. It also regulates trading in tissue, export and import of tissue, 
and the use of tissue for non-therapeutic purposes (e.g. audit, anatomical examination, research and 
post mortem). The Bill is discussed in chapter 2. 
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substantial weaknesses and does not adequately protect the interests of sources. It 
provides for a complex consent regime, with no protection of the right of a person to 
veto any use of their cadaver, should their relatives be willing to give consent.  
 
This thesis  argues that New Zealand law should recognise that sources have 
property rights over excised body parts and that a property interest in the cadaver 
arises at death. This interest would pass to a representative, and be administered 
according to the previously expressed wishes of the deceased person. It is argued that 
the aims of protecting the interests of sources and encourage their participation in 
organ donation and research will only succeed if the framework respects the interests 
of living and previously living persons, even if such respect conflicts with the wishes 
of families.  
 
This thesis is grounded in medico-legal concepts and, despite the emphasis on 
property,  it is not intended to develop a new concept of the law of property. The 
thesis does not focus on the regulation of medical and genetic information, or whether 
the law regards information as property. Rather, it is concerned with appropriate 
medico-legal structures for the collection, retention and use of body parts and 
cadavers. These recognise that even if body parts are treated as property, they are a 
special category and that the law must also incorporate concepts of autonomy and 
informed consent. Consequently, this thesis suggests draft legislative provisions to 
demonstrate the practical application of the proposals. 
 
II STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
A property right equates to the right to make decisions about matters such as 
the right to use, the right to sell, and the right to destroy the item. Property rights are 
both positive in that they allow actions such as consumption or destruction of the item 
and negative in the sense that they permit the holder of the property right to prevent 
others from doing things- such as using the item. Thus, property rights to the body or 
body part result in the authority to make decisions about disposition or use, while 
protecting the rights of the parties and providing remedies where appropriate. As 
stated, commentators have argued for and against property rights in human body parts 
and some of these arguments will be traversed in this thesis. However, proponents of 
a property approach have not generally teased out how such a construct could be 
combined with structures to respect autonomy and the commonly accepted concept of 
informed consent, as is intended here. 
 
Chapter 1 establishes the theoretical foundation for the thesis and introduces 
property theory as applied to body parts. It argues that there is no property interest in 
the whole body, but that there is such an interest in excised body parts and the cadaver 
after death. It considers how body parts may be transformed into things capable of 
being subject to property rights. It discusses whether informed consent is sufficient to 
protect sources, interests and concludes that, although vital, it does not resolve the 
issue of ongoing control over body parts or the sharing of profits from products and 
services made from them.  The chapter introduces arguments for and against property 
interests in body parts.  
 
Chapter 2 considers the development of the no-property rule with respect to 
dead bodies. It explores various regimes for consent to organ donation after death. 
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The problems with the present legislation, the Human Tissue Act 1964, are outlined. 
The issues considered in this thesis have been addressed, to some extent, in the United 
Kingdom in the Human Tissue Act 2004 (UKHTA). It is argued that the UKHTA is 
philosophically grounded in property rights and interests, even though this is not 
acknowledged in the Act. The UKHTA is considered and contrasted with the 
proposals for legislation in the HTB.10 It is argued that the HTB does not adequately 
address many of the issues in this area and that the proposed framework is a more 
effective solution. 
 
Chapter 3 explores materials excised from living bodies and, as there has been 
minimal litigation in this area in New Zealand, judicial decisions from the United 
States and United Kingdom are considered and analysed. It is argued that utilisation 
of tissues and samples for research is a societal good, but that participation in research 
should not be a matter of conscription. The research use of biobanked material is 
considered and also whether sources should be able to consent to unspecified future 
uses of their body parts. 
 
 Additionally, this chapter explores living donor transplantation and 
commentators’ arguments that such donors should be protected in light of their 
vulnerability to coercion. Donors would have property interests in their organs once 
the organs were excised, which they could agree to pass to the recipient. That 
agreement would be expressed by way of the donor’s informed consent. However, the 
chapter concludes that it is impossible to ensure that such consent is freely given, 
other than by way of robust procedures at the time of consent. It is argued that the 
property construct is applicable to living organ donation, because it provides a means 
for donors to control the collection and use of donated organs and provides remedies 
for misuse. 
 
As the thesis argues that persons have property interests in excised body parts 
it is necessary to explore when this interest arises, to establish the parameters of the 
thesis. Consequently, chapter 4 considers the status of embryos and the unborn child. 
Similarly, as the framework provides that a property interest in a cadaver arises at 
death, the nature of death is explored, particularly with regard to brain death. 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with a framework for New Zealand. 
Consequently, chapter 5 explores whether the proposed framework is sufficiently 
respectful of Māori cultural values, in light of the special position of Māori as tangata 
whenua,11 as expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi. It will be argued that the human 
body is a taonga12 and, as such, any legislative framework must be respectful of the 
strongly held tikanga13 around human bodies and body parts. Māori beliefs about 
whakapapa14 suggest that, to some Māori, individualistic decision-making is 
inappropriate. It will be argued that the proposed framework is sufficiently flexible to 
                                                 
10 Ministry of Health Review of the Regulation of Human Tissue and Tissue-based Therapies 
(Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2004) <http://www.moh.govt.nz> (last accessed 23 March 2006) 
and the Human Tissue Bill 2006.. 
11 Local people, hosts, indigenous people of the land - people born of the whenua, i.e. of the placenta 
and of the land where the people’s ancestors have lived and where their placenta are buried. 
12 Treasure. 
13 Customs or culture. 
14 Geneology. 
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allow an individual to choose either collective or individualistic decision making. 
However, it argues that it is inappropriate to impose any particular cultural framework 
on individuals, in light of the diversity of Māori and the pluralistic nature of New 
Zealand society. With regard to research use of body parts, it is argued that cultural 
values are more appropriately considered at the stage of research approval, by 
involved collective groups such as whānau,15 iwi,16 or hapū17 having a wānanga18 
around the broad purposes and processes of the research, before any individuals are 
approached to provide research materials. New Zealand differs from other 
jurisdictions, in that Māori values are valued and respected, but there has been scant 
academic debate considering how Māori values about body parts might fit into a 
western individualistic paradigm. It is argued that the framework proposed in this 
thesis advances existing writings, by adding an original dimension in the form of 
practical solutions. 
  
Children and mentally incompetent persons may have impaired ability to make 
or communicate their decisions. Although they are potential sources of organs and 
body parts, they may be unable to consent to such use. Chapter 6 considers the present 
New Zealand legislation with regard to incompetent persons and the consequences of 
the accommodation of property rights into such law. It concludes that parents may 
have a conflict of interests when making decisions about organ donation within the 
family and recommends that such decisions be overseen by the Family Court or the 
recommended Human Tissue Authority. 
 
Patenting biotechnological inventions encourages the investment of the capital 
necessary to fund research, but it may result in loss of control by human sources over 
the uses of their body parts and may reduce the affordability of resultant tests and 
treatments. The decision in Moore v Regents of the University of California19 allowed 
the biotechnology industry to utilise and profit from genetic raw materials, while 
failing to adequately protect Moore’s autonomy, or provide any incentive for others to 
allow research using their body materials. Chapter 7 argues that application of the 
property construct would provide a means for the human sources of biological 
material to participate in the profits resulting from the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions and considers potential approaches to achieve this.   
 
 Chapter 8 develops a proposed framework for collecting, retaining and 
utilising body parts. It suggests draft sections to demonstrate the practical effect of the 
framework. The framework proposes that living persons have inchoate property rights 
in their bodies. Once body parts are excised, the source has a property right in those 
parts. If conditions are imposed by the source, the doctor or researcher obtains limited 
possessory rights to use the body parts. It is accepted that some people may be 
indifferent as to the fate of such parts and may either impliedly or expressly abandon 
them, in which case property will pass to the doctor or researcher who obtains 
                                                 
15 Family group. 
16 Tribe. 
17 Clan, tribe or sub tribe. 
18 Discussion. 
19 Moore v Regents of the University of California  (1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494, 215 Cal App 3d 709 
(App Div) modified (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, (1990) 271 Cal Rptr 146, (1990) 793 P 2d 479  cert denied,  
(1991) 499 US 936.  This case is considered in detail in chapter 3. 
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possession and asserts ownership. It argues that a property right in a cadaver should 
arise briefly at the point of death, then pass to the representative of the deceased. 
 
Once a body part was reintegrated into the body of another, the source’s rights 
would be extinguished and the part become part of the recipient’s body and thus, 
included in that person’s personal rights.  
 
The proposed framework would allow living persons or representatives of 
deceased persons to control, transfer or destroy body parts and would provide 
remedies for misuse. Representatives would be required to carry out the wishes of the 
deceased and these wishes could not be overridden by family members.  
 
The legislation would prohibit the sale of organs, although payment of 
expenses to living donors and a funeral benefit to the estates of deceased donors is 
recommended. The framework would enable the parties to negotiate the equitable 
distribution of the profits from the commercialisation of human tissue and, in 
particular, from the patenting of inventions based on it. Negotiation of benefits could 
be on an individual basis, if a person had unique properties required for the research, 
by patient groups, or by the Human Tissue Authority. However, in most cases, the 
consent process would include the intended arrangements for profit sharing and 
sources would decide whether or not to participate on that basis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION  
 
 In common usage, the term “property” relates to material objects, whereas the 
legal definition of property is the collection of interests a person may have, incident to 
ownership, and protected by the state. The characteristics of property relating to its 
use, transfer and enjoyment are known as property interests and the aggregate of these 
interests connotes ownership. Property owners may be subject to restrictions on the 
use of their property or may extend ownership by creating ownership interests in other 
persons, such as by gift. Legal ownership can arise through a variety of interest 
combinations, including exclusive possession or enjoyment, transferability, 
alienability and divisibility. 
 
The relationship between persons and their bodies has many of the 
characteristics of ownership, such as possession, exclusive use, the ability to waste, 
modify, destroy or alienate, immunity from forced appropriation and the ability to 
give body parts to others. Courts’ decisions as to whether there are property interests 
in body parts have varied, depending on the public policy objectives and the factual 
circumstances.1 Property is a complex notion that varies in different situations and 
most normative theories of property initially seem ill-suited to body parts. 
 
              The fundamental argument against property interests in human body parts is 
that if persons are able to exercise control over their own bodies in a way that 
characterises their having commercial property in their bodies, this results in them 
treating themselves as means only and not as ends in themselves, consequently 
violating their human dignity. In contrast, the pro-property position is that to deny 
people the right to exercise property control over their bodies violates their human 
dignity, especially if third parties who obtain the body parts are able to have property 
rights. This thesis argues that once body parts are excised, a property-based 
framework with reasonable restraints is less offensive than the current situation, 
whereby the source does not have property rights, but subsequent possessors of the 
parts do acquire such rights.2 It would allow the source to restrict the uses to which 
the property might be put, and the control and protection provided by property law 
could prevent the degradation of personhood, by protecting autonomy and giving the 
source enforceable interests.  
 
Andrew Grubb considers the reasons why human rights alone are inadequate, 
stating:3
                                                 
1 See the cases in chapters 2 and 3. Historically, the feudal doctrine of tenures and slavery were 
examples of property rights in the human body.  This continued until slavery was abolished in the 
nineteenth century. See H Catterall Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro (Irish 
University Press, Shannon, 1968) 13. 
2 Examples of the source’s lack of control over body parts include the potential for unconsented use of 
biobanked material (see chapter 3) the patenting of genes (see chapter 7) and the ability for family 
members to override the deceased’s wish to be an organ donor (see chapter 2). 
3 Andrew Grubb “‘I, Me, Mine’: Bodies Parts and Property” (1998) 3 Medical Law International 299—
317. 
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English law has developed in the last decade to provide significant protection to 
individuals’ self-determination—by recognising a “right of bodily integrity”—
such that the taking of any tissue from a competent adult person would be 
unlawful without the consent of the source. The law is, however, solely 
concerned with the ‘taking’ rather than the ‘use’ of extra-corporeal organs or 
tissue. By contrast, property law would have something to say about subsequent 
‘use’ and ‘control’.  
 
A right to bodily integrity is a right not to be physically harmed against one’s 
will. A right not to have body parts removed without consent derives from a right to 
bodily integrity in so far as consent is required, because removal amounts to physical 
harm. Consequently, to assert the source has rights over subsequent uses cannot be 
attributed to a right to bodily integrity, as no further physical harm ensues.  
 
It might be argued that property rights are not the only rights that may allow 
control over excised body parts, as a right to prevent certain uses may be claimed to 
be the exercise of a right to personal integrity. For example, some Māori might 
object to the use of their genetic material in research involving genetic modification, 
because of cultural beliefs around whakapapa.4 Participants might also object to 
research that might expose particular groups to discrimination, as with research into 
Māori and the “warrior gene”.5 A requirement to obtain consent for future uses of 
excised body parts could be grounded in the need to protect such a personal right. 
Justification could take one of the following two forms: 
 
•  An interest or primary-right specific form, which exists subject to the 
subsequent use offending the source’s personal integrity. Objection would 
require the source to establish some conscientious objection to prohibit the 
use; or 
•  Respect for the personal integrity of the source could be sufficiently 
important that the source may prohibit future use without pointing to offence 
to personal dignity, with the only relevant factor being that it is the source’s 
body part. 
 
The second form is preferable, because it avoids the necessity to decide on a 
schedule of grounds for objection, a proposition that should be rejected because it 
requires value judgments about personal beliefs. Consequently, in order to assert that 
the rights of control are based on a property right, rather than some other right, it is 
necessary to decide what aspect is uniquely a property right.  
 
 It will be argued that the entire body falls more naturally within notions of 
personal rights that safeguard an inviolable corporeal identity. Such an assertion 
requires justification for the distinction between body parts within the entire body, as 
contrasted with excised parts, to determine, how a body part that is not property whilst 
part of the entire body becomes property once it is excised.  
 
 A  Work and Skill  
 
                                                 
4 See chapter 5. 
5 Agençe France-Presse “Maori Slam ‘Warrior’ Gene Study” (9 
August 2006) <http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/stories> (last accessed 20 August 2006). 
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Doodewood6 is authority for the proposition that human material can be the 
subject of property if a body has undergone a process or other application of human 
skill. If the work and skill is the surgical removal of an organ in transplantable 
condition, or the collection and preservation of samples, this would point to the 
property interest being held by the hospital, surgeon or researcher, rather than the 
source. However, living sources must subject themselves to some discomfort or 
inconvenience for the harvest of body parts. This equates to work and skill and 
doctors act as agents for sources when removing the parts. Alternatively, as excised 
body parts have different attributes, or a use or significance beyond their mere 
existence,7 they are different things from the entire body, so property interests might 
arguably arise under the Doodewood exception.8 Thus, an excised kidney in a dish 
awaiting transplantation is a different entity and has a use or significance beyond its 
mere existence, when compared with a kidney forming part of a complex entire living 
body.9
 
 B  First Occupancy  
 
An alternative approach is first occupancy- the argument that property rights 
arise when an unowned resource is occupied or possessed and the intention made 
clear that a person claims ownership. Thereafter, others have a duty not to interfere 
with the first owner’s private ownership of the resource. Becker stated that the 
occupier must show with reasonable clarity how much is being occupied and there 
must be some limits to occupation.10 Waldron argues that this theory satisfactorily 
resolves disputes about ownership of a resource, but does not explain why private 
property is preferable to other types of property system, as first occupancy allows 
individuals to impose duties on everyone else.11 Becker argues that it may give a right 
to possession, but not necessarily a claim-right to keep the thing.12
 
 One method of demonstrating a person’s ownership of a thing is to show that 
it was acquired fairly from a person who had title. However, at the beginning of the 
chain, the issue of original title remains. In terms of this thesis, a body part does not 
exist as a separate entity until excised from the entire body. First occupancy would 
suggest that if the part is unowned, it is then able to be claimed by the doctor or 
hospital that has possession of it. Consequently, the source would have no ability to 
direct the recipient of an organ or control the research use of body parts. The public 
policy disadvantages from such an approach were discussed in Colavito.13   
 
This thesis proposes legislation providing for a property interest in excised 
body parts and cadavers. This leads to consideration of a theory under which such 
                                                 
6 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 414 (HCA) Griffith CJ, Barton, Higgins JJ. 
7 R v Kelly [1998] 3 All ER 741, 750. 
8 Doodeward v Spence, above. See the discussion in chapter 2. 
9 R v Kelly, R v Lindsay [1999] Q B 621, 631C (CA) Rose LJ, Ognall, Sullivan JJ. See the discussion in 
chapter 2. 
10 Lawrence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 
London, 1977) ch 3. 
11 Jeremy Waldron The Right to Private Property (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990) 285. 
12 Becker, above, 28—30. 
13 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc (2006) 438 F 3d 214; 2006 US app LEXIS 4309 
(US App Ct) Sack J. See the discussion later in this chapter. 
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rights arise. Some theories proposed by commentators are considered in this chapter. 
This thesis does not aim to develop an original concept of property, nor add to the 
established body of property law jurisprudence. Rather, it suggests a legislative 
framework for the collection, retention and utilisation of body parts.14 This section 
attempts to define property right in the sense that is expressed in the framework, 
rather than considering the broader justifications for private property.15  
 
Part I of this chapter outlines the general conceptions of property upon which 
the thesis is based. Part II considers whether sufficient protection can be achieved 
through human rights, by way of the principle of respect for individual autonomy, 
which embodies a view of the individual as an independent moral agent whose 
choices must be respected. It argues that the conflation of informed consent with 
autonomy restricts autonomy, while only giving an illusion of power and control to 
the individual and that personal rights are inadequate to protect sources’ interests in 
controlling body parts after excision and benefiting from their economic value.  
 
PART I 
 
I THE NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS  
 
This section will consider what it means to assert that there are “property 
rights” over an object. This involves consideration of the nature of property rights and 
which objects might be “property”. No single definition of private property has 
produced a universal or general meaning and, apart from the idea that property rights 
are rights of control over objects, there appears to be little consensus about what 
constitutes having an object as one’s property. 16 As stated by Bernard Dickens: 17  
 
To enquire whether a person has property in the in situ or separated materials of 
his own living body requires a more precise definition of property, possession, 
ownership, and associated legal concepts than seems to exist. 
 
This thesis argues that a property right is a right to a thing, which is generally 
enforceable against others. There are two dominant senses in which the word 
“property” is understood. The first is that property is a physical or tangible thing, 
which is the reified perspective; the second is that property is a bundle of rights.  
 
A Reified Perspective  
 
                                                 
14 See the discussion of the UK Human Tissue Act 2004 in chapter 2, in which it is suggested that 
legislation does not specify a property interest but, in many respects, treats body parts as though they 
are property.  
15 As in J W Harris Property and Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1966); S R Munzer  A Theory of 
Property (CUP, Cambridge, 1990); J Waldron The Right To Private Property (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988). 
16 Lawrence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations (Routledge, London, 1977) 2—4; J 
Waldron The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 28—30; S R Munzer A 
Theory of Property (CUP, Cambridge, 1990) 15—36; J W Harris Property and Justice (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1996) 6—8; R A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (5ed, Aspen, New York, 1998) 39;  J 
E Penner The Idea of Property in Law (2ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 1—6.  
17 Bernard Dickens “The Control of Living Body Materials” (1977) 27 U Toronto L J 142, 144. 
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Most writers in the nineteenth century adopted the reified perspective, as is 
shown by Strahan, writing in the nineteenth century, who said:18
 
Only things which can be owned are determinate things, that is, an actually 
existing physical object….We cannot in this sense own a debt, or a patent, or a 
copyright, all of which are mere creations of the law, without any physical 
embodiments over which physical power can be exercised. Accordingly, strictly 
speaking, such rights are not property.  
 
 
Kant stated:19   
 
Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own 
property; to say he is would be self-contradictory; for in so far as he is a person he 
is a subject in whom the ownership of things can be vested, and if he were his own 
property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership. But a person 
cannot be property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned, for it is 
impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the property. 
 
Similarly, Strahan stated:20  
 
Physical objects alone, then, are subjects of ownership. But all physical objects 
cannot be owned. For example, there cannot by English law be any property in a 
human body, living or dead, though the executors of a dead testator are entitled to 
possession of his body for the purposes of burial…. With this exception, however, 
it may be said generally that any material thing of which physical possession can 
be taken may be owned. 
 
Property was restricted to the tangible, because it was theoretically connected 
to control and domination over the thing or the ability to alter the original nature of 
the thing by the expenditure of labour. The concept was that once a person has control 
or dominion over a thing, or has altered it from its naturally occurring state, then it 
becomes that person’s property. This idea of control and alteration led Locke to opine 
that every person has a proprietary interest in his or her body.21  
 
Locke said that we have a property right in our moral persons, not that we 
have a property right in our physical bodies. This implies that we have title in that 
with which we have mixed our labour, because labour is the expression of our agency 
and status as persons. We only have title to that which we have worked to make, so 
we do not own our bodies just because we inhabit them. Property is thus linked to self 
ownership and is derived from the interrelationship between value creating labour, 
purposeful activity and our agency, from ownership of our entire bodies. However, 
this thesis argues that the excision of body parts from the whole body requires 
intentionality and control and involves a variety of procedures, some of which are 
highly invasive (such as living organ donation). Thus, sources have property in their 
                                                 
18 James Andrew Strahan  A General View of the Law of Property (2 ed, Stevens and Sons Ltd, 
London, 1897). 
19 Immanuel Kant “Lectures on Ethics” in H J Paton (ed) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Hutchinson, London, 1953) 165. 
20 Strahan, above, 4. 
21 John Locke The Second Treatise of Government Thomas P Peardon (ed) (The Liberal Arts Press Inc, 
New York, 1952) 17. 
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own labour.22 The labour of the surgeon who removes the organ is provided as the 
source’s agent and would not result in the doctor having separate property rights. 
 
 Commentators have disagreed about whether property is limited to tangible 
objects23 or whether it includes the intangible.24 This thesis relates to excised body 
parts, which are tangible objects, but argues that property rights may include the 
intangible.25
 
B Bundle of Rights  
 
Having argued that  sources’ property in excised body parts can justifiably be 
regarded as conferring Lockean property rights, the type of right will now be 
considered. Commentators such as Hohfield26 and Honoré27 argue that private 
property consists of in rem rights between people in relation to things, thus liable to 
be exacted against a thing. The commonly accepted “bundle of rights” theory is 
derived from a combination of Hohfeld’s “framework of legal relations” and 
Honoré’s concept of “full ownership”.28 Hohfeld contended that there was confusion 
in the usage of terms such as “right” and “duty.” His response was to devise a series 
of fundamental legal rights and obligations, which were set out as correlatives or 
opposites. They included rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, liabilities, 
immunities and disabilities. Correlatives describe the view of the legal relationship 
from the perspective of each side of the relation. Thus, a right is an affirmative claim 
against another, which creates a correlative duty in the person on the other side of the 
legal relationship to act or avoid acting in a certain manner. A privilege is the legal 
freedom from the claim of another person. The person against whom the privilege 
exists has a correlative “no right” to determine that the person with the privilege must 
act or not act according to the privilege. 
  
Modern property rights models build on these concepts to formulate the 
incidents of ownership. Honoré developed a concept of “full ownership”, which 
consisted of rights, or incidents, of ownership.29 These included the right to possess, 
the right to use, the right to manage, and the power of transmissibility. He argued that 
all were necessary to have full ownership, but not all incidents were needed to have 
some form of ownership. His incidents were subject to varying definitions and he 
allowed for limitations on the scope of these incidents, so, even though a person may 
have the right to use a parcel of land, that use could be limited by the law.30 Honoré 
                                                 
22 Labour in this context would include the pain and suffering involved in the donation. 
23 B Boukhart “What is Property?” (1990) 13 Harv  J L & Pub Pol’y  775, 796. 
24 J W Harris Property and Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). 
25 Chapter 7 considers patenting and accepts that intellectual property rights exist separate from the 
physical existence of the patented invention. 
26 Wesley Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale 
Law Journal 16. 
27 Tony Honoré Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1987); 
28 Lawrence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge and K Paul, London, 
1977); J E Penner “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711; Tony 
Honoré Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987); 
Wesley Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale 
Law Journal 16. 
29 Becker, above, 19. 
30 Becker, above, 20. 
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argued that property rights are typically aggregates of different sorts of rights (or 
liberties) and rights-correlatives, and so a person may have the right to use and may 
exercise the right, which amount to a privilege. An essential feature was that “none of 
the characteristics which define the full or liberal notion of ownership in modern legal 
systems is necessary to all varieties of ownership.”31 Consequently, there are a wide 
range of sets of rights which, when held by a person, can justify the claim of 
ownership. These sets have come to be known as “bundles of rights”.  
 
Relativity of title also flows from Hohfield’s theory. This is the notion that 
property rights are neither absolute nor good against the whole world, but rather are 
relative and limited, circumscribed by the conflicting interests of others. This meaning 
has the difficulty that it does not indicate what part of a bundle of separable rights, 
which includes, for instance, rights of possession, control, use, and exchange, is the 
necessary minimum to constitute property, implying that the word may have no 
common convention. Honoré suggests that ownership in the fullest sense requires all 
eleven elements, which severely restricts the scope for having property rights.  
 
There are several difficulties that arise when applying these “sticks” to body 
parts, such as the power to alienate, the right to security and the liability to 
execution.32 Munzer proposes to remove from the “bundle of rights” such incidents as 
are inappropriate for body parts and classifies body rights into personal rights and 
weak and strong property rights.33 Body parts fit within the description of property 
under the Hohfeldian framework to the extent that a source has rights, privileges, 
powers and immunities in relation to others. Each person has the right to possession 
and use of their body parts free from interference from others, leading to a duty on 
others to avoid interrupting in that person’s use. The person has the right to refuse a 
request for a body part, even if donation would cause minimal inconvenience, and the 
other person has no right to demand that a sample be given.34 The source has the right 
to alienate body parts, by giving them to another or by placing them under the control 
of another. This demonstrates that the legal relation between the source and others 
with respect to body parts consists of a combination of rights, privileges, powers and 
immunities, even if it does not amount to “complete property”.35
 
The Hohfeld-Honoré model has been extended by the addition of accession 
and specification to resolve problems that are too complex for the model. An 
accession is something added to existing property. The general rule is that the value 
of the accession follows the object to which it has attached, so the owner of a chattel 
owns all things united with that chattel.36  If new property is created from the labour 
of one person and the material of another to transform the material into an entirely 
                                                 
31 Becker, above, 22. 
32 Jasper A Bovenberg Property Rights in Blood, Genes and Data (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 2006) 
132. 
33 S R Munzer A Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) 54—55. 
34 As considered in McFall v. Shimp (1978) 10 Pa D & C 3d 90. However, body parts may be 
compulsorily acquired in forensic contexts, such as blood alcohol testing. 
35 For example, the source does not retain control of a blood sample given for laboratory testing, but the 
source can demand that the sample be returned or destroyed after testing. See Health and Disability 
Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) Regulation 1996, Right 
7(9). 
36 Erik B Seeney “Moore 10 Years Later– Still Trying to Fill the Gap: Creating a Personal Property 
Right in Genetic Material” (1998) 32 New England L Rev 1131, 1151. 
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different species, the owner of the original material has lost the right to the new 
species. This is known as the doctrine of specification.37 If the person who 
transforms the material is an innocent trespasser, the owner of the original material 
may recover the value of the materials before their conversion but, if the trespasser 
was not innocent, the Courts have tended to award the full market value of the 
converted material to the rightful owner.38 Commonly, in research the samples are 
processed, from storage through to the creation of cell lines. If a sample is cultured it 
may not be representative of the total specimen used and the longer it is in culture the 
less it is like the original specimen. Consequently, it becomes difficult to consider 
the cell line or culture as the “fruits” of the original sample. Under the theory of 
accession the owner of the material would be entitled to such fruits. However, 
specification would apply, which would vest full title in the person who added the 
most value to the final product. 
 
In Moore v Regents of the University of California,39 the researcher added 
value to Moore’s cells by inventing a method of reproducing them. The patent was 
given for the modified biogenetic product, not the cells themselves, so the method 
could be argued to be an accession. As the value of the accession follows the object to 
which it is attached, the owner of the object has all those things united with that 
chattel, thus, if he owned his spleen, Moore would have title to the patent. However, 
as the material was combined with the labour of another, the theory of specification 
comes into play. So Moore would only have a claim for the market value of the spleen 
and would not have a claim to the resultant new species- the cell line. However, as the 
property was wilfully converted, the labourer should receive no benefit from the 
labour.  
 
In deciding which rights must be present before private property exists, 
various theories have arisen.  
 
C Natural Rights Theory 
 
 The natural rights theory of property argues that every person has property in 
his own body and that the person’s individuality, created by nature, is innate and 
cannot be separated from the person.40 This conception of property arises from the 
laws of nature, rather than from the laws of man, since individuality is of natural 
origin.41 Personal identity and individuality are necessary for individual self-
realisation. Property, (which is expressed in terms of ownership), is an extension of 
the concept of personal identity to relations between persons with respect to objects.42 
 
 This theory justifies the recognition of a property interest in body parts 
because they are necessary for an individual’s self-realisation and self-identity.43 The 
                                                 
37 Seeney, above, 1151. 
38 Seeney, above, 1152—3. 
39 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494, 215 Cal App 3d 709 (App 
Div) modified (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 271 Cal Rptr 146, 793 P 2d 479 cert denied, (1991) 499 US 936.  
This case is considered in detail in chapter 3. 
40 Thomas Hodgskin The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted (B. Steil, London,1832) 
18;         <http://oll.libertyfund.org> (last accessed 12 June 2006). 
41 Hodgskin, above, 29, 41. 
42 Hodgskin, above, 29. These objects need not be tangible. 
43 Hodgskin, above 28—29. 
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physical body is essential for the person’s identity, and having been given by nature, it 
cannot be denied by law. If the right of control over one’s body, the right to exclude 
others from exercising that control, and the right to dispose of the body or parts of it 
are fundamental rights, then the conclusion must be that natural law theory recognises 
a property right in the human body.44 The natural rights perspective hinges on the 
individuality of the person, which requires that the person be able to control its 
expression, through autonomy and self-determination.45  
 
  Hegel argued that ownership of one’s body necessarily precedes ownership of 
any external things.46 However, unlike Locke, he argued that no absolute property 
rights in the body could exist; rather, sources could decide when and how they wish 
to relinquish their rights to “the members of [their] bodies.”47 Hegel took Locke’s 
natural rights theory and added the element of human choice into the calculus of 
defining property rights. 
 
The right of dominion over one’s body, inherent in autonomy and self-
determination, involves the right to possess, use, and dispose of the elements of the 
body, subject to certain limitations, such as the duty to avoid actions that harm others. 
These interests are characteristic of property and are fundamental interests under a 
natural rights theory. Consequently, informed consent is a subset of property interests 
under a natural rights framework.  
 
D  Labour Theory 
 
 The labour theory of property asserts that each person is entitled to the 
ownership of whatever they acquire or create through their own labour. Locke 
asserted that each individual has a “property in his own person” and that no one other 
than that individual has a claim to that property.48 The property in one’s person is 
one’s individuality, which cannot be separated from the person. Accordingly, Locke 
asserted that since the labour of one’s body is also one’s property, then anything 
mixed with labour necessarily becomes property. Thus, everything of value derives 
from the individual’s body and from the labour of that body.  
 
Becker argues that since labour increases the value of the thing and 
unappropriated things are “no use”, the labourer is entitled to property rights in the 
thing laboured upon. The conclusion is that one is entitled to the value one’s labour 
adds to the thing, not the thing itself.49 An alternate argument is that since things are 
of no use until appropriated and appropriation usually involves labour that would not 
                                                 
44 Ellen F Paul “Natural Rights and Property Rights” (1990) 13 Harv J L Pub Pol’y 10 (arguing that the 
appellate majority and dissenting opinions in Moore display the tension between the natural rights and 
the utilitarian views of property). 
45 As discussed below, the need for individuals to maintain control over their persons and identities has 
focussed on informed consent. 
46 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Philosophy of Right (T M Knox trans) (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1967) § 44. 
47 Hegel, above, § 47. 
48  John Locke The Second Treatise of Government Thomas P Peardon (ed) (The Liberal Arts Press Inc, 
New York, 1952) para 123.  
49 Lawrence C Becker Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 
London, 1977) 34. 
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be undertaken except for the anticipated benefits, the labourer should get property 
rights in the thing laboured upon.50
 
 Nozick asked why mixing one’s labour with a thing should make the thing the 
property of the labourer, rather than losing the labour.51 If Locke’s argument that 
mixing labour with the property of another does not give the labourer property is 
accepted, why then should the first labourer obtain rights superior to the common 
rights held by all?52 For Mill, property comprised the rights to things that human 
beings produce by their own labour because those who are excluded have not lost 
anything if they cannot share in a thing that otherwise would not have existed at all. 
Thus, no property right in the entire human body could exist, since the body is not a 
product of human labour, but, as has been argued, body parts are created through the 
mental and physical endeavours of sources and their agents. 
 
 Bodies contain the elements of individual identity and as each person’s 
individuality is that person’s property, the embodiment of that identity in their body 
parts must also be their property. Thus, the labour theory does not justify finding 
property in body parts as a consequence of an individual’s labour, but as a result of 
the initial theoretical assumption of property in the person.53  
 
E Social Utility Theory 
 
 Social utility theory justifies the legal protection of property because property 
promotes the maximum fulfilment of human happiness.54 Society as a whole benefits 
from encouraging individuals to capture unutilised resources and improve them for 
more efficient use and, as protection of property interests maximises social welfare, 
the individual’s claim to the created object must be protected against others who 
assert a claim to it. Utilitarianism counters natural rights theory and argues that 
property rights exist only because human behaviour and laws create and grant them. 
Thus, while early natural rights theorists assumed that property rights exist in the 
human body, utilitarians denied this right. 
 
 The two major strands of social utility theory are the traditional utility 
argument, which defines happiness broadly to include the entire spectrum of human 
needs and aspirations and the economic argument, which defines happiness as that 
which can be obtained through market transactions.55 The focus of both is on society 
as a whole, not on the individual, since the goal of each strand is to maximise social 
welfare. This theory only protects property interests to the extent that they promote 
overall social welfare, so it is contrary to the natural rights perspective, as social 
utility theory does not accept the prospect of individual interests trumping the 
common good.56  
  
1  Traditional Utility Theory  
                                                 
50 Becker, above, 35. 
51 Robert Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974) 174—175. 
52 Jeremy Waldron The Right to Private Property (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990) 189—
190. 
53 Robert Nozick Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basil Blackwell Oxford, 1974) 206— 207.                                                            
54 Alan Ryan Property (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987) 54. 
55 Lawrence C Becker Property Rights (Routledge &Keegan Paul, London 1977) 57. 
56 Ryan, above, 53. 
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This theory assumes that attaining human happiness is desirable and the 
maximisation of human happiness across society should govern the outcome of all 
individual and societal choices.57 In addition, each incident must individually 
contribute to societal welfare.58  
 
 In Moore59 George J placed the various “competing interests” on the 
appropriate sides of the property interest question and concluded that Moore’s 
interests did not promote the common good and that the interests of the public would 
maximise societal welfare. This analysis has the advantage of flexibility, but that is 
also a weakness, as it results in uncertain outcomes and may justify either radical 
change or the status quo.60 The utilitarian perspective often determines the outcome of 
the required balancing and the result depends not on the nature of the property 
interest, but on its perceived impact on society. 
 
Moore suggests the format of a utilitarian analysis of enforceable property 
interests in body parts, but not the likely outcome. On the one side, the utilitarian 
would identify the source’s interests in autonomous decision making, control and 
economic interests. On the other side would be the interests of medical researchers 
and the interests of society in maintaining public health. The outcome of weighing 
these interests against each other will depend on the court’s view of the consequences 
of recognising a   property interest. Consequently, the traditional utility theory cannot 
predict the acceptance of property interests in body parts without some knowledge of 
the perspective of the utilitarian performing the balancing test. 
 
2  The Economic Utility Theory  
 
This unpredictability led to the development of a utility theory based on 
economic concepts.61 The economic utility theory justifies the protection of property 
interests as a means of creating incentives for the efficient use of resources.62 
Economic utility theory is a variant of the traditional utility theory, in that social 
welfare is narrowly defined as only that obtainable through market transactions. 
 
 This theory assumes that all market participants are rational maximisers of 
their own economic satisfactions and does not contemplate irrational or inefficient 
decisions.63 The economic utility theory generally ignores justice and other 
unmeasurable normative principles. Under the economic utility theory, any result is 
acceptable, irrespective of the motives of the participants or the consequences of the 
transactions.  
 
 The economic utility theory of property would recognise a source’s property 
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63 Becker, above, 70. 
 17
interest in body parts, if the parts have an inherent value in the marketplace. Clearly, 
body parts have value to researchers, recipients and sources. Under the economic 
utility theory, any valuable object will be more efficiently distributed through a series 
of voluntary market transactions than through other allocation systems. Thus, body 
parts should be exchangeable through the free market. 
 
 Since they will be available to market participants, they must be owned 
initially by someone. The original owner should be the individual whose body is the 
source of the parts and so has possession of them and is able to control their transfer 
to others. The source’s property interests must be transferable, to allow the source to 
make the most efficient productive use of the resource.64 Therefore, if body parts are 
a valuable resource, the property interests should be protected in order to create 
economic incentives for market participants to use the resources efficiently. Restraints 
on alienation would resolve the problem of unauthorised use.65
 
F Application of Theories of Property Justification 
 
 The following section will consider how some commentators have applied 
property theory to body parts, to demonstrate the complexity of this issue. For 
example, Narveson argues that to be free to do something means to be free to use 
what one owns and, because he argues further that all rights are freedom rights, it is 
plausible to argue that all rights are property rights.66 Clearly, if such a broad 
definition of property is adopted, it will be easier to justify an item as property than if 
a definition is used such as that proposed by Honoré. 
 
1  Gaus 
 
 Gaus suggests a “core” definition of property would be that for a person to 
have unimpaired ownership rights over something that person must have at least the 
following rights: 
 
•  Right of use; 
•  Right of exclusion; 
•  Right of transfer; 
• Right to compensation.67
 
He argues that when liberal theorists claim that people own their bodies, their 
claim is “attenuated” unless these four conditions apply to their relations to their 
bodies. This is because they apply to those things that liberals most characteristically 
claim to be property. He states that the right of transfer distinguishes property rights 
from rights to bodily integrity and the claim that persons own their bodies is 
controversial because it is not generally accepted that persons may permanently 
transfer rights over their own bodies to others. However, that argument is less 
convincing when considering extracorporeal body parts, as these are commonly 
transferred to others, for example, in living organ donation. 
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In contrast to the approach that attempts to identify an essence of property as a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be property, other 
commentators, such as Thompson, argue that “ownership is really no more than a 
cluster of claims, privileges and powers.”68  If a person has rights over a thing that 
sufficiently resemble rights that people have over things commonly recognised as 
property, then there is no harm in considering those rights to be property rights. This 
view leads to the concept of property as a shifting bundle of rights, because not 
everything that someone will consider to be sufficiently like core instances of 
property will have the same characteristics and there may be variations in the notion 
of core instances.  
 
2 Munzer 
 
Munzer argues that there are three main principles for justifying property.69 
These are a principle of utility and efficiency, a principle of justice and equality, and a 
principle of desert, based on labour. The theory is pluralist in the sense that the 
principles are irreducible and sometimes conflict. He states that when conflicts occur, 
priority rules can resolve most, but not all, conflicts. The principle of utility and 
efficiency requires that property rights should be allocated so as to maximise utility 
and efficiency. The principle of justice and equality provides that unequal property 
holdings are justifiable if: 
 
•  Everyone has a minimum amount of property; and  
•  The inequalities do not undermine a fully human life in society.  
 
 He argues that this principle is a standard of justice, as it morally regulates the 
sharing of benefits and burdens among persons and also a standard of equality as, if 
persons have different property holdings, it must be shown why the difference is 
morally and politically acceptable. The theory includes a principle of desert or 
entitlement, which rests on a conception of persons as agents who, by their actions in 
the world, are responsible for changes in it and so deserve or are entitled to a fitting 
recompense or response. Whereas the first two principles emphasise, in different 
ways, the equal worth of persons, this final principle focuses on differences in merit. 
 
           The labour-desert principle maintains that a person’s work gives a qualified 
justification for private property rights. This justification of property rights for the 
labourer is qualified by the rights of others, limitations on the process of acquisition, 
post-acquisition changes in situation, restrictions on transfer, general scarcity, and the 
nature of work as a social activity.   The principle of justice and equality involves the 
idea that persons have rights not to have certain of their interests traded for overall 
utility. This principle therefore differs from the idea, latent in the principle of utility 
and efficiency, that equal moral worth is just counting persons equally. Equal 
counting is compatible with sacrificing the individual utility of some to promote 
overall utility, and any such sacrifice ignores or undervalues the separateness of 
persons. Munzer argues that as body parts are potentially a highly valuable medical 
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resource, they should not be allowed to go to waste. One way to prevent such wastage 
is to establish and protect property rights in them.70
 
3  Reed 
 
It is possible to define property as a negative right, the right of exclusion as 
applied to limited resources. Reed argues that property is the constitutional and legal 
right to exclude others from specifiable limited resources originally possessed or 
acquired without coercion, deception, or theft.71 According to his definition, property 
has several characteristics. They are that it is:  
 
•  a constitutional right;  
•  recognised and enforced by the laws of the state;  
•  a right that excludes others from specifiable limited resources; and  
•  originally possessed or acquired without coercion, theft, or deception.  
 
If it is accepted that property interests protect the resources that are 
“appropriately” exclusive to an individual, which are those that are originally 
possessed or acquired without coercing, stealing from or deceiving others, then the 
relationship indicated by property is one not only between individuals, but also 
between the individual and the state. Although property in particular resources 
depends upon values prior to law and arises out of informal ways of ordering, there 
would be no need for the state to enforce property if people always respected the 
resources held by  others. In this sense property establishes and preserves social order 
and encourages resource development, by protecting private resources acquired 
without coercion, theft, or deception from the predations of others in the general 
community.  
 
Reed stated that: “at the very heart of property lies its singular conceptual 
core, which is the private right of exclusion.”72 This means that the owner can 
exclude others from the resource owned and that others have a duty not to infringe 
this right. Thus, the positive “bundle” of rights like possession, use and alienation can 
all be derived from the negative exclusionary right. For example, if owners can 
legally exclude others from interfering with the resources of their land, they can 
possess the land, use it in a myriad of ways that leave an equal right in others to use 
their resources, or transfer it through sale, lease, or gift to others. 
 
He argues that people who argue against the “commodification” of certain 
resources, such as objecting to the selling and buying of particular aspects of the 
body, are not rejecting the definition of property, only property’s application to 
specific resources. According to these views, property still exists in body parts and 
human services in the sense that the owner can partially exclude others from them, but 
the property right has been weakened, in that the owners of these resources are no 
longer able to exclude others from interfering with the exchange of these resources in 
the private market. Thus, the objections to property in the exchange of these resources 
are moral, rather than definitional. 
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From this he argued that individuals own themselves, such self ownership 
being acquired through original possession and constituting the central organising 
principle behind most human rights. Reed argues: “From the beginning, individuals 
own their faculties and the expressions of these resources in all activities of life that 
do not harm others.”73  
 
 However, Mossoff disagrees with the exclusion thesis. He maintains that 
exclusion is merely “the formal means by which Anglo-American legal rules identify 
and protect the substantive core of rights that constitute property”, which he identifies 
as “the rights of acquisition, use, and disposal.”74
 
4 Gold 
 
Gold states that property rights are rights that members of society have against 
each other, and when property rights are granted, this is on the basis of one or more 
ways of valuing the object or the individual to whom the rights are granted.75 He 
states that property discourse is based on the assumption that things that are property 
are best allocated through the market. As property is premised on encouraging 
economic value, it is not possible to translate other non-economic values into a money 
price and thus allocate rights of control of body parts through a ranking of these 
translated money prices.76 The status quo, whereby researchers are able to obtain 
patent rights in human tissues while the sources receive no compensation is 
unacceptable, so he proposes a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the rights 
and duties of the various participants, which would incorporate economic and non-
economic values. Such a scheme would exclude the application of property law, 
including patent law, to human biological materials.77  
 
Gold does not explain how such a scheme would operate in practical terms. 
In most cases, it is not the biological materials that are patented, but some 
development from them (such as a cell line), or some invention (such as a genetic 
test or treatment).78 The biomedical industry is premised on free market principles, 
thus, implementation of Gold’s proposal favouring the creation of a non-profit, non-
governmental organisation to control valuable tissue would be difficult to implement 
and would have to be globally adopted.79  
 
5 Radin 
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Radin argues a personhood analysis of property, based on Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right.80 Hegel viewed property as “the embodiment of personality”, the means by 
which people express their wills in the world.81 Radin argues that property is 
protected, not as a means of expressing personality, but because it is part of a 
person’s identity and personality.82 Those aspects, attributes, and qualities of the 
human person that are so qualitatively vital to the concept of human identity as to be 
quintessentially “human” should never receive property status.  
 
Crucial to Radin’s thesis is the notion of separability: “[t]o conceive of 
something personal as fungible assumes that the person and the attribute, right, or 
thing, are separate.”83 She contends that the law should recognise property rights in 
things to which the person is connected. The strength of the connection is assessed 
by the effect of loss of the object. Property is on a continuum between personal and 
fungible, reflecting varying levels of connection between person and object.  
 
Although Radin did not directly address the issue of whether the human body 
is property under this “personhood” paradigm, she appreciated that all body parts 
could be esteemed as so “integral to the [human] self that they are essentially distinct 
from vulgar, fungible market commodities.”84 To view a human organ, which likely 
would be deemed as truly personal to human self and identity, as “monetizable or 
completely detachable from the person . . . is to do violence to our deepest 
understanding of what it is to be human.”85 To separate the human person from the 
body, risks viewing all other people as objects, able to be owned as personal 
property. 
 
  She further developed the concept of separability within the context of 
alienability. Following Hegel, she defined alienation as “the separation of something 
. . . from its holder.” 86 Applying that model to the human person, she argued that 
only those things inherently separate from the human self can be alienated from it.87  
 
  Radin argued that certain things are market-inalienable, meaning that they 
can never be transferred by contract for sale in exchange for valuable 
consideration,88 although non-saleability does not prohibit donative transfers.89  If 
the human body is treated as an article of commerce, it would eventually lead to the 
human body itself being thought of as a fungible commodity.90 “By making 
something nonsalable we proclaim that it should not be conceived of or treated as a 
commodity.”91 Thus, no rights, attributes or things intrinsically unique to the human 
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person should be commodified.92 Non-commodification of the human body can be 
achieved by deeming it and its composite parts market-inalienable. 
 
  Radin states: “If the body is property, then objectively it is property for 
personhood.”93 Thus, it is entitled to the highest entitlement under the law. She 
considers the existence or not of a property right in body parts is a paradox. They 
might become fungible commodities, but “on the other hand bodily parts may be too 
“personal” to be property at all.”94 In this context she refers to the parts prior to 
excision from the entire body. She suggests: 95
 
We have an intuition that property necessarily refers to something in the outside 
world, separate from oneself….This intuition makes it seem appropriate to call 
parts of the body property only after they have been removed from the system. 
  
The conclusion from her personhood analysis seems inevitably to be that it is 
reasonable and necessary to allow sources’ property rights in excised body parts, 
because our bodies are integral to our identity and sense of being. Such property 
rights are closely connected with personhood and should be protected from 
interference by others.   
 
6 Beyleveld and Brownsword  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword argue: 96
 
We suggest that a right to exclusive use of an object is necessary and sufficient 
to characterize property rights substantively, and that the essential function of a 
justification on the basis of a property right is to justify a right to exclusive use 
in a characteristic way. 
 
They argue that, rather than a bundle of rights approach, the general 
conception of property with regard to body parts is that persons own their bodies 
according to a “rule-preclusionary” conception of property.97 The claim that a person 
owns an object is a claim that the person has the right to use the object in any 
legitimate way and to exclude others from using it, because the person stands in a 
relation to the item that precludes that person having to account on a case-by-case 
basis for the rights to use it and to exclude others from using it. Thus, property rights 
are prima facie rights and, if there are reasons that another may use the item that 
outweigh the person’s interest, then the person will not be permitted to control the 
use of the item. This does not mean that the item is not the person’s property- just 
that the property right is overridden.  
 
Confiscation, which removes the property right, must be distinguished from 
legitimate removal of control from the property owner, which does not remove the 
property right. This would be the case if there was a prohibition of the right to 
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exercise the property right, which is justified on the basis that, in the circumstances, 
such exercise would conflict with the more important rights of others. Essentially, 
this is asserting that if property rights over body parts do not exist, there will, as a 
general rule, not be adequate protection for specific rights. 
 
 They argue that if the living body and attached body parts cannot be the 
source’s property, then nothing else can be.98 From this they deduce that it does not 
follow automatically that excised body parts are the source’s property, because it 
does not follow that anything else can be the person’s property. To justify that 
anything else can be property, it must be established that other things stand in the 
same relation to the source as the living body. They assert  that excised body parts 
have a varying level of importance for the self-agency of the source, yet those 
differences do not affect the conclusion that sources should be granted a degree of 
rule-preclusionary control over them, proportional to the degree of seriousness of the 
claims of others required to override the control of the source. 
 
They support the views of Gewirth, who provides two arguments for property 
rights: 
 
•  A consequentialist argument that such rights protect both the well-being and 
the freedom that are needed for purposive action and generally successful 
action.99 A person can claim as private property those things over which it is 
necessary to have control, in order to protect that person’s generic rights. 
However, this construct does not distinguish between the amounts of property 
that different persons should have or determine whether work in producing 
items should place the producer in a privileged position. 
 
•  An antecedentalist argument deals with these issues by referring to 
circumstances prior to distribution, suggesting that property rights belong to 
the persons who produced the objects, in order to prevent exploitation and to 
protect generic rights.100
 
Gewirth’s approach results in body parts attached to the person being 
property, because to deprive the source of them affects generically the person’s 
capacity to act (or act successfully) and so, deprivation without agreement violates 
the person’s generic rights. Thus the person should have autonomous control unless 
the use violates the rights of others, or violates human dignity.  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that to grant the source rule-preclusionary 
control over body parts best protects the source. It is necessary to avoid the 
undesirable situation where others would have a right to use the body parts if that use 
was not specifically harmful to the source, and the source would have to justify any 
objection.101 They argue that the body is vital to personal interests and subject to 
personal cultural or emotional significances.102 Rule-preclusionary control should 
also be granted to excised parts and body parts after death. Although use of the 
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corpse cannot be to the detriment of the bodily integrity of the deceased, various uses 
may offend the personal integrity of living persons, so persons must be able to 
dictate legitimate uses of their body parts after removal, or death. The benefits of 
generic rights may be waived, but the generic rights themselves may not be, so a 
person cannot surrender the right to exclusive use of their body while alive.103 Thus, 
consent should be required both for removal of body parts and their subsequent use, 
even if there is no known specific promotion of, or threat to, the source’s interests.104
 
G Property in Intact Bodies 
 
Property rights and human persons first arose in the context of slavery, 
whereby slaves were considered to be chattels and not legal persons.105 Subsequent 
to Sommersett’s Case,106 it was held that habeas corpus meant that a slave being 
stored in England should be set free. Consequently, a living person could not be 
considered property.  
 
Ruth Chadwick states, with respect to intact human bodies:107
 
[A]lthough there is a sense in which persons do own their bodies, this is not the 
same as the sense in which they own tables and chairs. There is so great a 
difference between our bodies and other material objects that it is just a mistake to 
apply the institution of property, with what that is normally taken to imply for 
rights of transfer and sale, to the body. For my body is not simply ‘mine’: it is in 
some sense ‘me’.  
 
 The issue of property rights or ownership of the body, prior to any severance 
of body parts from the living body, is of little practical significance, other than as an 
addition to existing personal rights.108 A person’s intact body forms part of that 
person’s personal interests, which are principally protected through rights of self-
determination and respect.  
 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada questioned: 109
 
Why, then, should bodies not be regarded as ordinary property? An important 
answer may be that notions of bodily property do violence to our concepts of 
personal autonomy and human dignity. Property is traditionally associated with 
things, not with the human body. To equate the body with a thing is to 
dehumanise human existence; in the extreme, it suggests the repulsive notion 
that human beings may be owned. This answer hinges in a thing-person dualism, 
and an inference that human body parts are reflective of our notion of self. 
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This thesis does not argue that the entire living body is property, but argues 
that this does not necessarily imply that excised parts of it may not be property. As 
Grubb argues:110
 
Not only does no one else own my body, neither do I. Legal conceptions of 
“property” do not extend to ownership of another or self-ownership. This is 
not to say a person cannot assert property interests in parts or tissue that were 
part of his body or that property interests cannot be claimed over a dead body 
or its parts. 
 
H Property in Body Parts 
 
This thesis is based on the notion that property rights are only contingently 
connected to persons and are not intrinsic aspects of them.111 Thus, for an object to 
be the subject matter of property, a human subject must be separate from it. 
Consequently, body parts are theoretically capable of being characterised as things, 
because once excised they can be considered to be contingent material 
possessions.112
 
The argument for treating excised body parts as property is particularly 
convincing when human sources are alive and have interests in their excised body 
parts. It would allow individuals to bring claims to protect their interests in stolen or 
misappropriated body parts, as theft is generally only possible if someone has 
property in the item taken.113  
 
In some jurisdictions, renewable body parts can be the subject of ownership. 
Blood is commonly sold in America114 and is deemed to be full-fledged property – a 
“product” whose sale constituted “income” under the tax code, while the “business 
expenses” incurred by the seller in creating this “product” are deductible for the 
purposes of tax.115 There has been recognition of property in hair, urine and bone 
marrow. In New Zealand, the sale of blood and blood products is prohibited,116 as is 
the sale of gametes and embryos.117  
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In Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc,118 the plaintiff was the 
intended recipient of a kidney, which had been implanted into another. He sued the 
state organ donor network for fraud, conversion and violations of the New York 
Public Health Law. Sack J held that: “there is by no means a modern consensus that 
body parts are excluded from conversion actions at common law.”119 He added that 
even if public policy prohibited the sale of organs, this:120
 
…..does not necessarily imply that it also intends that no one can acquire a 
property right in them. It does not follow from a law that forbids the sale of a 
functioning human kidney, that a third party may with impunity take the organ 
against the express wishes of a potential donor and potential donee.  
 
This thesis suggests a legislative framework that would allow the sources of 
extracorporeal body parts to have property rights, as a basis for handling evolving 
issues regarding retention, use and control. At the point of transplantation into a 
recipient, property rights would cease to exist in either the human source or any other 
person and, as the organ becomes part of the recipient, it is included in that person’s 
personal rights. Thus, if a living donor’s kidney was transplanted into the incorrect 
recipient, the donor would be unable to recover the kidney, but would still have an 
action against the hospital or medical professional at fault.121  
 
PART II 
 
Although the common law has been reluctant to recognise property rights in 
body parts, it has for many years provided legal protection to protect invasions of the 
human body. This section will consider human rights, particularly the right to bodily 
integrity, which is grounded in notions of autonomy and human dignity, to determine 
whether the protections of that right are sufficient to enable the source to control the 
collection, retention, use and commercialisation of body parts. 
 
 
I AUTONOMY 
The right to bodily integrity derives from the concept of autonomy, which is 
generally expressed as the capacity of individuals to act independently. Autonomy is 
also linked to the concept of human dignity.122 The recognition of human dignity as a 
fundamental right is expressed in a number of international instruments.123 It is an 
imprecise concept that has not been developed greatly in English law,124 but this 
thesis considers autonomy as an aspect of the broader concept of human dignity.125 
                                                 
118 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc (2006) 438 F 3d 214; 2006 US app LEXIS 4309 
(US App Ct) Sack J. 
119 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc, above, 28. 
120 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc, above, 32—33. 
121 Such action might arise in negligence. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, difficulties could 
arise in assessing the quantum of damages. However, in jurisdictions where claims arise for personal 
injury, such assessment is common. 
122 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309 (HL) 349, Lord Millett. 
123 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations signed June 26 1945 USTS 993; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A (III); UNESCO Universal 
Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights Paris 24 June 2005 SHS/EST/05/CONF.204/3 REV. 
124 D Feldman “Human dignity as a Legal Value—Part I” [1999] Public Law 682, 682. 
125 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL) 114, Lord Millett. 
 27
Autonomy is often conflated with self-ownership. However self-ownership is a 
proprietary concept, whereas autonomy is not.   
 
The law protects a person’s right to act independently by way of the doctrine 
of informed consent. Although some commentators argue that this is sufficient 
protection of human rights, it will be argued that informed consent alone is not 
sufficiently powerful to ensure the protection of the rights of human sources. 
 
Consent is based on the idea that it is not the proper role of the State to 
interfere in what is done (or not done) consensually to a person, especially if there is 
no harm to others, because an individual is an autonomous being. In certain 
circumstances, the State has a role to intervene to protect and promote superior moral 
interests, but, if no public interest exists condemning the particular action, the primary 
ethical issue has come to be seen to be whether the competent human source of 
biological materials has given informed consent.  
 
Thus, autonomy has come to be equated with informed consent. However, this 
assumption is misleading as, in most cases, consent amounts to either a “yes” or “no” 
decision, whereas an autonomous decision may be much more complex and involve 
conditions or limitations. The modern developments in medical research and the 
potential benefits from utilisation of samples held in biobanks suggest that informed 
consent alone may be insufficient to determine the resulting complex ethical 
issues.126  
A  Principlism 
 
The development of medical ethics had four overlapping periods.127 The first 
was a long period in which the Hippocratic tradition was accepted, having been 
enriched over centuries by contact with the Stoics and with religious traditions. This 
period continued until the mid-twentieth century. The second period, beginning in the 
mid-1960s, was marked by philosophical inquiry and principle-based moral theories 
began to vary the Hippocratic ethic.  In the mid-1960s there was a general upheaval in 
moral values as a result of a series of societal changes. 
 
The third period, in the late twentieth century, was one of challenge to the 
ideas of principlism, with competing moral theories challenging the primacy of 
principles. The fourth period, still continuing, is one in which conceptual conflicts in 
ethics and the scepticism of moral philosophy challenge the very idea of a universal, 
normative ethic for medicine. 
 
The theory of prima facie principles, developed by Ross, became the dominant 
approach to ethics.128 Ross listed several moral principles and stated that, if the 
principles were in conflict, the greatest duty must be found by balancing right and 
wrong in that particular context. He distinguished between prima facie duties and 
                                                 
126 See the discussion of informed consent below. See also:  Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use 
of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research Purposes Discussion Document (Ministry of Health, 
Wellington, 2006). 
127 Edmund D Pellegrino “The Metamorphosis of Medical Ethics: A 30-year Retrospective” (1993) 269 
JAMA 1158. 
128 William David Ross The Right and the Good (Hackett Publishing Co Inc, Indiana, 1988) 19. 
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actual duties. A prima facie duty is one always to be acted upon unless it conflicts on 
a particular occasion with an equal or stronger duty. It is always right and binding, all 
other things being equal. An actual duty is determined by balancing the respective 
weights of the competing prima facie duties.  
 
This approach was adapted to medical ethics by Beauchamp and Childress.129 
They recognised the difficulties of attaining agreement on the most fundamental 
questions of ethics, such as the nature of the good, the ultimate sources of morality, 
and the epistemological status of moral knowledge. To bypass these problems, they 
followed Ross and turned to principles that, on face value, should always be 
respected, unless some strong countervailing reason exists to justify overruling them. 
In this prima facie category, they choose principles especially appropriate for medical 
ethics- autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. 
 
B Criticisms of Principlism 
 
Principlism lacks explicit decision rules for when the principles conflict, but it 
does have the advantage that the principles can be accepted by health professionals 
and be compatible with their underlying, or overarching, moral, religious, political or 
philosophical theories. Adapting the principles to a particular theory of health-care 
ethics requires culture-specific interpretation, specification and harmonisation when 
the principles conflict.    
 
Criticisms of the four principles include that principles are too abstract, too 
rationalistic, and too removed from the psychological milieu in which moral choices 
are actually made. Additionally, they ignore a person’s character, life story, cultural 
background and gender. They imply a technical perfection in moral decisions that is 
frustrated by the psychological uniqueness of each person or action. Commentators 
have suggested various remedies to replace, complement, or supplement prima facie 
principles. These include Engelhardt, who places autonomy in the first order of 
priority, ahead of beneficence,130 and Pellegrino and Thomasma, who favour 
beneficence-in-trust.131 Additional alternatives or supplements to principle-based 
theories include an ethic based in virtue, caring, “experience,” or a return to 
theological and biblical sources as the only reliable grounding for medical morals. 
 
Conventional ethical frameworks, such as principlism, seem inadequate to 
meet the normative challenges posed by human tissue collections. Informed consent 
has limitations when material is retained for future unspecified research purposes.132 
The fact that an individual has given consent does not give that person any control; 
rather, it assigns control to others. 
.  
II PROPERTY INTERESTS 
                                                 
129 T L Beauchamp, J F Childress  Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2ed, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1983). 
130 H T Engelhardt  The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986); H T 
Engelhardt and M A  Rie  “Morality for the Medical-Industrial Complex: A Code of Ethics for the 
Mass Marketing of Health Care”(1988) 319 N Engl J Med 1086. 
131 Edmund D Pellegrino and David C Thomasma For the Patient’s Good: The Restoration of 
Beneficence in Health Care (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988). 
132 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
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  Commentators have argued for and against the recognition of property 
interests in body parts. In this section, common argument are explored and discussed 
as an introduction to the arguments that will be further explored throughout the 
thesis.  
 
A Policy Arguments 
 
This thesis argues that the concepts of informed consent and breach of 
fiduciary duty relied on in Moore133 are insufficient, because they are limited to the 
doctor—patient relationship. In Moore,134 Mosk J argued that the law should, at 
least, recognise:135
 
…[Moore’s] right to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it: 
i.e., he could have contracted with researchers and pharmaceutical companies to 
develop and exploit the vast commercial potential of his tissue and its products.  
 
This reflects a view that the persons contributing biological materials should share in 
the rewards resulting from their contributions.136
 
An advantage of property rights is that they can be asserted not only against 
the original recipient of the material, but also against any subsequent users who did 
not have a relationship with the source by way of contract or informed consent. 
Privacy, informed consent or fiduciary interests would be likely to result in low rates 
of compensatory or punitive damages, which would be insufficient to deter misuse, 
whereas property rights would provide for remedies such as an action for the return 
or destruction of the samples, injunctive relief or damages. Gitter argues that without 
a property interest “research participants will be left without a remedy, because the 
harm they suffered affected not their medical interests but rather their dignity and 
autonomy.”137
 
A further policy argument relates to equity and justice, in that the sources’ 
role in research is indispensable and it is only fair that they should share in the profits 
to some extent- just as suppliers of other materials are normally paid.  
 
A contrary argument is that individuals should not profit from their natural 
endowments, such as Moore’s valuable spleen, but only from the benefits resulting 
from voluntary choices. However, as people are able to freely exploit their beauty, 
athletic ability, or intelligence, such an argument does not justify denying benefits to 
contributors of tissue samples for research.  
 
                                                 
133Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479 (Sup Ct Cal). See the 
discussion in chapter 3. 
134 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479 (Sup Ct Cal). 
135Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 510 Mosk J. 
136 This argument suggests a property interest which is subject to the contract. See the discussion of 
PXE International in chapter 3. 
137 D M Gitter “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research 
Participants’ Rights in their Biological Material” (2004) 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 296. 
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Researchers contribute labour and inventiveness, which are argued to be more 
deserving of reward than mere contributions.138 However, this thesis argues that all 
participants should be involved in decisions affecting ownership, access to and use of 
commercialised products and services. Merz argues that this is best achieved by 
negotiated arrangements with patient groups and that, in the case of individual 
participants, researchers and institutional review boards should compensate 
individuals, as a matter of equity. They argue that this is achievable without a need 
for property or other rights, but just because “it is the right thing to do.”139 However, 
this thesis argues that the need to control the use of body parts and have remedies for 
breaches necessitates a legal framework.  
 
It may be more difficult to provide an individual with a share of the profits 
than if researchers work with a patient advocacy group.140 Clearly, demands must be 
reasonable in relation to the contributions, the likely benefits and the risks. If a 
contribution-based formula was adopted, the inventor would receive the major share 
of the profits. Sources may prefer to influence access, pricing, ownership and control 
of products and treatments, rather than receive payment.  
 
Harrison claims that neither the necessary public debate nor fully informed 
individual choice is possible, if most contributors are unaware that their tissue might 
be used to generate profit.141 She suggests that the calculation of compensation 
should be based on the material’s relative scientific and commercial utility in 
research and development.142 Thus, Moore would have a strong case for 
compensation, because his contribution was indispensable for the discovery, whereas 
the Canavan families would have a lesser claim because their biological 
contributions were aggregated with many other samples with similar characteristics, 
and so their reward should be the collective or public benefit derived from the 
availability of new diagnostic tests or healthcare treatments.143  
 
These arguments suggest an apportionment of the benefits between the 
sources and the inventor is justifiable, with the greater proportion available to the 
party providing the intellectual input.144  
 
B  Control 
 
As already discussed, a personal property paradigm would operate in tandem 
with existing laws relating to autonomy, confidentiality and privacy. Property 
interests add to these the ability to empower individuals and communities and 
provide ongoing control and thus, moral and legal influence over body parts. 
Members of the Native American Havasupai Tribe claimed they felt violated and 
stigmatised after supplying samples for diabetes research and then having scientists 
                                                 
138 K Berg “The Ethics of Benefit Sharing” (2001) 59 Clinical Genetics 240, 240. 
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141 Charlotte H Harrison “Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating 
Contributors of Human Tissue” (2002) 28 Am j law med 77, 82. 
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use them without consent to study schizophrenia and inbreeding.145 Such interests 
can be harmed by research uses, even if the samples are anonymised. An example is 
Māori beliefs about harm from disruption of whakapapa,146 which could arise 
independent of any knowledge of the breach.  Further concerns are the replication of 
cell lines for a prolonged period, and the inability to be fully informed about future 
unspecified research. A property approach allows the enforcement of restrictions on 
the type or extent of future use, which is one of the major problems of the current 
consent-based approach to the use of samples.147
 
  In Washington University v Catalona,148 Limbaugh J appeared to accept that 
sources either unconditionally gift materials to researchers, or the researcher obtains 
a property right over the tissue by entering  into contractual arrangements, which 
may allow for conditional use. It was argued that patients would be unlikely to allow 
the use of their tissue if they had no control over how it might be used and no right to 
withdraw it.149
 
C  Public Trust 
 
Public trust in doctors and researchers is essential to ensure ongoing 
participation in donation and research. The Medical Research Council found 
evidence of public cynicism towards the medical profession, although most people 
thought research was worthy and worthwhile.150 The perception that others are 
making unjust profits may result in reluctance to provide tissue. This mistrust may 
then extend to the therapeutic setting.151 Thus, it is important that the public are 
provided with a clear and justifiable explanation of the uses of donated tissue and the 
allocation of any significant benefits.  
 
Cain argues that recognising property rights in human biological materials 
may diminish the fear that people feel when considering advancing biotechnology, 
because the property construct can mediate disputes over human biological 
materials.152 Consequently, she states that property rights would encourage organ 
donation, assure greater personal autonomy, diminish the international market in 
human body parts and diminish fears of the commodification of the human body.153  
 
She asserts that if the public perceive that they are being exploited, the doctor- 
patient relationship will be damaged to a point where donations will reduce. Incidents 
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such as the “unfortunate experiment” at National Women’s Hospital154 and the 
Greenlane Hospital heart library155 have contributed to mistrust of researchers in New 
Zealand. Despite this, there is strong support for measures to improve human health 
and reduce suffering.156
 
D  Informed Consent 
 
Autonomy is a notable value in the context of medical treatment, as from it 
flow the interests in self determination and bodily integrity, which in turn lie behind 
the moral and legal rights to consent to and refuse medical treatment. The right to 
self-determination encompasses more than just a narrow interest in bodily integrity, as 
it includes a broader dignitary interest in the person’s own body and extra corporeal 
body parts. This supports the contention that individuals should have the right to 
control excised tissues and cells. Informed consent was derived from malpractice 
cases involving non-consensual touching of the body. If a patient had not authorised 
treatment, or a doctor had performed treatment substantially different from that 
consented to, the patient had a cause of action for the tort of battery.  
 
Consent is the dominant ethical concept in the Code157 and it requires 
disclosure and comprehension of information. The consent must be voluntary and the 
person consenting must be competent. Informed consent makes it possible for people 
to choose autonomously, but it does not guarantee or require that they do so. 
Consequently, it often amounts to no more than the right to choose or refuse 
procedures on offer, and the corresponding obligation on the medical professional not 
to proceed without consent.  
 
Informed consent generally presupposes that consenting people are “in the 
maturity of their faculties”,158 but their ability to give informed consent may be 
impaired if they are ill or stressed by decision making on behalf of another. As stated 
by O’Neill:159  
 
These arise because informed consent is always given to one or another 
description of a proposal for treatment. Consent is a propositional attitude: it has 
as its object not a procedure or treatment, but rather one or another proposition 
containing a description of the intended procedure or treatment. 
Informed consent can be superficial, related to the actual descriptions used, 
without comprehension of the consequences. Full disclosure of information is often 
practically unachievable and, even if it is attempted, it is unlikely that it would be 
                                                 
154 Sylvia Cartwright The Report of the Cervical Cancer Inquiry (Government Printing Office, 
Auckland, 1988). 
155 D Gareth Jones and Kerry A Galvin “Retention of Body Parts: Reflections From Anatomy” 2, 2 
<http://anatomy.otago.ac.nz > (last accessed 21 April 2005); D Skegg “The Removal and Retention of 
Cadaveric Body Parts: Does the Law Require Parental Consent?” (2000) 10 Otago L Rev 425, 425. See 
also the discussion in chapter 2. 
156 Toi te Taiao The Bioethics Council The Cultural, Ethical and Spiritual Aspects of Animal-to-Human 
Transplantation (Bioethics Council, Wellington, 2005) 27. 
157 Health and Disability Commissioner’s Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
<http://www.hdc.org.nz> (last accessed 1 March 2006). Right 6 is the Right to be Fully Informed and 
Right 7 is the Right to Make an Informed Choice and Give Informed Consent.  
158 Mill On Liberty as referred to in Onora O’Neill Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, The Gifford 
Lectures University of Edinburgh, 2001 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 43. 
159 O’Neill, above, 43 (emphasis in the original). 
 33
fully understood. With the development of new biotechnologies, such as reproductive 
and genetic technologies, new choices and wider ranges of choices are probable, 
although not necessarily matched by greater cognitive involvement in consent. 
 
Despite these issues, it is commonly accepted that people undergoing medical 
treatment should give informed consent. Such treatment often involves the collection 
of biological material. If the material is destroyed after the treatment, it could be 
argued that destruction was included implicitly in the consent to undergo the 
procedure. If the material is stored and later used in research, it could be argued that a 
donation takes effect when there is a transfer of property coupled with an intention, 
often implied, to make the gift. An alternative construct is that the material has been 
abandoned and, consequently, property passes to the researcher or hospital authority 
who obtains possession of it. In either case, the patient has no further interest in it. 
 
However, consent to medical treatment does not, in itself, imply consent to 
further research uses of such material. It is true that most people do not expect the 
return of such material.160 Despite this, they may oppose research use because of 
objections that others might profit from their tissues and cells, or because of ethical or 
cultural concerns about the type of research.  
 
1 Bodily integrity 
 
English law has for many years recognised that everyone has a right to bodily 
integrity – the right to exclusive possession and use of their own bodies as against 
everyone else.  This right derives from the concept of autonomy, which in turn is 
closely linked to human dignity.161  
 
In medical law, bodily integrity is the means to protect autonomy and is 
protected by the torts of trespass to the person or negligence.162 Informed consent is 
premised on the right to self-determination, a right that has been interpreted narrowly 
as resting solely on the person’s interest in bodily integrity.163  
 
Persons who consent to medical treatment have already consented to the 
physical invasion of their bodies. The subsequent use of their body parts does not 
further threaten their bodily integrity. The consent related to the removal of certain 
materials and that is what has happened, so the right to control their own body has not 
been violated. Bodily integrity focuses on the need to inform the patient about the 
risks of the procedure and, as the removal of body parts in the course of normal 
treatment does not increase the risk, informed consent would not require the further 
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disclosure of the fate of these parts.164 However, the proposed property-based 
legislation would to allow the source ongoing control. 
 
2 Dignity 
 
Perley argues that informed consent should be extended by interpreting the 
right of self determination as including an individual’s right to dignity.165 She points 
to the example of the permanently insentient person who no longer has any interest in 
whether their body continues to live or not, yet an assault upon that person’s dignity 
causes injury.166 Thus, an interest in one’s dignity extends beyond the physical 
integrity of the body itself, to the values an individual holds. People have an interest 
in knowing their body parts will not be used contrary to their beliefs, so they should 
have the right to consent or refuse consent to the use of body parts and put restrictions 
on the use of them.  
 
Perley  proposes a remedy if the patient could prove the doctor failed to 
disclose information about the use of body parts and, had the information been given, 
consent to research use would have been refused.167 Damages would be related to the 
emotional injury suffered. However, at the time of excision, no research use may be 
envisaged by the treating doctor. Additionally, the loss may not be confined to 
emotional harm and may include loss of the profits or loss of the ability to control the 
cost and availability of tests and treatments. 
 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine is predicated on a basic 
premise of respect for human dignity.168 Similarly, The Universal Draft Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights provides: “Human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.”169 However, some bioethicists 
believe that human dignity has little to contribute to ethical advancement, if it simply 
acts as a way of expressing concern about some new possibility in science or 
medicine.170 Brownsword states: “What we need is a defensible concept of human 
dignity as the basis on which human rights and human virtue are founded.”171 He 
points out that human dignity is dominated by two ideologies. One is that human 
dignity is the foundation of human rights and the basis of individual autonomy. The 
other is that certain procedures are intrinsically wrong, as they compromise human 
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dignity.172 Thus, dignity can provide humans with rights against one another, but 
superimposed upon such rights are concepts of responsibility, in light of human 
vulnerability. 
 
Public policy might determine that the proposed framework is insufficient to 
protect human dignity in some situations, and consequently, there may be a need to 
restrict the retention and use of body parts. For example, unfettered autonomy has 
not been allowed in assisted reproduction.173 The arguments supporting such 
regulation include the welfare of the future child and public policy around issues 
such as surrogacy.174 However, this thesis argues that if property rights confer better 
control to people over the future disposition of their bodies after their death and their 
excised body parts during their lives, in general, their dignity will be enhanced, 
rather than diminished. 
                                                                                  
3 Chill research? 
 
Research is socially beneficial and some commentators argue that a need to 
obtain and retain individual consent for the use of every retained biological sample 
might chill research and, potentially, cause researchers who did not provide the 
treatment to be at risk of liability.175 Others argue that property rights would stimulate 
research by providing incentives for otherwise reluctant or indifferent sources to 
supply material.176 There would be administrative requirements, but these must be 
weighed against the rights of the sources and the importance of preserving the trust 
and willing involvement of the public, both in organ transplantation and in research. 
Uncertainty about how body parts will be treated is a threat to continuing 
developments in biotechnology. A property approach would increase certainty by 
applying a well developed system of law, even if public policy necessitates 
restrictions on commercialisation.  
 
4 Third parties 
 
A major weakness in reliance on informed consent alone is that it does not 
effectively deal with researchers who obtain body parts from other researchers or 
biobanks and those who formulate a research use after obtaining them from the 
sources. This thesis argues that the property construct incorporates consent, which 
will remain the main mechanism by which human sources transfer their interests in 
biological materials. The availability of remedies such as conversion will impose an 
obligation on researchers to check the provenance of research materials. Such a 
requirement has been proposed by the Ministry of Health for established human 
embryonic stem cells.177 It is likely that researchers who obtain biological material 
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from biobanks will protect themselves from liability by relying on generic “blanket” 
consent or “authorisation”.178  
 
III ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PROPERTY CONSTRUCT 
 
A Economic Inefficiency 
 
It has been argued that property rights could require researchers to engage in 
costly and time-consuming negotiations with numerous sources, or risk failing to 
secure clear title to the samples on which their products and patents were based. 
Researchers could face considerable transaction costs in locating and negotiating 
compensation arrangements with each individual source and, as studies may involve 
samples from sources worldwide, the complex and protracted negotiations might 
discourage research. Additionally, tissue is frequently obtained from other 
researchers or biobanks and the identities of the sources are unknown. 
 
Tissue samples are often acquired in clinical situations, before research 
applications have been determined, or at an early stage of development of the 
research proposal. At this stage, it would be difficult to predict the ultimate 
commercial utility of any products that might result from the research. There would 
be a particular risk to scientists in the non-profit sector, who do not necessarily plan 
to commercialise their findings. In many cases, the material would never be used in a 
commercially profitable product and the costs involved in acquiring the rights to the 
samples might render the research impractical.179 Generic consent forms would 
overcome the need to re-contact sources to seek consent once research information is 
available.  
 
Heller and Eisenberg assert that inefficiencies can result from excessive 
protection of individual property rights in biomedical research.180 They argue that 
the “anti- commons” arises when people hold too little in common, so that too many 
people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual 
interest.181 Biotechnology companies would need to strike a separate bargain with 
every person whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a 
commercial product. Thus, it would be better if fewer property rights were 
recognised. 
 
Harrison argues that it is important to separate concerns about efficiency 
from differences in strategic or policy goals.182 Each party has a strategic interest in 
obtaining an acceptable financial return, while retaining the long term goal of 
developing new and better healthcare products. Individual tissue donors may be 
influenced by financial considerations, as well as particular concerns about research 
into the cure, treatment or prevention of diseases. She states:183  
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In a market that serves the dual purpose of medical care and entrepreneurship, the 
extent of protection afforded to a tissue contributor’s non-economic interests is a 
public policy question…It should be considered in conjunction with, but not 
subsumed by, concerns about financial returns and efficiency. 
 
She suggests that the solution is to adopt non-market mechanisms for 
assessing value and transferring compensation to contributors of human tissue. The 
values would be determined by predictable standards after the commercial usefulness 
of a sample had been demonstrated in research and development, and only for those 
relatively few samples demonstrating a certain level of utility. She states:184
 
Standards for assessing utility could be set through the political process and 
interpreted in particular circumstances by an administrative agency or tribunal.  
 
  Bovenberg argues that the most equitable solution may be for the government 
to levy taxes on the corporate income generated by the biotechnology industry and 
redistribute the profits, subject to democratic control.185 New Zealand has a largely 
state funded health system. It could be argued that if individuals were able to claim a 
portion of the profits from inventions the solidarity of the system could be 
undermined, because the costs of treatment are largely funded by taxation.186 
However, the same argument could be applied to anyone who supplied goods or 
services to the government, while also benefiting from using them.  
 
  Sources should have the option of negotiating on their own behalf or 
choosing that negotiations be conducted on a group basis by a patient group or an 
independent agency.187 Researchers would be required to keep track of sources, cell 
lines, the source’s contribution to each cell line and the role of each cell line in 
developing end products.188 Although the studies and applications may take some 
years, careful record keeping should be part of good research practice, and 
maintenance of adequate records is relatively straightforward with use of computer 
databases.   
 
It is likely that the sources’ body parts would be transferred by way of a 
standard form, which would include the conditions, such as any financial 
arrangements. In most cases an individual’s contribution would not be vital for a 
particular research project, however if it was, or if insufficient donors are prepared to 
accept the conditions, a more acceptable offer would be required.189
 
B Commodification of the Person 
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138. 
186 Bovenberg, above, 137. 
187 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
188 A similar structure is proposed by the Ministry of Health in its proposed Guidelines for Using Cells 
from Established Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines for Research (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 
2005) 42. Researchers would be required to provide evidence that excess IVF embryos were used to 
create cell lines and also evidence details of the consent process.  
189 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
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One reason this thesis argues for recognition of a property interest in body 
parts is to enable sources to control the uses of and share in the profits made from the 
utilisation of body parts. However, many people feel discomfort with the concept of 
financial value being attributed to the human body and its parts, because such 
concepts are incompatible with human dignity and breach their sense of the 
significance of the human body. They argue that the dignity of a human being is 
diminished if the body is treated like a commodity that can be traded in exchange for 
money. Commodification is seen as a type of objectification or reductionism, which 
may lead people to see human beings as “repositories of body parts with a market 
worth rather than entities with…dignity.”190
 
Despite this, the existence of markets for body parts does not necessitate that 
market prices are the only measure of their worth. Money is only one dimension of 
human interaction and valuing, and recognition of the monetary value of body parts 
may increase the level to which we value them. It is commonly argued that, as the 
law should prevent the sale of biological material, the material can only be classified 
as incomplete property. However, property rights do not need to be complete in order 
to be able to be protected,191 as the material could still be considered personal 
property carrying “sticks” from the bundle of rights.192 The legislation would clarify 
which incidents of ownership are removed from the bundle.193 However, if most of 
the rights normally associated with property were eliminated, then, at some point, 
there would be insufficient remaining rights to sustain a property interest.194  
 
If body parts were classified as market-inalienable, as proposed by Radin,195 
they could be given away, but not sold196 and sources would retain the right to 
exercise ongoing control. The problem with this approach is that property rights 
could not be invoked as the basis for profit sharing.  
  
 In most countries, a market-based system of organ trade is considered to be 
unethical.  In the United States, the sale of blood and sperm is permitted, but not the 
sale of non-renewable body parts.  In Australia, there are prohibitions against trading 
in such tissue,197 whereas in New Zealand there is, as yet, no such specific prohibition 
on the sale of organs, although such a contract may be void as being contrary to 
public policy. The Ministry of Health considered various arguments for and against 
the sale of tissues and concluded that such commercialisation should not be allowed 
in New Zealand.198 The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 
                                                 
190 Stephen R Munzer “An Uneasy Case against Property Rights in Body Parts” (1994) 11 Social 
Philosophy & Policy 259, 286. 
191 Catherine M Valerio Barrad “Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory” (1993) 87 Nw 
U L Rev 1037, 1059–60. 
192 Barrad, above, 1058. 
193 See chapter 8 where the framework recognises property rights but prohibits certain forms of 
commercialisation on public policy grounds. 
194 This was argued in Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479, 491—2 
(Sup Ct Cal). See the discussion in chapter 3. 
195 Margaret  Radin “Market- Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849, 1853. 
196 This is the outcome from the cases discussed in chapter 3. 
197 See Human Tissue Act 1985 (Tas) Part IV; Transplantation and Anatomy Ordinance 1978 (ACT),  
s 27; Human Tissue Transplant Act 1979 (NT); Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1979 (Qld); Human 
Tissue Act 1982 (Vic); Human Tissue Amendment Act 1987 (Vic); Human Tissue and Transplantation 
Amendment Act 1987 (WA); Human Tissue Act 1982 (NSW). 
198 Ministry of Health, above, 95—97. 
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prohibits valuable consideration for the supply of a human embryo or human 
gamete199 and the proposed human tissue legislation will contain a prohibition of the 
sale of organs.  
 
Price argues: 200
 
Objections to selling body parts for transplantation are most commonly voiced 
independently of the issue of “property rights”, however, and instead insist that the 
donation of organs should be based on altruism. 
 
He argues that payment is not necessarily incompatible with altruism and, in any 
event, living organ donation is commonly not truly altruistic, as it is based on self-
interest, as the donor may consent primarily to preserve the family unit.  
 
There are concerns that commercialising the supply of organs would lead to 
the harvest of organs from the vulnerable and a loss of respect for persons. If the 
recipient of an organ pays the donor or the donor’s family directly, the poor may be 
compelled, through economic necessity, to donate organs to the more financially 
advantaged. This might increase the number of diseased organs being made available. 
The same concerns were expressed about the sale of blood in the United States. This 
fear centres on the belief that the poor, especially people who are malnourished, 
alcoholics, or drug users, might comprise the largest group of donors. Such donors 
could have an incentive to misrepresent their health status.201  
 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom the HFEA has permitted “egg sharing” 
whereby parents who agree to donate eggs to other couples or for research obtain 
fertility treatment at a reduced cost.202
 
If there were a market in organs, then free donations might reduce, as people 
are less likely to donate an item for which payment is available, but monetary value 
for organs may result in increased availability. Testing might not always be able to 
identify defective organs to ensure they are not transplanted into unwary recipients.203 
However, the quality of organs would not necessarily decline, as suppliers of 
potentially poor quality organs would not be competitive in the market.204 These 
concerns can be countered by the argument that an increased supply of body parts 
would be a societal good and the difficulties could largely be addressed by assessment 
and testing of donors.  
 
Cain suggests that as altruistic organ donation has proved unsuccessful in 
maintaining a sufficient supply of organs, controlled commercialisation is necessary 
to increase the supply, but this should exclude paid living donation and protect 
                                                 
199 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 13. 
200 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 9 (emphasis in original). 
201 J Brams “Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale be Authorised by State Statutes?”  
(1977) 3 Am J Law and Med 183, 192. 
202 As there is only one State funded cycle per couple and these are not always available, poorer parents 
may be unable to access fertility treatment unless they agree to donate. 
203 However this is no different from the present situation. 
204 A purchaser would tend to select a vendor who has been tested and the results indicate as far as 
possible that the donor is healthy. 
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indigent donors.205 She argues that as an international “black market” in organs and 
tissue already exists, regulation would provide controls to protect the vulnerable.206 
The recognition of property rights would also promote autonomy, by allowing human 
sources to participate in the commercial development of their biological materials.  
 
Munzer argues that the mere assignment of value to a body part does not 
necessarily entail commodification. He concludes that commodification is not 
created if the amount to be paid for a particular body part is assessed on a collective, 
non-market basis rather than in private negotiations, under a liability rule, rather than 
a property rule.207
 
Commerce already pays a central role in the distribution of human biological 
materials.208 Once they have been donated, they are bought and sold throughout the 
medical industry, but the property rights vest in the secondary individuals and 
institutions, rather than the donor. Such property rights provide an incentive for 
researchers and pharmaceutical companies to do research that will prove 
commercially profitable, but this does not necessitate that individuals be denied 
property rights. 
 
There is no obvious public policy justification for failing to generously 
compensate living organ donors for expenses and loss of income. Similarly, a state-
funded funeral benefit payable to the estates of deceased donors would not be 
sufficiently significant to equate to families selling their relatives’ bodies and could be 
justified as social recognition of a worthy act.  
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explore the opposing arguments mounted 
by a large number of commentators regarding the sale of organs, nor to argue in 
favour of a market for transplantable organs, because it is clear that such a move 
would be contrary to public policy. However, it is argued that sources should have the 
ability to control the uses of their body parts and make contractual arrangements to 
share in the profits arising from patenting products based on them and this is best 
achieved by treating body parts as property.209 It would be possible to devise controls, 
to avoid the degradation of individuals or of personhood in general, as limitations on 
uses of property are common in other situations.210  
 
1 Futures market 
 
Some commentators suggest that a futures market would be a more acceptable 
form of commercialisation than sales of body parts. A futures market for bodily 
organs would involve a contractual commitment being entered into by the source of 
the organs, to make those organs available to the other contracting party for 
                                                 
205 See the discussion of commercialisation of body parts above. 
206Amy S Pignatella Cain “Note: Property Rights in Human Biological Materials: Studies in Species 
Reproduction and Biomedical Technology” (2000)17 Ariz. J Int’l & Comp Law 449, 478. 
207 Stephen R Munzer “An Uneasy Case against Property Rights in Body Parts” (1994) 11 Social 
Philosophy & Policy 259, 281. 
208 For an indication of the scale of the black market in organs see 
<http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/biotech/organswatch>  (last accessed 14 March 2004). 
209 See chapter 7. 
210 Susan Rose-Ackerman “Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights” (1985) 85 Colum L Rev 
931, 931. See the proposed jurisdiction of the Human Tissue Authority in chapter 8. 
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transplantation, or other purposes, on the death of the source. They argue that the sale 
of an organ to be removed while the source is still alive should be prohibited and that 
the organ buyer under a futures contract would be under no obligation to harvest those 
organs upon the death of the source, or to dispose of the cadaver, but would merely 
have an option right to choose to harvest the organs.  
 
An important issue would be whether organ buyers would make current 
payments to sources, in exchange for obtaining future rights to organs, or whether 
payments would only be permitted to be made to the estate of the deceased person. 
The payment could be cash, lower health premiums, or a payment to a charity. 
Alternatively, payment or a state-funded funeral benefit could be given to the 
successors, once the donor died in a sufficiently healthy state for the organs to be 
useful, and the required consents were given. The amounts paid to sources for 
entering into futures contracts could be set by competitive forces, or there could be 
regulatory restrictions on the contracting process. 
 
One issue is to determine whether the hospital or other institution in which the 
source dies would be obliged to notify the organ buyer of the death and to preserve 
the organs until they were able to be harvested. Legislation could specify that a 
governmental agency would be the sole buyer, or a number of private or public 
entities could be allowed to compete to obtain futures contract commitments. It would 
also have to be decided to what extent a secondary resale market in future organ rights 
might be permitted.  
 
 Crespi has proposed a structure for a futures market in bodily organs.211 
Issues arising include the status of such a contract and the implications of the 
contractual obligations, should the organs not be used. Although individuals may 
contract to sell future goods, such contracts do not in themselves transfer property 
rights. Legal title to property cannot ordinarily be transferred until it comes into 
existence. Under the proposed framework, that would be at the time of the separation 
of body parts from the living person, or the death of the source. Kennedy and 
Dworkin assert that as a purported transfer of future property may only amount to a 
contract to transfer the title once the property is created,  the title must first vest, at 
least momentarily, in the donor.212
 
A futures market would be unlikely to markedly increase the rate of organ 
donation in New Zealand because, generally, the donor must have been declared 
dead in an intensive care unit and maintained on a ventilator. There are 
comparatively few intensive care beds in New Zealand, compared to other Western 
countries.213 The practice of limiting intensive care if patients are considered to have 
a poor prognosis restricts the rate of organ donation. Nevertheless, the structure 
proposed in this thesis would facilitate futures contracts and if the potential to reduce 
public health costs by increased transplantation is recognised, a policy decision may 
be made to direct additional resources toward intensive care.  
                                                 
211 Gregory S Crespi “Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market in Bodily 
Organs” (1994) 55 Ohio St L J 1, 35. 
212 I Kennedy and G Dworkin “Human Tissue: Rights in the Body and its Parts” (1993) 1 Med L Rev 
291, 302. 
213 New Zealand has 69 intensive care beds per million people,  compared to France with 384, Australia 
with 88, Spain with 148 and the United States with 305. 
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C Professional Relationships 
 
Various scandals involving body parts have resulted in public mistrust in 
researchers,214 as is demonstrated by the parties in Moore215 and Greenberg.216  
There is a perception that consent to donation of body parts could result in reduced 
efforts to keep the human source alive, or unnecessary extension of the dying 
process. Physicians may be seen to have conflicts of interests, although this could be 
reduced by separating the persons involved in treatment from those involved in 
research or transplantation. Dickens states:217  
 
A prudent safeguard against the appearance of abuse, and also against the legal 
presumption of undue influence lies in consent for donation for research being 
sought by a stranger to the patient who does not appear to be an authority figure or 
to have any influence over the patient’s treatment or daily comfort. The possibility 
remains, however, of the physician taking extra tissue or, for instance, blood 
required for diagnosis to serve his interests in research or instruction.  
 
A similar approach is commonly adopted when seeking consent for organ donation, 
with the process being removed from the treatment of the donor. 
 
As already considered, there is a level of public distrust of science, resulting 
from perceived misconduct by researchers.218 This is more likely if the public 
perceive that sources are unfairly excluded from benefits, or otherwise 
disadvantaged, such as being unable to afford tests because of the effect of licensing 
agreements. Secondary uses of material supplied for medical diagnosis or treatment 
may impact on the therapeutic relationship, especially if it is perceived that there are 
commercial benefits from such use. Similarly, concern about the potential for 
unconsented secondary uses of the “Guthrie test” samples has resulted in increasing 
numbers of people wishing to obtain the return of the sample cards.219 It is essential 
to devise structures to ensure that the public maintain confidence that treatment 
decisions are not compromised by the potential for secondary uses of tissue or organ 
harvest. 
 
D Altruism and the Common Good 
 
It is commonly believed that people should donate organs or participate in 
medical research for altruistic reasons, and that a focus on the sharing of financial 
benefits could attenuate people’s willingness to participate for idealistic reasons. 
Price suggests the emphasis on altruism is a source of ambiguity and confusion and 
is based, erroneously, on the work of Titmuss, which related to blood donation.220  
 
                                                 
214 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
215 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 93 P 2d 479, 484 (Sup Ct Cal). 
216 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others (2003) 64 F Supp 2d 1064. 
217 Bernard Dickens “The Control of Living Body Materials” (1977) 27 U Toronto L J 142, 151. 
218 Such as the Greenlane Hospital heart library and the “unfortunate experiment” at Auckland 
Women’s Hospital. See the discussion in chapter 2. 
219 See the discussion in chapter 3.  
220 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 
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The acknowledgment of property rights would not necessarily end gratuitous 
gift-giving, as human sources could to choose whether to make a gift of biological 
materials, or to enter into some alternative arrangement.221 The common good would 
be best served by increased public involvement in organ and tissue donation. Price 
suggests that:222
[G]reater regard for the autonomy of the participants would yield ethical goods 
both in increasing protection and respect for involved individuals and in reducing 
suffering and mortality through organ failure.  
 
This thesis argues this is more likely if the source is able to control excised 
body parts, negotiate profit sharing and have remedies for misappropriation.  
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter argued that a legislative framework incorporating property rights 
over excised body parts, would be more protective of the interests of sources. Some 
concepts of property were applied to body parts and it was concluded that organs and 
body parts assume a different nature once removed from the whole body, so for 
example, a kidney inside a person’s living body forms an integrated part of the whole- 
it is perfused with the person’s blood and it interacts with the entire system. Once it is 
removed, it assumes a different character and becomes an inert tangible item.  
Additionally, in order to have body parts removed, a person must undergo a process 
which is, to some extent, invasive and involves pain and suffering or inconvenience. 
A doctor generally removes the parts, but that work is done as an agent on the 
source’s behalf and should not lead to property rights that would trump those of the 
source, unless ownership is transferred or there is clear evidence of abandonment. A 
dead body is clearly a different thing from a living person so, at the point of death,223 
it becomes a tangible item, albeit with significance for the living.224
 
 The development of the dominance of autonomy in western bioethics was 
outlined and it was argued that consent has come to be seen as being synonymous 
with autonomy and, as such, is an individualistic and atomistic concept, as it focuses 
on the individual and the furtherance of a person’s interests. It was argued that the 
ethical value of autonomy is more than informed consent, as autonomy reflects 
various different aspects of personhood that are worthy of respect, such as choice, 
independence, freedom of action, self-governance and control. Thus, it is suggested 
that equating autonomy with consent restricts the concept of autonomy, which is best 
perceived as a universal ethical good.  
 
To acknowledge that people have property rights in body parts would enhance 
the value of individuals and their autonomy. At present, researchers or institutions that 
develop products utilising human material acquire property rights, but the sources are 
precluded from benefiting from the commercialisation of their biological materials. 
Much of the tissue used in biotechnology research is acquired by express donations,  
                                                 
221 See the discussions in chapter 3 about the Canavan families, who were concerned to ensure 
availability of the tests and about living donor transplantation. 
222 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 466. 
223 See the discussion of death in chapter 4. 
224 See the critique of the “no property in a dead body” rule in chapter 2. 
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or obtained in the course of medical treatment. This tissue is, supposedly, abandoned 
by the sources, even though they may  be unaware of its potential value.225  
 
The increasing need for body parts for transplantation and research provides 
an impetus to refine the existing ethical framework, to ensure better respect and 
protection for sources and their families. There would still be a place for altruistic 
donation, but property interests would allow negotiation of a share in the profits and 
on-going control over the uses of the material. An increased willingness to donate 
should result, thus benefiting society.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225 As in the case of John Moore. See Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 
479 (Sup Ct Cal) discussed in chapter 3.  
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  Chapter 2 
 
BODY PARTS FROM THE DEAD 
 
Our son David was all heart, and he was buried without his heart…. He isn’t 
resting in peace. He’s resting in pieces.1
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
 The next two chapters consider dead and living bodies separately. This 
structure is adopted, not as an assertion, but because the proposed New Zealand 
Human Tissue Bill makes this distinction. Also, although courts have indicated that 
cadavers may be the subject of property because of an application of human skill, 
similar logic has not been applied to the creation of cell lines from cells derived from 
the living body.2
 
 Corpses have prospective significance for living persons and emotional 
significance for families, so treatment of the corpse in a manner that is incompatible 
with personal or cultural values may be disturbing to persons with emotional ties to 
the deceased. Consequently, it appears paradoxical that the law enforces testamentary 
dispositions of property after death, while the common law asserts that no one has a 
property interest in a dead human body, or its composite parts.3  
 
  The use of cadavers is controversial, partly because of the ambiguous legal 
status of the corpse.  From a consequentialist point of view it is desirable, or even 
morally necessary, to use corpses to prolong lives or facilitate medical research, as the 
dead have no preferences or interests. However, duties regarding the dead are 
indirectly duties towards living persons, who do have preferences about how the dead 
should be treated. These may be the preferences of relatives of the deceased, or those 
of living persons about procedures to be carried out on their bodies after death.  
 
Consequentialists argue that it would benefit society if people could be 
convinced that that the benefits of recycling corpses outweigh their, allegedly, 
irrational objections. Harris suggests that, as it is accepted that the need for an autopsy 
must outweigh the wishes of relatives, it is irrational to allow their preferences to take 
priority in organ donation.4 Feinberg denies the notion that organ collection causes 
psychological harm to dying people and their relatives. He considers that people who 
object to routine organ recovery are overly sentimental or superstitious, stating:5
 
                                                 
1 Tom Mashberg “Parents Sue Hospital for Harvesting Child’s Organs” (19 May 2003) Boston Herald 
Boston, 016. 
2 However the Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32(a) applies the work and skill exemption to tissue, 
irrespective of whether the source was alive or dead. 
3 With respect to the disposition of property, see the Wills Act (UK) 1837 (as amended). The executor 
of a deceased person is entitled to custody of the body and has a duty to bury it.  Awa v Independent 
News Auckland Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 701, 710 (HC) Hammond J. Although a person may express 
wishes about the disposition of their body, these requests are not binding.  
4 John Harris The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1985) 119.  
5 Joel Feinberg “The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies” (1985) 15 Hastings Cent rep 31, 36. 
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It is difficult to understand how the thought of bodies having their organs removed 
before burial can be more depressing than the thought of them festering in the cold 
ground or going up in flames.  
 
 A contrary argument is that a person’s interest in his or her body should only 
be lost to the State if a strong interest or need can be demonstrated and that society 
does not have an interest sufficient to justify the collective ownership of corpses. The 
emotional impact of such issues was demonstrated by the parents of the dead children 
involved in scandals at Alder Hey in the United Kingdom and Greenlane Hospital in 
New Zealand, who were intent on reclaiming body parts from deceased children.  
 
As stated in chapter one, it is conceptually difficult to argue that living persons 
have property in their intact bodies. However, property concepts are more readily 
applicable to excised body parts and cadavers. A dead person cannot directly own 
anything, so it is argued that a regulatory framework for the control of body parts 
should permit a living person to appoint a representative, to whom a property interest 
in the corpse would pass at the appointer’s death.6 That person would be required to 
carry out the deceased’s express wishes as to the disposition of the body. If no such 
instructions were given, the representative would have decision-making authority. If 
the deceased had not appointed a representative, then the person specified in a priority 
list would assume the role, similar to intestate succession.7  
 
The legislation should specify the information to be provided to the person at 
the time of making the appointment and giving the instructions, to ensure that the 
decision is fully informed.8 The appointment process should be prescribed, similar to 
the appointment of an executor.9 The disadvantage of this proposal is the potential for 
offence to family members, but this thesis argues that if a property interest is 
acknowledged, then there is no conceptual coherence in permitting family members 
interests to trump the wishes of the deceased and the interests of potential recipients. 
It is acknowledged that this proposal may concern some Māori, as they have strong 
cultural views about death and the interment of the whole body and that the proposed 
framework should honour the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi, particularly with 
regard to taonga.10  
 
The respective positions of the representative and the possessor of the 
materials would be that a form of bailment would apply until the transplant or 
research use is complete. The hospital or researcher would obtain possessory rights to 
the materials, subject to the terms of the bailment established by the personal 
representative, who could take action if the materials were misused. Once organs were 
transplanted to another, they would become part of that person and no longer subject 
to property interests.  
 
 Part I of this chapter will outline some recent controversies regarding 
cadavers and consider potential procurement systems. It will examine the accepted 
view that there is no property in a dead body and consider whether quasi-property is 
                                                 
6 The details of the framework are set out in chapter 8. 
7 Administration Act 1969, s 77. Once a grant of administration was made, the administrator would 
assume the role of representative. 
8 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
9 A will must be in writing, signed and witnessed.Wills Act 1837 (UK), s 4.  
10 Treasures. See the discussion in chapter 5. 
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an adequate solution. In Part II it will outline the current law with regard to dead 
bodies and demonstrate its conceptual incoherence. It will compare the United 
Kingdom Human Tissue Act 2004 (UKHTA) with the New Zealand Human Tissue 
Bill (HTB), to analyse whether either provide a solution to the issues addressed in this 
thesis and as a basis for the suggestion that both imply underlying notions of property.  
II MODERN SCANDALS 
 
There have been a series of scandals in different countries regarding the 
retention of body parts. Additionally, concern has arisen about exploitation of 
research participants.11 These concerns have led to calls for benefit sharing and 
protection of indigenous resources.12  
A    United Kingdom 
 
In 1999, the public became aware of the retention and storage of dead 
children’s body parts without parental consent.13 Initially, Alder Hey Hospital 
admitted retaining the hearts of 2,087 children. Later, it was discovered that other 
organs were removed during post-mortem examinations.14 Following an inquiry, it 
was determined that the general practice at Alder Hey was to remove every organ 
from every deceased child between 1988 and 1995.15 An official inquiry, involving a 
census of organ retention, found that at the end of 1999, 210 National Health Service 
trusts and medical schools were holding 104,300 organs, body parts and entire bodies 
of still-born babies and foetuses. 
 
Many parents gave consent for “tissue” to be removed, not realising this could 
include organs and body parts. The report of the subsequent inquiry recommended 
that parents be informed of each organ retained and the purpose for which it is to be 
used.16 The implication was that parents have an interest in their children’s bodies, 
whether or not the child was born alive.17 It recommended that when the next of kin 
sign the consent form they relinquish control, subject to retaining the right to specify 
how the material should be respectfully disposed of after completion of the purpose 
for which it was retained. In order to avoid repeated requests for consent, it 
recommended that further consent would not be necessary should the original 
research develop or diversify, or if new interests arose.18 It recommended a consent 
paradigm and did not specifically recommend recognition of property interests in 
                                                 
11 Zbigniew Bankowski and Robert Levine (eds) Ethics and Research on Human Subjects: 
International Guidelines : Proceedings of the XXVIth CIOMS Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, 5-7 
February 1992 (CIOMS, Geneva, 1993) 43; Leonard H Glantz and others “Research in Developing 
Countries: Taking ‘Benefit’ Seriously” (1998) 38 Hastings cent rep 38, 38. 
12 See the discussion in chapter 5. 
13 Nigel Bunyon “Milburn Orders Inquiry into Baby Organ Scandal” (4 December 1999) The 
Telegraph London <http://www.telegraph.co.uk> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
14 Tim Reid “Doctor Denies Storing Organs for Research” (4 December 1999) The Times, London 
2W4. 
15 House of Commons The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report (The Stationery Office, London, 
2001) HC [session 2000-2001] 112-II <www.rlcinquiry.org.uk> (last accessed 10 September 2004). 
16 House of Commons, above, 22.  
17 See the discussion of personhood in chapter 4. 
18 These issues have been addressed in the Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK) discussed below. 
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dead bodies and body parts, although the provisions of the resulting UKHTA do 
indicate an implicit acceptance of notions of property.19
 
The revelations resulted in a loss of confidence in the medical profession and 
an abrupt drop, in organ donations of up to 50 per cent,20 but the 2002/3 figures 
showed some recovery.21 There were also reductions in research and other procedures 
using human tissue, including tissue acquired from pathological archives, and fewer 
hospital post-mortems performed. Donations of corpses for anatomical examination 
reduced and there was a substantial drop in the referral of brain specimens for 
examination across the United Kingdom.22  
B New Zealand 
 
Following the overseas organ retention disclosures, experts stated that these 
issues could not arise in New Zealand. Jane Zucollo, paediatric pathologist at Capital 
Coast Health, perhaps reflecting a common public perception, stated that the problems 
in the United Kingdom arose because “…we didn’t remember the child was the 
property of the family….”23  
 
Despite this, in 2002, Greenlane Hospital admitted that approximately 1,300 
babies’ hearts had been retained, in many cases without parental consent, between the 
1950s and late 2001. The hearts were used for research and teaching. The majority 
were from deceased children who had congenital heart conditions, although there 
were also adult hearts from cases in which children with congenital heart conditions 
had survived until adulthood. 
 
The hearts, which had been removed by pathologists at autopsy for further 
examination, were sent to Greenlane Hospital, where the specialists in cardiac 
morphology were based. They were then either returned, or kept at Greenlane for 
educational purposes. After 2002, a search by the Auckland District Health Board 
found specimens in a decommissioned laboratory building and also discovered that 
Labplus24 had stored limbs and other specimens, which were intended to be returned 
to families but had not been collected. Some unidentified skeletons were also used for 
teaching purposes. Additionally, it was found that the Christchurch School of 
Medicine had a teaching collection of over 3,000 organs, mostly obtained without 
consent since 1945.  
                                                 
19 See the discussion of the UKHTA later in this chapter. 
20 David Charter “Milburn Accused of Scaring Away Organ Donors” (6 February 2001) The Times 
London 4M4. 
21  UK Transplant <http://www.uktransplant.org.uk> (last accessed 3 December 2004). A six per cent 
increase in solid organ transplants, a four per cent increase in cadaveric donation, a two per cent 
increase in live donors and a six per cent increase in cornea donors on the previous year, but a five per 
cent decrease in heart donors.
22 N Carr and others “The Autopsy: Lessons from the National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative 
Deaths” (2002) 95 J Royal Soc Med 328, 329. 
23 Val Aldridge “Bodies of Evidence” (15 March 2001) The Dominion Wellington A4. 
24 The Auckland District Health Board pathology service. 
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 C United States 
 
There have been scandals in the United States involving anatomy departments, 
tissue banks,25 non-profit and for-profit private biotechnology companies26  
crematoria27 and medical schools.28 While some of these cases involve commercial 
interests, the underlying issue is the necessity to obtain human tissue for research, 
therapy and teaching. Although public support is strong for products and services that 
make use of human tissue, the distribution of the financial returns is controversial.29
 
The denial that sources have property interests results in the ironic outcome 
that they must act gratuitously, while subsequent transfers to transplant programmes, 
pharmaceutical companies, and the like, are commercial transactions.  Donations of 
transplantable solid organs are made pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.30 
The National Organ Transplant Act31 prohibits payments for any organ to be used in 
transplantation.32 However, the possession of transplantable organs can generate 
considerable amounts of money. Organ Procurement Organisations receive payment 
from transplanting hospitals for procuring organs from sources and delivering them to 
transplant programmes, pursuant to the system established and administered by the 
United Network for Organ Sharing. These payments are often called “acquisition 
fees.”33
 
The National Organ Transplant Act prohibits the “transfer of any organ for 
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation, if the transfer affects 
interstate commerce,” but organ procurement organisations are permitted to receive 
“reasonable payments associated with removal and transportation.”34 In a 1993 study, 
the median “donor acquisition charges” billed to transplant patients ranged from 
approximately $US12, 000 to $US16, 000.35
 
Transplant programmes provide these organs to patients as part of a package 
of transplant services and are paid considerable amounts for these services by 
                                                 
25 Emily Waltz “The Body Snatchers” (2006) 12 Nature Medicine 487. 
26 M Katches, W Heisel and R Campbell “The Body Brokers: Parts 1–5” (16-20 April 2000) Orange 
County Register Orange County, California <http://www.ocregister.com> (last accessed 11 April 
2005); Lori B Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin Body Bazaar (Crown Publishers, New York, 2001) 25.  
27 J McDonald “Mortician May Have Sold Body Parts” (22 February 2002) San Diego Union-Tribune 
San Diego <http://www.signonsandiego.com> (last accessed 1 April 2005). 
28 J Wampler “Body Parts Use by University of Kentucky Questioned” (25 February 2002) Kentucky 
Kernel University of Kentucky <http://www.kykernel.com/news> (last accessed 14 October 2004).   
29 James F Childress “Organ and Tissue Procurement: Ethical and Legal Issues Regarding Cadavers.  
Religious and Humanistic Beliefs, Attitudes and Practices” Warren Thomas Reich (ed) Encyclopaedia 
of Bioethics (2 ed, Macmillan, New York, 1995) 1854, 1866. 
30 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (amended 1987), 8A ULA § 19.  
31 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 USC § 273-274 (f). 
32 National Organ Transplant Act, above,§ 274 (e). 
33 Roger W Evans “Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial Incentives” (1993) 269 
JAMA 3113, 3114. 
34 National Organ Transplant Act, above, § 274e. 
35 Evans, above, 3115–16. 
 50
recipients and their insurance companies.36 Although the organ is not sold and 
patients only pay for medical services, the services have no value without the organ, 
which cannot be acquired in a separate transaction. 
 
Changes in federal laws during the 1980s encouraged corporate investment in 
academic research, especially in potentially profitable areas of biotechnology. 
University medical researchers were permitted to profit from research they undertook, 
often using public funds.37 After the Supreme Court allowed the patenting of new 
life-forms, researchers and biotechnology companies moved to patent their findings.38 
This meant claiming ownership of the cell lines and genes provided by research 
subjects.39  
 
Tissue donors commonly believe donations are a non-profit endeavour for the 
benefit of the community and are unaware that the collection, processing and 
distribution of tissue are a billion-dollar nation-wide business.40 There is no federal 
requirement that tissue banks disclose to families what will happen to the tissue they 
collect and the requirements of informed consent vary from state to state. 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency responsible 
for the regulation of human cellular and tissue based products. It derives its regulatory 
authority from the Public Health Service Act,41 which relates to those regulations 
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission or spread of communicable 
diseases from state to state, or from foreign countries into the United States. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, several examples of transmission of serious illnesses from 
tissue donors prompted attempts in Congress to pass comprehensive legislation 
regulating human tissue banks.42 However, the proposed legislation never became law 
and safety concerns have remained, recently regarding the theft and use of parts from 
cadavers.43
  
III PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS 
 
There are a number of commonly proposed organ procurement systems and it 
is reasonable to employ the system that results in the largest pool of organs or 
research materials without violating human rights. Most jurisdictions require either 
the express or presumed consent of the deceased prior to death, or the express consent 
of a relative, to permit the harvest of transplantable organs. It is widely accepted that 
this respects the autonomy interests of the deceased, presumably on the basis that 
                                                 
36 In 1994, mean charges for the first year following transplantation ranged from $US116, 000 for a 
kidney transplant to $US314, 000 for a liver transplant: Richard H Hauboldt Cost Implications of 
Human Organ and Tissue Transplantations, An Update 1996 (Milliman and Robertson Inc, 
Minneapolis, 1996) 27– 28.       
37 Lori B Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin Body Bazaar (Crown Publishers, New York, 2001). 
38Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 448 US 303 (SC).  
39 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
40 For example, the patent held by Amgen for the human erythropoietin gene, which codes for a protein 
needed by kidney disease patients, is worth more than US$1.5 billion per year, because a genetically 
engineered treatment can be made from it. 
41 Public Health Service Act, 42 USC § 264 (1994), s361. 
42 Lynn Wagner “Tough Rules Urged for Tissue Banks” (1992) Mod Healthcare 17, 17. 
43 Michael Powell and David Segal “In New York, a Grisly Traffic in Body Parts: Illegal Sales Worry 
Dead’s Kin, Tissue Recipients” (28 January 2006) Washington Post Washington A03. 
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relatives can best reflect the wishes of the deceased or that they have a greater interest 
in the formerly living person than has anyone else.  
 
This thesis argues for a system that would ensure that the wishes of deceased 
persons were respected, irrespective of the views of relatives.44 The proposed 
structure would respect the values and desires of the deceased person and provide a 
mechanism to ensure that, if practically possible, the wishes are carried out. To refuse 
consent to the harvest of the organs of a person who wished them to be used, is to fail 
to respect that person’s autonomy, even if the family opposes organ collection.45  
 
It could be argued that respecting autonomy does not require the satisfaction 
of the prior desires of the dead, because the dead cease to exist as autonomous beings. 
Consequently, self-determination after death is meaningless, because there is no self.  
However, this thesis proposes that sources have property interests in their bodies, so 
the body can be disposed of in a manner similar to other property that is subject to 
testamentary disposition.46  
 
The framework proposed would respect the autonomy of the previously living 
person and remove decision-making from relatives. It would allow individuals to 
make binding, enforceable, decisions about the eventual disposition of their bodies47 
and avoid decision-making by emotionally distressed relatives when a person was 
dying. This thesis argues that the proposed framework would result in the collection 
of most organs where that was the wish of the deceased and also respect those who 
did not wish to have their organs harvested, which is the preferred outcome in a 
pluralist society. 48   
 
Some commonly suggested procurement systems are: 
 
A Conscription 
 
Governments could legislate that all cadavers are the property of the State.  
Few countries have taken such an extreme step and, in those that have, there have 
been concerns about human rights violations, especially where the organs of criminals 
have been removed following execution.49 China has allowed the harvest of organs 
from executed prisoners since 1984 and this practice harvests 2,000 to 3,000 organs 
per year.50 The law of the Syrian Arab Republic permits the removal of organs from 
                                                 
44 See chapter 8. 
45 Assuming the organs are in a suitable condition to be used and that there is a suitable recipient 
available. 
46 A will is made for the purpose of making dispositions of property, to take effect on or after the 
testator’s death. It may also appoint executors whom the testator wishes to manage the estate. During 
the life of the testator, it is a mere declaration of intention and may be freely revoked or altered in a 
prescribed manner. On death, it crystallises and takes effect according to its tenor. Wills Act (UK) 
1837. 
47 Including the burial instructions, subject to the estate having sufficient funds. 
48 See chapter 8. 
49 Christian Williams “Combating the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ 
Supply through Presumed Donative Consent” (1994) 26 Case W Res J Int’l L 315, 323.  
50 Allison Owen “Death Row Inmates or Organ Donors: China’s Source of Body Organs for Medical 
Transplantation” (1995) J Ind Int’l and Comp L Rev 495, 496; British Transplantation Society “British 
Transplantation Society criticizes the alleged use of organs without consent from prisoners executed in 
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persons whose death is a consequence of capital punishment.51 Such seizure is 
premised on the notion that cadavers belong to the State, or that the taking is a form of 
confiscation or forfeiture.  
 
 Emson argues that the right of control over the cadaver should be vested in the 
State, with control vested in an organisation at arms length from it.52 He states:53
 
The concept of the right of a person to determine before death, the disposal of their 
body after death, made sense only when there was no continuing use for that body; 
it makes neither practical nor moral sense now, when the body for which the dead 
person no longer has any use, is quite literally a vital resource, potential source of 
life for others. 
  
However, he recognises that such a policy may be politically unattractive in light of 
prevailing public opposition. 
 
Similarly, Neri argues that property rights in the body should be eliminated 
and courts should not be permitted to consider the issue of entitlements after death.54 
She favours the concept of mandatory organ conscription, in which medical providers 
would harvest every cadaveric organ suitable for transplantation, without regard to 
any contrary wishes previously expressed by the deceased, or by relatives after death.  
 
This approach would increase the supply of organs, but at the cost of 
breaching cultural and personal sensibilities and reducing trust in the medical 
profession. People might resist hospital treatment, because of concern that they would 
be given lesser treatment in order to hasten death and make their organs available. 
Auckland Hospital intensive care specialist, Stephen Streat, commented:55
 
I believe an individual’s spirituality and dignity are not things the state or others 
have a right to subsume or demand. And this applies to your body after you’re 
dead. People have strong attachments to people they love. This doesn’t stop the 
moment they die. If we, in a utilitarian way, ride over that, then we are debasing 
something about our humanity and spirituality. 
 
Few States have adopted such policies, because of a widely held view that 
individuals have interests in the future treatment of their cadavers, or that family 
members have emotional attachment to the bodies of their kin. The involvement of 
family is a safeguard to ensure that human rights violations do not occur, however, the 
family will not necessarily be aware of the wishes of the deceased, or may choose not 
to follow such wishes.56  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the Peoples Republic of China” 19 April 2006< http://www.bts.org.uk/morenews.htm> (last accessed 4 
November 2006). 
51 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 83. 
52 H E Emson “It is Immoral to Require Consent for Organ Donation” (2003) 29 J med ethics 125. 
53 Emson, above, 128. 
54 Rebecca M Neri “New Organ Donations” (2002) 10 Digest 67, 71. 
55 Jenny Chamberlain “To Give or Not to Give?” (March 2004) North and South Auckland 33, 38. 
56 See the discussion of brain death in chapter 4 and the difficulty some people have in accepting that 
such a person is dead. 
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B Presumed Consent 
 
Presumed consent is based on the notion that, if structures are in place to allow 
for dissent and no steps have been taken, then consent can be presumed. It is assumed 
to increase the donation rate by collecting organs from people who have taken no 
steps, either because they are willing to donate or are indifferent. Erin and Harris 
categorised presumed consent as a “fiction” and state that “without the actual consent 
of the individual, there is no consent.”57 Some argue that, if there is a power to “opt-
out”, such a system is, in some sense, consensual. However, presumed consent is 
likely to impact most on the lower socio-economic groups, who lack the knowledge or 
confidence to access the opt-out processes. 
 
Presumed consent systems are diverse in their character and impact. In 
“strong” systems, the lack of objection of the deceased is, in itself, sufficient 
authorisation for organ harvest to proceed. In “weak” systems, the agreement or lack 
of objection of relatives is required for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether 
they know of any unrecorded objection by the deceased.58
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which presumed consent laws solve the 
organ shortage as, in some countries,59 even though there are strong laws, in practice 
clinicians defer to the wishes of relatives.60 However, it seems such systems do 
increase the rates of donation, especially if combined with a highly organised and well 
resourced system.61
 
If autonomy is ethically essential, then presuming consent is wrong. The 
empirical basis for such a system is unclear. Is it a belief that reasonable persons do 
not object to the use of their organs for transplantation and so there is no objection to 
unconsented harvest? If not, then presumed consent disrespects autonomy. 
Alternatively, is it that most people would consent to donation if they took any steps, 
but for various reasons, such as procrastination or a reluctance to consider their own 
mortality, they never actually give consent? Thus, presumed consent is actually doing 
for them what they would have done, had they ever sufficiently overcome apathy to 
take any steps at all. 
 
If empirical foundations are irrelevant, then the normative foundation may be 
the value of saving lives. The Report of the Conference of European Health Ministers 
supported this approach, stating: 62  
 
                                                 
57 C Erin and J Harris “Presumed Consent or Contracting Out” (1999) 25 J med ethics 365, 365 
(emphasis added). 
58 G Wolfslast “Legal Aspects of Organ Transplantation” (1992) 11 J Heart and Lung Trans 160. 
59 Such as France, Spain and Poland. A Council of Europe survey in 1987 found that 21 Member States 
and Finland had presumed consent systems. 
60 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 87. 
61 Price, above, 92. The lack of intensive care beds is a major impediment to increased organ harvest in 
New Zealand, together with a failure to ask for consent in every case where a person might be a donor. 
62 Third Report of the Conference of European Health Ministers (Paris 16–17 November 1987) Organ 
Transplantation: Legislative Measures in Relation to Organ Transplantation and to European 
Cooperation (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1987) 105–6. 
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When the right to life and health of the diseased person awaiting transplantation 
comes into conflict with the supposed “right” of a cadaver, which is no longer a 
person, the right of the living recipient is certainly predominant over that of the 
dead donor. The interest of the community prevails over that of the individual dead 
body. 
 
The British Medical Association recommended that the UKHTA include 
presumed consent. However, the Government decided against it63 and the Health 
Minister stated that full consent is the cornerstone of the new legislation because, 
“[o]ur bodies are not the property of the state, they are not the property of doctors or 
scientists or researchers.” She added:64   
 
There is no evidence that a policy of presumed consent increases the number of 
organs for transplantation. Evidence from Spain, which has the highest organ 
donation rates in the world, has shown that having a person responsible for 
identifying possible organ donors in hospital is the most effective way of 
increasing donors. 
 
In many European countries, presumed consent is being replaced with 
voluntary systems65 and in North America there are opt-in policies. In New Zealand, 
individualism is overlaid by cultural and historical influences and, in light of the need 
to respect Māori cultural values, any movement toward presumed consent would 
necessitate prior consultation with Māori, who would be unlikely to support it.66 
Consequently, it is not proposed in the HTB. 
 
Presumed consent is not necessarily incongruous with a property construct, 
because the public interest overrides private title in other contexts. However, a 
presumed consent system would require persons wanting the property interest in their 
bodies to pass to their representatives to opt-out; otherwise the interest would be 
overridden by the interest of the state in acquiring transplantable organs. Presumed 
consent is, in effect, a form of nationalisation of body parts and, for the reasons 
discussed above in the context of conscription, it is not recommended. 
 
C Required Request 
 
In most jurisdictions where express consent is required prior to organ removal, 
there are no legal requirements to approach relatives, or dying patients, to seek 
consent for organ removal. If the possibility of donation has not occurred to them, 
organs may be lost. There is no apparent objection to requesting donation, so long as 
this function is separated from the provision of medical care to the dying patient, to 
avoid the suspicion of a conflict of interests. However, if the patient or family belong 
to a religion or culture that that does not accept donation or believes that the body 
must be interred whole, such an approach might be distressing or culturally offensive. 
Alternatively, the relatives might be so distraught that such an approach is 
inappropriate.  
                                                 
63 Matthew Tempest “‘Opt-out’ Organ Donations Ruled Out” (15 January  2004) The Guardian 
Unlimited  London <http://politics.guardian.co.uk> (last accessed 4 March 2004). 
64 Richard Woodman “UK Rules out Presumed Consent for Organ Donation” (14 January 2004) 
Reuters <http://www.reuters.com>  (last accessed 21 February 2004). 
65 Troy R Jensen “Comment: Organ Procurement: Various Legal Systems and their Effectiveness” 
(2000) 22 Houst j int law 555, 573. 
66 Māori cultural values are considered in chapter 5. 
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Health-care professionals are reluctant to be required to make such approaches 
in every case and some clinicians would object to bureaucratic intervention that 
intruded on their clinical discretion. In a study of deaths in New Zealand intensive 
care units in the year to 31 March 2000, it was found that of the 104 people who died, 
consent was not sought from 16 potential donors, because the doctors felt the family’s 
circumstances made approaching them for consent inappropriate. Organs were 
retrieved from only 36 persons.67
 
By 1990, 26 states in the United States and the District of Columbia had 
enacted required request laws, and a further 18 had routine enquiry laws.68 Required 
request laws require documentation of a request and its outcome on the death 
certificate, whereas routine enquiry laws require that hospitals develop policies, or 
protocols, to ensure that families are asked to donate. These have not been highly 
successful, with levels of non-compliance by physicians exceeding 50 per cent in 
some states.69 There has not been the anticipated increase in rates of donation, with 
initial modest increases that tailed off after about two years. 
 
The proposed framework would encourage prior discussion of donation and 
representatives would be aware of their appointment. Consequently, if an appointer 
was on life support, the representative would anticipate an approach and not be 
offended by it. If staff made the approach, there would be no need for legislated 
required request. Streat argues that this role should be assumed by intensivists, who 
should adopt a morally neutral position, as they often facilitate decision-making in 
other contexts, such as whether to withdraw intensive care.70
 
D Mandated Choice 
 
Mandated choice requires persons to specify whether or not their organs may 
be transplanted as a condition of receiving some benefit, such as a driver’s licence. 
This appears to respect personal rights, as the person is free to agree or decline. 
However, mandated choice is in tension with autonomy, because choice is mandated. 
A person’s autonomy is compromised if forced to choose, especially as a condition of 
receiving a benefit, as the decision may have been made in order to receive the 
benefit, rather than being genuine consent. 
 
E  Preferred System 
 
It is impossible to devise a perfect system for acquiring organs. The current 
opt-in system results in an inadequate supply. If the system involves conscription, it is 
likely to violate individual autonomy and impact on personal rights. In New Zealand, 
the HTB retains the present opt-in system but, contrary to present practice, if a person 
consented to donation prior to death, harvesting would proceed, despite the objections 
                                                 
67 “Death Tests Could Ease Organ Need” (14 November 2000) The Dominion Wellington A4. 
68 A Gaber and others “An Assessment of the Impact of Required Request Legislation on the 
Availability of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation” (1990) 22 Transplant proc 318, 318. 
69 V Robertson and others “Concentrated Professional Education to Implement Routine Referral 
Legislation Increases Organ Donation” (1998) 30 Transplant proc 214, 214. 
70 Stephen Streat “Clinical Review: Moral Assumptions and the Process of Organ Donation in the 
Intensive Care Unit” (2004) 8 Critical Care 382, 386. 
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of relatives. So long as the consent was fully informed, this policy would respect the 
autonomy and rights of the previously living person and allow their rights and the 
needs of the recipient to trump the rights of relatives. However, as is discussed below, 
the HTB focuses on consent alone rather than respecting the source’s right to dissent. 
 
This thesis argues that property rights would carry greater weight, allow 
remedies in the event of a breach and avoid the need to make the request to relatives 
(other than the representative) at a distressing time. If the person wished only to 
express a lack of objection to donation, rather than actually consent, then the 
appointment could specify that certain relatives would have a power of veto, and the 
personal representative would be required to respect this.71
  
IV COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY IN THE DEAD BODY 
 
Property rights in dead bodies have been questioned since the seventeenth 
century,72 originating with Haynes’ case in 1614.73 Haynes was indicted for the theft 
of four winding sheets, used in the burial of three men and a woman. It was essential 
for the success of the indictment to state the person with property in the sheets. It was 
decided that property remained with the owners at the time the bodies were wrapped 
in the winding sheets, because the dead body is not capable of owning property. It did 
not decide, as has since been claimed, that the dead body is not capable of being 
property.  
 
Blackstone stated that a corpse cannot be property, but did not cite any 
authority.74 Sir Edward Coke stated that as “[t]he burial of the Cadaver (that is, caro 
data vermibus) is nullius in bonis and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognizance.”75 As the 
cadaver was “in the goods of no one,” no property rights could exist. Similarly Roman 
law held “Dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur”76 Thus, as Paul Matthews 
states:77  
 
The classical writers of the common law, then, for the most part agree that there is 
no property in corpses, but they either cite each other or the case of a buried corpse 
where the question did not even arise, much less was decided. 
 
In R v Sharpe,78 the defendant’s mother had been buried in unconsecrated 
ground. When his father died, the defendant was permitted to open his mother’s grave 
in order to bury his father there, but instead he took both bodies to be buried in a 
consecrated graveyard. He was convicted of unlawfully, wilfully and indecently 
opening a grave and removing a body. However, he was not charged with larceny, 
because: “Our law recognises no property in a corpse…” 79
                                                 
71 See the proposals in chapter 8. 
72 Sir Edward Coke The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, 
and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes (W Clarke and Sons, London, 1817) 203. 
73 Haynes’ case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113, 77 E R 1389 as discussed in Paul Matthews “Whose Body? 
People as Property” (1983) 36 CLP 193, 197. 
74 William Blackstone Commentaries Vol 2, 429; William Blackstone Commentaries Vol 4, 236. 
75 Coke, above, 110. 
76 Ulpianus, Dig 9, 2, 13 translatable as “It appears to be the case that no one is the owner of his/her 
own body parts.” 
77 Paul Matthews “Whose Body? People as Property” (1983) 36 CLP 193, 198. 
78 R v Sharpe (1857) Dears & Bell 160, 163, 169 ER 959, 960. 
79 R v Sharpe, above, 163 Erle J.  
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Subsequent common law cases have applied the general rule that human body 
parts cannot be property,80 although in England a few decisions have recognised that 
substances from the body such as blood and urine are property capable of being 
stolen.81 The persons charged by the law with the duty of interring the body have a 
right to the custody and possession of it until it is properly buried.82 There does not 
appear to be such a duty on next-of-kin.83 If there is no duty, there is no legal right to 
possession of the corpse.  
 
The issue was considered in relation to an intestate death, when a dispute arose 
about the funeral arrangements between, on the one side, the widow, her sister and the 
deceased’s sister and, on the other side, the chief kaumatua84 of the sub-tribe to which 
the deceased belonged.85 A defamation claim was brought by the kaumatua, whose 
actions in seizing the body were referred to in a press report as “body snatching.” 
Hammond J stated:86  
 
At common law a person does not “own” his or her body. But those responsible 
for the estate of a deceased person have a duty to see to a proper burial according 
to law …. Here nobody had a common law right to Billy T’s body at the relevant 
time. But the body was in the legal possession of the widow and those in the 
Muriwai house. 
 
Hammond J applied R v Sharpe,87 but did not refer to the fact that the case 
related to a buried corpse and that the comments were obiter. Matthews argues that it 
is difficult to understand why the statement in R v Sharpe88 should also apply to an 
unburied corpse, in which there is a limited right to possession.89 He states: “If the 
right of possession is only for the purposes of burial (or other lawful disposal) then 
the right is effectively subject to something like a trust.”90
 
Doodeward v Spence91 is authority for the proposition that once a body has 
undergone a process or other application of human skill, such as stuffing or 
embalming, it can be the subject of property. Griffith CJ stated that “… so far as it 
constitutes property, a human body, or a portion of a human body, is capable by law 
of becoming the subject of property.”92 He added:93
                                                 
80 William Boulier “Sperm, Spleens and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognise Property Rights in 
Human Body Parts” (1993) 23 HOFSTRA L Rev 693, 693; Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659, 
662–663; J F Clerk, W H B Lindsell and A M Armitage Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (17ed, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London,1995) 653, para 13—50. 
81 R v Rothery [1976] RTR 550, 552—553; R v Welsh [1974] RTR 478, 479; R v Herbert [1961] 
JPLGR 12, 13. 
82 Clerk, Lindsell and  Armitage, above, 653.  
83 Dobson and Another v North Tyneside Health Authority and Another [1996] 4 All ER 474, 478 
(CA) Butler-Sloss, Gibson, Thorpe LJJ. 
84 Elder or person with high status. 
85 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd [1995] 3 NZLR 701 (HC) Hammond J. 
86 Awa v Independent News Auckland Ltd, above, 705. 
87 R v Sharpe (1857) Dears & Bell 160, 169 ER 959. 
88 R v Sharpe, above. 
89 Paul Matthews “Whose Body? People as Property” (1983) 36 CLP 193, 211. 
90 Matthews, above, 214. 
91 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 414 (HCA) Griffith CJ, Barton, Higgins JJ. 
92 Doodeward v Spence, above, 414. 
93 Doodeward v Spence, above, 414. 
 58
 
When a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human 
body or part of a human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some 
attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right 
to retain possession of it, at least as against any person not entitled to have it 
delivered to him for the purpose of burial… 
 
Barton J stated that an unburied corpse was not the subject of property, while 
Higgins J stated that no one could have property in another human being, alive or 
dead. Barton J and Higgins J differed in the result, because Barton J held that a still-
born foetus did not constitute an unburied corpse within “the general rule.”94
 
In Dobson and another v North Tyneside Health Authority and another,95 the 
next of kin of a deceased woman wanted the hospital to produce the brain, which had 
been removed at post-mortem, but not sectioned for histology.  The hospital could not 
do so. The Court held that while it was “arguable” that a body or body part that had 
been embalmed or fixed might become property, a brain held in storage, but later lost 
or destroyed, was not.  The Court did not wish to impose a duty on hospitals to retain 
tissue removed at post-mortem just in case it could be required for any future 
litigation. The brain was lawfully removed for the post-mortem and the obligation to 
retain the material continued only so long as the coroner required. The plaintiffs could 
not establish a right of possession at the time the brain was disposed of because 
although the executor has a limited right to possession of the cadaver, the next-of-kin 
does not. 
 
Similarly, in AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust,96 Gage J held that the 
rights following a post-mortem are unclear, but favoured the view that pathologists 
are entitled to possess removed body parts, because the removal was lawful and 
parents had no right to possession of them once their children were buried. The 
preservation of the parts fell within the Doodeward97 exception. However, Gage J 
held that if the parents:98  
 
…when consenting to a post-mortem specifically asked for the return of an organ I 
can see that in certain circumstances ….a cause of action based on conversion 
exists….But in the absence of such a cause of action in respect of the body of a 
deceased person being recognised by an English Court I am not prepared to hold 
that one does exist. 
 
Gage J further stated that, should the doctor fail to pass such a condition on to the 
pathologist, a claim for negligence might arise.99  
 
It is not the application of work and skill, in itself, that creates the ownership 
rights over the tissue, but the creation of a new object. If tissue is donated on a 
permanent basis, the researcher may obtain lawful possession and this may provide 
the opportunity for the creation of proprietorship rights if the item has genuinely 
                                                 
94 Doodeward v Spence, above, 416. See the discussion on personhood in chapter 4. 
95 Dobson and Another v North Tyneside Health Authority and Another [1996] 4 All ER 474, (CA) 
Butler-Sloss, Gibson, Thorpe LJJ. 
96 AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644, para 156 (QB) Gage J. 
97 Doodeward v Spence, above. 
98 AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust, above, para 161. 
99 AB v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust, above, para 161. 
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changed its identity. In Doodeward, the application of skill amounted merely to the 
preservation of the two-headed foetus. However, it was stated in Dobson that the mere 
preservation of pathological or anatomical specimens by fixing would not be 
sufficient to amount to the required change in identity, and that preservation was not 
on a par with stuffing or embalming a corpse.100
 
The Royal College of Pathologists issued a Consensus Statement with the 
Institute of Biomedical Science stating: 101
 
Pathologists, in the course of ordinary medical practice, substantially transform 
specimens from their original state. The durable materials thus produced (slides 
and blocks) can fairly be claimed as the property of the entity which produced 
them.  
 
Such material has not been altered to become something other than preserved 
human tissues. However, the creation of a cell line from human cells is more clearly a 
change that could create property rights for the creator. Cell lines are routinely sold by 
providers of laboratory supplies and are believed to be outside the prohibitions on 
selling human tissue that apply in many countries.102  
 
Preservation of bodies arose in another context in R v Kelly, R v Lindsay,103 
where body parts were “stolen” from the Royal College of Surgeons in London, to be 
used for artistic purposes. On appeal, it was argued that the trial judge had been 
wrong to say that these preserved body parts were property in the Doodewood sense. 
The Royal College might have been custodian of the parts, but since they were not 
property it could not own them, so they could not be stolen. Rose LJ stated that the 
common law does not stand still, so the courts might, in the future, hold that body 
parts are capable of being property, even without the acquisition of different 
attributes, if they have a use or significance beyond their mere existence. He stated, as 
examples, where they are intended for use in an organ transplant operation, for the 
extraction of DNA, or as an exhibit in a trial.104  
 
The present position seems to be that the dead body is presumed to have no 
value. This may have been so in the eighteenth century, but clearly is not so today. As 
stated by Cowan J:105
 
Human remains can have significant commercial value, even though they are 
not typically bought and sold like other goods. Although remains which are 
used for these medical and scientific purposes are usually donated, rather than 
bought and sold, this does not negate their potential commercial value. 
  
 Furthermore, when misappropriation is claimed, value per se is not relevant. In 
Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc106 the New York Court of Appeals 
                                                 
100 Dobson, above, 479G. 
101 Royal College of Pathologists Consensus Statement of Recommended Policies for Uses of Human 
Tissue in Research Education and Quality Control (Royal College of Pathologists, London, 1999) 12. 
102 See the discussion in chapter 3 of Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 
479, 479-97 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J, Lucas C J, Eagleson, Arabian and Kennard JJ concurring, 
Broussard J (concurring and dissenting), Mosk J (dissenting). 
103 R v Kelly, R v Lindsay [1999] Q B 621 (CA) Rose LJ, Ognall, Sullivan JJ.  
104 R v Kelly, R v Lindsay, above, 631C Rose J. 
105 Onyeanusi v Pan Am (1992) 952 F 2d 788, 792 (3d Cir). 
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considered the misappropriation of a human kidney that the deceased’s widow had 
agreed could be harvested for the purpose of transplantation into the plaintiff. 
Regarding conversion, Sack J stated that: “there is by no means a modern consensus 
that body parts are excluded from conversion actions at common law.”107 He held that 
the quasi-property cases relating to emotional harm caused by misuse of a corpse 
were inapplicable,108 because a person who fails to receive a donated organ is not 
suing for control over a body. He stated that rather, a prospective recipient would sue 
for the loss of a functioning organ, and added:109
 
Plaintiffs such as Colavito are not using the term “property” as a legal fiction 
upon which to base a claim for emotional harm. They have—or assert they 
have—a practical use for the organ, not a sentimental one. 
 
Although New York public policy prohibits the sale of organs, Sack J held that 
this does not necessarily imply that policy also intends that no one can acquire a 
property right in them. He stated:110
 
It does not follow from a law that forbids the sale of a functioning human 
kidney, that a third party may with impunity take the organ against the express 
wishes of a potential donor and potential donee. 
 
He added that it is arguable that both the source’s widow and the recipient had 
enforceable rights to have their wishes as to the donation of the kidneys honoured. In 
deciding the recipient had such rights, he referred to privity of contract principles.111 
This suggests that the widow had a property right in her deceased husband’s kidneys 
that she had agreed to transfer to the recipient.  
 
Property was also considered in an Australian case in which the plaintiff 
wished to establish whether the deceased was her father through DNA tests of body 
specimens taken from him during surgery.112 The legislation provided for the making 
of orders with respect to property. Master Sanderson considered the case law and 
quoted with approval the following passage from Palmer and McKendrick:113
 
Proprietary actions such as theft and conversion are clearly appropriate to ensure 
that the terms of a tissue bailment are respected. In the Australian context, the 
terms of bailment would limit the purposes to which donated tissue could be put to 
the purposes specified in human tissue legislation. Similar terms, it is submitted, 
would also be implied at common law, where tissue is donated for transplantation 
or scientific research. In both Australia and the UK, proprietary remedies are 
necessary since no specific legislative offences exist for the maltreatment or 
destruction of validly donated tissue. To apply the “no property” rule here would 
be to open up a cavernous regulatory vacuum which will rapidly widen as 
                                                                                                                                            
106 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc (2006) 438 F 3d 214 (US App) Sack J. 
107 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc, above, 27. 
108 Quasi-property is discussed below. 
109 Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network Inc, above, 30—31. 
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WASC 146 (7 June 2000) Civ 2115 (WASC) Master Sanderson. 
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umbilical cords, frozen blood vessels, bones, joints and freeze-dried nerves (to 
name just a few) join blood and blood products as items of storage in tissue banks.  
 
The authors also concluded that tissue removed during medical procedures 
should be regarded as gifted to the relevant hospital in the absence of specific 
agreement which, they assert, is only possible if the tissue has the status of property. 
Master Sanderson also referred to a 1977 Australian Law Reform Commission 
Report, which stated that such tissue had no status at law. The Master commented that 
the world has moved on since 1977 and, in light of the need to apply the principles of 
law in line with reason and good sense, decided that it is proper to hold that human 
tissue is property. He commented:114  
 
In the wider sense it defies reason to not regard tissue samples as property. Such 
samples have a real physical presence. They exist and will continue to exist until 
some step is taken to effect destruction. There is no purpose to be served in 
ignoring physical reality. To deny that tissue samples are property, in contrast to 
the paraffin in which the samples are kept or the jar, in which both the paraffin and 
the samples are stored, would be in my view to create a legal fiction.  
 
However, he declined to determine who holds the proprietary interests in the 
tissue. This is a fundamental issue, if the human source is to retain rights.115 Although 
this case could be seen as confined to the particular facts, the need for the law to adapt 
to rapid change in this area is clearly enunciated. 
 
A  Effect of Framework on Common Law Position 
 
This thesis suggests that the proposed framework should not differentiate 
between organs and samples. The public policy pressures are unclear as enforceable 
property rights may have the effect of deterring doctors and hospitals that need to act 
urgently to preserve organs.116  However, as was suggested in Calovito,117 if there are 
no such rights, with legal remedies to enforce them, donors or their families may 
refuse to donate.  
 
The present enforceable rights with respect to corpses, such as the rights to 
possess for the purposes of conducting a post-mortem, or for disposal of the body, are 
possessory rights, rather than proprietary rights of the type normally involved in 
property. A conceptual problem is that in other contexts where possessory rights exist, 
such as a bailment, some other person will have title in the goods. If the executors 
have extended possessory rights in the corpse, these will exist in the absence of 
property interests, resulting in the corpse being res nullius.  
 
                                                 
114 Roche v Douglas as administrator of the Estate of Edward John Hamilton Rowan (Dec), above, para 
24. See also the discussion of H v G (14 May 1999) High Court Auckland M1868/98 Salmon J 
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liability. 
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There are conceptual difficulties in attempting to argue that that the deceased 
person has property rights in the corpse, because a non-existent entity cannot be said 
to own anything. As stated by Price:118
 
The former person’s autonomy therefore receives due consideration and respect 
through personal rights rather than property rights subsisting after death. Thus, if a 
body could potentially become property at death, any ownership rights would have 
to be in the hands of third parties. 
 
Where administration of the estate of a deceased person has been granted, the 
administrator has power to bring any action in respect of the estate comprised in or 
affected by the grant.119  The framework suggests that title in the corpse arises briefly 
prior to death and at death passes to the representative, who may be the administrator 
of the estate or may be a person appointed for this task alone. The representative will 
have title in the corpse, arising from the appointment, which will not require a grant 
of administration to be effective.120 The representative will be able authorise 
possessory rights of others, such as the doctor or hospital carrying out the organ 
transplantation, or transfer title to researchers in accordance with the instructions of 
the deceased. If the deceased instructed that conditions be imposed, such as the type 
of research or the time for which the body parts could be retained and utilised, the 
representative would permit possession and use by the researchers, subject to these 
conditions.  
 
Institutions carrying out transplantation or research would obtain possessory 
rights to the materials, subject to the terms of the bailment as established by the 
representative, who could bring an action in conversion if the cadaver was misused. 
The remedy would be damages and/or an order for the return of the biological 
material, if it was being used in research. The estate would have a right to claim the 
benefits from a patent, if the materials were improperly acquired.121 Alternatively, if 
so instructed by the deceased, the representative could transfer the cadaver 
unconditionally. In any event, once organs were transplanted into the body of a 
recipient, they would become part of that person’s body and no longer subject to 
claims for recovery by the representative. 
 
Rapid identification of the representative would be vital, as delay is likely to be 
fatal to any potential organ transplantation.122 The Human Tissue Bill (HTB) 
proposes a complex consent structure, plus an organ donation register,123 but this 
thesis proposes a similar structure to that presently applying to enduring powers of 
attorney, with a copy of the appointment retained by appointer and representative.124 
                                                 
118 David Price “From Cosmos and Damian to Van Velzen: The Human Tissue Saga Continues” (2003) 
11 Med L Rev 1, 33 (emphasis in the original). 
119 Administration Act 1969, s23. 
120 To require such a grant would result in delay which would render the organs unusable. 
121 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
122 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
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124 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, Schedule 3. However the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Amendment Bill proposes strengthening witnessing requirements so that 
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Representatives would then be able to act immediately they became aware that the 
source was in intensive care and unlikely to survive. As with an enduring power of 
attorney,125 the source could authorise the representative to act generally, in relation 
to the whole or a specified part of the property right over the body, or limit the power 
to act to specified things, and such authorisation could be given subject to conditions 
and restrictions.126
 
V  QUASI-PROPERTY 
 
In Britain, matters relating to the interment of corpses were dealt with by the 
ecclesiastical courts, until jurisdiction was gradually transferred to the common law 
courts. However, in the United States, there were no ecclesiastical courts and so 
cadavers and body parts fell within the common law, which did not recognise 
property rights in them.127 The no-property tradition needed to be reconciled with the 
need to ensure that corpses were given proper disposition and due regard.128 
Consequently, American courts began to move closer to a property based approach, 
by adopting a quasi-property standard. It was held that the no-property rule was 
unsound in light of the rights of the next of kin with regard to burial.129  
 
A quasi-property right in a cadaver refers to the rights of the family to claim 
the body for burial purposes, but not for any other reason. As stated in Bogert v City 
of Indianapolis:130  
 
We lay down the proposition, that the bodies of the dead belong to the surviving 
relatives, in the order of inheritance, as property, and that they have the right to 
dispose of them as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the 
disposition of other property may be regulated.  
 
This concept of quasi-property is a consequence of the inherent ambiguity of 
the term “property”. It results in the body being the subject of property-based causes 
of action or jurisdiction, without allowing any proprietary rights in it. Quasi-property 
does not amount to a true right of ownership and there is no right to transfer or use the 
body, other than for the prescribed purpose, such as burial. 131
 
Quasi-property is an attempt to balance two competing interests, by refusing to 
fully recognise a property right in a dead body, while at the same time ensuring proper 
respect for the dead. However, recent cases have been less clear. In Brotherton v 
Cleveland, 132 the Court of Appeals considered a statute that permitted the coroner to 
remove the corneas, so long as he knew of no objection from the decedent’s spouse or 
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the person authorised to dispose of the body. The widow advised the hospital of her 
objection, but this was not conveyed to the coroner, who removed the corneas. It was 
held that the removal amounted to a deprivation of the constitutionally protected due 
process rights of the spouse under the United States Constitution, as she had a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement” in the body.  
 
This was followed in Michigan in Whaley v County of Tuscola.133 It was held 
that the next of kin had a constitutionally protected property interest in a deceased 
relative’s body, including the eyes, as such rights “are the heart and soul of the 
common law understanding of ‘property’.”134 This decision has been criticised 
because it disregards the historical reason for a “quasi-property” right, which was to 
prevent a property interest in dead bodies.135
 
Constitutional challenges to presumed consent laws have been unsuccessful136 
because it has not been accepted that there is a privacy right in the human body that 
extends beyond death and the quasi-property rights, where accepted, do not amount to 
constitutional protection. In Arnaud v Odom,137 a coroner was unsure of the effect of 
a drop from a certain height on the skull of an infant. He performed experiments on 
the corpses of two other infants, by dropping them on their heads from different 
heights. The court held that such experiments, while abhorrent, did not support a 
claim for interference in a property right in a corpse.138 It was accepted that there 
were quasi-property rights in corpses, but they did not amount to the constitutional 
protection guaranteed by the due process clause.  
 
The major distinction between a property right and a quasi-property right is 
the basis in which the law is grounded. The quasi-property right does not relate to the 
injury to the dead body, but rather whether the improper actions cause emotional or 
physical pain and suffering to the surviving family members.139 Even if the dead body 
is damaged in some way, there will be no redress if the parties were not demonstrably 
affected by it. Thus, as was discussed in Colavito,140 quasi-property is not an adequate 
solution to the body parts conundrum, because of the need to address the ongoing 
control of the retention and use of body parts and the sharing of profits arising from 
biotechnological inventions, rather than just the harm to relatives.141
 
VI        SHOULD PROPERTY IN A DEAD BODY BE RECOGNISED? 
 
A Societal Changes 
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On the few occasions the courts dealt with body parts, they only used property 
terminology as a last resort. Cadavers were treated differently from other inanimate 
objects, because medical science was insufficiently advanced to remove organs from 
the living, and there were compelling public health reasons to prevent access to dead 
bodies, other than for disposal. There were no medical reasons for such access, except 
for educational purposes.  
 
Society has changed markedly since the times of Coke and Blackstone. The 
ecclesiastical influence has disappeared, and New Zealand society is multi-cultural 
and mainly secular. Handling human tissue now has minimal health and safety risks 
and it can be used in many previously inconceivable ways. The societal pressures that 
previously pointed away from lawfully possessing and using human tissue from 
cadavers now point towards it. As stated by Matthews:142
 
The non-property solutions of yesterday are inadequate to the task of today. That 
does not mean that a property analysis is the only - or even the best - way to deal 
with that task, but it at least invites the inquiry. If the answer is favourable, 
property law could be developed to the right level.  
 
B          Conflicting Interests 
 
The common law essentially sees property as a negative concept, in that it 
confers a right to exclude others.143 As stated by Price:144
  
Whilst property rights may entitle one to take action, typically for damages, 
against specific individuals, property rights are rights against the world and permit 
the potential continuing exercise of control with respect to the items concerned.  
 
Living persons have continuing interests in their tissue,145 including being able 
to control the uses to which such tissue may be put. At present, the family has an 
interest in ensuring the proper disposal of the body and the executor has a duty in this 
regard, but neither owns it. This does not provide an independent basis for donating, 
utilising or selling the cadaver. Consequently, in the absence of specific legislative 
provision, there appears to be little justification for allowing the family to consent in 
the absence of any prior consent by the deceased. However, if a cadaver is property, 
the representative would have ownership rights, but would be required to carry out the 
deceased’s instructions. Consequently, the interests of the previously living person 
would trump those of relatives.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
The arguments against this include the concern that if doctors harvest organs 
in the face of family opposition, there is the potential for distressing altercations with, 
or between, family members, in very highly charged emotional circumstances. New 
Zealand is a multi-cultural society, and different cultural values may be reflected 
within one family, resulting in potential conflicts about organ donation, or even in the 
type of funeral that is appropriate.  
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Publicity arising from disputes might to give rise to implications of “body 
snatching”, leading to a loss of trust in the medical profession and, potentially, an 
increased number of people deciding not to donate. Further, even if family objections 
are overridden, in most cases it is necessary that the family co-operates by providing 
the donor’s medical and social history, or the organs may not be able to be used.146  
 
Despite these arguments, this thesis favours decision-making by a 
representative because it would ensure compliance with the wishes of the deceased. 
 
C         Retention of Tissue Samples 
 
Different values are commonly given to whole organs than to tissue 
samples.147 There is an emotional distinction and the purpose of retention is different. 
As microscopic examination of tissues is an integral part of an autopsy, pathologists 
argue that consent to autopsy includes the retention of blocks of tissue preserved in 
paraffin for the preparation of microscopic slides and microscopic diagnosis. Removal 
of organs from bodily cavities is also an essential part of an autopsy. Normally, these 
are replaced in the body cavity and retention may not be justified. However, 
sometimes retention is necessary for diagnostic purposes. For example, the brain may 
have to be fixed in formalin for several weeks before it can be properly examined.148 
If the brain is to be reunited with the body once the examination is complete, the 
funeral would need to be postponed for several weeks, which is likely to be 
distressing to families and culturally unacceptable to Māori.  
 
Since the early 1990s, if organs are retained for further examination, the next-
of-kin are informed and advised of the likely delay. They then have the choice of 
leaving the body in the mortuary until the retained organs could be replaced, or 
collecting it for the funeral and dealing with the retained organ later.149 However, the 
Greenlane Hospital heart retentions demonstrate that these processes were not always 
followed. 
 
D        Respect 
 
Some people perceive a link between respecting dead bodies and respecting 
living persons, in that treatment of dead bodies as “spare parts” might lead to 
deterioration of our treatment of each other during life, because of adverse social 
learning. Although the learning effects from the symbolism of social practices are 
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empirically uncertain, they may be important for the development of societal norms of 
mutual aid and respect.150  
  
 An alternative argument is that maintaining respect for the dead by preserving 
the bodily integrity of cadavers has little effect in maintaining respect for the living. 
From this viewpoint, respect for the dead relates to the intangible, rather than physical 
aspects, of the former person. Thus, it neither shows disrespect for the dead nor 
discounts the value of their lives if their bodies are used to preserve life in others.  
 
Emotional attachment to the dead exists in most cultures, as is demonstrated 
by burial rituals.151 The families involved in the unconsented retentions at Greenlane 
hospital did not dispute that the retained hearts were used for the benefit of other 
children, through improvements in surgical techniques. Despite this, many stated that 
the retention was unacceptable and disrespected their deceased child. Some stated that 
they might have consented, if asked. This suggests that even though the alleviation of 
suffering is valued, it must be weighed along with other values. A system of organ 
procurement that disrespects these values would be socially and politically 
unacceptable.152 An advantage of the proposed framework is that it is sufficiently 
flexible to allow respect for the wide variety of viewpoints in a pluralistic society.153
 
PART II 
 
 This Part will consider the present legislation and then compare the provisions 
of the UKHTA with the Human Tissue Bill (HTB), to assess whether the aims of this 
thesis have been achieved by either. 
 
I     PRESENT FRAMEWORK 
 
The present law relating to body parts is derived from the common law, the 
Human Tissue Act 1964 (HTA)154 the Coroners Act 1988 and the Coroners Act 2006, 
which apply to cadavers and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ 
Rights (the Code) which applies to living persons.155  
 
The HTA applies if tissues are taken from a dead body for any reason other 
than to determine the cause of death. Section 3 relates to the removal of human body 
parts for therapeutic purposes, medical education, or research. It does not apply to the 
use of the whole body, as it refers to the removal from the body of any part; thus, 
whole bodies fall within the common law. The HTA emphasises consent, but does not 
provide for property rights in a corpse or parts of it.156 The Coroners Act requires the 
coroner’s consent for the removal of organs, if an inquest or post-mortem is required.  
 
The HTA provides: 
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•       Organs may be removed for therapeutic use if the donor has made a specific 
 request that his or her body, or a specific part of it, be so used.  This may be in 
 writing, or oral in the presence of two witnesses if during the donor’s last 
 illness; 
• The person lawfully in possession of the body may authorise the removal of 
 organs, according to the request; 
• The person lawfully in possession of the body is not required to act on the        
 request. In practice, this discretion means donation does not occur if opposed 
 by the immediate family;157
• If no request has been made, the person lawfully in possession of the body 
 may  authorise removal of the organs for therapeutic purposes if, after such 
 reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, that person has no reason to believe 
 that the deceased had expressed an objection to such use, or that the surviving 
 spouse or relatives so object.158
 
If authority has been given in these circumstances, both the removal and 
transplantation are lawful, provided that they are performed by a registered medical 
practitioner,159 who must be satisfied by a personal examination of the body that life 
is extinct.160
 
Section 2 provides that, without limiting the rights, powers or duties of any 
person entitled under any rule of law to the possession of any body, for the purposes 
of the Act, the Medical Superintendent or other medical officer in charge of any 
hospital, or Superintendent of any penal institution is deemed to be lawfully in 
possession of any body lying in the relevant institution. 
 
The hospital’s right to possession cannot limit the relatives’ or executor’s 
rights under any rule of law. Consequently, if a relative or executor claims that 
possessory right, they have the power to authorise or refuse removal and 
transplantation of organs.  The hospital can only act in the absence of such right being 
asserted. However, a person entrusted with a body only for the purpose of burial or 
cremation cannot give the authority for the removal of organs.161
 
The Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs states that, if 
the deceased has expressed a wish, in accordance with the Act, that the relevant parts 
of the body may be used after their death for therapeutic purposes, there is no legal 
requirement to establish lack of objection on the part of the relatives.162 It does 
recognise the reluctance of medical professionals to harvest organs in the face of 
objections by relatives, by providing that, in such circumstances, the person lawfully 
in possession of the body may decline to authorise the removal.163 This may also have 
                                                 
157 Kidney Foundation of New Zealand The Gift of Life (Kidney Foundation of New Zealand, 
Wellington, 1995) 3. 
158 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 3(2). 
159 Human Tissue Act 1964, ss 2(1), 3(3) and 3(4). 
160 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 3(4). 
161 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 3(6). 
162 Department of Health A Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs (Department of 
Health, Wellington, 1987) 2. 
163 Department of Health, above, 2. 
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been acknowledgment of the common law rights of relatives over the remains of 
family members. Lamb has argued there is an inconsistency in that “if we uphold the 
right not to donate, as a right which cannot be vetoed, then the right to donate without 
veto should also exist.”164
 
Approximately 43 per cent of drivers’ licence holders have indicated that they 
wish to be donors.165 Many people believe that the notations on their  licences are 
binding, although they are inadequate for the purposes of the HTA. However, notation 
provides an indication of the person’s wishes at the time the application was made. 
The form states that, in the event of the licence holder’s death, family will be asked 
for their agreement to the donation of organs even if the “yes” box has been ticked. It 
does not allow the person to indicate which organs they might wish to donate, nor 
does it provide information about the processes involved, such as brain death. It does 
not advise how to revoke the notation, should the decision  change. 
 
Stating a preference at a given time may be an imperfect index of the person’s 
preferences, or their intensity. When a person applies for a driver’s licence, there is 
generally no perceived immediacy to a question about willingness to be an organ 
donor.  Alternatively, it could be argued that decision making in the face of an 
immediate crisis is less likely to be reflective decision making, because of the 
immediate demands of the situation. There is no ideal time for such consent - reality 
may always be too far, or too near. 
 
Neither the relatives, nor any other person lawfully in possession of the body, 
have any “right of consent” to the use of a dead body under the HTA. Consent is only 
relevant in that it is implied within the expressed wish of the deceased that the body 
be used for medical or scientific purposes. In its absence, no one else can actively 
consent. However, the person lawfully in possession of the body can authorise the use 
of the body, provided that, after having made such reasonable inquiry as may be 
practicable, there is no reason to believe that the deceased had expressed any 
objection to organ removal, nor that the surviving spouse or relative objects to the 
body being so dealt with. Thus, theoretically, consent given by those in possession of 
the body does not remove the potential veto through dissent that any relative might 
express. 
 
Many people believe that the preferred approach to organ donation is for the 
individual to decide the issue prior to death. Only 14 per cent of respondents in a 
survey of more than 1,000 adults in the United States believed that the issue should be 
decided by family members,166 and only about a half of those wishing to donate had 
told their family.167  
 
                                                 
164 David Lamb Organ Transplants and Ethics (Routledge, London, 1990) 145. 
165 Ministry of Health Review of the Regulation of Human Tissue and Tissue-based Therapies 
(Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2004) 64 <http://www.moh.govt.nz> (last accessed 23 April 2004). 
166 A Spital “Mandated Choice: A Plan to Increase Public Commitment to Organ Donation” (1995) 273 
JAMA 504, 505. 
167 US Department of Health and Human Services “Clinton Administration Launches National Organ 
and Tissue Donation Initiative” Press Release (15 December 1997) 
<http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1997pres/971215a.html> (last accessed 12 April 2005). 
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The Body Parts Tissues and Substances Review Panel concluded: 168
 
The Human Tissue Act recognises the deceased’s right to consent to tissue or 
organs being used after death, however in practice clinicians will not do so against 
the express objection of family members. The panel acknowledges that this is a 
difficult issue. The majority consider that the prior informed consent of the 
deceased person should prevail and be respected.  
 
This thesis supports this view, as the major weakness of the current organ 
donation system is that far fewer organs are available than are needed.169 Difficulties 
with the HTA include: 
 
•  defining the concept of the “person lawfully in possession of the body”; 
• uncertainty about the legality of common procedures, such as preserving 
organs for transplant by way of the insertion of a catheter into the femoral 
artery and the injection of cooling solution after death. Although the HTA 
permits the use of the body for therapeutic purposes, it presupposes the 
removal of the relevant parts for such purposes; 
• defining who is a “relative”; 
• interpreting the phrase “such reasonable enquiry as may be practical”, to 
ascertain objections to organ harvest. Skegg has suggested that generally all 
that is required is to enquire of “either the spouse or a close relative whether 
he or she has reason to believe that the deceased had expressed an objection, 
or whether some other person whose objection is relevant objects”;170 and 
• lack of any provisions providing for sanctions in the event of a breach.  
 
II COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM HUMAN TISSUE 
ACT AND THE HUMAN TISSUE BILL 
  
 Commentators have expressed concerns about the low rate of organ donation 
in New Zealand and dissatisfaction with the HTA. Consequently, the Ministry of 
Health undertook public consultation during 2004, leading to the introduction of the 
Human Tissue Bill (HTB) in November 2006. The Bill attempts to address the 
concerns, but this thesis asserts that the processes it establishes are unsatisfactory, 
particularly with regard to the consent regime. 
 
 The UKHTA covers all human tissue, whereas the HTB relates to body parts 
from the dead, trading in tissue, export and import, and use for non-therapeutic 
purposes. The collection and use of tissue from the living will remain within the Code 
and the common law. An exception is that the Bill covers analysis of tissue from the 
                                                 
168 Auckland District Health Board Body Parts Tissue and Substances Review Panel Report (Auckland 
District Health Board, Auckland, 2002) 22. 
169 During 2005, there were 29 deceased donors and no non heart beating donors. Organ Donation in 
New Zealand Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation in New Zealand: 2005 Report 6 
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170 P D G Skegg “Human Tissue Act 1964” (1976) 16 Med  Sci  Law 197; see also  Department of 
Health Code of Practice for Transplantation of Cadaveric Organs (Department of Health, Wellington, 
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living, if this is not in the course of a health care procedure. It also covers the use after 
death, for a secondary purpose, of tissue taken from the living. 
 
A  Structure  
 
Part 1 of the UKHTA outlines the activities for which consent is required and 
the criminal penalties that may apply if consent is not obtained. Part 2 sets up an 
infrastructure to monitor the regulated activities. It describes the remit and 
membership of the Human Tissue Authority and lists the activities for which a licence 
must be obtained from the Authority. Provisions in this Part also regulate organ 
donation and create a criminal offence for commercial dealings (“trafficking”) in a 
limited range of transplantable material. Part 3 includes definitions and a criminal 
offence for holding DNA with a view to analysing it without consent.  
 
Part I of the HTB gives the purposes and an overview of the bill and defines 
the terms used, Part II covers the lawful collection and use of all tissue, the consent 
required for collection and use from cadavers, the consent required for genetic testing 
other than during a health care procedure, and secondary uses after the living donor’s 
death.  Part III creates offences for breaches, such as trading in human tissue. 
 
B Human Tissue Authority 
 
The UKHTA established an over-arching authority to rationalise existing 
regulation of activities like transplantation and anatomical examination, and regulate 
other activities, like post-mortem examinations and the storage of human materials for 
education, training and research.171 The Human Tissue Authority has a licensing remit 
similar to that of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.172 A variety of 
activities must be licensed and the Secretary of State may, by regulation, add to, 
remove, or alter the activities to which the section applies.173 This allows for 
relatively rapid changes; however, there may be a lack of Parliamentary, and thus 
public scrutiny of many of the key aspects of the legislation and subsequent changes.  
 
Although this thesis suggests that a similar authority is necessary in New 
Zealand,174 the HTB does not propose the establishment of a human tissue authority. 
It is extraordinary that the need for an overarching body is recognised in the area of 
assisted reproduction,175 yet no such body is to be established with regard to human 
tissue, a sensitive area similarly affected by new technologies.  
C Application 
The UKHTA applies to “relevant material”, defined as “material, other than 
gametes, which consists of or includes human cells”,176 but excluding hair and nails 
                                                 
171 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 14. United Kingdom Parliament Human Tissue Bill: Explanatory 
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173 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 16(4). 
174 See chapter 8. 
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from a living person and embryos outside the human body.”177 This definition does 
not distinguish between bodies, body parts, tissues or cells that may be derived from 
the human body, or the technological artefacts being generated from human materials. 
Thus, no distinction is made between a whole organ removed post-mortem and a few 
cells taken as a biopsy, for diagnostic purposes.  
Similarly, the HTB applies to human tissue or tissue which is derived from 
material collected from a living individual or from a cadaver and includes human 
cells, but does not include an in vitro human embryo or in vitro human gamete. Cell 
lines derived from human cells are human tissue only for the purposes of clauses 48 
and 63, which relate to standards for collection and use of human tissue for non-
therapeutic purposes and standards for export and import of human tissue.178 
Consequently, profit-sharing, in situations such as that in Moore179 have not been 
addressed. Thus, the HTB covers whole bodies, body parts and organs, blood, cell 
lines derived from tissue, stillborn and foetal material, bodily substances that are 
excreted or shed by the body naturally, such as hair and urine, but excludes material 
covered under the HART Act. 
D Consent 
 
Section 1 of the UKHTA contains a mandatory requirement to seek consent 
before carrying out most activities that use cells, tissues or organs of a deceased 
person. It revises the law governing the storage and use of tissues obtained from 
living persons and even if tissue might be described as “waste” or “abandoned” that 
does not mean that a third party can take control of it and use it for their own 
purposes.180 Coroners’ investigations are an exception to the consent rule, but the Act 
is silent about when consent is needed to bury a corpse.  
 
 The notion of consent is the fundamental concept unifying the UKHTA, 
described as its “golden thread”.181 The scope and specificity of “appropriate 
consent”182 is not set out on the face of the Act and these facets will be determined by 
the Human Tissue Authority or fall to the common law. Commentators have stated 
that the legislation should rectify the lack of clarity within the common law about the 
scope and specificity of consent.183  
 
 The UKHTA only specifies that written consent (from the now-deceased 
person) is required for anatomical examination and the public display of corpses. 
Consequently, the implication is that explicit consent is not necessarily required in 
                                                 
177 Gametes and embryos are partially regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
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other circumstances. However, the UKHTA appears to favour the notion of positive 
consent, rather than a psychological state inferred from a lack of objection. Article 22 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that a 
part of the human body may only be used for a purpose other than that for which it 
was removed where it is done in conformity with appropriate information and consent 
procedures. This indicates that consent is required for each use, which would involve 
recontacting individuals. This is not the intention of the UKHTA, which appears to 
envisage generic and enduring consent for “research”. 
 
 Similarly, the HTB establishes a consent framework for the collection, use, 
retention and disposal for therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes of tissue from 
cadavers. Informed consent is required for genetic testing of tissue taken from living 
people, in circumstances where the Code does not apply. It is also required for use 
after death for secondary purposes of tissue taken from a living person. The consent 
for use of cadavers is consistent with that in the Code184 and the definition of 
informed consent is broadly consistent with that in the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994.185  
 
  The consent structure is one of the weaknesses in the bill. Organ harvest will 
require the formally recorded consent of the source, or a person nominated by the 
source to make the decision.186 There is no requirement that the nominee should do as 
instructed by the deceased or make the decision that they believe the deceased would 
have wished. Clause 45 provides that the consent given by the deceased or the 
nominee will override any objection by the family or the person lawfully in 
possession of the body. However, it only says the consent may be acted upon and it is 
likely that doctors will continue to be unwilling to “snatch” a body in the face of 
objections by family members. This thesis also recommends that the consent of the 
source should be paramount, but requires the representative to act as the deceased 
instructed. 
 
 The HTB provides that if “no consent can be given” by the source or the 
nominee, then the decision will be made by a “majority” of the immediate family.187 
The definition of “immediate family” is contestable, particularly where more than one 
culture is represented in the family- a common situation in New Zealand. If no 
consent can be given by the immediate family, the HTB provides for decision-making 
by a “senior available next of kin”.188  This process could result in persons who wish 
to harvest organs continuing to seek consent until a family member is found who will 
give consent. The weaknesses of this process include its complexity, which it is likely 
to lead to conflicts within families and the potential for delays, which may result in 
the organs being unusable or the source being retained on life support in a brain dead 
condition for an extended period while consent is obtained. Despite the wish to 
increase the numbers of organs available, this should not be achieved by continuing 
                                                 
184 Ministry of Health, above, 6. 
185 Human Tissue Bill, clause 7. 
186 Human Tissue Bill, clause 28. 
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non-beneficial treatment of unconscious patients. People often express concerns that 
their death will be hastened, or that it will be unnecessarily prolonged, in order to 
enable the harvest of organs.  
 
 Clause 3 states that a purpose of the Act is to ensure that collection and use of 
human tissue occurs only with proper respect for the autonomy and dignity of the 
source, so it seems extraordinary that there is no requirement to respect sources’ vetos 
(or refusals of consent). There is no provision stating that a veto trumps subsequent 
familial consent. It is not even clear whether clause 41 would mean that a veto put on 
the organ register would prevent harvest, as “other donor information” as defined 
does not include a refusal. However, it is a criminal offence to collect or use tissue 
from cadavers without consent, although that does not necessarily mean the consent 
of the source, or even that families have to do what the deceased would have wished. 
  
A national organ and tissue donor register is being established and those 
proposing to collect organs or tissue will be required to take all reasonable steps 
(including consulting the responsible person189 and checking the register) to 
ascertain whether consent was given.190 The disadvantages  of a register include  its 
cost in light of the small number of potential donors,191 and the likelihood that donor 
rates might drop in the short term, as low numbers on the register are anticipated 
initially and it might be assumed from the absence of an entry that the deceased did 
not wish to donate.  In other countries with consent registers, they have had little 
impact on donor rates, as professionals continue to consider it unreasonable to 
retrieve organs without family consent. However, the proposal in this thesis that the 
representative be required to implement the wishes of the deceased would change 
this emphasis. 
 
E    When Consent Required 
 
The UKHTA provides that the purposes for which consent will normally be 
required for storage and use of tissue are:192
 
• Anatomical examination; 
• Determining the cause of death; 
• Establishing after death the efficacy of a drug or treatment; 
• Obtaining scientific or medical information about a living or dead person 
which may be relevant to another person (including a future person); 
• Public display; 
• Research in connection with disorders, or the functioning of, the human body; 
• Transplantation 
 
                                                 
189 The responsible person is the person lawfully in possession of the body, such as the person in charge 
of a hospital; Human Tissue Bill, schedule 1. 
190 Human Tissue Bill, clause 42. 
191 There are only around 100 potential deceased donors in New Zealand each year ( those with organs 
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192 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), Schedule 1, part 1.   
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No consent is required for the use or storage for any specified purpose of any 
existing holding from the human tissue archive which was held immediately before 
the day on which the relevant part of the Act comes into effect.  
 
Part 2 of schedule 1 sets out purposes for which consent will not normally be 
required, with regard to tissue taken from living persons. These are clinical audit, 
education or training relating to human health, public health monitoring, quality 
assurance and performance assessments. Consequently, clinical audit procedures are 
exempt while research on such tissue will usually require consent. Similarly there is 
little distinction between public health monitoring and epidemiological “research”.  
Regulations may allow the High Court to issue an order dispensing with the need for 
consent for research on tissue from living or dead persons in connection with 
disorders or the functioning of the human body, where this is in the public interest.193 
This is intended to address extraordinary circumstances and would allow the court to 
override a refusal of consent to the removal of material from a dead person. 
  
The UKHTA provides that it is lawful for material that came from a person’s 
body in the course of treatment, testing or research, which has ceased to be used or 
stored for use, to be dealt with as waste,194 but it does not specify the status of this 
waste.195  
 
The HTB will establish a consent framework for the collection and therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic uses of body parts, including the retention and disposal of human 
tissue from bodies. There will be a requirement, subject to some exceptions, for 
informed consent for analysis of tissue taken from living people where the Code does 
not apply and the analysis is for the purpose of obtaining genetic or other information 
about a particular actual or potential condition, or trait, of the source. There will also 
be a requirement for informed consent for use for a secondary purpose, after the 
donor's death, of tissue taken from living persons. 
 
F Research  
 
One contentious aspect of the original UK Bill was whether generic consent 
would be sufficient to permit the research use of tissue. If not, further consent would 
be required if the tissue was to be used for research projects, or projects not explicitly 
consented to.196 Doctors argued that it would be impossible to take and record 
consents and that specific consent is unnecessary, as most patients are happy to have 
tissue that is taken from them used for research and teaching.197 Such willingness 
equally supports an argument that consent should be obtained. However, there are 
logistical and thus budgetary implications involved in obtaining and recording 
consents. 
 
The government acceded to the demands of biomedical researchers, and so, the 
UKHTA criminalises the retention and use of tissue for “research in connection with 
disorders, or the functioning, of the human body” unless the material has come from a 
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living person,198 the research is ethically approved199 and the person from whom the 
material came cannot be identified.200 It also includes “obtaining scientific or medical 
information about a living or deceased person which may be relevant to any other 
person (including a future person).”201
 
This has compromised the philosophy of the legislation and the logistical 
concerns could have been addressed by requiring the recording of objections to 
research use in general, or certain types, of research. If the majority of people would 
have no objection, this would have been less administratively onerous than recording 
all consents. This thesis argues that, even if the material is anonymised, human 
sources retain an interest in their biological materials.  They may oppose certain types 
of research, based on their cultural, ethical or spiritual values.202
 
  In New Zealand, the Code states that consumers must be informed of any 
proposed participation in teaching or research, including being informed whether the 
research requires and has received ethical approval.203 It also requires that consent to 
participate in research, as part of a health care procedure, must be informed consent, 
and must be given in writing.204 However, Right 7(10) permits unconsented research 
use, utilising samples that are not necessarily anonymised, with ethics committee 
approval.205
 
The HTB provides that where consent was obtained for one purpose, but a 
secondary purpose is proposed, consent to the secondary use must, in general, be 
obtained.206 However, there will be certain limited circumstances where the public 
good associated with the use of tissue will outweigh informed consent 
requirements.207 These provisions are based on the amendments to Right 7(10) of the 
Code.208 It will make certain exceptions on the need to obtain consent,209 including 
that retained tissue may be tested or disposed of, if that is necessary to avoid 
endangering public health or safety or where, despite all reasonable attempts, the 
tissue has not been able to be returned to a family member.210 Also, the consent 
provisions will not cover existing holdings of tissue or existing anatomical 
specimens of educational, historical or other cultural significance that were retrieved 
from a human body prior to the legislation coming into force. This will include tissue 
held by museums, schools of anatomy, and medical schools.211   
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The HTB extends the provision in Right 7(10) of the Code to human tissue 
from cadavers and provides that unconsented use secondary purposes is permissible, 
with ethics committee consent, even if the committee knew that informed consent 
had not been and would not be obtained for the research.212 The meaning of this 
provision is unclear, but it is unfortunate if it includes a situation where it is known 
that the source would not have wanted to research to proceed. 
 
This thesis proposes greater emphasis on the autonomy of the source of the 
material, arguing that only in the case of extant material should unconsented use be 
permitted of material obtained from living or dead bodies and then only if the 
material is anonymised and the research is not of a sensitive nature.213 This is 
because the sources may be untraceable or dead and a requirement for individual 
consent might have the effect of rendering existing biobanks unusable for research. 
With future collection, it is argued that the source, or the representative of a dead 
source, must give consent to specified research or authorisation for unspecified 
future research. 
  
G Surrogate consent 
 
The UKHTA provides that “appropriate consent” refers to the consent given 
by the deceased, prior to death. If an adult person made no decision, consent may be 
given by a “nominated representative”, if appointed. If not, then a person who stood 
in a “qualifying relationship”214 immediately prior to death may consent. With 
children, consent may be given by a parent, or a person who stood in a qualifying 
relationship to the child. Once the consent of one qualifying relative has been given, 
no other relative can veto that consent. Consequently, a relative who knows of an 
objection by the deceased might be unable to dispute the decision of a relative of the 
same, or higher, rank. Thus, there is a need for a mechanism to record objections or 
for a concerted effort to encourage people to appoint a representative. 
 
 The HTB provides that sources can appoint nominees to give consent after the 
source’s death.215 The appointment may be made orally (before two witnesses), in 
writing, or in the source’s will.  
 
 A person over 16 is presumed to be capable of giving consent or making a 
nomination.216 The senior available next of kin of a deceased child under the age of 
16 years is a parent, but if no parent is available, it is a guardian of the child and, if 
the child died with no available guardian, then it is a sibling over the age of 16. 
 
 The Gillick approach is not followed with regard to children under the age of 
16 and their capacity is based solely on their age. This is contrary to the widely 
accepted approach based on actual competence.217 A child under 16 will be able to 
                                                 
212 Human Tissue Bill, clause 23. See the discussion of the amendment to Right 7(10) in chapter 3. 
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 78
consent to the non-therapeutic collection or use of tissue to be used for genetic testing, 
but they can not consent to anything else under the Bill, apparently because it is 
difficult to decide after death whether a child was competent. However, the same 
concerns could apply to an adult who was impaired prior to death. This thesis 
recommends a Gillick approach to consent by children.218
 
 The HTB provides for a “responsible person” who is “the person lawfully in 
possession of the body”. The responsible person will, if consulted by a person 
proposing to harvest tissue from a cadaver, “help” that person to ascertain whether 
appropriate consent has been given.219 The nature of such help in unclear, but 
intensivists will doubtless continue to believe that there are circumstances in which it 
is inappropriate to make an approach to the family of a prospective donor. This thesis 
recommends a less complex provision- that the institution may proceed with the 
arrangements for organ harvest if the person in control believes in good faith that 
consent has been given. This is particularly important as the bill introduces criminal 
liability for collection and use without consent.220
 
H Organ donation 
 
The cadaveric transplantation consent regime in the UKHTA is similar to the 
previous practice in the United Kingdom, which has operated an explicit consent 
policy for many years. The Act will probably increase the influence of relatives, as 
most people have expressed no opinion about donation prior to death. Although the 
British Medical Association argued for a presumed consent law, this was not accepted 
by the government.  
 
Presumed consent is not proposed in New Zealand and the HTB emphasises 
the role of the family. Although this thesis also recommends a priority list of persons 
to make the decision should the deceased fail to do so or appoint a representative, the 
structure is much simpler and has a priority list of decision-makers. Thus, the process 
would involve less delay and minimise family disputes.   
 
Section 33 of the UKHTA provides that living organ donation or 
transplantation from a living donor is illegal, unless the Secretary for State has by 
regulation permitted this to take place and the Human Tissue Authority is satisfied 
that no reward has been given. This applies to both genetically related and non-related 
donors. No such provision is proposed in New Zealand, and consent to living organ 
donation remains within the Code. However, this thesis argues that aspects of living 
donor transplantation, such as sibling donation, require oversight by an independent 
authority.221
 
I Commercialisation 
 
The UKHTA prohibits trafficking in human material intended for the purposes 
of transplantation,222 unless the person engaging in the activity is designated by the 
                                                 
218 See chapter 6. 
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221. See the discussion in chapter 8. 
222 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32. 
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Human Tissue Authority as a person who may lawfully do so.223 It does not impose a 
broader prohibition on commercial dealings in bodily material and it exempts 
gametes, embryos,224 hair and nails from a living person, and material that is the 
subject of property because of an application of human skill.225 Initially, this 
provision also applied to commercialisation of human material for purposes such as 
research, but the bill was amended in light of concerns from companies involved in 
drug development and other work involving human tissue. Thus, the distinction 
between tissue to be used for transplantation and tissue for other purposes fails to 
fully comply with Article 21 of the Council of Europe Biomedicine Convention. 
 
Human organs and tissue are frequently processed in complex ways, requiring 
the investment of work and skill. The UKHTA exempts such products from 
regulation, as they are the property of the scientist or technician who has applied skill 
in the manufacture. However, it is not specified how much, or how little, skill has to 
be applied to human tissue to make it the subject of property rights.226 There seems 
little conceptual basis to continue this dubious construct which has its basis in the 
common law.227 It will not, of itself, prevent the commission of offences by 
commercial companies or remove the contradictions within the common law as to the 
status of body parts.  
 
Section 4(7) provides that material shall not be regarded as from a human 
body if it is created outside the human body. Thus, once a cell line is created, it 
appears to be exempt from the provisions of the Act, although the human source 
would have had to consent to use of the initial cells. The point at which sufficient 
work and skill has been applied to transmute the possessory right in the cells into a 
property right in the cell line is unclear. An alternative interpretation of the UKHTA 
is that, as the cell line was created outside the body, the Act does not apply anyway. 
The source will only be able to recover expenses, but the material will be able to be 
sold by research institutes, subject to the permission of the Authority.  
 
The HTB will prohibit the sale and purchase of tissue (including blood) from 
both living and deceased people, with exemptions if it is in the public interest to allow 
such sale or purchase, and it is authorised in writing by the Minister of Health and 
gazetted.228  This provision will authorise hospitals, and the like, to purchase tissue 
for audit, diagnosis or treatment and receive payment for the expenses incurred in the 
processing of tissue.  Researchers will also be able purchase tissue or imported cell 
lines for research purposes. The current policy of allowing welfare assistance for 
living donors would not be affected by this provision.  
 
The HTB does not address the fundamental injustice of permitting parties 
other than the source to treat body parts as property and thus commercialise them or 
the issues of profit sharing that are addressed by the framework proposed in this 
thesis. However, it seems to acknowledge that such parts are property once they pass 
from the control of the source. 
                                                 
223 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32(3). 
224 Gametes and embryos are regulated under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK). 
225 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32(a). 
226 See the discussion above.  
227 See the discussion above. 
228 Human Tissue Bill clauses 54—58. 
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J Philosophical bases  
 
Neither the UKHTA nor the HTB specify what rights or interests are breached 
if tissue is stored or used without consent. Price states: “The failure to obtain consent 
is not a wrong per se; it is not ethically or legally ‘self-supporting’.”229 He argues that 
informed consent relates to medical procedures on living persons, where the person is 
able to weigh the benefits and risks in deciding whether to undergo a procedure that is 
potentially harmful and may compromise personal integrity.230 In the case of donation 
of tissue for research or transplantation, any rights do not relate to the infringement of 
personal integrity in the same sense. 
 
During the Parliamentary debates, it was stated that the UKHTA was based on 
the right of an individual to control body materials. However it is not clear whether 
these rights are autonomy rights, privacy rights, dignity rights or property rights. The 
rhetoric of ownership was expressed in the House of Commons231 when it was stated 
that “we all own our bodies.”232 Despite this, Price asserts that government had no 
intention of altering the established “no property” rule.233  
 
 Similarly, the New Zealand Cabinet paper stated: “It has long been 
considered a matter of common law that there is no property in the body of a deceased 
person.”234 That document then extrapolated that dubious construct235 to propose that 
tissue may not be sold by the source. 
 
Price argues that the UKHTA is: 236
 
…philosophically grounded in property rights and interests even despite the 
modifications to the Bill obviating the need for consent, but which in any event 
apply only to non-identifiable tissue as regards research. 
 
Both the UKHTA and the HTB protect the source’s right to control excised 
body parts, while denying that property rights are the rationale for such control. Thus, 
the basis of both appears to be the infringement of personal integrity.237
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
It has been frequently stated that in English law, there is no property in a 
corpse, thus it cannot be bequeathed. This means that there are people who have 
rights, duties and liabilities with respect to a corpse, although not proprietary rights, 
but these are not the deceased persons themselves.  
                                                 
229 David Price “The Human Tissue Act 2004” (2005) 68 MLR 798, 815. 
230 Price, above, 815. 
231 Dr Ladyman “The fundamental principle that we must apply to interpreting the Bill is that material 
provided by people from their own body is theirs to control, and they must consent to how it is used.” 
HC Standing Committee G col 59 27 January 2004. 
232 House of Commons, above, col 65. 
233 Price, above, 816. 
234 Ministry of Health, above, 6. 
235 See the discussion above. 
236 Price, above, 817 (emphasis in original). 
237 See the discussion of personal rights in chapter 1. 
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Excised body parts or cadavers have the characteristics of “things”, distinct 
from the person from whose body they were derived and thus are amenable to notions 
of property. It is necessary to decide who has rights over the corpse, in terms of 
controlling or authorising its use. Possessory rights are granted for specific purposes 
to coroners, next of kin, and executors. Possession includes the right of control and 
yet the traditional view is that there are no property interests in dead bodies or excised 
body parts, in the absence of work having been carried out to change the nature of the 
body or body part.  
 
 The HTB proposes a complex consent regime, with scant protection for the 
right to refuse consent for the collection of body parts from the dead. At each level, if 
consent is not forthcoming, the person wishing to harvest the organs may seek consent 
from a person on the next level. Organ collection will only require consent from one 
family member and a lack of expressed opposition from the others. This is 
insufficiently respectful of the autonomy rights of the living to control what happens 
to their bodies after death and is likely to result in family disputes. 
 
This thesis proposes legislation which provides that a property interest held by 
the deceased person arises briefly at the point of death. After death, that interest will 
pass to the representative or if the deceased failed to appoint a representative, the 
highest person on the priority list.238 Direct evidence of the deceased’s wishes would 
be honoured irrespective of the views of relatives, as with the disposition of other 
property by way of a will. If the deceased appointed a representative, but expressed no 
preferences as to the disposition of the body, the representative would have the 
decision-making power, based either on substituted judgment, or in accord with the 
representative’s own preferences.  
 
This approach is similar to that in the UKHTA and reflects the individualistic, 
libertarian nature of our culture. However, the individualistic approach may be 
inappropriate in cultures where such decision making is considered a collective 
matter, or where elders or other relatives are considered the appropriate persons to 
make such a decision. In such cultures, individual property interests in the human 
body may be culturally offensive. The proposed framework would be sufficiently 
flexible to encompass such a world view, as the source could choose a kaumatua239 as 
the representative and/or instruct the representative to dispose of the body in accord 
with cultural imperatives. Any new framework should only be introduced after careful 
consultation and, in particular, after consideration of Māori cultural preferences.240
 
Some people might argue that to fail to harvest all tissue and organs suitable 
for recycling, or to fail to adopt a system of presumed consent, indicates a lack of 
moral progress in the valuation of human life. However, presumed consent or 
conscription may be perceived as an assault on the autonomy of living persons, who 
wish to control the disposition of their bodies. Relatives may believe they should 
retain control over the corpse of a deceased family member and that their interest 
                                                 
238 See the discussion in chapter 8. An administrator who obtains a grant of administration will assume 
the role of representative. 
239 Elder. 
240 See the discussion in chapter 5. 
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trumps the previous views of the deceased or the needs of prospective organ 
recipients.  
 
These are complex issues and consensus is unlikely. Treating bodies and 
tissues as property would provide strong protection of personal autonomy, but has 
costs in terms of possible losses to the collective interests in transplantation and 
research. The suggested approach treats the cadaver in a similar manner to other 
property and promotes the interests of human sources over the interests of family or 
those who would benefit from use of the cadaver, because of the resultant conceptual 
and practical benefits.   
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Chapter 3 
 
BODY PARTS FROM THE LIVING  
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers body parts excised from living persons. Unlike the 
cases considered in chapter 2, some of which apply the work and skill exemption to 
cadavers, the cases in this chapter tend to be based on public policy considerations 
rather than specifically relying on potentially relevant theories of property, such as 
first occupancy or labour.  
 
This chapter builds on the argument in chapter one that the interests of the 
sources of biological materials would be more effectively achieved by a legislative 
framework incorporating notions of property rights, than relying solely on informed 
consent. It suggests that property rights underlie the present treatment of body parts 
and the denial of them by the courts is little more than a convenient fiction that has 
arisen because of concerns that such rights could chill research and lead to the sale of 
organs.  
 
It also considers whether additional protection is necessary for living organ 
donors and concludes that a property construct alone cannot prevent conflicts of 
interest and protect sources, especially those who are vulnerable. However, it 
concludes that sufficient protection should be achieved through procedural 
guidelines that emphasise a right to withdraw at any stage which, together with the 
professionalism of medical professionals, would result in a refusal to proceed if there 
was apparent reluctance to donate.  
 
II ORGANS AND CELLS 
 
A Moore  
 
John Moore suffered from hairy-cell leukaemia. He consented to treatment 
involving the removal of his spleen, but he was unaware that Dr Golde planned to 
retain part of it for research purposes. His cancerous blood cells possessed T-
lymphocyte features, only the second such recorded occurrence in medical 
literature.1  
 
For seven years he regularly returned, ostensibly for treatment of his 
condition. Samples of blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate and sperm 
were taken and used, without his knowledge, for research. A cell-line was developed 
using genetic engineering, with an estimated commercial value of $US3 billion. 
Moore had not been informed of this use or the value of his tissue.  
 
                                                          
1 A T-lymphocyte is a type of white blood cell. T-lymphocytes produce lymphokines, or proteins, that 
regulate the immune system. Some lymphokines have potential therapeutic value. If the genetic 
material responsible for producing a particular lymphokine can be identified, it can sometimes be 
used to manufacture large quantities of the lymphokine, through the techniques of recombinant DNA. 
Moore’s T-lymphocytes were interesting to the defendants because they overproduced certain 
lymphokines, thus making the corresponding genetic material easier to identify. 
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When he was asked to sign a complex consent form, he refused. However, 
commercial exploitation of his cell line continued, and the name of the cell line was 
altered to avoid detection.  In 1984, the researchers received a patent for the cell line 
and assigned the rights to the University of California. When Moore eventually 
discovered these actions, he sued, seeking damages based on 13 causes of action, 
including conversion of his spleen.  
 
Conversion derived from the common law action of trover. To maintain an 
action in trover, the plaintiff had to allege possession of certain goods, that the goods 
had been lost, that the defendant found the goods and instead of returning them the 
defendant converted the goods to his or her own use. Gradually, the elements of 
losing and finding the goods were not required. The plaintiff needed only to 
demonstrate a right to possession and the fact of conversion of the personal property 
by the defendant. The plaintiff was entitled to damages amounting to the full value of 
the personal property at the time of conversion.  
 
The Californian Court of Appeal held that Moore’s spleen was an item over 
which he had “an unrestricted right [of] … use, enjoyment and disposition and thus it 
fits under the traditional legal provisions of property.”2 It held that Moore could 
claim that the defendants had converted his tissue and held that he had not 
abandoned his spleen. The Court noted that the “intense moral, religious and ethical 
concerns” that could accompany the use of a person’s body or body part without 
consent made an inference of abandonment, even of a diseased organ, 
“inappropriate”.3   
 
The Supreme Court held that spleen cells are not the property of the person 
from whose body they are withdrawn.4 It stated that human biological materials were 
considered by the law as sui generis and their disposition regulated in deference to 
public policy considerations, rather than “abandoning them to the law of personal 
property.”5 It stated that should Moore be granted a property right, this would set a 
precedent that would have a chilling effect on medical research.6 In any event, it was 
not necessary to recognise a property right, as he had an appropriate remedy based 
on lack of informed consent.7 However Broussard J (dissenting) stated:8
 
It is clear under Californian law that a patient has the right, prior to the removal of 
an organ, to control the use to which the organ will be put after removal. It is also 
clear, under traditional common law principles, that this right of a patient to 
control the future use of his organ is protected by the law of conversion. 
 
The majority held that the defendants failed to convert Moore’s cells, because 
he abandoned them when the doctors removed them from his body, but they could 
                                                          
2 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494, 504. 
3 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 510. 
4 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479, 479-97 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J, 
Lucas C J, Eagleson, Arabian  and Kennard JJ concurring, Broussard J (concurring and dissenting), 
Mosk J (dissenting). 
5 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 137 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
6 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 154 Panelli J. 
7 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 164 Panelli J. 
8 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479, 502 (Sup Ct Cal) Broussard J. 
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become the property of the scientists who harvested them and transformed them into 
a valuable cell-line, as a proprietary interest arose once a patent was issued.   
 
1  Policy arguments 
 
The policy arguments supporting the researchers’ property right included: 
 
•  the need to ensure an adequate supply of biological materials; 
•  the importance of economic incentives for research; and  
• the need for certainty of title to research materials.  
 
The Supreme Court held that to allow an action in conversion could hinder 
research and product development by restricting access to necessary raw material. 
However, the court did not point to any empirical evidence that recognition of 
sources’ property rights would chill research. It further argued that such a right 
would damage the free exchange research culture but, as Mosk J stated,9 the 
biotechnology research industry is already commercialised and so there is limited 
free exchange. Both economic incentives and certainty of title are possible if the 
source has title, as this can be transferred by sale or gift and good research practice 
requires adequate record keeping.  
 
Another policy concern was to ensure that parties who engage in socially 
useful activities, such as medical researchers, are not threatened with civil liability. 
Conversion is a strict liability offence, so if a patient owned cells excised from his or 
her body and had not abandoned them, he or she might be entitled to their return or 
to compensation for their market value, even if the researcher did not know that the 
cells belonged to someone else.  
 
Had Moore succeeded in conversion, future researchers could have obtained 
detailed consents, such as the form that Moore refused to sign. As tissues used in 
research usually come from multiple sources and the products are not based directly 
on a specific component in one, a property interest would not necessarily adversely 
impact on the progress of scientific research. Even if it did have some minor impact, 
this thesis argues that such concerns are outweighed by the importance of the 
principle that sources should be able to determine what is done with their body parts.  
 
2  Fiduciary duty 
 
The Court attempted to solve the problem by separating the sticks in the 
bundle, by distinguishing the power to determine disposition from the ability to sell 
and by tying the separation to the different causes of action alleged in the complaint. 
It accordingly upheld the action for breach of fiduciary duty because of the failure to 
secure informed consent, while dismissing the action for conversion.  
 
It held that physicians must tell their patients if they have personal research 
or economic interests unrelated to the patient’s health, which might affect their 
judgment. Breach of fiduciary duty depends on the doctor’s failure to inform the 
patient of circumstances that may affect the patient’s decisions about medical care, 
                                                          
9 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 513, Mosk J. 
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rather than any wish to share in the profits from the doctor’s research. A patient who 
knows that the doctor may derive a benefit from a given course of care may (for 
example) want a second opinion, but that would have been unlikely to change the 
course of treatment. Moore’s leukaemia was life-threatening and removal of his 
spleen was not elective surgery. At most, he might have chosen subsequent care 
closer to home, instead of continuing to travel to California. The doctors’ duty to 
inform him of their potential conflict of interest has little to do with Moore’s desire 
to negotiate the most lucrative arrangement possible, in return for consent to use his 
spleen. This approach can protect patients from physicians who collect tissue, but it 
does not protect them from researchers, employers and other institutions that may be 
collecting or testing tissue samples without the person’s consent.  
 
 The Court avoided consideration of the distinction between a property interest 
sufficient to assert decision making power and one that would permit sale of human 
cells, by appearing to deny the existence of any property interest at all. Panelli J 
stated:10
 
It may be that some limited right to control the use of excised cells does 
survive operation of the statute. There is, for example, no need to read the 
statute to permit “scientific use” contrary to the patient’s expressed wish. A 
fully informed patient may always withhold consent to treatment by a 
physician whose research plans the patient does not approve. That right, 
however, as already discussed, is protected by the fiduciary-duty and 
informed-consent theories.  
 
This passage, however, misses the distinction between the remedies to the two causes 
of action. If the doctors sold Moore’s tissue in violation of his expressed wishes, 
what would be the measure of damages? Moore consented to the surgery, and 
appeared at that time to have no special attachment to his cells. His only real loss 
was the market value of his tissue. If the court were to award such a remedy, it would 
in effect have created an action for conversion. To refuse to do so may render 
meaningless the breach of informed consent (in the sense of the above quote). The 
court did not apply the Doodewood11 “work and skill” argument that creation of a 
cell line resulted in the specimen acquiring features beyond its mere existence, 
although cell lines could arguably fall within this exception.  
 
Moore’s tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent 
for removal of his spleen were allowed to proceed and were eventually settled.  
 
3 Waste 
 
The researchers argued that Moore’s spleen was “waste”, as he would not 
expect, or wish, to retain it. There are two different senses of the word “waste”, 
either superfluous matter that is normally shed or cast away, or matter that is useless 
or valueless. The spleen might have been waste in the first sense, but not in the 
second. Categorising it as waste suggests it was valueless, yet, in the age of 
biotechnology, human tissue certainly does have value. The California Court of 
Appeals suggested that the extraordinary lengths to which Golde had gone to obtain 
                                                          
10 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479, 488 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
11 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406 (HCA). See the discussion in chapter 2. 
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specimens for his research demonstrated his belief in the value of the tissue.12 Moore 
is now one of many individuals whose cell lines can be ordered by perusing the 
American Type Culture Collection, or one of its foreign counterparts.13
 
4 Interpretation 
 
Moore affirms a person’s right to exclude others from taking body parts 
without consent, while it simultaneously protects the researchers’ rights in the 
resultant cell-lines. Rao argues that Moore is capable of at least three different 
constructions: 14
 
• The Court’s refusal of Moore’s conversion claim was recognition that body 
parts cannot be property so long as they are contained in a living human 
being.  Rao suggests that the Court could have recognised Moore’s ownership 
of his spleen at the point it was detached from his body, without making his 
whole person a form of property; 
• Even if the spleen was initially Moore’s property, its “owner”, for whom the 
diseased organ was valueless, had abandoned it and thus it was available to 
be used by another; 
• The Court may have implied that body parts, once removed, return to the 
public commons, available to all, and become a form of communal property 
available for “capture” by the first person who recognises their commercial 
potential and puts them to productive use. 
 
B Subsequent US Cases 
 
In Miles Inc v Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation,15 there was a 
property dispute between researchers. Dr Zimmerman provided Scripps-Miles with 
an antigen, later used to create a monoclonal cell line whose antibodies possessed an 
affinity for Factor VIII:C.16 When the corporation dissolved, Miles acquired the 
laboratory. However, Zimmerman and Scripps continued to use the cell line for 
research and eventually obtained a patent for a process utilising the antibodies to 
produce purified Factor VIII:C. Miles sued Zimmerman and Scripps, alleging 
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court held that although, 
because of the decision in Moore,17 California law appears to recognise a right to 
commercialise a cell line, conversion fails to protect this intangible right. The Court 
distinguished this case from Moore, because Miles had a property interest in the 
                                                          
12 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 126 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
13 American Type Culture Collection <http://www.atcc.org> and World Data Centre for 
Microorganisms <http://wdcm.nig.ac> (last accessed 18 September 2003). John Moore’s cells are for 
sale as CRL-8066. 
14 Radhika Rao “Property, Privacy, and the Human Body” (2000) 80 BUL Rev 359, 374. 
15 Miles Inc v Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation (1991) 951 F 2d 361 (9th Cir). 
16 Factor VIII:C is a substance that permits a hemophiliac’s blood to clot. Without Factor VIII:C, 
hemophiliacs run great risks of blood loss. Purified Factor VIII:C serves this vital function without 
risk of transmitting AIDS or hepatitis through treatment. For a general discussion of the use of Factor 
VIII:C, see Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v  Genentech, Inc (1991) 2d 1565, 1568 (Fed Cir). 
17 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494, 215 Cal App 3d 709 (App 
Div) modified (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 271 Cal Rptr 146, 793 P 2d 479 cert denied (1991) 499 US 936. 
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commercialisation of the cell line. In Moore,18 the plaintiff’s raw materials led to the 
creation of a cell line, whereas in Miles, “the cell line is the starting point.”19  
 
The Court refused to extend California conversion law to cover Miles’ 
intangible right and stated that such a decision is “more appropriately the subject of 
legislative deliberation and resolution.”20 It noted that conversion is as a strict 
liability tort and stated that contract law and patent law protections are adequate to 
protect personal interests. The case was dismissed. 
 
In United States v Arora,21it was alleged that Arora had tampered with 
culture flasks leading to cell deaths. A civil suit was filed against Arora for 
conversion or trespass. The Court held that, in Maryland, a cell line exists as a form 
of property capable of being converted. Although Arora did not steal the cell line, it 
was alleged that he had interfered with, destroyed, or altered its nature, thus 
satisfying an allegation of conversion. The court distinguished Miles22 by 
concentrating on the differences between an actual cell line and the intangible right 
to commercialisation. 
 
In Cornelio v Stamford Hospital,23 the plaintiff wished to recover pap smear 
slides containing her genetic material. She argued in the Superior Court of 
Connecticut that she had a property interest in the slides. The Court compared 
pathology slides with x-rays and stated that neither are the property of the patient. 
They are the property of the doctor, although the patient is given access to them. The 
plaintiff argued that it is difficult to equate slides, which contain human cells, to an 
x-ray or personal notes made by a doctor as part of a patient’s case file, because the 
slides contain human substances drawn from the patient’s body, which are incapable 
of being duplicated or reproduced. The Court applied Moore,24 stating that the 
source does not have a right to possess cells following their removal. It pointed to the 
consent form signed by the plaintiff, which concluded with the words “…including 
the right to dispose of all tissue” and applied contract law reasoning to determine that 
the plaintiff did not retain a property interest in her cells.  
 
The decision was upheld in the Supreme Court. McDonald J dissented, 
stating that “one principle that formerly appeared deeply ingrained in our society and 
in our law is that one controls one’s body.”25 He further stated that: “The decision 
now severely restricts the patient’s control over her own cells at a time when the 
advance of genetic science should raise very wide privacy implications.”26
 
Most of the cases considering property rights in human biological materials 
relate to established cell lines. The Canavan case considers the rights of the sources 
                                                          
18 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 149 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
19Miles Inc. v Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation (1991) 951, 1097 F 2d 361 (9th Cir) Rhoades 
SR. 
20 Miles Inc. v Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation, above, 1096 Rhoades SR.  
21 United States v Arora (1994) 860 F Supp 1091, 1093 (D Md) Messitte J. 
22 Miles Inc. v Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation (1991) 951 F 2d 361 (9th Cir). 
23 Cornelio v Stamford Hospital (1997) WL 430619 (Conn  Super Ct ) aff’d by (1998)717 A 2d 140 
(Conn). 
24 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 137 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
25 Cornelio v Stamford Hospital, above, 149 McDonald J. 
26 Cornelio v Stamford Hospital, above, 149 McDonald J. 
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of the raw materials if there if there is no doctor/patient relationship, when such 
rights conflict with the rights of researchers, . 
 
C  Canavan Children 
 
Canavan is a rare genetic disorder. If a child inherits two copies of the 
Canavan gene, it will develop an untreatable fatal condition.27 The Greenbergs had 
two children with Canavan disease. They sought out Dr Matalon and convinced him 
to research the disease. They raised money for the research, provided him with tissue 
samples from their children and found other families to participate in the research. 
This was done with the understanding and expectation that the samples and 
information would be used for the specific purpose of researching Canavan disease 
and identifying gene mutations, which could lead to carrier detection within their 
families and benefit the public at large. It was anticipated that carrier and prenatal 
testing would be provided on an affordable and accessible basis and that the research 
would remain in the public domain, to promote the discovery of more effective 
prevention techniques and treatments and, eventually, a cure for Canavan disease. 
 
In 1993, Matalon successfully isolated the gene responsible for Canavan 
disease. The families continued to provide tissue and blood for the research. In 1997, 
Matalon obtained a patent, then began charging a fee and restricting the use of the 
diagnostic test. The families claimed that they did not know of the patent application 
until 1998. They alleged that they were not informed of the defendants’ intentions to 
seek a patent on the research, commercialise the products of the research and restrict 
access to Canavan testing. 
 
In 2000, the families sued Miami Children’s Hospital for breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraudulent concealment, conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets, unjust 
enrichment, and breach of informed consent. They sought a permanent injunction 
restraining the defendants from enforcing their patent rights. They were concerned 
that research on Canavan would be slowed because access to information and testing 
would be limited by excess fees, making it difficult for other researchers to conduct 
new investigations and that the availability of diagnostic testing would be reduced. 
 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in May 2003, the motion was 
granted in part.28 The decision with respect to the various grounds of the claim is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
27 The body cannot produce an enzyme, aspartoacyclase, which leads to the build up of another 
enzyme that destroys the myelin sheath that protects brain cells. Symptoms usually appear between 
three and six months of age and most children die between 10 and 15 years of age. 
28 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others (Greenberg) (2003) 264 F 
Supp 2d 1064 (SD Fla).  
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1 Informed consent 
 
It was held that medical consent law applies to medical researchers in certain 
circumstances. The issue was whether this duty extended to disclosure of a 
researcher’s economic interests. The Court distinguished Moore,29 because there the 
researchers did not inform the patient that they were using his blood and tissue for 
research, whereas in Greenberg the defendants were solely medical researchers and 
there was no therapeutic relationship. Moreno J stated:30
 
In declining to extend the duty of informed consent to cover economic interests, 
the Court takes note of the practical implications of retroactively imposing a duty 
of care of this nature. First, imposing a duty of the nature that the plaintiffs seek 
would be unworkable and would chill medical research as it would mandate that 
researchers constantly evaluate whether a disclosable event has occurred. Second, 
this extra duty would give rise to a type of dead-hand control that research subjects 
could hold because they would be able to dictate how medical research progresses. 
Finally, these plaintiffs are more accurately portrayed as donors rather than objects 
of human experimentation, and thus the voluntary nature of their submissions 
warrants different treatment.  
 
Consequently, in the United States, informed consent is only required if 
treatment is being provided, although this is not so in New Zealand.31 Further, the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights32 provides: 33
 
Scientific research should only be carried out with the prior, free, express and 
informed consent of the person concerned. The information should be adequate, 
provided in a comprehensible form and should include modalities for 
withdrawal of consent.  
 
Informed consent is an important tool for protecting donors, but it is not the universal 
ethical panacea imagined by some commentators.34 In particular, it does not address 
the issue of principled apportionment of the benefits of successful research.35
 
2 Breach of fiduciary duty 
 
In Moore,36 the Court stated that a physician’s duty included a fiduciary duty 
to disclose information that is material to a patient’s decision. This included a duty to 
disclose personal interests, whether research or economic, that may affect the 
physician’s medical judgment. In Greenberg,37 it was held that this is a two-way 
relationship, and a fiduciary relationship will only be found when the plaintiff 
                                                          
29 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120 (Sup Ct Cal). 
30 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others, above, 1070 Moreno J.  
31 Health and Disability Commissioner Act, s 2.  The Code applies to a “health care procedure” which 
means “any health treatment, health examination, health teaching, or health research administered to or 
carried out on or in respect of any person by any health care provider; and includes any provision of 
health services to any person by any health care provider.” 
32 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights Adopted on 19 October 2005 by 
the 33rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO. 
33 UNESCO, above, article 6 (2). 
34 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
35 This is a particular concern of indigenous populations. See chapter 5. 
36 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120 (Sup Ct Cal). 
37 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others (2003) 264 F Supp 2d 1064 
(SD Fla).  
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separately alleges that the plaintiff placed trust in the defendant, and the defendant 
accepted that trust.  
 
  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants accepted the trust by undertaking 
research that they represented as being for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The 
defendants successfully asserted that the plaintiffs did not allege any facts showing 
that the trust was recognised and accepted. It was held that there is no automatic 
fiduciary relationship when a researcher accepts research donations, as the 
acceptance of trust, which is the second element of a fiduciary duty, cannot be 
assumed. 
 
  In New Zealand, doctors and patients do not have a fiduciary relationship as 
such,38 although the Code provides:39 “Before making a choice or giving consent, 
every consumer has the right to the information that a reasonable consumer, in that 
consumer’s circumstances, needs to make an informed choice or give informed 
consent.” Deliberate failure to disclose and deceit could amount to negligence, or an 
equitable breach such as fraud, duress or undue influence.40
 
3 Unjust enrichment 
 
This claim required the plaintiffs to establish that they conferred a benefit on 
the defendant and that the defendant knew of the benefit. The defendant must have 
voluntarily retained the benefit, and it must be shown that under the circumstances it 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain it without paying for it. 
 
It was accepted that the plaintiffs conferred a benefit on the defendants, but 
they argued that the plaintiffs did not suffer a detriment, as they received what they 
sought–the successful isolation of the Canavan gene and the development of the 
screening test. The plaintiffs argued that, had they known that the defendants 
intended to commercialise their genetic material, they would not have provided the 
benefits to the defendants on those terms. The Court held that obtaining a patent did 
not preclude the defendants from being unjustly enriched, stating “…the facts paint a 
picture of a continuing research collaboration that involved [p]laintiffs also investing 
time and significant resources in the race to isolate the Canavan gene.”41 The claim 
for unjust enrichment was allowed to proceed. 
 
4 Fraudulent concealment 
This claim failed because there was no duty of disclosure, as there was no 
fiduciary relationship. Additionally, the facts were not fraudulently concealed, 
because a patent becomes public knowledge when issued, thus the plaintiffs could 
have discovered the patent application. It was not accepted that the plaintiffs were 
unable to make reasonable inquiries because they had no reason to believe patenting 
would occur. In New Zealand, the Code provides that: “Every consumer has the right 
                                                          
38 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 (HL).  
39 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulation 1996, Right 6(2). 
40 Gerald Dworkin and Ian Kennedy “Human Tissue: Rights in the Body and its Parts” (1993) 1 Med L 
Rev 291, 308. 
41 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others, above, 1072 Moreno J. 
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to be free from discrimination, coercion, harassment, and sexual, financial or other 
exploitation.”42 Exploitation includes any abuse of a position of trust, breach of a 
fiduciary duty, or exercise of undue influence.43 Thus a complaint could be made in 
such circumstances. However, it is unlikely that the resolution of a complaint would 
result in an apportionment of the profits from a patent. 
5 Conversion 
 
The Court applied Moore44 and held that there was no property interest in 
body tissue and genetic information given voluntarily to researchers. These were 
donations to research, without any contemporaneous expectation that they would be 
returned. Moreno J stated: “Plaintiffs have no cognizable property interest in body 
tissue and genetic matter donated for research under a theory of conversion.”45 The 
Court held that the patented research outcome is both factually and legally distinct 
from excised material used in the research. The material was used for the agreed 
purpose, namely research, and it was the fruits of the research that were 
commercialised. Thus, the patent cut off all the sources’ rights, even though they 
were not claiming that they were solely entitled to the patent and wished merely to 
retain a degree of control over the research outcomes.  
 
6 Misappropriation of trade secrets 
 
The plaintiffs claimed that the Canavan registry was a trade secret that was 
misappropriated. The Court held that even if the registry was a trade secret, which 
was doubtful, it was not misappropriated. The hospital did not know that the registry 
was a confidential trade secret guarded by the plaintiffs, nor that the researcher had 
acquired it through improper means. There was no explicit authorisation of the 
purposes for which the information could be used. “Plaintiffs cannot donate 
information that they prepared for fighting a disease and then retroactively claim that 
it was a protected secret.”46
 
The case would have proceeded on unjust enrichment alone, but in September 
2003, the parties reached a confidential settlement that provided for continued 
royalty-based genetic testing by certain licensed laboratories and royalty-free research 
by institutions, doctors and scientists searching for a cure.  
 
D Washington University v Catalona47
 
  Moore related to a cell line and Greenberg to the patenting of a genetic test, 
but Catalona directly related to the ownership of biological samples. Washington 
University claimed ownership of biological materials, including prostate specimens, 
stored in the GU Biorepository. The defendant was a surgeon and researcher into 
prostate cancer. The participants in the research, many of whom had been his 
patients, signed informed consent forms stating they could not claim any ownership 
                                                          
42 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights Regulation 1996, Right 2. 
43 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights Regulation 1996, reg 4. 
44 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120 (Sup Ct Cal). 
45Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others, above, 1074 Moreno J. 
46Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others, above, 1077 Moreno J. 
47 Washington University v Catalona (2006) US Dist LEXIS 22969 Limbaugh J. 
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rights to any medical or scientific product, and including a right to withdraw their 
consent at any time. A brochure advised that the tissue would be identified and 
destroyed on request. When Catalona left the university, he contacted the 
participants, suggesting that they request the university to transfer the samples to him 
at Northwestern University. 
 
Limbaugh J held that the participants were donors, who had made a gift of the 
materials to Washington University. It became the absolute owner when it took 
delivery and accepted the samples. The right to discontinue participation meant no 
more than that the person had chosen to provide no further materials. He stated that 
Washington University was the sole and exclusive owner of all biological samples 
and associated clinical data in the Repository and that researchers and research 
participants had no legally recognised ownership right. 
 
 Under Missouri law, exclusive possession and control of personal property is 
prima facie evidence of ownership and anyone else claiming such property bears the 
burden of proof. Limbaugh J found that it was undisputed that Washington University 
had been in exclusive possession of the material, in part because the University was 
solely responsible for the maintenance of the Repository, which was housed on 
University property. Also, the University signed all material transfer agreements, by 
which outside parties could obtain samples for research from the Repository. The 
University had consistently asserted its ownership interests in the materials, through 
its intellectual property policy. The University alone had the legal, regulatory and 
compliance risks from all research done in connection with the Repository and he 
found no compelling federal authority prohibiting Washington University from 
asserting an ownership interest in the samples.  
 
Limbaugh J rejected Catalona’s arguments that:  
• The exculpatory language in the informed consent forms invalidated the 
 gift; and 
• The research participants’ right to discontinue participation included a 
 right to control and transfer the samples. 
He stated that the public policy considerations supporting his decision were 
that medical research can only advance if access to these materials by the scientific 
community is not thwarted by public agendas and that such open access is best 
assured by placing responsibility for, and authority over, biological samples with 
institutions. He emphasised the benefits of medical research and stated: 48  
If left unregulated and to the whims of a [research participant], these highly-
prized biological materials would become nothing more than chattels going to 
the highest bidder. 
He argued that it is antithetical to the goals of science and public health to 
allow research participants to direct the recipient of a sample and doing so would be 
tantamount to a blood donor being able to dictate that the blood can only be infused 
into a person of a certain ethnic background. Additionally, institutional ownership 
                                                          
48 Washington University v Catalona, above, 48. 
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would avoid the buying and selling of human tissue. Both of these arguments are 
questionable. Living donors commonly specify the recipients of organs. A donor’s 
ability to limit research use to a particular researcher will not inevitably lead to 
discrimination and many people may wish to direct their interest to particular 
programmes or else they may refuse to participate at all. The second argument ignores 
the fact that tissue is a commonly bought and sold biotechnological resource. 
Limbaugh J stated that the issue was whether the participants retained 
ownership rights, so they could direct the use of the material and transfer it to third 
parties.49 This, together with the emphasis on a completed gift to the university, 
signalled that the sources had property interests prior to the gifts being made, which 
then passed to the university. As such, had the sources made their contribution subject 
to the ability to withdraw the samples should Catalona leave the institution, then a 
completed gift would not have been made, as no intention to make an unconditional 
gift would be evident. If the university accepted the samples on such conditions it 
would have a contractual arrangement with the sources, similar to those entered into 
with researchers by PXE International.50
 
E Comment on Cases  
 
In Moore and Greenberg it was held that research participants are donors, 
who part with ownership rights once biological materials are excised for medical 
research and pass into the possession of researchers. In Catalona, it was held that the 
sources had made unconditional gifts of their property to the university. 
 
Greenberg indicates that the courts are reluctant to impose limits on 
researchers’ economic exploitation of discoveries, in the absence of express 
agreements about the rights of contributors. Moreno J stated that the legal principles 
adopted must not “cripple” the ability of researchers to carry on their work. Although 
this is an important concern, public policy should also encourage the participation 
and support of affected individuals. If researchers are free to use samples, 
information and funding from family members to develop tests and therapies that are 
priced beyond their reach, then support for research will diminish.  
   
 Catalona demonstrates the weakness of reliance on informed consent alone. 
The consent forms gave the sources the right to withdraw from the research and, in 
some versions, the right to have the specimens destroyed.51 Limbaugh J held that this 
meant no more than they had chosen to provide no more materials and he accepted 
that the university could then destroy the samples, store them indefinitely without 
any further use, or anonymise them and continue to use them in research. Moreover, 
the forms referred throughout to “your” tissue. It was not unreasonable for sources to 
conclude that to “withdraw” meant that they could claim their samples back. The 
university relied on its intellectual property policy to justify its ownership. Although 
the sources may have been able to access this policy, it is unlikely they would 
                                                          
49 Washington University v Catalona, above, 21. 
50 See the discussion below. 
51 Under the section “What if you change your mind?” The brochure stated “To request that your tissue 
no longer be used for research, you should call the investigator listed on the consent form. Your tissue 
will be identified and destroyed on request. Any research results already obtained cannot be destroyed 
or recalled.” Washington University v Catalona, above, 6. 
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undertake research beyond the informed consent form and unreasonable to expect 
them to do so. Consequently, the sources were not fully informed.  
 
The Court held that the sources “had the present intent to make inter vivos 
gifts; i.e. donations of their biological materials to WU for medical research.”52 It 
referred to the specimens as “personal property”53 and accepted that the sources had 
passed property to the university by way of gift.  
 
Moore54 concluded that informed consent provided sufficient respect and 
protected Moore’s interests. The consent model and the prospect of property interests 
were treated as mutually exclusive, and yet there appears no reason why this must be 
so. Sources have personal rights, so tissue cannot be excised without appropriate 
prior consent. This thesis argues that  at that stage, they have an inchoate property 
right, which becomes a full property right once the tissue is excised. They could 
agree to abandon the tissue, in which case the researcher would assume full property 
rights over the tissue. Alternatively, they could agree to transfer it under certain 
conditions, such as for particular research purposes.  
 
If researchers act contrary to these wishes then, prima facie, sources have an 
action for conversion. The normal remedy of damages for conversion relates to the 
value at the time of conversion, together with consequential and foreseeable damage. 
Alternatively, sources might be permitted to claim some of the profit from any patent 
and its products, which could be seen as the improved products of their cells or they 
could seek equitable remedies, such as delivery up or an account of the profits. 
 
 
III THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCHER/CONTRIBUTOR 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
A Collection of Samples 
 
For two centuries, body parts and tissues have enabled researchers to acquire 
information about illnesses and behaviours.55 Some research, such as studies of the 
prevalence of a particular disease, or the identification of a disease gene, requires 
tissue samples from a large number of individuals. Consequently, researchers wish to 
gain access to tissue specimens that were collected for other purposes and thereafter 
retained.56  
 
Specimens may come from tissue removed in the course of screening, 
diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, autopsies or voluntary donation. Biobanks are 
also being created de novo by the collection of material and health data from 
representative portions of certain populations.57 Commentators argue that the 
scientific and commercial potential of biobanks may not be realised if there is 
uncertainty over the ownership of the archived material and that obtaining consent 
                                                          
52 Washington University v Catalona, above, 19. 
53 Washington University v Catalona, above, 12. 
54 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 127 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J.  
55 Lori Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin Body Bazaar (Crown Publishers, New York, 2001). 
56 Such collections are commonly referred to as “biobanks”. 
57 Such as UK biobank, Iceland and Estonia. 
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from individual sources is time consuming, expensive and, in the case of historic 
collections, may be impossible. Additionally, some researchers argue that studies on 
blood, cell lines, or genes should be exempt from consent because they use 
replenishable tissue and consent undermines biomedical research.58  
 
However, the basic moral premise of research is that people are entitled to 
refuse to participate. Blanket (or generic) consent is not a solution, because sources 
may wish to put limits on the types of research that may be carried out on their 
samples and have no way to foresee the directions future research may take.59 The 
Code requires that health consumers be notified of any proposed participation in 
teaching or research, including whether the research requires and has received ethical 
approval.60 They should be given such information as a reasonable consumer would 
require, which arguably includes the type of research, the time frames and so on. 
 
To give sources control over the uses of their body parts does not necessarily 
mean that they should have a financial interest in, or property rights in, resultant 
patents or cell lines. However, it is commonly accepted that sources have the right to 
control whether donation will occur. There seems to be no principled reasons for 
requiring that a gift of a body part must be unconditional and pass all rights of 
control to the researcher or transplant hospital. Conditional gifts are already 
commonplace in other contexts, including living organ donation.61
 
The right to withdraw from research is a method of control and it appears in 
many international instruments.62 Similarly, the Code gives the right to have body 
parts returned.63 A solution may be that if material has been stored for a certain 
period without being reclaimed by the source, it will be treated as though it has been 
abandoned. An alternative approach is to specify in the original consent that 
recontact will only occur for a set period and thereafter, if the source is unable to be 
located, certain steps will be taken.64 The source will be able to decide whether to 
provide the material or not, in light of this information. 
 
The consent may be limited to certain types of research or for a certain time 
period, with additional consent required for any other use, so long as the samples 
have not been completely anonymised (which renders recontact impossible). The 
                                                          
58 Eliot Marshall “Policy on DNA Research Troubles Tissue Bankers” (1996) 271 Science 440. 
59 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
60  Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulation 1996, Right 6(d). However, Right 7(10) allows unconsented research use, with ethics 
committee approval. 
61 Also in other contexts, such as an endowment to a university for a specified purpose. 
62 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki –Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects  Adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki, Finland June 1964 
Para 22; Council of Europe Bioethics convention Article 5 part II “The person concerned may freely 
withdraw consent at any time”; Office for the Protection from Research Risks Issues to Consider in the 
research use of stored data or tissues <http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/reposit.htm> 
(last accessed 17 September 2006).  
63 Health and Disability Commissioner, above, Right 7(9). 
64 Either that the material will be destroyed or that it will be used for research without further consent. 
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United States National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended a range of 
options, to enable donors to specify the extent and limits of their consent. 65
 
The concern that property rights in such samples would hinder research can 
be countered by the argument that most people support research, but oppose 
commercial entities being allowed access to databases.66 Most individuals would 
find that their property was of minimal economic significance to researchers,67 and 
the value difficult to quantify,68 but the issues arising are not solely those of profit 
sharing. Sources may wish to limit the types of research using their body samples, or 
may not wish to be involved in research at all.  
 
B European Guidelines 
 
The Council of Europe instrument on the use of archived human biological 
materials in biomedical research built on the principles in the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine and the Protocol on Biomedical Research, to protect human 
rights and dignity with respect to research on human biological materials.69
 
Human biological material is defined as material of human origin, whether 
identified identifiable or anonymised,70 but the instrument does not apply to research 
on unlinked anonymised human cell lines or stem cell lines.71 It permits unconsented 
use of irreversibly anonymised material.72  
 
Identified or identifiable material may only be stored and used for a 
secondary purpose if this is done in conformity with appropriate information and 
consent procedures. However, for research on anonymised materials, the verification 
of the anonymisation process by a competent body is sufficient and no consent from 
the source of the materials is required. 
 
 This approach is criticised by Trouet who states:73
 
Human biological materials are more than information; even anonymised they are 
not neutral to the person from whom they derive. The source can be opposed to 
certain uses of his (anonymised) cells or tissues for fear of stigmatisation of the 
group to which he belongs, he might want to exclude them from certain uses if this 
goes against his personal convictions (whether religious, spiritual, o[r] emotional). 
                                                          
65 National Bioethics Advisory Commission Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical 
Issues and Policy Guidance (National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Maryland, 1999) 
Recommendation 9.  
66 H Busby “Blood Donation for Genetic Research” in R Hutton and O Corrigan (eds) Genetic 
Databases: Socio-ethical Issues in the Collection and Use of DNA (Routledge, London, 2004) 39—54.  
67 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
68 Medical Research Council  Code of Practice for the Use of Human Stem Cell Lines Annex 2a 
<www.mrc.ac.uk> (last accessed 17 September 2006).  
69 Council of Europe Instrument on the use of archived human biological materials in biomedical 
research (2002) <http://www.coe.int> (last accessed 16 April 2004). The proposal was approved on 20 
June 2003. 
70 Council of Europe, above, Article 2. 
71 Council of Europe, above, Article 3.2 
72 The researcher is unable to obtain any further information about the source, or recontact the source 
of the materials.  
73 C Trouet “New European Guidelines for the Use of Stored Human Biological Materials in 
Biomedical Research” (2004) 30 J med ethics 99. 
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Some European countries, such as the Netherlands and Iceland, have 
regulations that offer the source of biological materials a say in their retention and 
use, even when they are anonymised.74 There are similar regulations proposed in 
France and Belgium.  
 
 
C  “Guthrie” Test Samples 
 
In New Zealand, determination of the status of biobanked samples arose with 
respect to the “Guthrie” or “heel prick” samples, which are collected to screen 
newborns for genetic disorders and thereafter retained indefinitely.75 In H v G,76a 
putative father sought to disprove paternity of a deceased child, by DNA testing of 
the Guthrie sample. He relied on the provisions in the High Court Rules permitting 
inspections of “property”.77 Salmon J stated: “I have no doubt that the samples come 
within the very wide definition of property contained in the Rule and I find 
accordingly.”78 He held that samples taken for a specific purpose were permitted to 
be used for the unanticipated secondary purpose. The man had a legitimate interest in 
knowing whether he was the father of a living child and this could be extended to a 
deceased child, so that he could have certainty on the issue and be able to grieve 
properly. Such interests overrode the objections of the mother. This was a decision 
directed to these particular facts, rather than signalling a wider conception of 
property in body parts, but it illustrates ethical concerns about secondary uses of 
biobanked samples. 
 
 In S v T,79 a man applied for a child to be placed under the guardianship of 
the court, to take a buccal swab to determine whether he was the father. O’Regan J 
indicated that if the mother did not facilitate the taking of the swab, he would place 
the child under the guardianship of the court. The decision was upheld in the Court 
of Appeal, which agreed that the child’s welfare would be enhanced by having the 
issue of paternity resolved.80 The Guthrie card was unavailable for paternity testing, 
because the mother had uplifted it. O’Regan J accepted that, as a parent, she had the 
right to do so, without commenting on the legal status of the sample. 
 
The cards are held indefinitely, unless the parents (or the adult child) request  
their return. The number of requests to have them returned rose from none in 1995 to 
775 in 2002.81 The collection of blood samples is, potentially, a valuable research 
resource. The Privacy Commissioner stated that there was no adequate legal 
                                                          
74 Trouet, above, 100. 
75 Approximately 1.9 million samples are retained by the National Testing Centre, which is a division 
of Auckland Healthcare. 
76 H v G (14 May 1999) High Court Auckland M1868/98 Salmon J. 
77 High Court Rules, Rule 322(3): “In this rule property includes any land and any document or other 
chattel, whether in the ownership, possession, custody, or power of a party or not.” 
78 H v G, above, 5 Salmon J. 
79 S v T [2003] NZFLR 223 (HC) O’Regan J.  
80 T v S [2005] NZFLR 4 para [60] (CA) Anderson P, Hammond and William Young JJ. 
81Information about the mother and the child is retained even if the sample is released.  Privacy 
Commissioner Guthrie Tests (Privacy Commissioner, Wellington, 2003). The rate of requests for return 
has remained at a similar level since 2002. 
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protection for the samples against access by third parties, or against future uses. He 
recommended that: 
 
• The Ministry of Health allocate clear responsibility and authority for the 
operation of the newborn metabolic screening programme; 
• That the resultant body move urgently to develop clear rules for retention of 
the samples and any further use or third party access to those samples after 
consultation with stakeholders and the Privacy Commissioner; 
• These rules and permission-granting structures should be “incorporated in 
legislation in such a way that they are clear, robust and enforceable”. 
 
In response to the report, control of the samples passed to the Ministry of 
Health’s national screening unit in July 2005. In 2006, the Ministry announced the 
joint signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the New Zealand police, 
clarifying the circumstances in which the samples may be used for forensic purposes, 
such as the identification of dead bodies. The Ministry is formulating guidelines for 
ethics committees when considering proposals for use of biobanked samples,82 
which allow for blanket consent for future use of samples, so long as the sources 
have been specifically advised that they will not be informed of the uses of the 
samples and that they will thereafter lose all future control over them. In addition, the 
Ministry will shortly undertake consultation on the future research use of the Guthrie 
sample collection.83
 
If the Guthrie samples are the child’s property, with the mother having 
privacy interests in the information held about her, the child, once competent, would 
have the right to control the uses of the samples, but not necessarily the maternal 
information. Alternatively, as the parents could have uplifted the cards,84 but have 
not done so, it could be argued that the samples have been abandoned. The parents 
could abandon the samples, as proxies for their incompetent children, but only if they 
were aware that the cards were retained and that they had the right to uplift them. 
This does not equate to a property interest, but acknowledges that sources retain an 
interest in the disposition of body parts.  
 
There is an increasing tendency to apply presumed consent to the use of 
biological samples and to allow access to the medical records of participants in 
screening programmes.85 An opt-out system, which allows access to test samples and 
medical records impinges on patients’ interests and may alienate participants in 
screening programmes.  
                                                          
82Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research 
Purposes: Discussion Document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006). See the discussion in 
chapter 8. 
83 Ministry of Health The Consent, Storage and Use of Newborn Blood Spot Cards: a Public 
Consultation Draft (Unpublished- copy held by author). 
84 The Code gives the right to the return of the cards. Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of 
Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) Regulation 1996, Right 7(6): “Every consumer has 
the right to make a decision about the return or disposal of any body parts or bodily substances 
removed or obtained in the course of a health care procedure.” 
 
85 Health (National Cervical Screening Programme) Amendment Act 2004, s 112ZF only applies to the 
National Cervical Screening Programme, but the Act provides that it could be extended to any other 
screening programme, by an Order in Council. 
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D Amendment to the Code 
 
In 2004, Right 7(10) of the Code was amended to permit the use of bodily 
substances or body parts for: 
 
•  research that has received the approval of an ethics committee;  
• a professionally recognised quality assurance programme; or  
• an external audit or evaluation of services that is undertaken to assure or 
improve the quality of services.86  
 
This allows unconsented use of biobanked samples,87 whilst retaining the right of the 
human source to reclaim them.88 Ethics committees have the onus to ensure that 
ethical standards are maintained, rather than control remaining with the sources.89 
However, just because it is legally permissible to use unconsented samples in 
research does not mean the use is ethical, so ethics committees may still require 
informed consent before approving a proposal.90
 
In light of this amendment, the consent procedures when samples are taken 
must emphasise to parents the potential uses of the samples. Without this 
information, they will be unable to exercise their Code rights, especially Right 7(9). 
A reasonable parent would expect to be given such information, which enables 
parents to decide whether to consent to the original taking of the sample, and 
whether to request the return of the cards after testing.91
 
  E Anonymisation of Samples 
 
Targeted research on biological samples is impossible if the samples are not 
identified, but other research, such as epidemiological studies to determine the 
prevalence of a genetic mutation in the population, can be conducted on de-identified 
samples. Biobanked tissue has significant potential value for population studies, 
which may help government and health administrators plan for the future community 
health needs. The collections can be used to study the interaction of genetic and 
environmental factors in disease over time, to examine the causes of genetic diseases 
and to locate genetic mutations. Through such research, new diagnostic tools and 
treatments can be developed, which will have economic and medical value.  
 
Only blanket consent is possible for future, yet to be determined, research. 
Effectively, participants are consenting to not being informed about the types of 
research. Ellis and Mannion state: “The key to solving this dilemma of using 
                                                          
86 Cabinet Minute “CAB Min 40/8 03” (8 December 2003). The amending regulation came into force 
on 11 June 2004. 
87 With ethics committee approval. 
88 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulation 1996, Right 7(9). 
89 Ethics committees are considered further in chapter 8. 
90 Joanna Manning “Heath Care Law Part 2–Legislative Developments” [2004] NZ Law Rev 385, 395. 
91 Anecdotal evidence suggests that either consent processes are inadequate or, if they do take place, 
that many parents have little or no recall of the information. 
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unconsented samples has to be in anonymising the samples.”92 There are two main 
forms of anonymity. Absolute anonymity arises if there are no means available to 
link the data to an identifiable individual. Proportional or reasonable anonymity 
exists when there are no reasonable means of identification of specific individuals.93 
This applies when anonymity is achieved by using linked or linkable coded 
information, with access to the link appropriately controlled. 
 
Anonymisation may reduce the risk of harm through misuse of information, 
but it is not an absolute protection, in light of the use of increasingly sophisticated 
computers with the capacity to search multiple databases. It does not allow for 
objection to the uses of the samples and although it reduces the quality of the 
relationship that individuals have with their samples, but does not extinguish it. 
Public policy may dictate that other interests weigh more heavily than individual 
autonomy in the decision to allow the use of anonymised samples, but the potential 
for harm to individuals from cultural or personal concerns about certain types of 
research and from discrimination remains.94 If the samples remain the property of the 
sources until transfer of ownership, remedies would be available for misuse, theft and 
unauthorised use.  
 
F Res Nullius 
 
Biological material removed from a living person might be regarded as res 
nullius, a corporeal item in the ownership of nobody. It would be reduced into 
possession by the first person to obtain physical control with the intention to exercise 
control over it and the source would be afforded no prior interest. The Nuffield 
Council stated that an analysis based on res nullius would reflect the traditional 
approach of no property in the body. 95  
 
Such a concept may not serve the interests of the source or the researcher.  If 
the material passes into the absolute ownership of the hospital or doctor controlling 
the removal and intending to appropriate it, this might defeat the source’s justifiable 
interest in its use or disposition and also the purpose for which the material was 
collected, such as transplantation or research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 I Ellis and G Mannion “Humanity versus Utility in the Ethics of Research on Human Genetic 
Material” (2001) 1 Genetics Law Monitor 1, 1. 
93 Graeme Laurie Genetic Privacy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 295. 
94 Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University  3:04-CV-1494 (D Ariz); Tilousi v Arizona State 
University 3:04-CV-1290. The research suggested that the people had migrated to Arizona from Asia, 
which was offensive to the tribe who believe that the Grand Canyon is the birthplace of the human 
race. Additionally, it alleged that the schizophrenia research is stigmatising. Paul Rubin “Indian 
Givers” (27 May 2004) Phoenix New Times <http:www.phoenixnewtimes.com> (last accessed 12 
October 2006).  See the discussion in chapter 5. 
95 Nuffield Council on Bioethics Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, London, 1995) 9.11. 
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G Waste 
 
People undergoing medical tests or surgical procedures do not usually expect 
the return of removed body parts or tissues. However, the value and variety of uses 
are increasing, so this habitual lack of concern may change. They commonly 
abandon biological materials, such as hair and fingernail clippings. In R v X,96 a 
diplomat, who ejaculated on his nanny’s hair while she feigned sleep, argued that the 
hair with semen on it was inadmissible, because it constituted the “person of a 
diplomatic agent.”  It was held that X’s “person” had not been interfered with and 
there was no breach of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, as nothing 
had been done to detain or arrest or somehow constrain X to obtain the sample, nor 
was it in any way procured through agents of the government. Although not 
necessary for the decision, it was held that the concept of ownership of semen and 
genetic material was complex but, if necessary to do so, the Court would find that the 
semen was abandoned, or discarded, by the man. 
 
Hospitals regard blood and tissue as waste–something over which the patient 
has given up any claim. It is routine to either store such tissue or destroy it.97 It is a 
highly relative notion whether an item may be considered waste and dependent on 
context. A person who has blood taken for diagnostic tests would normally anticipate 
no further use of it. However, if the blood was later used for research that was not for 
the benefit of the patient, the patient might consider that this use was not legitimate 
and not regard the surplus blood as a waste product. Had John Moore been aware of 
the proposed uses of his spleen, he would not have viewed it as surgical waste. 
 
Bernard Dickens suggests that a valid approach:98  
 
…may be to consider the human source as having an inchoate right to property in 
materials issuing from his body, which right he may expressly or by implication 
abandon to another, or similarly make prevail over a contending claim. 
 
 Dickens states that if the person does nothing to indicate an intention to assert the 
right of ownership, possession, or control over such materials, the inference is that 
the person intends to abandon the materials. The property interest in the materials 
would then pass to the hospital.  
 
The working party of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics proposed that tissue 
removed from patients in the course of treatment should be considered abandoned, 
but if it is voluntarily donated, any claim to it would be based on the terms of the 
donation.99 Abandonment suggests the prior existence of proprietary rights to 
abandon. As informed consent attempts to prevent harms before they occur, it should 
be given before the research takes place. The ability to object to research use 
recognises that sources have a definitive interest in what will happen to excised body 
parts. This contradicts the view that once removed from the body such materials 
become waste.100  
                                                          
96 R v X (18 October 2004) Court of Appeal CA 299/04 McGrath, Hammond, William Young JJ. 
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100 Arthur L Caplin “Blood, Sweat, Tears, and Profits: The Ethics of the Sale and Use of Patient 
Derived Materials in Biomedicine” (1985) 33 Clinical Res 448, 450: “[I]n the area of commercial 
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Organs are typically donated specifically for transplantation, rather than 
being removed as part of ongoing medical treatment, except in situations such as 
those involving a domino heart transplant procedure. In the case of living organ 
donation, the framework proposes that property in the severed organ vests in the 
donor, until corporeal reintegration occurs in the recipient. The doctor, or hospital, 
with physical possession of the organ would not obtain legal ownership, but would 
only be a bailee of the organ, required to take reasonable care of it. The proprietary 
duty would be owed to the donor, not to the recipient. Consequently, deliberate 
destruction or misuse could amount to unlawful conversion.101
 
H Adequacy of Informed Consent to Protect Sources 
 
The Code is premised on individual choice. Consumers must be able to make 
an informed choice and have the right to make a decision about the return or disposal 
of any body parts or bodily substances removed or obtained in the course of a 
healthcare procedure.102 The consumer must be given such information that a 
reasonable consumer, in that consumer’s circumstances, needs to make an informed 
choice or give informed consent. This, presumably, would include information about 
the nature of the research, what the research hopes to accomplish and who will 
medically and financially benefit from it. The Code does not address the issue of 
apportionment of profit resulting from research. The consent relates to the initial 
collection, but must be sufficiently expansive to include subsequent uses of tissue.  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword suggest:103   
 
There is a distinction between rights relating to the taking of body parts and rights 
relating to the use and control of body parts. Moreover, once we are contemplating 
rights of the latter kind, we are in the natural territory of property rights.  
 
They argue that if it is accepted that a person has a protected interest in the uses to 
which body parts may be put, because there is some form of privileged relationship 
between the person and the body parts, this can only be justified by way of property 
rights. The personal rights, such as the right to bodily integrity will not be further 
impaired once the parts have been excised, so proprietary rights must be involved. 
 
Informed consent requires that doctors and researchers explain the treatment 
and research to sources prior to operating, removing material, or medical testing. 
Consent normally requires an explanation of the procedure and being apprised of the 
risks. However, consent forms do not commonly indicate that the research may 
culminate in a patent application, or that a patent would legally allow restricted 
access to any patented medical treatment or testing. Even if the forms did include 
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Regulation 1996, Right 9. 
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such information, it is doubtful whether persons with limited treatment options, or 
desperate for discoveries to ameliorate conditions, are in any position to negotiate the 
waiver of intellectual property rights.104 Sources assume that the outcomes of 
research on their biological materials will be available for them and other similarly 
afflicted persons.105  
 
 Even if no commercialisation is anticipated early in the research, this may 
change if a potentially lucrative discovery is made. As it appears onerous to be 
required to recontact numerous contributors to seek further consent, consent forms 
are commonly phrased in very general or vague terms, such as that “there are no 
present plans” to share the proceeds with contributors. This is unsatisfactory, as a 
reasonable person might wish to take commercialisation into account when deciding 
whether to contribute. 
 
Charlotte Harrison suggests further inequality may arise because: 106  
 
Enterprising contributors may seek to negotiate better arrangements for themselves 
than are offered to others. Medical institutions can be caught in a difficult position, 
recognizing the equitable claims of contributors, but ill-equipped to provide 
payment to everyone and reluctant to create a double standard by compensating 
only those who demand it. 
 
 The current emphasis on autonomy in western bioethics has focussed on 
informed consent as the only means of respecting and empowering individuals in 
their dealings with health care professionals and researchers. Consent does provide 
protection for researchers and is one means of respecting individuals, but it does not 
necessarily empower them, even if it does supply an illusion of control. The only 
power the research subject has is to refuse to consent and there is no residual ability 
to exert ongoing moral and legal influence over samples once consent is given, 
unless further consent is required. In contrast, property rights protect and empower 
individuals, particularly if combined with other protections, such as autonomy, 
confidentiality and privacy. 
 
I PXE International and the University of Hawaii 
 
It seems accepted that sources have the right to control tissues while they are 
still part of their bodies and, if they are aware of the potential value prior to excision, 
they can treat them as a marketable commodity. Collaborative schemes provide for 
reimbursement of research expenses and distribution of a percentage of subsequent 
profits to the researchers and their funding sources. A patient advocacy group which 
has developed such a scheme is PXE International Inc, established by a couple who 
discovered that two of their children had a genetic disease, PXE.107 They sought out 
                                                          
104 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
105 See chapter 7 for patenting of life form inventions. 
106 Charlotte H Harrison “Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating 
Contributors of Human Tissue” (2002) 28 Am j law med 77, 85. 
107 Pseudoxanthoma elasticum, which causes the connective tissue in the skin, eyes and arteries to 
calcify. PXE International Inc “What Is PXE?” <http://www.pxe.org> (last accessed 15 December 
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people with PXE, and asked them to provide blood and tissue samples.108 The 
foundation stores the samples and raises research funds. 
 
The biobank was made available to researchers who agreed to joint 
possession of any intellectual property rights and to share profits from discoveries. 
PXE also requires that any genetic test be made available to the foundation. 
Researchers at the University of Hawaii agreed to these conditions and used the 
samples to isolate the gene responsible for the disease. PXE and the University filed 
a joint patent application, which was granted on 24 August 2004.  However, although 
the gene has been discovered, its operation has not yet been determined, so no test is 
available to detect who carries the gene and no treatment is available.     
 
Unlike the Canavan families, PXE International negotiated directly with the 
scientists and entered into contractual arrangements to give research support and 
materials, in return for a share of the patent rights. The contract has not been legally 
challenged and so its enforceability has not been tested, but it could be argued that 
the contract is void as against public policy on the grounds that research participants 
cannot possess property rights in their tissue, pursuant to Moore. However, if the 
courts do recognise the rights of such participants to negotiate for property rights in 
the commercial products developed from their tissue, it is illogical and unjust to deny 
such rights to those in the position of the Moore and Greenberg plaintiffs from 
whom researchers withheld vital information about their intentions to commercialise 
their scientific findings.109  
 
Courts may adopt a contextual approach, with the results in particular cases 
dependent on the way they are framed.  Consequently, patient groups may be able to 
dictate the terms of the use of the biobanks they have set up, whereas claims by 
individual research participants to restrict or profit from each use of their biological 
material may be denied, based on public policy arguments that large biobanks would 
then be likely to be underused and informed consent requirements would, by 
necessity, become complex. Bovenberg argues that “property rights in such material 
[should] vest in the entity that has lawfully collected and stored the material”, 
because the collections are a global public good.110 However, if as Catalona111 
suggests, the source initially has property in the material, the question is whether the 
biobank has lawfully collected the material, if the consent process was inadequate. 
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IV LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION    
 
This thesis proposes that a property interest arises after body parts have been 
excised. Consequently, at the time living donors give consent, the interest has not yet 
arisen; however, the consent also covers the subsequent transplantation into the 
recipient. The proposed framework would allow remedies should the organ be 
misused. In Colavito,112 both the intended recipient and the widow of a dead donor 
had a cause of action, so it is arguable that living sources should have similar rights. 
 
  Donors may be willing to take excessive risks in the interests of assisting 
others, particularly those with whom they have a close emotional tie. The public 
policy problem is determining the point at which the donors’ ability to transfer their 
organs should be restricted.  Restrictions may be justified because consent was not 
freely given, or because the risks were excessive. This section argues that such 
restriction would not preclude the notion of property and it concludes that the issues 
arising should be dealt with by way of administrative processes, rather than 
regulation. 
 
 Deceased donors are the primary sources of transplantable organs. However, 
the growing disparity between the availability of, and need for donor organs has lead 
to a rapidly increasing reliance on living donors.113 In the United States in 2001, the 
total number of living organ donors (6,528) exceeded the total number of deceased 
organ donors (6,081).114 Between 1990 and 1999, 87 per cent of living donors and 
recipients were biologically related and 13 per cent unrelated.115  
 
Living donation initially only involved kidneys, but now has been extended 
to pancreases, livers and lungs. Donation was originally restricted to emotionally 
connected parties, but recently there have been non-directed donations from living 
donors. Concerns relate to informed consent, psycho-social considerations and 
concern for the welfare of the donor. 
 
Results of LDT of kidneys are better than cadaveric transplantation.116 
Analysis of renal data from 1987 to 1995 showed the one-year and five-year survival 
rates for wholly incompatible living related and unrelated kidney donors were 
comparable to the figures for identically matched cadaveric transplants, and much 
superior to the results where the cadaver donors were mismatched to any degree.117 
This is probably because of closer tissue compatibility and less ischemia time. The 
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organs are likely to be in better condition, and the surgery takes place while the 
recipient is still relatively well. 
 
For healthy kidney donors, the risk of dying ranges from 1 in 2,500 to 1 in 
4,000.118 However, liver transplantation is much more complex. Transplantation of 
the right hepatic lobe from live donors has been technically feasible since the mid- 
1990s. If an adult donates a modest portion of the liver to a child, the mortality rate is 
in the region of 1 in 500 to 1 in 1000, but if the recipient is another adult, up to 60 
per cent of the donor’s liver must be removed. The mortality risk is then around 1 in 
100.  
 
 A Gender Issues   
 
There is an increasing donor gender imbalance. In 1988, the female to male 
donor ratio in the United States was 1.2 (55 per cent female versus 45 per cent male) 
which rose to 1.4 in 1998 (58 per cent female versus 42 per cent male). A study at a 
Canadian transplant centre found that 36 per cent of wives who were able to donate 
did so, compared with 6.5 per cent of husbands. However, although more women 
donate, more men are recipients. In the United States, females are less likely to be on 
the kidney transplant waiting list and wait-listed females are less likely to receive 
either a cadaveric or living renal transplant.119 This disparity exists not only among 
spouses, where female to male donation rates represent 68–73 per cent of cases, but 
also between biological relatives, with more mothers, daughters and sisters donating, 
and more fathers, sons and brothers receiving, kidney allografts.120
 
Research indicates that males may have greater ambivalence about donation, 
and may be less available or less able to donate.121 Men have a higher incidence of 
coronary artery disease and hypertension and the impact of lost wages may reflect on 
the availability of a primary income earner to undergo the operation.122
 
Strickling argues that women’s self-abnegation is such that there may be no 
“self” beyond their identification with others.123 In its negative form, the self-
abnegator abandons any sense of being a particular self outside of her relationships. 
Such women are vulnerable to suggestions that they should allow their body 
materials to be used for the benefit of others.  
 
Questions arise about such decision-making, especially in cultures where 
women are subservient. The ethic of care would suggest that cultural and social 
traditions and expectations are part of a valid decision-making framework. However, 
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radical feminists might argue that this is a result of the imbalance of power that 
causes women to feel unable to refuse consent. Property rights do not address this 
problem; however this thesis does not suggest that consent processes should differ 
for women. Rather, robust consent procedures should be instituted to recognise and 
address these pressures.124  
 
B  Informed Consent 
 
LDT decision making, particularly where it involves a person of emotional 
value to the donor, challenges the concept of informed consent. Majeske, Parker and 
Frader state: 125
 
The traditional requirements of informed consent do not appear well suited to 
evaluations of living related donors’ decision making, however, with its frequent 
emphasis on feelings of relatedness, interconnectedness, and obligation- a sharp 
contrast to the unpressured, rational decision making typically said to underlie 
informed consent…The traditional model of informed consent is based on an 
impartialist understanding of the requirements of autonomy that de-emphasises 
personal relationships so that each decision maker is conceived as being free to 
pursue autonomous goals. 
 
  Donors engage in potentially damaging procedures to benefit others. As such, 
the ethic of care may be a more appropriate ethical framework than informed 
consent. A parent whose options are either the death of their child or consent to 
donation may feel there is no choice at all, yet parents donating to their children 
display the least ambivalence of all donors.126 Part of informed decision making is 
that the decision maker possesses the ability to delay impulses and to refrain from 
making a decision without reflection.127 Studies of live kidney donors have 
suggested they decide before inquiring into possible consequences to themselves, or 
seeking reassurance as to the eventual benefits for the recipient.128  
 
Price argues that the lack of alternatives does not necessarily indicate that the 
consent was not voluntary, because when people suffer serious illnesses there often 
is only one realistic therapeutic option and the lack of alternatives does not invalidate 
the consent to that treatment.129 However, that argument overlooks the difference 
between consenting to treatment and consenting to a procedure that will benefit 
another, with no medical benefit. 
 
                                                          
124 Such as transplantation physicians being willing to provide a medical “white lie” as to suitability of 
a donor who appears unwilling. 
125 R Majeske,  L Parker and J Frader “In Search of an Ethical Framework for Consideration of 
Decisions Regarding Live Donation” in B Spielman (ed) Organ and Tissue Donation: Ethical Legal 
and Policy Issues (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1997) 89, 95.  
126 R Simmons and others Gift of Life: the Effects of Organ Transplantation on Individual, Family and 
Societal Dynamics (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1987) 189.  
127 I Janis and L Mann Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict Choice and Commitment 
(The Free Press, New York, 1977) 11. 
128 R Simmons and others, above, 189. Only 25 per cent of the donors could be regarded as complying 
to any substantial degree with a deliberative model of decision making. 
129 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 294. 
 109
  Commentators distinguish between internal and external pressures that might 
compel a choice to consent to donation.130 Internal pressures are feelings of 
obligation and compulsion, resulting from the nature of the relationship. External 
pressures are those from outside agencies such as family members, medical 
professionals and the knowledge of the low likelihood of the patient receiving a 
donor organ. Faden and Beauchamp assert that pressure will be insufficient to nullify 
free consent, unless it has overborne the will of the person consenting, rather than 
having the effect of encouraging the donor to make the decision that they would have 
made in any event. 131
   
C  Compulsion 
 
The concept of an ethic of care and decision making within relationships and 
the community has not compelled donation, even where it involves little personal 
risk or inconvenience. This is because people have ultimate dispositive power over 
their body parts. In McFall v Shimp,132 the Court refused to order a man to donate 
compatible bone marrow to his cousin to save the cousin’s life:133
 
 [T]o compel the defendant to submit to an intrusion to his body would change 
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would 
defeat the sanctity of the individual and would impose a rule which would know 
no limits and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn.  
 
Although, the Court described the refusal as morally indefensible,134the 
general view is that donation displays moral goodness, not moral duty. Compulsion 
would involve practical problems of enforcement and the risk of loss of trust in the 
medical profession. Although compulsory acquisition of other types of property 
exists,135 it is not recommended with regard to body parts. 
  
D Ethical Aspects  
 
From a consequentialist perspective, LDT is a “good”, especially kidney 
donation, as the outcomes are extremely good balanced against very low risk to 
donors. This perspective is also consistent with a beneficence-based ethic. The 
Nuffield Council considered that there was no ethical injury arising from LDT.136 
Deontological approaches emphasise the right of individuals to control the uses of 
their body, irrespective of the likely benefit to be derived by, or denied to, another. 
 
The principle of non-maleficence is problematic in this context, because all 
organ removals are potentially harmful and it is difficult to weigh the benefits to the 
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recipient against the risk to the donor. There are short-term risks resulting from the 
donation and any long-term risks are unknown. As stated by Price:137  
 
It is necessary to accept that harms are indeed intentionally inflicted and that it is 
the willingness of the individual to consent to that harm and the potential benefits 
accruing to others (and also donors) which ultimately justify any particular 
procedure. 
 
The justification for LDT rests with donors’ interests in their body parts and 
the right of self-determination, together with beneficence. There may be limits to the 
scope of permitted donations and persons may be prevented from giving autonomous 
consent to such procedures when harm rises above a certain level. However, 
Alldridge rejects a threshold approach, or any ceiling on permissible risk taking.138 
Similarly, Harris states:139
 
Should I be permitted voluntarily to donate a vital organ like the heart? Again, if I 
know what I am doing then I do not see why I should not give my life to save that 
of another if that is what I want to do. 
 
Price states:140
 
The unique nature of LDT creates a challenge for orthodox analysis and 
development of an adequate regulatory infrastructure. The prima facie clash 
between the interests of the potential donor and those of the intended recipient 
requires accommodation and resolution. 
 
The Law Commission of Canada asserted that, in the context of LDT: 
“Consent alone…does not ensure the moral acceptability of the medical 
intervention.”141 In most surgical operations, the person may consent to substantial 
harm with the purpose of therapeutic benefit, but it is more problematic to justify 
such harm when the procedure is non-therapeutic.  
 
The contentious issue is not freedom of choice, even though there is a risk of 
coercion. Rather, it is the potential to harm a healthy donor, because no one would 
consider such a choice coercive if no risk of harm were involved. Donors make 
decisions to donate within a web of social relationships and most people feel more 
comfortable about LDT between family members, particularly if a child is the 
recipient. The assumption is that this is a gift of love, which is viewed differently 
from endorsing self-harm from a stranger. If a parent decides to donate to save their 
dying child, this is not a purely other-regarding decision. Potentially, the parent will 
receive a substantial benefit, with extended ramifications for the whole family unit. 
 
                                                          
137 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 227 (emphasis in the original). 
138 P Alldridge “Consent to Medical and Surgical Treatment- The Law Commission’s 
Recommendations” (1996) 4 Med L Rev 129, 143. 
139 John Harris  Wonderwoman and Superman: the Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1992) 113. 
140 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 228. 
141 Law Reform Commission of Canada Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissues and Organs 
Working Paper 66 (Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1992) 7. 
 111
The Law Reform Commission of Canada proposed three conditions for 
LDT:142
 
• The donor must consent freely and knowledgably; 
• There must be some reasonably expected benefit to the donor; and 
• Likely benefits to the recipient must considerably outweigh likely harms to 
the donor. 
 
Price comments that: “These conditions attempt to reconcile the three key 
operational ethical principles here: (donor) autonomy, non-maleficence (to the 
donor) and beneficence (for the recipient).”143 He suggests that an assessment of 
benefit to the donor is not required as a precondition for competent adult donors, as it 
is subsumed within the requirement of informed consent and states that so long as an 
initial risk/benefit assessment is satisfied, then the donor should decide whether to 
donate. 144 The Task Force on Organ Transplantation stated:145  
 
Refusing to use a kidney from a competent living donor is unduly paternalistic 
where a donor is well informed, understands, and is willing to accept the risks of 
kidney donation.  
 
However, the physician should have the right to decline to perform the 
transplant if to do so would be incompatible with acceptable medical practice.146 If 
there is objective evidence of the existence of pressure, so the genuineness of consent 
is in doubt, the doctor may have a duty to decline to proceed.  
 
LDT has advantages over cadaveric donation. It is possible to be confident 
that the donor has actually given informed consent, with no need to resort to 
stratagems such as presumed consent. The donors are able to appreciate the benefits 
of their altruism. Living donors are, potentially, much more plentiful than suitable 
cadavers and cadaveric donations are unlikely to suffice to meet the need, no matter 
what strategies are employed to increase the rates of donation.  
 
LDT is a societal good, so donors should receive compensation for resultant 
expenses, such as loss of income during pre-operative procedures and convalescence, 
travel and accommodation costs, home help, childcare and a guarantee that any future 
medical treatment consequent upon the donation should be state-funded and high 
priority. The funding for compensation payments should not come from the recipient, 
but from the state.147  
 
A vocabulary of rights and autonomy, or reliance on property interests, is 
inadequate to represent the intimate bonds of family and friends, the balance between 
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Cambridge, 2000) 253. 
144 Price, above, 258. 
145 United States Department of Health and Human Services Report of the Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, Washington DC, 1986) 37. 
146 J Childress Who Should Decide? Paternalism in Health Care (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1982) 3. 
147 See the 2005 decision to compensate donors, discussed in chapter 8. 
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sacrifice and self interest and the complex relationship between doctors and organ 
donors. In a moral framework shaped by respect for patient autonomy, the decision 
whether or not to undergo risk or harm can seem a matter purely for the donor to 
make.  
 
This thesis argues that although this is an area where it could be ethically 
justifiable to restrict the free alienation of the property interest, the law is largely 
unable to ensure the voluntariness of decision making, apart from establishing 
procedural criteria, such as a right to withdraw.  Rather than regulation limiting LDT, 
it is better to establish transparent procedures for the counselling and consent 
processes, together with reliance on the professionalism of medical professionals, who 
should decline to proceed where there is apparent reluctance to donate.148 The 
UKHTA provides that living organ donation is illegal, unless regulations permit it to 
take place and case-by-case approval of Human Tissue Authority is obtained.149 Such 
a restriction is not recommended, as it does not appear necessary in light of the lack of 
evidence of egregious practices in this area. However, it is recommended that the 
Authority be required to establish guidelines, if necessary.150
 
V CONCLUSIONS 
 
A Biological Samples 
 
The body is more than a utilitarian object, as it has social and ritual 
significance, with cultural meanings and personal associations. It is the only thing 
many people can really call their own.151 The use of body parts saves lives and 
contributes to scientific research, but it also intrudes on body boundaries and 
personal autonomy. The range of potential uses of body parts and their value are 
increasing, whilst their status remains uncertain. A framework to resolve these issues 
must protect the interest persons have in their own bodies, in light of the increasing 
value of body materials. It must also be consistent, fair and practical in its 
application. 
 
The recognition of property rights has implications for access, storage and 
use of human biological samples. This issue has been considered infrequently by the 
courts and the cases have only dealt with limited fact situations. The status of excised 
body parts is inconsistent, reflecting little conceptual coherence. The cases 
considered in this chapter reveal three themes: 
 
• An unwillingness to acknowledge that sources have property interests in 
excised body parts; 
• A lack of consensus about the appropriate ethical basis for the retention and 
use of body parts; and 
                                                          
148 Doctors commonly provide a “white lie” regarding unsuitability to donate, where reluctance is 
evident. 
149 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 33. 
150 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
151 Leonard Barkan “Cosmos and Damian: Of  Medicine, Miracles, and the Economics of the Body” in 
Stuart Younger, Renee Fox and Lawrence O’Connell (eds) Organ Transplantation: Meanings and 
Realities (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1977) 242, 246. 
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• The need to develop a uniform standard in the treatment of human body 
materials, in light of the rapid development in biotechnology. 
 
The courts have not produced any clear ruling on the particular property 
rights that may be held over tissue samples, beyond a right of possession, the 
violation of which constitutes theft only in limited circumstances. It is not clear what 
other property rights exist, although the common law has implicitly accepted the 
existence of other property rights in tissue, such as the right to use, by allowing 
continued possession by hospitals, laboratories and museums. Boulier suggests that: 
“Once again, the law is lagging behind medical technology, though perhaps it is 
seeking to abandon the no property rule by inaction.”152
 
Essentially, the framework needs to ensure that  donors are able, if they wish, 
to retain a continuing relationship with their excised body parts after consent has 
been given. This thesis suggests that a body part is property at the point of severance, 
as it no longer forms a functional unity with the entire body. At that point, it is the 
property of the source and may be transferred to another. If a fully informed source 
fails to assert the rights of ownership, possession or control, it can be inferred that 
there is an intention to abandon the material. 
 
Researchers, or hospitals engaged in transplantation, obtain possessory rights 
akin to a bailment. The right to possess is only for specified purposes, and remedies 
should be available in the case of a breach. Once organs are transplanted into a 
recipient, they are incorporated that person’s body and cease to be separate property.  
 
If the purpose changes during the course of research, additional consent is 
required unless this was exempted in the initial consent. If such further consent was 
refused, the samples concerned should be returned or destroyed, and any information 
derived from the samples removed. Although this appears an onerous requirement, 
particularly where information from a large number of individuals is aggregated, it is 
achievable with the use of increasingly sophisticated computer systems, so long as 
appropriate records are maintained. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
  Commentators oppose property interests in the human body because of 
concerns about the sale of organs.153 However, commercialisation already exists, and 
bodies may produce returns to all parties, other than the source. In Moore,154 the 
California Supreme Court stated that Moore’s ownership claim was problematic 
because the law “limits drastically a patient’s control over excised cells” and 
“eliminated so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that… what [was] 
left [could not be assumed to] amount to “property” or “ownership for the purposes 
of the common law.”155 Moore suggests that the user of tissue acquires possessory 
rights at least, and probably a right of ownership, but the source does not. However, 
not all of the incidents of property need be present for the assertion of ownership 
                                                          
152 William Boulier “Sperm, Spleens and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in 
Human Body Parts” (1993) 23 HOSTRA L Rev 693, 715. 
153 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
154 Moore v Regents of the University of California  (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 140 (Sup Ct Cal) Panelli J. 
155 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 176 Mosk J. 
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rights.156 Property rights and market alienability are not synonymous, so it is 
possible to have a property right without the right to buy or sell the goods.  
 
The positive functions of control of a living person’s excised body parts are 
to serve the person’s interests as a human being, paying due regard to autonomy and 
confidentiality and to relate the means of acquisition to the uses that can be made of 
the material, subject to the constraints of societal approval and public policy. 
Negatively, the function of control is to give the source of the material preventive or 
remedial power over detrimental use of the body materials. By denying the property 
interest of the human source, that person is prevented from asserting that the 
materials have been stolen or converted.  
 
Should a discovery result in commercial benefit, sources should either be 
entitled to a share in the resultant profits, or be paid a negotiated figure to abandon 
their rights. The great bulk of the value of a patent, such as a cell-line patent and the 
derivative products, can be attributed to the efforts of the researchers and drug 
companies, rather than the “raw materials” from the sources, and so it is reasonable 
to limit the level of payment. This could be determined by individual negotiation, but 
a more practical approach would be to make provision for the Human Tissue 
Authority to negotiate collectively, to avoid multiple negotiations.157  
 
In some cases, the motivation of the sources is to enable predictive tests to be 
publicly available. Researchers should not be able to obtain a patent without the 
knowledge of the sources, who should be able to place conditions on their consent, 
such as preventing the licensing of tests, or that some or all of the subsequent profits 
must be employed to advance research, rather than become profit for biotechnology 
companies.158 The model demonstrated by PXE International may be appropriate 
where there are well-organised patient groups, but many sources may not be in a 
position to negotiate such an agreement. However, as such direct links with a 
patented product are rare, there seems little need for legislation in this area. The 
guidelines for ethics committee oversight of research proposals should include a 
requirement to ensure that researchers who anticipate a commercial product inform 
the donors of this and advise them to seek advice to protect their interests.159
 
B Living Donor Transplantation 
 
Property in severed organs should remain with the person from whom the 
materials were removed, until corporeal reintegration occurs in the recipient. Doctors 
and hospitals having control of the materials would have possessory rights only, 
subject to the conditions imposed in the donor’s consent. The hospital or surgeon 
obtaining physical possession would be a bailee, with a duty to take reasonable care 
of the property. Thus, a failure to comply with the terms of the bailment, such as 
unauthorised transplantation, might constitute theft and negligent misuse might 
amount to unlawful conversion.  
 
                                                          
156 J E Penner “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43 UCLA L Rev 711, 712. 
157 See the discussion in chapters 7 and 8. 
158 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
159 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
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 In order to safeguard against coercion or commercialisation, neither recipients 
nor their medical advisors should solicit organ donors. The process should continue to 
be managed through independent third party agencies, with oversight by the Human 
Tissue Authority. The apparent existence of voluntary and informed consent should 
be verified for both related and unrelated donors, recognising the potential for an ethic 
of care model to create its own form of tyranny, in which the relationship itself 
implies a duty to donate.   
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Chapter 4 
 
PERSONHOOD   
 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Policies about uses of human body parts are influenced by perspectives of the 
significance of embodiment, the concept of self, and how parts of the body relate to 
the whole. These depend on whether a dualist or monalist perception of the “self” and 
the body is accepted. The dualist perception is that the body is separate from the self, 
thus the continued functioning of the body is not morally significant, so death may be 
declared even though the lower brain and vegetative functions persist. The monalist 
perspective is that the body forms part of the self, so its continuing function is 
incompatible with death. 
 
In light of the intention in this thesis to incorporate a property construct into a 
legislative framework, it is necessary to consider the points at which personhood 
arises and concludes. There is potential for substantial effects on human rights if the 
meanings of “life” and “person” are capable of radical revision in the context of 
medical technologies with the ability to attenuate existence. The transplant 
community seeks ways to increase the number of available organs, and people in 
states between life and death may be medically suitable sources of body parts. If they 
are no longer “persons”, then harvesting of parts from them is ethically acceptable. If 
the person is dead, although the body still lives, then the proposed framework 
suggests that the property interest in the body has passed to the representative, who 
may authorise the collection of body parts. While the source is still alive, non paired 
organs remain part of the source and cannot be harvested.  
 
Ethical and legal “harm” in relation to insentient beings, and the moral 
significance of personhood are essential concepts in this thesis. They lead to 
consideration whether deontological concerns are raised by procedures intended to 
benefit others, which are not of direct benefit to the source. If no such concerns arise, 
utilitarian considerations may justify such procedures. Public policy must mediate 
between the utilitarian goals of increasing organ supply and facilitating potentially 
valuable research and deontological concerns around respect for persons. For 
example, potentially valuable treatments may result from stem cell research using 
human embryos. Often these are “surplus” embryos that were produced for in vitro 
fertilisation. Their destruction raises ethical concerns, which are often expressed in 
terms of personhood. 
 
This chapter will consider circumstances in which the concept of personhood 
is uncertain in order to define the parameters of the framework proposed in the thesis. 
Issues discussed include whether embryos are persons, with property rights over their 
cells or property, subject to proprietary rights of others. It also considers the point at 
the end of life when personhood ceases and property in the dead body would pass to 
the deceased’s representative. Although it is accepted that non-paired organs can only 
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be retrieved from dead donors, there are a variety of constructs of death, so the 
concept and criticisms of brain death are discussed. 
 
II  THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 
 
Traditional medical ethics subscribe to the principle of the sanctity of human 
life in asserting that, because all lives are intrinsically valuable, it is wrong to 
intentionally kill a human being. However, technology now permits the maintenance 
of life by artificial means in persons who formerly would have died. Additionally, 
there has been substantial debate about the meaning of death– is it the cessation of the 
heartbeat and circulation, or is it the destruction of the upper brain, consisting of the 
cerebral hemispheres that contain the neuro-physiological basis of higher mental 
functions such as self-consciousness, deliberation, thought, memory and 
consciousness? The destruction of the upper brain means the loss of the capacity for 
any sort of mental life. It contains the basis of specific memories, beliefs, attitudes 
and personality traits that make up a person, so its destruction destroys the states that 
underlie personal identity. However, provided that the lower brain continues to 
function, the person will still live, as the lower brain (or brain stem) controls life 
processes such as respiration.  
 
The point at which an individual ceases to be a person, or whether some 
individuals are ever persons at all, depends on the viewpoint of the commentator. 
Some employ mentalist personhood perspectives and regard the mind as being the 
critical entity, distinct from matter in the form of the human body. Others regard the 
mind as located within the body, or dependent upon the body. Those who regard the 
biological functioning of the body as being of paramount importance might regard the 
mind as either being distinct from the body or part of it. Gervais states:1  
 
Underlying these different analytical approaches is a fundamental difference in 
focus– either on the human as organism or on the human as person.  
 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada observed that:2
 
A conception of persons as embodied selves may not be amenable to rational 
justifications, because the respect it accords the body likely derives from 
fundamental sentiments that transcend rational argument. 
 
Locke stated:3
 
…we must consider what person stands for; which I think, is a thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking 
thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness 
which is inseparable from thinking and seems to me essential to it; it being 
impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. 
 
The extent to which the “self” is identifiable with the body is variable and, to 
some extent, dependent upon cultural or religious belief. However, the public 
                                                 
1 K Gervais Redefining Death (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986) 20. 
2 Law Reform Commission of Canada Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissue and Organs 
Working Paper 66 (Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1992) 105. 
3 John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II (Oxford University Press, London, 
1964) ch 27 (emphasis in the original). 
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perception is that there is a strong correlation between the two, even continuing after 
death. Consequently, there is a lack of acceptance of the notion of self being related 
solely to mental and psychosocial functioning. In 1981, Scott expressed the view that 
once the shock of a new technology wears off, society adjusts by shifting its values if 
sufficient benefit is found to result. In referring to organ transplants from cadavers, he 
stated that “[w]e are dealing with deep-rooted attitudes and nothing more, attitudes 
which are in fact changing.”4 However, it is debateable whether efforts to 
reconceptualise the body as distinct from the person inhabiting it would ever be able 
to overcome a cultural insistence on self/body inviolability.  
 
Harris states the issue as when life begins and ceases to matter morally.5 He 
asks: “In short, when does life begin to have that special value we believe attaches to 
human life and when does it cease to have that value?”6 He argues that the value is 
the capacity to value life. In order to value its own life, a being would have to be 
aware that it has a life to value, which is similar to Locke’s conception of self-
consciousness. This is an awareness of awareness. The being would have to have a 
capacity to envisage the future and have a desire either to experience it or not. On 
such a view, permanently insentient individuals possess no interests. Harris also 
argues that because each person’s life is individually valuable, two lives are more 
valuable than one. Consequently, if a choice has to be made between lives, where not 
all at risk can be saved, the choice should be to save as many lives as possible.7  
 
Similarly, Tooley argues that personhood does not arise from belonging to a 
species whose normal adult members are persons, because an entity’s moral status 
should be based on its intrinsic properties, rather than on its relations to other 
individuals.8  He states that moral status should be connected with having interests 
that need to be protected. The morally significant concept of an interest is one that 
connects with being a conscious being capable of having desires. A person whose 
upper brain has been destroyed does not have the same moral status as a person, so 
there is no moral reason to prolong the lives of such individuals.  
 
This approach is opposed by Keown, who states: 9
 
The law does not deny personhood, and the rights it attracts, because the person 
has lost the ability to think even though the necessary legal respect may vary from 
one context to another.  
 
Lamb argues that personal identity is a quality of a living thing, not a 
reference to an individual’s physical state or structure.10 He claims that there is 
insufficient diagnostic accuracy of personhood to use it as a test to determine when 
actions such as organ retrieval may take place. 
                                                 
4 Russell Scott The Body as Property (Viking Press, New York, 1981) 260. 
5 John Harris The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (Butler & Tanner Ltd, London, 
1985) 8. 
6 Harris, above, 8. 
7 Harris, above, 22. 
8 Michael Tooley “Personhood” in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds) A Companion to Bioethics 
(Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1998)123, 123. 
9 J Keown “Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland” (1997) 113 LLQR 481, 
493. 
10 David Lamb Organ Transplants and Ethics (Routledge, London, 1990) 43. 
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The rationale behind the requirement that the donor be dead before non-paired 
organs are harvested is to ensure respect for persons, and this is accomplished by 
ensuring that the ends or interests of potential donors are not threatened.11 If people 
who permanently lack awareness lack any interests at all, the dead donor rule would 
not apply to them. Alternatively, the person lacks awareness of interests so cannot be 
harmed by an event of which they have no knowledge. This is a contentious view, 
especially to people who believe that there are innate interests.  
 
Personhood arguments can be challenged on both deontological and utilitarian 
grounds. Kant argued that all human beings have intrinsic worth, rather than 
instrumental worth. To argue that some humans are not persons, and so may be used 
to benefit others, transgresses the second form of Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act 
so you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an 
end and never as a means only.”12  
 
From a utilitarian viewpoint, the use of insentient beings as a means to benefit 
others may lower respect for the value and dignity of human life and reduce public 
trust in medical decision making, resulting in an overall reduction in willingness to 
participate in research, or donate organs. The crucial decision may not be whether to 
respect the sanctity of life, but which decision best respects it.   
 
The resolution of these issues in the form of, or even in the absence of, law 
demonstrates the relationship between law and morality in that society. Developments 
depend on whether that state wishes to impose views on citizens relating to moral 
convictions, and the social acceptability of such views. In making such decisions, the 
Courts and legislature are compelled to develop a social and, at times, a moral vision 
of relationships and medical treatment in order to determine considered responses to 
the social and moral dilemmas created by modern biotechnology. New definitions of 
death challenge familiar assumptions and, this regard, the courts have tended towards 
pragmatism, rather than adopting a philosophical concept of a “person.” 
 
III   AIREDALE NHS TRUST V BLAND13
 
Bland had been in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for three years when a 
doctor and the Trust responsible for his care, with the support of Bland’s family, 
successfully applied to the High Court for a declaration that it would be lawful to 
remove his naso-gastric tube, resulting in his death by dehydration. It was held that 
the law of homicide did not cover the proposed course of conduct, the declarations 
were granted and Bland died. 
 
Nine judges in three courts pronounced on the case and each made it clear 
that, although Bland was alive, they did not value life that is only human in a 
                                                 
11  N Fost “The Unimportance of Death” in S J Youngner, R M Arnold and R Shapiro (eds) The 
Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1999) 161—
78. 
12  I Kant Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals T Abbott (trans) (Bobbs Merrill Co 
Inc, Indianapolis, 1946) 46. 
13 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 AC 789 (HL) Keith, Goff, Lowry, Browne-Wilkinson and 
Mustill JJ. 
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biological sense. The implication is that Bland was in some hinterland between life 
and death, a kind of “living death.”  
 
 Goff LJ cited with approval the decision of Thomas J in Auckland Area Health 
Board v A-G,14 where it was held that it was not unlawful to discontinue ventilation of 
a patient with Guillain-Barré syndrome, if that accorded with good medical practice.15 
This amounted to a collegiate decision made by the doctors, endorsed by the 
appropriate ethics committee, with the informed consent of the family members 
concerned. It was held that the sanctity of life is not an absolute value. It could be 
offset by values of human dignity and personal privacy.16  
 
Bland17 supports the notion that body parts are separate from the person and 
distinct from the “self”. Thus, there is no ethical objection to a person specifying by 
way of an advance directive that, in certain circumstances, steps should be taken to 
preserve body parts. Withdrawal of hydration renders them unfit for transplantation. 
Whilst euthanasia is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is suggested that a person 
might instruct that withdrawal of treatment must be carried out in a manner that best 
protects the organs, as is done when a brain dead person is withdrawn from 
ventilation. 
       
IV THE STATUS OF GAMETES AND THE UNBORN CHILD 
 
A Gametes 
 
The preservation, and subsequent use, of gametes illustrates the need for a 
coherent legal framework, as categorisation of the materials is integral to resolution of 
disputes. The cases considered in this section are responses to the different factual 
situations in different jurisdictions yet, generally, the approach is to ensure that the 
prior interests of the deceased man are respected. They also lead to complex 
considerations of succession law. 
 
A fundamental issue in posthumous reproduction is whether a man has the 
right to transfer or bequeath his sperm to another person. If sperm is not classified as 
some form of property, then a donor’s interest in the sperm may die with him and 
make legal post-mortem insemination impossible. If stored gametes are property, it 
follows logically that they are owned, because someone has possession of them, or 
has the authority to decide what to do with them. Consequently, the owner has the 
power to bequeath them. Alternatively, they may be less than property, but in a 
category that entitles them to special respect, because of their potential for human life. 
The cases considered relate to sperm, but the ability to cryopreserve and subsequently 
use human eggs is presently being refined and this discussion would apply similarly 
to oocytes. 
 
                                                 
14  Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 (HC) Thomas J. 
15  Bland, above, 867. 
16  Auckland Area Health Board v A-G, above, 244, 245. 
17 Bland, above. 
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In 1984, the French Tribunal decided Parpalaix v CECOS.18 Alain Parpalaix 
was diagnosed with testicular cancer and, as chemotherapy would leave him sterile, 
he deposited sperm in a sperm bank. He did not state his intentions for the frozen 
sperm in the event of his death. He married two days before his death. When his wife, 
Corinne, subsequently requested the sperm for use in artificial insemination, this was 
refused. Alain’s wife and parents claimed that they were his heirs and the owners of 
the sperm. They argued that Alain’s intent was for Corinne to use the sperm to 
conceive a child after his death.  
 
The sperm bank argued that they did not have any obligations to Corinne, as 
their agreement was with Alain and that the sperm was not divisible from the body in 
the absence of specific instructions from Alain, and so was not inheritable. Since 
Alain and Corinne were not married at the time of deposit and Alain did not provide 
any written directives, the sperm should not be given to Corinne. Their final argument 
was that the deposit was for therapeutic purposes, to psychologically aid Alain. 
 
The Court found that human sperm was not inheritable property within the 
meaning of the French Civil Code and that Alain’s intent was the determining factor. 
As he had not specified his intent in writing, his parents and Corinne were best able to 
articulate it. The Tribunal ordered the return of the sperm to Corinne, but she was 
unsuccessful in her attempt to posthumously bear Alain’s child. 
 
In 1993, the first United States case arose relating to the bequeathing of frozen 
sperm.19 Kane lived with Hecht and had two teenaged children from a previous 
marriage. Before committing suicide, he deposited sperm at a sperm bank, signing an 
agreement containing the statement “in the event of the death of the client…the client 
instructs the Cryobank to….continue to store [the specimens] upon request of the 
executor of the estate [or] release the specimens to the executor of the estate.”20 Kane 
stated that the vials were to be released to Hecht and her physician. His will named 
Hecht as executor and bequeathed all right, title, and interests in any stored sperm to 
her. He left a letter addressed to his children, including future posthumous offspring. 
Kane’s children challenged the will and argued that Moore21 applied, resulting in a 
no-property conclusion. The Court held that he had “an interest in the nature of 
ownership, to the extent that he ha[d] decision-making authority as to the use of his 
sperm for reproduction.”22 Hecht established that gametes are a unique type of 
property, but the court avoided adopting a full property analogy.  
  
In Hall v Fertility Institute of New Orleans,23 Hall was diagnosed with cancer. He 
deposited 15 vials of sperm with a fertility institute and executed a formal act of 
donation, by which he transferred his interest in the vials to his girlfriend. Following 
Hall’s death, his executor sought to have the vials destroyed or transferred to Hall’s 
son, because of the son’s discomfort at the prospect of posthumous siblings. The 
                                                 
18 Parpalaix v CECOS as related in C L Streeb “A Child Conceived After his Father’s Death?: 
Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights. An Analysis of Ohio Statutes” (2000) 48 Clev St L 
Rev 137, 149. 
19  Hecht v Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal Rptr 2d 275 (Ct App). 
20  Hecht v Superior Court, above, 276. 
21  Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479 (Sup Ct Cal). See the 
discussion in chapter 3. 
22 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 283. 
23 Hall v Fertility Institute of New Orleans (1994) 647 So 2d 1348 (La Ct App). 
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executor unsuccessfully alleged that the transfer of sperm was contrary to public 
policy and morals. It was held that, if the facts at trial showed that the decedent was 
competent at the time of the gift and not under undue influence, the frozen semen was 
the property of the girlfriend and she had full rights to its disposition. Similarly, in 
Kurchner v State Farm Fire and Casualty Co,24 Ramirez J held that sperm outside of 
the body is property and not a part of the body, thus, no bodily injury was caused by 
the destruction of stored sperm. 
 
In the United Kingdom, in R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
ex p Blood,25 Blood contracted meningitis and fell into a coma. Shortly before his 
death, semen was collected, following a request by his wife. Brown J held that the 
Authority was correct to refuse to allow her to use the semen, because her husband 
had not given consent to its storage before he died and it had not exceeded its powers 
by refusing to allow her to take the semen overseas. This latter finding was reversed 
by the Court of Appeal, because the Authority had not taken into consideration the 
effect of the European Community Treaty. The Court left open the question of the 
lawfulness of the taking of sperm from an unconscious person.26
 
In New Zealand, the Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproduction 
Technologies, when considering the status of gametes and embryos, stated that the 
property approach failed to give due regard to the mana of human tissue and the 
personhood approach was inconsistent with present abortion laws. The committee did 
not resolve the issue of status, but felt that the powers of disposition should rest with 
the providers of the gametes and that the first point of reference should be the contract 
between the clinic or storage agency and the donor.27  
 
Similarly,  the Guidelines for the Storage, Use, and Disposal of Sperm from a 
Deceased Man28 provide that appropriate counselling must be provided to men 
donating sperm and consent forms must specify what is to happen to the sperm, 
should the donor die leaving stored sperm. In the case of sperm stored prior to 
medical treatments, options on the consent form must provide either that the sperm is 
disposed of in a culturally respectful manner, or that it will be available for use by a 
specified person within a specified time frame. When consent cannot be obtained, or 
there is a variation to the requirements of the guidelines, an application for ethical 
review must be submitted to the ethics committee. The guidelines state that the 
collection of sperm from a comatose or recently deceased man, without his prior 
written consent, is “ethically unacceptable.”29  
 
The Code provides for surrogate consent on behalf of incompetent persons and 
that “[e]very consumer may use an advance directive in accordance with the common 
                                                 
24 Kurchner v State Farm Fire and Casualty Co (2003) 858 So 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla Ct App). 
25 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex p Blood [1997] 2 FLR 756 (CA) Lord Woolf 
MR, Waite, Henry LJJ. Mrs Blood succeeded in giving birth to her husband’s posthumous children. 
26 R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ex p Blood, above, 764.  
27 Ministerial Committee on Assisted Reproduction Technologies Assisted Human Reproduction: 
Navigating Our Future (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1994) 93. 
28 National Ethics Committee on Assisted Human Reproduction Guidelines for the Storage, Use, and 
Disposal of Sperm from a Deceased Man (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2000). 
29 The guidelines have been adopted as an established procedure under the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004: Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 14 (1)(a)- 
these guidelines must be reviewed by November 2007. 
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law.”30 Advance directives are not required to be in writing, therefore a conflict might 
arise between the Code and the Guidelines if a man has clearly indicated his wishes 
with respect to the collection or disposition of semen, but this has not been expressed 
in writing, perhaps because of the sudden nature of his illness. Presumably, collection 
would take place, and use after the man’s death would be considered by the ethics 
committee. 
 
By contrast, in October 2003, in response to several such applications in 
Israeli courts, the Israeli Attorney-General published guidelines that allow courts to 
permit the posthumous extraction and use of sperm.31 The guidelines are based on the 
assumption of presumed consent, in the absence of explicit objection by the deceased 
man. This is justified by balancing the uncertain interests of the deceased against the 
certain expressed interests of the spouse. Her interests are considered strong enough 
to limit state curtailment of her reproductive autonomy. Approval is limited to female 
partners at the time of death and denied to other parties, such as parents. The 
guidelines argue that fatherhood is not being forced on the man, even should a 
mistake have been made about his wishes. The child would be registered as the child 
of the deceased, but such registration does not entail any inheritance rights. Ravitsky 
suggests that the guidelines reflect the strong pro-natalist cultural values dominant in 
Israel and the primacy given to honouring the memory of the dead.32
 
One problem from posthumous reproduction is the distribution of the donor’s 
estate. If potential children can be beneficiaries, administration may be delayed for 
years until the children are born. During that time, other beneficiaries would be left 
waiting and uncertain about their futures. Since public policy would suggest the 
desirability of efficient distribution of estates, the law is unlikely to permit potential 
children to inherit, without some time limitations.  
 
The status of gametes indicates the challenge to established social structures 
imposed by such technologies and the effect they may have on traditional views of 
inheritance and the family. It also demonstrates the conceptual incoherence of the law. 
Gametes are treated as property in almost all respects, yet there is a marked reluctance 
to acknowledge this. Similar issues could arise if one of the gamete sources wished to 
utilise stored embryos after the death of one of them.33
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B  Is An Unborn Child a Person? 
 
                                                 
30 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, Right 5 <http://www.hdc.org.nz> (last 
accessed 14 September 2006). 
31 Vardit Ravitsky “Posthumous Reproduction Guidelines in Israel” (2004) Hastings cent rep 6. 
32 Ravitsky, above, 7. See also Barbara Prainsack “‘Negotiating Life’: The Regulation of Human 
Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Israel” (2006) 36 Social Studies of Science 173, 185. 
33 See the discussion about embryos, below. 
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A child is born when its body has been completely removed from the body of 
the mother, even though it might still be attached by the umbilical cord.34 A spatial 
relationship between the bodies is necessary. Additionally, the child must be born 
“alive”. In C v S,35 the Court of Appeal held that, in order to be born alive, a child 
must be able to breathe. If a child requires mechanically assisted breathing support, it 
is born alive if it will eventually be able to breathe unaided. In Rance v Mid-Downs 
Health Authority,36 a child was held to be born alive if it was capable of breathing 
through its lungs alone, without deriving any support from its mother. The Court did 
not require the child to be viable, partially because of doubt about the meaning of that 
term.  
 
The classical common law position adopted by the English law was that a 
foetus is not a person.37 Although the child en ventre sa mère has some protected 
interests, such as the right to inherit, such interests are contingent rights that 
crystallise only on  birth alive. The Warnock Committee stated:38  
 
We examined the current position of the in vivo embryo in law. The human 
embryo per se has no legal status. It is not, under law in the United Kingdom, 
accorded the same status as a child or an adult, and the law does not treat the 
human embryo as having a right to life. However, there are certain statutory 
provisions that give some level of protection in certain respects. 
 
In Burton v Islington HA,39 a case relating to damage to a foetus in the womb, Dillon 
LJ held that the injury to the unborn child was just an evidentiary incident in the 
causation of damage suffered at birth.40 Subsequently, Mustill LJ stated that the 
relationship between the mother and her unborn child is one of bond, not identity, and 
that the Court of Appeal was wrong to treat the foetus as part of the mother, rather 
than a unique organism.41  
 
In New Zealand, the parents of a still-born child made a claim for damages,42 
claiming that the obstetrician failed to exercise reasonable care and skill and failed in 
his obligations of communication to them. The obstetrician asserted that the claims 
were statute-barred,43 because they related to damages arising directly or indirectly 
out of a personal injury. In the High Court, Wild and Ronald Young JJ held that, 
although an unborn child is “inside and connected to” the mother, it is not the same as 
the mother.44 While the foetus is connected to the mother and housed within her body 
                                                 
34 Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (2 ed, Stevens, London, 1983) 289—290. 
35 C v S [1988] QB 135 (CA) Donaldson MR, Stephen Brown, Russell JJ.  
36 Rance v Mid- Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587 (QB) Brooke J. 
37 Paton v Trustees of BPAS and another [1978] 2 All ER 987(CA);   Re F (In Utero) [1988] 2 All ER 
193 (CA); C v S [1987] 1 All ER 1230 (QB); [1988] QB 135 (CA). 
38 Warnock Committee Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Cm 9314 (HMSO, London, 1984) para 11.16—17. 
39 Burton v Islington HA [1992] 3 All ER 820 (CA) Dillon, Balcombe and Leggatt LJJ. 
40 Burton v Islington HA, above, 839–40 Dillon LJ.  
41 Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] QB 581(HL) Goff, Mustill, Slynn, Hope, 
Clyde LJJ. 
42 Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2003] 3 NZLR 289  (CA)  Elias CJ, Keith J, Blanchard J, 
McGrath J, Glazebrook J.  
43 Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, s 52(2). 
44 Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2002] NZAR 513 (HC) para 22. 
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until birth, “none of this equates to sameness.”45 Harm to the unborn child is “distinct 
from harm to the mother” as a matter of “biological reality.”46
 
On appeal, Elias CJ stated: 47
 
Foetus and mother are not the same but neither are they physically free from one 
another. They are physically connected. The connection ends with birth or by 
death of one of the two. 
 
She and Keith J held that the mother did suffer a personal injury when her child died 
in utero.48 McGrath J held that the foetus cannot have any rights of its own until it is 
born and has a separate existence from the mother. He recognised that any conclusion 
that the mother and foetus are a single entity is problematic and stated that this is 
because the rule is based on expedience rather than principle.49 He held that a mother 
and foetus could consist of a single entity in a particular legislative context. 
 
However, Blanchard and Glazebrook JJ held that to treat the death of the 
unborn child as direct physical injury to the mother is, in effect, to treat a mother and 
foetus as a single entity, which ignores biological reality. Their conclusion was that 
the death of the unborn child was the death of a separate organism, albeit one 
connected to the mother.50 Thus, the majority concluded that injury to the foetus is a 
personal injury to the mother, and so the statutory bar would apply. 
 
In Sisasubramaniam v Yarrall,51 although Heath J applied the majority 
decision in Harrild, he stated that he agreed with the dissenting judgments, that an 
injury to an unborn child should not be regarded as a personal injury suffered by the 
mother.  
 
In Re an Unborn Child,52 it was planned that a pornographic film would 
include the birth of a child. Orders were sought, inter alia, placing the unborn child 
under the guardianship of the High Court. It was necessary to determine whether the 
term “child” included an unborn child.53 Heath J held that the issue was one of public 
policy54 and “child” could include an unborn child for the purposes of making a 
guardianship order.  
 
This decision raises a number of concerns. If an unborn child is a person, in 
this thesis would argue that it has a property interest in the excised parts of its body. It 
is difficult to determine the stage of development at which it would be treated as a 
                                                 
45 Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above, para 23. 
46 Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above, paras 31—32. 
47 Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2003] 3 NZLR 289 (CA)[20]. 
48 Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above, [22]and[42]. 
49 Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above, [126]. 
50 Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above, [69]. 
51 Sisasubramaniam v Yarrall  (21 December 2004) High Court Wellington CIV 2004-485-464, para 
68 Heath J. 
52 Re an Unborn Child [2003] 1 NZLR 115 (HC) Heath J. 
53 Guardianship Act 1968, s 2(1). 
54 Re an Unborn Child, above, 117. 
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person.55 Re an Unborn Child56 adopts a personhood approach, in order to justify 
controls over the behaviour of the mother. In light of the substantial ramifications 
should this case be applied universally to unborn children, it is likely that its 
application will be confined to its particular, highly unusual, factual situation. The 
practical difficulties arising from the personhood approach are so significant that this 
thesis argues that personhood only arises once a child is born alive.57
 
C Is An Unborn Child Property? 
 
An alternative approach is to argue that an unborn child is property and may 
be treated as a chattel. There has been reluctance to characterise embryos and foetuses  
as property, because this might lead to the notion that the owner could enjoy powers 
of sale, disposition, and bequest, and that such property might become the subject of 
property disputes, especially relating to relationship property. However, surplus 
embryos may be destroyed,58 donated to others or donated for research. The existence 
of a property interest is suggested by the parents’ ability to transfer the embryos.  
 
In Davis v Davis,59 a divorcing couple were unable to agree on the disposition 
of seven frozen embryos. Initially, the wife wished to have them implanted in her 
womb. The husband objected, as he wished the embryos to be retained in a frozen 
state, until he decided whether he wanted to be responsible for a child born after the 
divorce. The trial court held that the embryos were “human beings” from the moment 
of fertilisation and awarded custody to the wife. The Court of Appeal rejected the 
notion that the embryos were persons and held that the husband and wife shared an 
interest in the embryos, and so both had joint control and an equal input into their 
disposition.   
 
The Supreme Court held that the couple did not have property rights in the 
embryos, but they had an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they 
had decision-making authority regarding their disposition. The embryos were not 
persons or property, but were “an interim category that entitles them to special respect 
because of their potential for human life.”60 If the parties had agreed about the 
disposition of the embryos that agreement would have been implemented, but as there 
                                                 
55 Howard W Jones and Lucinda Veeck “What is an Embryo?”(2002) 77 Fertility and Sterility 658—
659: The egg, when fertilised, spends the first four days making cells. It starts as two and multiplies 
during this time. During the next 10 days the placenta, amnion, umbilical cord and the other 
membranes that will be the support system of the embryo are formed. Next comes the clustering of 
cells together to form the primitive streak, which will develop into the spinal column and central 
nervous system of the embryo. In the first 14 days, there is no differentiation of cells; any of which 
might form part of the placenta or the embryo itself. Consequently, 14 days has been considered the 
limit for research on embryos. By eight weeks after fertilisation, the placenta and all the protective 
membranes have separated from the embryo and all the main organs of the body and the limbs have 
formed. Thereafter, the organism is generally referred to as a foetus.  
56 Re an Unborn Child, above. 
57 Note that there has been much discussion as to whether an embryo is a person from the point of 
fertilisation, in the context of human embryonic stem cell research and abortion. Consensus is unlikely 
and the arguments often relate to cultural or spiritual values. This issue will not be explored in this 
thesis. 
58 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 10, embryos must not be stored beyond ten 
years. 
59 Davis v Davis (1992) 842 SW 2d 588 (Tenn Sup Ct).  
60 Davis v Davis, above, 596. 
    127
was no agreement, the Court had to weigh the relative interests of the couple. The 
wife had remarried and now wished to donate the embryos to another couple. The 
husband’s wish to avoid procreation overrode the wife’s wish to donate, so the 
fertility clinic was free to dispose of the embryos. 
 
Subsequent United States cases have emphasised that people have a right not 
to become parents against their will.61 There has been a secondary emphasis on the 
parties’ agreements.62 This suggests a “quasi-property” approach towards the embryo, 
not extending to ownership. 
 
In the United Kingdom, two claimants had each undergone IVF treatment with 
a partner from whom she subsequently separated, leaving stored frozen embryos. 
Each woman wished to have the embryos implanted, with a view to becoming 
pregnant. Both men had withdrawn their consent to the continued storage of the 
embryos, and wanted the embryos to perish. Wall J held that there is no property in an 
embryo, but both gamete donors have an interest in, and rights over, the embryos they 
have created.63 Additionally, embryos cannot be considered to be persons, or to have 
a “qualified” right to life.  
 
Ms Evans lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, 
asking the Court to consider whether destruction of her stored embryos would be a 
breach of her human rights. It ruled unanimously that there had been no violation of 
Article 2- the right to life, or Article 14- the prohibition of discrimination.64 A 
majority of five votes to two decided that there had been no violation of Article 8- the 
right to respect for private and family life. Thus, an embryo did not have independent 
rights or interests and could not claim, or have claimed on its behalf, a right to life. 
The dissenting judges took the approach of balancing the private interests of the 
parties and concluded that the wishes of the party withdrawing consent should not 
prevail if the other party could not otherwise have a genetically related child, had no 
children and did not intend to use a surrogate.65  
 
In Dickson v United Kingdom,66 a case about whether a prisoner could 
conceive a child through artificial insemination, the Court applied Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which protects a person’s right to respect for 
private and family life. This is qualified by Article 8(2), which permits interference 
where it is necessary in a democratic society for reasons such as the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. The issue was whether the interference with the 
applicants’ rights under Article 8 could be justified under Article 8(2). The majority 
held that the policy served a legitimate public interest, such as preserving confidence 
in the penal system; so the interference with the applicants’ rights was lawful. Bonello 
J stated that “permitting offspring to be born to the applicants would not be fostering 
the best interests of the desired child,”67 so the refusal was justifiable under Article 
                                                 
61 AZ v BZ (2000) 431 Mass 150 (Mass Probate Ct). 
62 Kass v Kass (1998) 91 NY 2d 554 (NY Ct App). 
63 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam) Wall J. 
64Case of Evans v United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights, Application 6339/05. 
65 Case of Evans v United Kingdom, above, 30. 
66 Case of Dickson v United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights, Application no 44362/04, 18 
April 2006. 
67 Case of Dickson v United Kingdom, above, Concurring Opinion of Bonello J para 5. 
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8(2). He treated a child who has not yet been conceived as a person who has rights 
which are protected by the Convention, a view that could have the consequence, for 
example, that lawful abortion was incompatible with the right to life under Article 2.  
 
The status of gametes and embryos illustrates the conceptually unsatisfactory 
state of the law regarding body parts. The rights approach requires a method to 
balance conflicting rights. The determination of the point at which consent may no 
longer be withdrawn is based on public policy, rather than rights. If the contract of the 
parties is determinative, this suggests some form of property interest must exist. 
Evans68 is unsatisfactory, because the woman had to make a rapid decision during a 
medical crisis and she accepted the assurances of her partner that she did not need to 
make provision for the possible termination of the relationship.69 If the embryos are 
destroyed, she will have lost her only opportunity to parent a genetically related child. 
The couple had an agreement, which she relied upon and doing so, acted to her 
detriment. It seems inequitable for the man to then resile from the agreement. 
 
 Public policy suggests that a man should not become a father against his will, 
although that is not an uncommon occurrence with natural conception. If each party 
had a property interest in their gametes, then they would have a joint (or common) 
interest in the resultant embryos. If they were unable to agree about disposition, the 
embryos would be divided between the parties.  However, arguably, abandonment of 
the embryos by one party should result in the full interest passing to the other, rather 
than destruction. 
  
D Research Using Embryos 
 
Research use of human embryos has become a matter of great scientific 
interest, particularly the creation of embryonic stem cell lines. If it is believed that 
embryos are “persons”, such research would amount to killing one person to benefit 
another.  
 
Stem cells are a potential source of new cells, for example blood stem cells 
will replenish and enrich blood cells. Embryonic stem cells are still in a pluripotent 
state and have the potential to develop into any of the human cell types. They have the 
ability to renew themselves, by undergoing an unlimited number of divisions, for an 
indefinite amount of time. Human stem cell research could be of use in formulating 
new therapies, by assisting with the development and testing of new drugs. 
Additionally, differentiated derivatives of human embryo stem cells could be applied 
to transplantation therapies and may enable the treatment of diseases resulting from 
abnormal cell division and specialisation.  
 
The most efficient method of obtaining stem cells is to extract them from early 
human embryos, which results in the destruction of the embryo. Although many 
countries have regulated research that uses human reproductive material, the United 
Kingdom is presently the only country in Europe that allows the creation of human 
embryos specifically for research purposes, including the use of cloning techniques.70  
                                                 
68 Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd, above. 
69 For example, by fertilising some of her eggs with donor semen. 
70 The United States Code and Federal Register contain legislation that defines the degree of protection 
that must be given to the material in the course of experimentation. 46 CFR @ 26.208 (a)(2) (1996); 42 
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 A House of Lords Select Committee reviewed the science and ethics of stem 
cell research and the resultant regulatory issues.71 Its view was that that the embryo 
should be respected without requiring total protection, so research on early human 
embryos should not be prohibited.72 Respect for persons necessitates research to save 
lives so, unless early embryos have an unconditional claim to protection, it is wrong 
to rule out research, involving them. It recommended that 14 days should remain the 
limit for research on early embryos73 and that embryos should only be created 
specifically for research purposes if there is a demonstrable and exceptional need that 
cannot be met by the use of surplus embryos.74  
 
 In New Zealand, an advisory committee (ACART) will develop advice to the 
Minister and guidelines on assisted human reproductive procedures and research, 
within which the ethics committee (ECART) is required to operate.75ACART must 
produce advice for the Minister in 2007 and opinions are no doubt as divided as in 
other countries where the issue has been debated.76  
 
If embryos are people, such research attempts to prolong the lives of some 
people by destroying younger persons. “Those opposed to research on embryos are 
concerned that we are on a slippery slope, facing a creeping moral degradation 
fostered by unbridled technology.”77 Slippery slope arguments are speculative and 
must be weighed against the potential benefits from research.  
 
If embryos are the property of the gamete providers they could transfer them 
to other couples or to researchers.  However, most jurisdictions require controls in 
addition to the consent of the providers. This does not mean the property construct is 
inapplicable to embryos, as in many other areas there are legislative controls over the 
uses of property, if public policy has determined that private interests should be 
constrained.  
 
V  DEATH 
                                                                                                                                            
U.S.C.S. @289 (g). In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
controls research that utilises human embryos. In Australia, the Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 
(1995) and the South Australian Reproductive Technology Act (1988) provide controls over the use of 
embryos for research. To date, only two European states have adopted regulations expressly 
authorising such research, whilst the majority have either no legislation, or have introduced restrictive 
legislation prohibiting embryo research. The Swedish Research Council has issued guidelines 
endorsing the use of Cell Nuclear Replacement (December 2001) and the Netherlands has adopted 
legislation allowing CNR after a moratorium of five years (October 2001). In both cases research is 
only permitted on surplus embryos. L  Matthiessen (ed) Survey on Opinions from National Ethics 
Committees or Similar Bodies, Public Debate and National Legislation in Relation to Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Use (European Commission, Geneva, 2001). 
71 Stem Cell Research HL Paper 83(i) (Report) and 83(ii) (Evidence) (HMSO, London, 2002). 
72 Stem Cell Research, above, 4.21. 
73 Stem Cell Research, above, 4.22. 
74 Stem Cell Research, above, 4.28. 
75 The merits of ethics committees are considered further in chapter 8. ACART is working with the 
Bioethics Council to inform and engage with the public to encourage public involvement in ACART’s 
processes. 
76 TNS Human Embryo Research Qualitative Research Report (TNS, Wellington, 2006) 
<www.bioethics.org.nz> (last accessed 8 November 2006). 
77 Gerald D Fishbach and Ruth L Fishbach “Stem cells: science, policy and ethics” (2004) 114 J Clinic 
investig  1364, 1369. 
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This thesis argues that the property interest in cadavers passes to the 
representative of the deceased at death; consequently it is vital to know the point at 
which death occurs. Previously, there was little dispute about the appropriate criteria 
for diagnosing death. However, new technologies have rendered redundant the 
previously accepted view that clinical death always involves the virtually 
simultaneous loss of cardiopulmonary and neurological function. Circulation and 
respiration can now be artificially maintained, despite apparent cessation of the 
neurological function. The development of organ transplantation and the need for 
organ donation from “beating heart donors”, together with the increasingly diverse 
use of body materials, required a redefinition of death.  
 
The “dead donor rule” necessitates that donors of vital organs be declared 
dead before harvest, to avoid charges of unlawfully killing the source. Organ harvest 
appeared to involve a form of murder, but the redefinition of death as “brain death” 
allowed organ transplantation to continue. Commentators have argued the concepts 
that underlie brain death are not biologically plausible and may be unacceptable to the 
community at large. This may, in part, explain the low organ donation rate in New 
Zealand and Australia. Singer argues that brain death is a “convenient fiction” to 
facilitate organ transplantation.78  
 
In 1988, the Danish Council of Ethics focussed on the perceived difference 
between scientific and ordinary views of death.79 It stated that the concept of death 
must relate to everyday experience, in which the identity of the person relates to the 
body and the mind. It recommended that the standard of death should be the cessation 
of respiration and cardiac activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A  Development of the Concept of Brain Death 
 
In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine 
the Definition of Brain Death issued a report containing a new brain-based set of 
criteria for determining death. If physicians had established “permanent loss of brain 
functions, from consciousness to primitive brain stem reflexes” a patient could be 
diagnosed as “dead”.80 It was assumed that society would accept the authority of 
medical science and make the necessary changes to ideas of death and personhood, so 
transplantation could proceed.81 The Report justified the new criterion, by citing the 
need for standards by which to determine when resuscitative and support care should 
                                                 
78 Peter Singer Rethinking Life and Death (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) 35. 
79 Danish Council of Ethics Report The Criteria of Death (Danish Council of Ethics, Copenhagen, 
1988). 
80 M Pernick “Brain Death in a Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of Death, 1967–1981” in S 
Youngner, R Arnold and R Shapiro (eds) The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies (The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1999) 3. 
81 Russell Scott The Body as Property (Viking Press, New York, 1981). 
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be terminated. However, there is little doubt that the priority of harvesting organs for 
transplantation was an equally important motivating factor.82 In 1981, the President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research recommended that the permanent loss of all brain functions be 
adopted as a criterion for diagnosing death, in addition to conventional 
cardiopulmonary criteria.83  
 
The “higher” brain definition of brain death includes patients who have 
permanently lost consciousness, but are able to breathe unaided. Consciousness-based 
criterions have not been introduced into public policy or law, because: 
 
•  Spontaneously breathing patients are not apparently dead; 
•   The clinical tests to determine irreversible loss of consciousness are not as 
definitive as those for brain death; 
•   Consciousness is supported by anatomical regions in both the brain stem and 
the cerebral hemispheres, and  
•  Even among higher brain advocates there is disagreement about whether the 
critical factor is the loss of personhood, rather than consciousness.84  
 
“Higher” brain death proponents would assert that Bland was already dead and 
thus his organs could be taken while his heart was still beating. It is unlikely that the 
public would accept this notion. Thus, irreversible cardiopulmonary cessation remains 
as the proper criterion for the determination that the brain death standard has been 
satisfied.  
 
Organ Donation New Zealand is considering whether to use “non-heart-
beating donors” to improve low donor rates. Unlike brain-dead patients, whose organs 
are retrieved while the heart is still beating, non-heart-beating donors are first allowed 
to die before their organs are removed.85 Australia and Britain have been using this 
category of donors for some time. The main disadvantage is that the organs could be 
of lower quality, reducing survival and function rates.  
 
Brain death is not the death of the entire organ, but rather the loss of all 
functions of the brain. Pallis identified the capacity for consciousness and 
spontaneous respiration as the critical functions, because loss of brain stem function 
                                                 
82 David Rothman Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed 
Medical Decision Making (Basic Books, New York, 1991). 
83 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research Defining Death: Medical Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death 
(Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1981) 119. 
84 E T Bartlett and S T Youngner “Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex” in R M Zaner 
(ed) Death: Beyond the Whole-Brain Criteria (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988) 199, 
215. 
85 Once the decision to withdraw treatment is reached, medications such as blood thinners and blood 
vessel dilators are often started to preserve the organs.  When the ventilator is removed, doctors wait 
for the patient’s heart and breathing to stop, declare cardiac death either immediately or after a waiting 
period of two to five minutes and then take the organs. The legal standard of irreversible cardiac death 
is considered met because the decision has already been made not to restart the heart by 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the heart is not expected to resume beating on its own. John T Potts 
and Roger Herdman Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: Medical and Ethical Issues in 
Procurement (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1997). 
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effectively eliminates both.86 Subsequently, clinicians have accepted that the essential 
physiological component of brain death is the death of the brain stem, and the 
diagnosis of brain death is made by examining the functioning of nerves that originate 
there. Although the “whole brain” criterion of death has been widely accepted since 
1981, some societies, such as Denmark, Poland and Japan, were slow to accept it. 
Others, such as China, Iran, Israel and Korea, still either wholly or partially reject 
it.87According to Truog: 88
 
At a practical level, [the concept of brain death] has been successful in delineating 
widely accepted ethical and legal boundaries for the procurement of vital organs 
for transplantation. Despite this success, however, there have been persistent 
concerns over whether the concept is theoretically coherent and internally 
consistent. Indeed, some have concluded that the concept is fundamentally flawed 
and that it represents only a “superficial and fragile consensus”. 
 
In New Zealand there is no relevant legislation, other than the Human Tissue 
Act 1964, which requires a registered medical practitioner to be satisfied, by personal 
examination, that “life is extinct”.89 The Human Tissue Bill retains this provision and 
is silent with regard to the definition of death. In the United Kingdom, the Code of 
Practice 1998 states that “brain stem death equates with the death of the individual.”90
 
In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General,91 Thomas J stated:92  
 
With the advances in technology and medical skills which have occurred, the 
medical profession has rejected the notion that death is to be equated with the 
cessation of a person’s heartbeat. In open-heart surgery, for example, the patient’s 
heart is temporarily stopped, but it is not thought that he or she has died. Instead 
the medical community has preferred the concept of what is called “brain death”. 
 
Thomas J added that, although brain death has not been formally adopted in New 
Zealand law, it is widely accepted by the medical profession.  
 
B  Concerns about Brain Death 
 
Although the Harvard Committee may have been certain that social consensus 
would rapidly follow their proposal, the public response in the United States was not 
positive. Rothman documents negative reaction, demonstrated by numerous popular 
press articles, following publication of the committee’s report.93 The redefinition of 
death based on brain activity remains the subject of significant cultural ambivalence 
                                                 
86 C Pallis and D H Harley ABC of Brainstem Death (BMJ Publishing Group, London, 1996). 
87 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
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and intensive care nurses state that it is difficult to explain to relatives that the heart-
beating, apparently alive, patient is actually dead.94 Research in minority communities 
on attitudes towards organ donation indicates wide spread suspicion that brain death 
might be declared prematurely, in order to provide organs for transplantation.95  
 
A 1995 study showed that about 20 per cent of families of brain-dead patients 
continued to have doubts about whether their relative was actually dead, even after 
brain death was explained to them, while a further 66 per cent accepted that the 
patient was dead, but felt emotionally that they were still alive. This experience did 
not appear to be related to whether the families agreed or disagreed with organ 
donation.96 Physicians and nurses also indicate considerable philosophical confusion 
about the concept of brain death and a wide range of personal views about when life 
ends.97
  
When the concept of brain death was first introduced, it was argued that death 
of the brain stem inevitably implied the imminent death of the whole body. Even with 
ventilation and intensive care, such persons inevitably had a cardiac arrest within 
weeks.98 This is no longer the case, as medical therapy and intensive care have 
become increasingly sophisticated at replacing brain stem function, so brain dead 
patients can be kept alive for extended periods.99 Brain dead pregnant women have 
been maintained for months and given birth to healthy infants, and brain dead children 
have been reported to survive for up to 14 years with ventilatory and nutritional 
support.100 Some show evidence of environmental responsiveness, such as a 
hemodynamic response to surgical incision.101 It has been reported that 10 out of 10 
organ donors in one study showed a dramatic rise in blood pressure and heart rate as 
soon as the scalpel was applied during organ removal, and that such an occurrence 
appears to be common during organ harvesting.102  
 
It has been argued that it is biologically and philosophically simplistic to 
suggest that the brain stem is the supreme regulator of the body.103 It is true that, 
unlike the heart lungs or kidneys, the brain stem cannot be replaced by technological 
                                                 
94 Pat S Helmberger Transplants: Unwrapping the Second Gift of Life (Chronimed Publishing, 
Minneapolis, 1992). 
95 Clive O Callender “Organ Donation in Blacks: A Community Approach” (1987) 19 Transplantation 
Proceedings 1551. 
96 I Y Pearson, P Bazely, T Spencer-Lane and others “A Survey of Families of Brain Dead Patients: 
Their Experiences, Attitudes to Organ Donation and Transplantation.” (1995) 23 Anaesthesia and 
Intensive Care 88. 
97 Stuart C Youngner, C S Landefeld, CJ Coulton and others “‘Brain death’ and Organ Retrieval: A 
Cross-sectional Survey of Knowledge and Concepts Among Health Professionals.” (1989) 261 JAMA 
2205. 
98 C Pallis “ABC of Brain Stem Death” (1983) BMJ 123-4; B Jennet and C Hessett “Brain Death in 
Britain as Reflected in Renal Donors” (1981) BMJ 359.  
99 F Shann “A Personal Comment: Whole Brain Death Versus Cortical Death” (1995) 23 Anaesthesia 
and Intensive Care 14.  
100 D Alan Shewmon “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard Biological 
Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ with Death” (2001) 26 J Med & Phil  457—478. 
101 K G Karakatsanis and J N Tsanakas “A Critique on the Concept of ‘Brain Death’” (2002) 18 Issues 
in Law and Medicine 127. 
102 Randall C Wetzel and others “Hemodynamic Responses in Brain Dead Organ Patients” (1985) 64 
Anaesthesia & Analgesia 125, 126—127. 
103 I H Kerridge, P Saul, M Lowe and others “Death, Dying and Donation: Organ Transplantation and 
the Diagnosis of Death” (2002) 28 J med ethics 89, 97. 
    134
means, but neural tissue repair may be possible through future developments in 
human embryonic stem cell research.104  
 
Thomas J recognised the inexactitude of the definitions of death when he 
stated:105
 
Whether or not ever-advancing technology and the maturity of thought which be 
no more than the product of the passage of time will lead to a further revision of 
the moment when a person can be accounted dead is an open issue. That is as it 
should be. It will ultimately be for the medical profession, sensitive to the values 
of the community and alert to the requirements of the law, to decide whether the 
irrevocable destruction of nerve tissues which are imperative to breathing and 
heartbeat as are the “tissues” which constitute the brain stem, require the definition 
of death to be revised. 
 
Kerridge and others argue for the abandonment of the “dead donor rule” and 
support organ harvest from patients without defining them as dead. The identification 
of brain stem death would be for its prognostic value only. There would be no change 
in eligibility for organ donation, but it would place much greater emphasis on consent 
and make the decision to donate more complex for families. They argue:106  
 
If families are told that brain stem criteria define the point where consciousness is 
not recoverable and where physical recovery is impossible, but where organ 
donation is an option, although the patient is not yet dead, this may be more 
commensurable with common morality and may more honestly acknowledge the 
layers of moral difficulty in the present situation. Rather than defining those who 
are “brain dead” as “dead” it may be more honest to acknowledge that such 
individuals are not dead and that removing their organs is in fact killing them. 
Such an action is undeniably morally troubling; it may, however, be morally 
justifiable in precisely defined circumstances such as where recovery is impossible 
and personal identity is lost. It may also be less morally objectionable than the 
creation of a fiction (the redefinition of death) which is the only alternative. The 
long term viability of transplantation programmes is likely to be better served by 
telling the truth than trading in fictions. 
 
Kappelman states that the dead donor rule is misguided and that the focus 
should be on the particular patient’s history, as, if the person has indicated by way of 
advance directive a wish to allow the body to be used for transplantation or 
experimentation, this should be honoured, even if it involves the removal of organs 
from a person who is in a PVS. She does not recommend such an action if the person 
has not made an advance directive, as relying on familial perceptions of the person’s 
probable views is subject to error. Such an approach would require legislative change to 
provide for the removal of organs from a person whose death is imminent, with careful 
definition of imminent. It seems unlikely that such a move would be politically or 
socially attractive, even if the aim was to increase the availability of organs for 
transplantation. 
 
This thesis suggests that Price is correct when he suggests that it is preferable 
to have a statutory definition of death with a unitary definition, rather than a binary 
                                                 
104 Kerridge and others, above, 97. 
105 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, 246 (HC) Thomas J. 
106 Kerridge and others, above, 97. 
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system by which death is either brain death or cardiopulmonary cessation.107 This is 
to avoid the possibility that a person might be dead by one set of criteria and not dead 
by another. He supports the approach of the Canadian Law Reform Commission, 
which provides: 
 
•  A person is dead when an irreversible cessation of all that person’s brain 
functions has occurred; 
•  The irreversible cessation of brain functions can be determined by the 
prolonged absence of spontaneous circulatory and respiratory functions; 
•  When the determination of the prolonged absence of spontaneous circulatory 
and respiratory functions is made impossible by the use of artificial means of 
support, the irreversible cessation of brain functions can be determined by any 
means recognised by ordinary standards of current medical practice.108
 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
 
At present, there are few legal principles that directly determine personhood. 
This thesis argues for a framework incorporating property interests in biological 
materials, so, it is necessary to determine when the interest arises and when it passes 
to the representative of the deceased.  
 
This involves considerations of personhood at the beginning and end of life 
and with respect to permanently insentient persons. Commentators have argued that 
individuals who are permanently insentient have no interests and therefore cannot be 
harmed, so there is no need to find a justification for organ retrieval or research 
involving them. The perceptions of “interest-less”, but living, beings are based on a 
mind/body dualism, which is not generally supported by mainstream religious, secular 
or legal thought. Keown stated: 109
 
The law has hitherto rejected the notion of “biological units” which are 
“inhabited” by a non bodily person and has, on the contrary, taken the traditional, 
commonsense view that human life is personal life, that living human beings are 
persons and that persons are, applying standard biological criteria, either alive or 
dead. 
  
As is shown in this chapter, this view reflects judicial perceptions, and 
arguably, also reflects the instinctive views of a substantial proportion of the 
community. Thus personhood, and consequently, the property interest in excised body 
parts, should remain with the person until death, but people should be able to specify, 
by way of advance directive, the manner in which treatment is to be withdrawn, 
should they wish to ensure their organs are able to be used.  
 
 There is a tension in many transplant protocols between the human source’s 
rights to autonomy and dignity, and the interests of transplantation and research. The 
conceptual difficulties suggest that the point at which organs might validly be 
retrieved should be dealt with by legislation. This thesis argues that death should be 
                                                 
107 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 78. 
108 Price, above, 79. 
109 J Keown “Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland” (1997) 113 LLQR 481, 
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legislatively defined and suggests it is an irreversible cessation of all of a person’s 
brain functions, assessed by ordinary standards of current medical practice.  
 
 If organ donation and research using human body materials are seen as social 
goods, then it is essential that the public support such endeavours. The use of the 
human body and its parts is a highly sensitive area, in light of cultural and religious 
perception of the body and support is best achieved through open debate of the issues, 
rather than relying on comfortable fictions, such as asserting that a brain dead person 
on life support is dead. 
 
The cases considered generally conclude that gametes and embryos must be 
dealt with in accord with the sources’ agreements with the clinics storing them. This 
thesis suggests that frozen embryos are the common property of the “parents”. As 
such, they should be divided between them in the event of a dispute, rather than being 
destroyed unless both parents agree to their use. This may result in some men 
becoming fathers against their will, but men are not uncommonly unwitting sperm 
donors by natural means.110 It is argued that embryos are not persons and that 
personhood, and thus potential property interests, only arise when a child is born alive 
although the law may, as a matter of public policy, regulate the uses and treatment of 
embryos and foetuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110 It would be reasonable to accept that a man in such a situation has no obligation to maintain the 
resultant child. 
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Chapter 5 
 
     THE MĀORI PERSPECTIVE 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous chapters it was argued that the autonomy interests of sources in 
their excised body parts and their concern to control the use of their bodies following 
death are best promoted by recognising property interests in excised parts and dead 
bodies. However, cultural imperatives may impair the ability to make autonomous 
choices. In this chapter, Māori perspectives on the retention and use of human body 
parts will be considered.1 It will be argued that a framework proposed for New 
Zealand must encompass the Māori world-view, particularly in light of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi2 relating to taonga.3  
 
Flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances have enabled the 
survival of many Māori customs and cultural values and there are likely to be 
significant benefits from maintaining and encouraging the healing, dying, death and 
grieving processes that are central to Māori culture. The number of people who are 
descended from Māori and, of those, the number who identify themselves as Māori, 
can be determined from the New Zealand census.4 In 1996, almost half of all Māori 
identified with at least one other ethnic group. Consequently, the framework would 
allow individual sources to choose whether or not to act in accord with tikanga 
Māori,5 to avoid assumptions about their values. 
 
 Although Māori usually appear to be westernised, Māori cultural heritage 
influences ideas, attitudes and reactions, especially with respect to illness. Māori 
believe that each person is an event within the ongoing procession of nature.6 
Shortland, writing in 1856, observed that Māori imagined sickness originated from 
the entrance of spirits into the body of the sufferer.7   
 
The Law Commission stated:8  
 
Māori law does not tolerate the removal or retention of body parts. Māori consider 
that all parts of the body are imbued with a life spirit handed down from the 
ancestors, contributed to by each successive generation, and passed on to future 
generations. Since Māori view their most sacred role as being the preservation of 
the dignity of their ancestors, the removal or retention of body parts is sacrilegious 
to them. It undermines their cultural values and prevents them from carrying out 
their responsibilities in relation to the deceased. 
                                                          
1 Note that many of the Māori concepts discussed herein do not directly translate into English. 
Consequently, the translations given are only approximations of meanings. 
2 See discussion of the Treaty of Waitangi below. 
3 Treasures. 
4 In the 1996 census, a total of 579,714 people indicated they were descended from a Māori, while only 
85 per cent of these, 523,374, actually identified as Māori. Statistics New Zealand New Zealand Now: 
Māori (Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1998) 13. 
5 Māori custom. 
6 Maori Marsden “God, Man and Universe: A Maori View” in Michael King (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri: The 
World Moves On (Hicks Smith & Sons/Methuen NZ Ltd, Auckland, 1977) 162. 
7 Edward Shortland Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders (Longman Brown Green, 
Longmans & Roberts, Paternoster Row, 1856) 114. 
8 Law Commission Coroners: A Review (Preliminary Paper 36, Law Commission, Wellington, 1999) 9. 
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 Although Māori removed body parts from conquered enemies in times of war, this 
was consistent with cultural beliefs of mana9, tapu10 and mauri11. 
 
There are inherent difficulties in attempting to describe the concepts and 
values of one culture using the language of another. However, the most basic 
contrast between Māori and European world views is that Māori culture puts spiritual 
and communal matters ahead of material and individual needs. It emphasises the 
primacy of nature and the need for man to tread carefully when interfering with 
natural laws and processes. 
 
The consideration of Māori views in this chapter will be confined to 
consideration of the removal and use of body parts in contemporary times, in the 
context of organ donation and research. In light of the low rate of Māori organ 
donation, attitudes to sickness and death and strategies to increase the donation rate 
will be considered. It is argued that conscription and presumed consent are 
inappropriate in New Zealand, because of the potential for cultural offence and loss 
of trust in the medical profession. The proposed property interest, which would pass 
to a representative at death, would allow Māori to choose whether to make decisions 
individualistically or collectively by appointing as representative a person with 
mana12, such as a kaumatua13, to exercise the decision-making function. 
 
Research holds promise for treatment of conditions affecting Māori, but there 
is disquiet about genetic modification and the exploitation of indigenous resources. It 
is suggested that consultation and collective decision-making about research projects 
should take place at the point of ethics committee approval, rather than when tissue 
is collected. There is a danger that consultation with Māori will be limited to mere 
acknowledgement of their world-view, as the potential benefits of medical research 
are more easily quantified than are the risks from cultural offence. This is 
demonstrated in this chapter by the section on transgenic animals. 
 
II  BASIS OF THE MĀORI WORLD VIEW14
 
A Contemporary Health Model 
 
A view of health that accords with contemporary Māori thinking is the whare 
tapu wha15 model.16 The model compares health to the four walls of a house, all four 
being necessary to ensure strength and symmetry. The four sides are tahu wairua (the 
spiritual side), tahu hinengaro (thoughts and feelings side), taha tinana (the physical 
side) and taha whānau (family side). As stated by Durie: 17
 
                                                          
9 Authority, status. 
10 Divine. 
11 Life principle. 
12 Status. 
13 Elder. 
14 This thesis does not suggest there is a single Māori world view, but attempts to demonstrate some 
fundamental principles. 
15 Whare=house, tapu=sacred wha=four. 
16 Mason Durie Whaiora: Māori Health Development (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) 70. 
17 Durie, above, 71. 
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 The four dimensions of health were originally portrayed as a set of interacting 
variables, not dissimilar from a holistic view, nor for that matter from the World 
Health Organisation 1947 definition but, unlike them, firmly anchored on a 
spiritual rather than a somatic base. 
 
Taha wairua18 is the most essential requirement for health. It involves the 
spiritual components of faith and the links between the human situation and the 
environment. This spiritual aspect includes, but does not require, a religious belief. 
The relationship with the environment is integral to identity and a strong sense of 
well-being. Durie states: 19
 
Spiritually, the hours immediately following death are particularly significant. As 
the deceased person’s spirit hovers tentatively between the visible world and the 
world of spirits, mourners themselves are able to feel a spiritual presence and to 
experience a renewed sense of continuity with their own ancestors, their history, 
and their future. For that reason a rapid retrieval of a deceased relative from 
hospital becomes a matter of urgency. 
 
Early retrieval of a relative’s body is critical to upholding the mana of the 
family and the individual, thus, bereaved Māori families are often offended if the 
body is not released within 24 hours after death.20  
 
Taha hinengaro concerns the expression of thoughts and feelings. 
Understanding occurs by synthesis into wider contextual systems, so that any 
recognition of similarities is based on comparisons at a higher level of organisation. 
Health is viewed as an interrelated phenomenon, rather than an inter-personal one. 
Poor health is regarded as a breakdown in harmony between the individual and the 
wider environment. Te taha hinengaro must be considered alongside physical well-
being in events such as the removal, retention, or return of body parts, organ 
donation and post-mortem procedures. The whānau21 needs to be able to grieve 
together, to have time to provide support and the opportunity to discuss different 
aspects of the process, so that all can achieve te taha hinengaro. 
 
Taha tinana involves a belief that certain parts of the body, and particularly 
the head, are special (tapu) and bodily functions such as sleeping, eating, drinking 
and defecating have special significance and rituals. Tapu and noa are vital concepts 
to Māori cultural views. Tapu accords respect and mana to certain people, objects, 
events, places and parts of the body. In particular, tapu status has traditionally been 
accorded to human hair, blood and mucus, which are the main sources used by 
researchers to access DNA. Noa is the concept that ensures that tapu people can be 
approached, or that tapu objects are able to be used. Whakanoa, the practice of 
removing or weakening the tapu, allows such objects to be used without any resultant 
harm to the user. For many Māori, tapu and noa are fundamental to the tikanga22 that 
Māori carry out in a wide range of activities, including births, deaths and marriages. 
Traditionally, tapu and noa were used as interventions for the protection and 
promotion of health.23
                                                          
18 Spiritualism. 
19 Durie, above, 71. 
20 Durie, above, 71. 
21 Family. 
22 Custom. 
23 Durie, above, 70–74. 
 141
 
The fourth dimension of health, taha whānau, relates to the importance of the 
extended family to health. The family is the prime support system, providing 
physical, cultural and emotional care. Interdependence, rather than independence, is 
valued. Individual health is integrated into a wider system, with the boundary 
between personal and family identity unclear. 
 
The events surrounding times of serious illness, dying, death and grieving are 
among the most sacred and important in Māori life. Once the tangata mauiui24 and 
their whānau are involved with a healthcare service, they are deemed to be in a state 
of noa (being beyond one’s own physical and/or spiritual power). They become 
disempowered. Acknowledging their rites and respecting their beliefs restores the 
tapu (well-being) of tangata mauiui and their whānau. Following removal, human 
tissue and substances are tapu and must be handled with respect and treated with 
dignity.  
 
When a person dies, they enter the state of tūpāpaku, in which the person’s 
spirit or soul is separated from the physical body, but remains close by. It is the 
responsibility of whānau to care for and protect the tūpāpaku and to see that body 
fluids, tissues and substances are cared for in an appropriate manner.25 Spiritually, 
the hours immediately following death are highly significant. The tangihanga26 is a 
time of great sorrow, but it is also believed that it is appropriate to face the world of 
the living again, so the immediate whānau, local hapū27, and manuhiri28 stay 
overnight with the deceased.  
 
Many Māori believe that the healthcare system over-emphasises the physical 
aspects of health, in its biological constructs and emphasis on cellular phenomena, to 
the detriment of ecological and caring considerations. As stated by Durie:29  
 
While scientific method often dissects the whole into smaller parts in order to find 
the truth, Māori philosophical methods work in the opposite direction; truth is a 
function of wider relationships and higher order synergies. 
 
Other Māori health perspectives have been mooted, but they all attempt to widen the 
meaning of health to incorporate culturally significant concepts and to balance 
physical and biological approaches with cultural and sociological views. The 
relationships that confer coherence within the natural world are the fundamental 
starting point upon which Māori world-views are built.  
 
B The Relevance of the Treaty of Waitangi 
 
As long ago as 1837, there was concern about Māori health, which was one 
of the motivating factors leading to the Treaty of Waitangi. Busby30 was concerned 
                                                          
24 The patients. 
25 Auckland District Health Board Body Parts Tissues and Substances Review Panel Report (Auckland 
District Health Board, Auckland, 2002) 23. 
26 Wake. 
27 Clan. 
28 Guests, visitors. 
29 Mason Durie “Mana Tangata: Culture Custom and Transgenic Research” (Deputy Vice-Chancellor’s 
Lecture, Massey University, Wellington, 5 August 2003) 12. 
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that Māori might disappear, as a consequence of introduced disease and lifestyle 
factors. He urged the Colonial office to take action, stating that, without intervention, 
Māori would be vulnerable to the evils of British settlement.31 The Treaty of 
Waitangi was the proposed solution. The Preamble to the Treaty contained the 
objectives. Article one provided for a transfer of sovereignty, Article two provided 
for a continuation of existing property rights and Article three provided for 
citizenship rights. There were two texts, one in English and one in Māori. The 
English version is more expansive in Article one and the Māori version broader in its 
interpretation of Article two. As stated by Mead, Māori found the concept of sharing 
land and resources acceptable, subject to the existence of a constitutional code to 
articulate rights and responsibilities, regulate behaviours, and accommodate access 
rights of settlers, without compromising the guardianship/ownership rights of 
Māori.32
 
Article two has particular relevance to Māori health. The English version 
amounted to a confirmation of existing property rights, together with a guarantee that 
they would not be unjustly alienated, while the Māori version incorporated social and 
cultural guarantees. As stated by Durie:33
 
By equating “full exclusive and undisturbed possession” with “tino rangatiratanga” 
the effect was to recognise the authority of chiefs, generally. Moreover the 
translation of “other properties” (by implication the English version meant 
physical properties) as “taonga katoa” further extended the meaning to include 
cultural as well as material properties.  
 
Te tino rangitiratanga reflects the status of Māori as tangata whenua34 and 
gives rise to rights of self-determination and tribal self-development. It incorporates 
the rights and responsibilities to make decisions on the use, control and protection of 
natural resources, according to Māori cultural values and customary practices.35  
 
Taonga resources, in this sense, include significant species and traditional 
knowledge that might be used to create new life-forms, or to be the subject of a 
patent. Māori see the issues involved in patents and intellectual property in life-form 
inventions as a subset of the rights of ownership,36 but the patent system does not 
deal with the fundamental issues of the ownership of the original life-forms from 
which inventions might be derived.37 However, patents do create effective property 
rights, which Māori assert flow from ownership of the original life-form–the right to 
use that life-form as a source of biological material for genetic research. Māori argue 
that the grant of exclusive monopoly rights to life-forms explicitly ignores Māori 
                                                                                                                                                                      
30 The British Resident in New Zealand from 1832. 
31 P Adams  Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand 1830-1847 (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1977) 88. 
32 Aroha Te Pareake Mead “How are the values of Maori going to be considered and integrated in the 
use of plant biotechnology in New Zealand?” (Paper presented to the Talking Technologies Conference 
on Plant Technology, Wellington, 8 May 1999). 
33 Durie, above, 84. 
34 Natives of the land. 
35 Ministry of Commerce Maori and the Patenting of Life Form Inventions. An information paper 
produced by the Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (Putahi Associates for the Ministry of 
Commerce Wellington,1999) <http://www.moc.govt.nz> (last accessed 25 March 2003). 
36 Ministry of Commerce, above, part 1. 
37 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
 143
traditions and cultural values and denies input from Māori regarding their ownership, 
use and control. The current system does not provide Māori with adequate protection 
for their taonga, because intellectual property laws require individual or joint 
ownership to be clearly established, before protection can be given. It can be difficult 
to determine who originally created Māori traditional knowledge and culture, as 
these have been developed over generations and are collectively owned. Even if 
knowledge is not shared, the holders of restricted knowledge probably do not have 
the right to commercialise it for personal gain. Additionally, Māori want enduring 
protection of their cultural and intellectual property, but the current system only 
provides for limited periods of protection.38
 
Article three promised “all the rights and privileges of British subjects”. This 
implied not only that there would be citizenship rights, but also equity, an aspect that 
remains relevant in light of continuing disparities in standards of health between 
Māori and non-Māori. Although the two versions of the Treaty varied, this variation 
was, to some extent, addressed by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, which required 
the newly established Waitangi Tribunal to take into account the principles of the 
Treaty and gave it statutory authority to decide what those principles were. 
 
Although it has been used to aid the interpretation of the law generally, the 
Treaty of Waitangi has been enforceable only when it has been incorporated into 
legislation. Some Acts contain a reference to the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, 39while others refer to Māori interests, but do not go so far as stating that 
the Crown has an obligation to take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. However, each Act requires that some aspect of the Māori situation must 
be taken into account.40  
 
Tino rangatiratanga upholds the entitlement of Māori to a measure of 
autonomy to manage their own policy, resources, treasured possessions and affairs.41 
The principles of the Treaty provide a framework for developing practical responses 
to Māori health, cultural property rights and intellectual knowledge. The principle of 
partnership is central to the Treaty, involving an exchange of rights and obligations. 
The partnership principle requires that the Crown and Māori act reasonably and in 
good faith in their interactions, taking into account the evolving nature of the 
relationship. The Crown must actively protect the Treaty rights of Māori and not 
encroach upon the exercise of tino rangatiratanga. Agencies should seek to involve 
iwi, hāpu and Māori organisations in policy development and priority setting. The 
Crown must actively protect the social, economic and cultural well-being of Māori. 
The Treaty partnership requires that Māori remain able to protect their cultural 
practices and their tikanga and to participate fully in New Zealand society as Māori.  
 
                                                          
38 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
39 Such as the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975; Environment Act 1986; Resource Management Act 1991; 
Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
40 The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, was controversial because of provisions 
mentioning the Treaty of Waitangi, specific Māori health needs, and specific representation on health 
boards.  
41 Waitangi Tribunal Murwhenua Fishing Report  (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1988) 187; 
Waitangi Tribunal Mangonui Sewerage Report (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1988) 187; Waitangi 
Tribunal The Taranaki Report (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1996)17–21. 
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Consequently, it is vital that the proposed New Zealand legislative 
framework does not conflict with the principles established as a result of the Treaty. 
Treaty implications regarding human tissue have yet to be determined, but the 
Crown’s obligation to protect the Māori people and culture guarantees the right of 
Māori to determine how body parts and tūpāpaku are treated.42 Consequently, 
compulsory acquisition of body parts is likely to be offensive43 and consultation is 
essential prior to the adoption of any proposed framework. Ethics committees must 
recognise and respect the sensitivity of certain types of research.  
 
C Human Tissue Concepts 
 
At least four key Māori concepts are involved when debating the use of 
human organs or tissue. These are Tapu, Mauri, Whakapapa and Kaitiakitanga. 
 
1 Tapu 
 
Tapu is the underlying spiritual concept, encompassing many sources of harm 
that might arise from inappropriate use of body parts. Tapu is the web of observances 
and rules that overlays and binds this world and the next world. Tapu ensures 
consistency and safety for those who comply with, and respect, its rules. 
 
As stated by Lewis and Pickering:44  
 
Organ donation tears at the fabric of tapu. To seek to retain the life of an individual 
by the removal of organs from someone who has died creates an interplay between 
the living and the dead that may upset the spiritual order, lineages or whakapapa, 
and the spiritual elements of mauri and hau are intermingled through an unnatural 
process. The spark of life is transferred by human will, not by divine order. Where 
tapu is broken the implications are often unknown. Spiritual retribution, 
manifested in the spirit or physical world could befall donor and/or recipient and 
affect either party’s whanau. It is possible that these are considerations that are for 
some great enough to outweigh the benefits of either donating or accepting organs. 
 
2 Mauri 
 
Mauri, or the physical life force, has been described as one of the 
fundamental spiritual concepts that permeate all relationships Māori have with each 
other and with the natural world.45 The traditional Māori view is that everything in 
the natural world possesses mauri, including people, plants, animals, genetic material 
and physical entities, such as lakes, rivers and rocks. Mauri is a special power which 
makes it possible for everything to move and live in accordance with the conditions 
and limits of its existence. Barlow observes that when a person is born, the gods bind 
the body and spirit together.46  Humans possess mauri-ora, which is of a higher order 
                                                          
42 Te Puni Kōkiri Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellingon, 1999). 
43 See chapter 2 relating to consent for the harvest of organs from the dead and chapter 3 relating to the 
“Guthrie test” samples. The heart retention at Green Lane Hospital was especially offensive to Māori 
parents- see chapter 2. 
44 Greg Lewis and Neil Pickering “Māori Spiritual Beliefs and Attitudes towards Organ Donation” 
(2003) NZ bioeth j 31, 34. 
45 N Gibbs Genetically Modified Organisms and Maori Cultural and Ethical Issues Commissioned by 
the Ministry for the Environment (Government Print, Wellington, 1998). 
46 C Barlow Tikanga Whakaaro: Key Concepts in Maori Culture (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1991). 
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than mauri and, in addition, requires humans to assume responsibility towards the 
environment. Emerging biotechnologies that involve tampering with genes are seen 
as unnatural and may change the spiritual essence of being Māori as kaitiaki47 over 
the cultural, social, physiological and environmental aspects of the genetic encoding 
of te ao Māori. 
 
3 Whakapapa 
 
Mauri and each life-form, including humanity, are linked together by 
whakapapa, through mutual descent. Whakapapa provides the generational link, 
which ensures the continuity of the three fundamental social units of Māori: whānau, 
hapū and iwi. The concept is one of laying one thing upon another, as with one 
generation upon another. Living things and inanimate objects such as soil, rocks and 
mountains have a whakapapa. Mead states:48
 
In stark contrast to the Western concept of isolating a human gene from any 
broader identity, for Māori, the physical human gene is inextricably linked to the 
metaphysical whakapapa, that is, the direct heritage from ancestors which must be 
transmitted to descendents. The general perception would be of considering human 
genes as collective cultural property and not the property of an individual. Western 
science, however would tend to argue quite the opposite and stress the uniqueness 
and very individuality of human genes. 
 
As the mauri of all living things is connected, any action that changes or 
degrades the essence of one life form has an impact on the integrity of all other life. 
Mead states that the human gene contains a life force, which cannot be separated or 
isolated as an entity devoid of life. “Isolation, reproduction or manipulation of the 
physical gene would not alter the perception by Māori of the whakapapa and mauri 
inherent and inextricable from the gene.”49 To alter the genetic material is to alter the 
blood of the ancestors, thus altering the whakapapa relationship, by changing or 
introducing new blood that may impact on the other rights of authority, status and 
control that are passed down. Genetic research has the potential to individualise 
choice, which conflicts with Māori expressions and understandings of collective 
relatedness. 
 
Organ transplantation may result in a perception that the blood line has been 
diluted, or even contaminated. An organ from an unknown source makes 
interconnections within the whānau less certain and whakapapa is no longer only 
connected to certain tipuna. Other individuals would have a part of their lineage 
present in the recipient and, consequently, in the whānau. 
 
As stated by Lewis and Pickering:50  
 
With a “foreign” organ in the body, recipients are no longer made up of the 
material only of their tipuna or ancestors. They also possess a foreign element, an 
                                                          
47 Guardian. 
48 Aroha Te Pareake Mead  “Human Genetic Research and Whakapapa” in P Te Whaiti, M McCarthy 
and A Durie (eds) Mai I Rangiatea: Maori Wellbeing and Development (Auckland University Press & 
Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 1997) 126, 128. 
49 Mead, above, 128. 
50 Greg Lewis and Neil Pickering “Māori Spiritual Beliefs and Attitudes Towards Organ Donation” 
(2003) NZ bioeth j 31, 34. 
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unquantifiable, unknown element of an ancestral line that is alien to their own. 
This issue is likely to be highlighted by the practice of anonymous donation. For 
some organ recipients this may create a feeling of alienation or isolation from 
whanau, iwi and tipuna. In possessing spiritual connections with another whanau 
through a donated organ, an individual’s connection with their whanau as a whole 
may be weakened. And just as the individual’s sense of being part of a whole will 
diminish, so the sense of other individuals of the whole of which that individual is 
a part may also be affected. 
 
4 Kaitiakitanga 
 
Kaitiakitanga is the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an 
area, in accordance with tikanga Māori, to protect and care for the environment and 
heritage. The purpose is to ensure the protection of the mauri of all things. Māori are 
concerned to maintain guardianship rights, to ensure the non-interference with their 
multi-generational whakapapa. There is a customary obligation on individuals to 
assume this responsibility, including the cultural imperative that human remains 
must be returned to their place of origin and must be buried, or otherwise left to rest. 
Thus, the storage of human materials in institutions, particularly outside the area of 
collection, is culturally unacceptable. As stated by Mead: “Storage and eventual 
repatriation are ethical issues as significant to Māori as collection and usage.”51
 
III CONSULTATION 
 
The proposed framework would require consultation to determine Māori 
views and preferences prior to its introduction. Such consultation is an integral part 
of a Treaty-based approach. “Consultation should occur at various levels: with iwi, 
hāpu and Māori organisations, and with individuals and whānau as patients or 
clients.”52 Several guidelines on consultation have been prepared.53 These emphasise 
that consultation must involve a spirit of goodwill and open-mindedness and 
requires: 
 
• reasonable time for consultation to occur; 
• sufficient information to enable a committed response; and 
• genuine consideration of the views of consulted groups. 
 
The dubious benefit of some consultation is shown by the decision of the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) to allow cows to be bred to 
produce milk containing human myelin basic protein. Bleakley54 demonstrates the 
difficulties arising from what Goddard J referred to as “… the collision between 
spiritual belief and scientific understanding.”55 This conflict is likely to be 
                                                          
51 Mead, above, 131. 
52 Ministry of Commerce Maori and the Patenting of Life Form Inventions. An information paper 
produced by the Patenting of Life Forms Focus Group (Putahi Associates for the Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington, 1999) <http://www.moc.govt.nz> (last accessed 25 March 2003) 8. 
53 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Proposed Guidelines for Local Authority 
Consultation with Tangata Whenua (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Wellington, 
1992); Responsiveness Unit, State Services Commission, Partnership Dialogue: A Māori Consultation 
Process (State Services Commission, Wellington, 1989); Te Puni Kōkiri  A Guide for Departments on 
Consultation with Iwi (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellington, 1993). 
54 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213, 286 (HC). 
55 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority, above, 286. 
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dominated by scientific imperatives, because of the greater ability to demonstrate the 
potential consequences of scientific endeavours, compared with the effects of 
cultural damage. 
 
IV ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO MĀORI RELATING TO HUMAN 
MATERIALS 
 
A Organ Transplantation 
 
New Zealand has one of the lowest organ donation rates in the developed 
world.56 However, it has been argued that the comparative measure of donation 
performance by way of the number of donors per million of population is 
scientifically flawed, because assessment of organ donation from the deceased, by 
reference to a census of the living, does not provide an analysis of a comparison of 
the number of actual organ donors with the number of deceased potentially suitable 
donors.57 A more accurate assessment would be achieved by conducting death record 
interviews, to determine organ donation potential. The percentage of those potential 
donors who were converted into actual donors is a better measure of organ donation 
effectiveness. 
 
Māori appear to be less likely to be either organ donors, or organ recipients, 
than non-Māori.58 From 1996-2000 3.5% of donors were Māori. As the 2001 census 
statistics indicate that one in seven people identify as Māori, this indicates that Māori 
are under-represented per capita in donation statistics. The low rate reflects cultural 
objections by some Māori, but may also reflect discomfort with the concept of brain 
death,59 mistrust of medical staff and historical concerns about the retention of 
organs and tissues at autopsies.60
 
Māori most commonly need kidney transplants, because of their high rate of 
diabetes.61 Although Māori total approximately 30 per cent of the dialysis 
population, they receive approximately 10 per cent of the transplants performed. 
Māori are also the main group requiring bone marrow transplants.62 The requirement 
to match tissue type for bone marrow transplantation restricts the availability of 
donors, because Māori ethnic uniqueness. The number of Māori on bone marrow 
donor panels is low and the large donor pools in the United States and Europe are not 
likely to provide a match.63
 
                                                          
56  In 2005, the rate per million of population was 8. There were 29 donors. Organ Donation: The Gift 
of Life <http://www.donor.co.nz>  (last accessed 14 October 2006). 
57 Richard S Luskin and Francis L Delmonico “Assessing Organ Donation from the Dead Should Not 
be done by Reporting a Census of the Living” (2003) 3 American Journal of Transplantation 1185. 
58 Australian and New Zealand Organ Donation Registry 2002 Annual Report of the Australian and 
New Zealand Organ Donation Registry <http://www.anzdata.org.au> (last accessed 17 March 2005). 
59 See the discussion in chapter 4. 
60 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
61 The Māori rate of death from kidney-related disease is four times greater than for non-Māori .Te 
Puni Kōkiri Hauora o te Tinana me ona Tikanga (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellingon, New Zealand, 1999)14. 
Matthew Torbit “Maori ‘facing extinction’ from Diabetes” (14 November 2006) The Dominion Post 
Wellington A1. 
62 Te Puni Kōkiri, above, 14. 
63 Te Puni Kōkiri, above, 15. 
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Commentators have questioned the justice of permitting access to the limited 
supply of organs by members of groups that are unwilling to donate. It is practically 
and morally justifiable to limit the provision of cadaveric transplants to foreign 
nationals, despite the advantages in entering into organ sharing arrangements with 
other countries, because of the small New Zealand population. Some countries have 
refused to allow other countries to participate in such schemes, unless there is 
sufficient reciprocity. For example, the nations of the European community, through 
the auspices of the Council of Europe, co-operate in an organ-sharing network, they 
have excluded countries with a low rate of organ donation. These countries did not 
contribute a fair share, and so their citizens were ineligible to receive organs from the 
common pool.64  
 
However, it is harder to justify similar action with regard to particular groups 
in a community. To select them on ethnic, racial or religious grounds is 
discriminatory. In any event, individuals not groups need organs. Even if it could be 
identified that Māori, as a group, donate organs at a lower rate than others, Māori are 
highly diverse and it is impossible to extrapolate that data to the individual who 
needs a transplant, as that individual may not share the reluctance. In addition, a 
person can simultaneously belong to several groups, such as being a woman, a 
mother a teacher, and so on. Each of these groups, if considered separately, might 
show different rates of group donation. Rhodes stated: “There is no principled way to 
determine which group identification gets used for ruling individuals ineligible for a 
cadaveric organ.”65  
 
Additionally, a person needing an organ is likely to have increased awareness 
and knowledge about organ donation and thus may be prepared to donate organs. 
These factors indicate that although it is morally acceptable to encourage donation, 
and perhaps provide incentives,66 it would not be acceptable to impose sanctions on 
individuals because they might not be willing to donate, or because they belong to a 
group that has a statistically low rate of organ donation. 
 
In considering the use of body organs or tissue, there are three distinct issues 
that Māori may view differently from other population groups; firstly, the donation 
of material from living donors, secondly, harvest from the dead and thirdly, the 
collection of material for research purposes.  
 
1 Living donation 
 
The living donor and recipient often have a close familial relationship. 
Although histocompatibility is less important for kidney transplantation than for 
other organs, the parties commonly have some emotional tie.  Living donation within 
a whānau may be more acceptable for Māori than between strangers, as threats to 
whakapapa are reduced. Māori value kinship, as stated by Rangihau: “There is as 
much joy-or perhaps greater joy-in giving as in receiving. And so we give of one 
                                                          
64 Rosamond Rhodes “Organ Donation” in Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds) A Companion to 
Bioethics (Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 1998) 335. 
65 Rhodes, above, 336. 
66 See the discussion on commercialisation in chapter 1. 
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another to one another.”67 Prior to the arrival of Pakeha, Māori lived in a tribal 
kinship society, involving an intricate set of relationships relating to “gift-giving”.68 
There was great spirituality implicit in gift exchange and reciprocity. Traditional 
Māori society is said to have been underpinned by an “economy of affection”, as 
contrasted with the “economy of exploitation” introduced as a consequence of 
colonisation.69 The emphasis on giving and sharing suggests that, with greater 
awareness of the need for organs to assist and support the family group, together 
with efforts to improve trust in the medical establishment, the rates of donation might 
be increased.  
 
However, factors that may inhibit living donation between strangers are the 
intermingling of whakapapa with resulting disturbances of ancestral lineages, and the 
ramifications of such disruption for individual and whānau.  
 
2 Organs from deceased donors 
 
Most Māori have an attitude to death that requires that the dead are cared for, 
cherished, mourned, spoken to and honoured. Most still choose burial, rather than 
cremation. They want to see their dead and have them with them. Very few leave the 
dead in an undertaker’s chapel until the funeral. In part, this closeness with the dead 
may contribute to the reluctance to donate organs. Additionally, the appearance of a 
brain dead person on life support is such that the intuitive response of family 
members may be that the person is alive, even if they intellectually accept the 
medical advice that the person is dead.70
 
In traditional Māori belief, the wairua begins to leave the body at death. This 
wairua may be affected by actions taken with respect to the body following death. 
The belief is that death is a process, rather than an event occurring at a specific point 
in time. Lewis and Pickering explain: 71
 
The wairua must undergo a transformation of understanding and go through a 
process of becoming part of the next world. This is reflected in the Māori 
Tangihanga, or funeral ceremonies, that often last for three or more days. The 
wairua is believed to leave the body upon death, but to come and go from the 
corpse as it slowly ventures out to explore the newly discovered spiritual realm. 
 
The removal of organs during the course of this process is considered 
disrespectful to the wairua and may deleteriously effect the wairua’s preparation for 
the journey to Te Pō, the final resting place. 
 
Another possible source of harm to the wairua is through the hau of the 
deceased person, which might imbue the organ. The hau is a mixture of personality 
and aura, or self-presence. It is no longer generated after death, but during life it 
                                                          
67 John Rangihau “Being Maori” in Michael King (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri: The World Moves On (Hicks 
Smith & Sons/Methuen NZ Ltd, Auckland, 1977) 166. 
68 M Mauss The Exchange of Gifts W D Halls (trans) (Routledge, London, 1990). 
69 M Henare “Human Labour as a Commodity– a Maori Ethical Response” in Victoria University of 
Wellington Department of Geography Labour Employment and Work in New Zealand (Victoria 
University, Wellington, 1995). 
70 See the discussion of brain death in chapter 4. 
71 Greg Lewis and Neil Pickering “Māori Spiritual Beliefs and Attitudes Towards Organ Donation” 
(2003) NZ bioeth J 31, 33. 
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exists within and around the body, so a person may leave hau in anything they come 
in contact with. Consequently, traditional Māori protected anything derived from the 
body, such as fingernails, placenta or hair cuttings. Lewis and Pickering state: 72
 
The fear in the case of organ donation would be that a donated organ could fall 
into the wrong hands and be used in some way against the individual after his or 
her death. 
 
Although donated tissue or body parts can be life-saving for individuals, it is 
essential that the spiritual well-being, as well as the physical well-being, of the 
recipient is considered. The recipient may suffer adverse effects relating to the 
spiritual element transplanted with the organ, rather than any physical consequences. 
This could spread from the organ and consume the recipient, effectively poisoning 
the recipient with the same spiritual element that killed the donor. If an organ 
continues to live after the donor is dead, the mauri of the donor may interact with the 
mauri of the recipient. Similarly, the hau of the donor may be imprinted on the organ 
and be mixed with the hau of the recipient. The blessing of the organ, by karakia73 
prior to the transplantation, may promote the well-being and health of the recipient. 
 
It is unclear to what extent Māori values are amenable to change, although 
many who are reluctant to donate or receive organs suggest that they might have 
different views if the procedure was to save a loved one. The Bioethics Council has 
discovered in its dialogues with Māori that the core values about the implications of 
biotechnology for tikanga, matauranga, whakapapa and the role of tohunga are 
seldom articulated. It suggested that thinking in these areas may be evolving, stating: 
“This in turn raised diverging views about the nature of tikanga itself and the extent 
to which it is an immutable body of tradition or custom, or a spectrum of ever-
changing practices.”74
 
The Auckland District Health Board Review Panel concluded that with 
respect to tissue or organs being used after death, the prior informed consent of the 
deceased person should prevail over the express objections of family members and 
should be respected.75 This might have the effect of increasing the availability of 
such tissue or organs, but the consequence might be a loss of trust in the medical 
establishment, as well as cultural offence to Māori and other groups in the 
community. The public attention that might result from distressing altercations 
between families and the medical establishment could have a negative impact on 
donation rates, as potential donors could withhold consent out of deference to family 
sensibilities.  
 
However, despite these concerns the structure proposed in this thesis would 
provide a means for sources to make binding dispositions of their cadaver, because 
the benefit from increased donation rates outweighs the risk of cultural offence. 
Consequently, the consent of the source must be fully informed and consideration 
                                                          
72 Lewis and Pickering, above, 33. 
73 Prayer. 
74 Toi te Taiao: The Bioethics Council  The Cultural, Ethical and Spiritual Aspects of Animal-to-
Human Transplantation (Bioethics Council Wellington 2006) 20. The Bioethics Council recommended 
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ao Māori. 
75 The Human Tissue Act 1964 is considered further in chapters 3 and 8. 
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given to all the wider interrelated factors.76 This thesis suggests that representatives 
must carry out the instructions of the source regarding the disposition of the body 
and their decisions will trump the views of the whānau. However, the source could 
choose to instruct the representative to follow tikanga. Similarly, living persons who 
want decision making in a collective manner can make arrangements accordingly.  
 
B Uses of Biological Materials 
 Māori assert that their intellectual property in traditional knowledge, taonga 
and images is being unjustifiably appropriated. The Wai 262 Claim77 is a Treaty of 
Waitangi claim brought against the New Zealand Crown in 1991 by the members of 
six iwi.78 Wai 262 generally asserts exclusive and comprehensive rights to flora and 
fauna, cultural knowledge and property, as taonga protected by Article Two of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. The claimants assert that the Crown has: 
• Failed to actively protect the exercise of tino rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga 
 by the claimants over indigenous flora and fauna and other taonga, and also 
 over mātauranga Māori79;  
• Failed to protect the taonga itself;  
• Usurped tino rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga of Māori in respect of flora and 
 fauna and other taonga, through the development of policy and the enactment 
 of legislation; and  
• Breached the Treaty of Waitangi by agreeing to international agreements and 
 obligations that affect indigenous flora and fauna and intellectual property 
 rights and rights to other taonga. 
 The Crown has attempted to distil the broad scope of the Wai 262 claim into 
four categories: 
• The protection and retention of Mātauranga Māori (traditional knowledge).  
• Māori cultural property (tangible manifestation of mātauranga Māori) as 
 affected by the failure of legislation and policies to protect existing Māori 
 collective ownership of cultural taonga and to protect against its exploitation 
 and misappropriation.  
• Māori intellectual and cultural property rights - as affected by New Zealand's 
 intellectual property legislation, international obligations and proposed law 
 reforms. Issues include the patenting of life form inventions and the 
 inability of intellectual property rights to protect Māori traditional knowledge 
 and cultural property.  
                                                          
76 See the discussion in chapters 2 and 8. 
77 The claim was the 262nd claim lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal and, as a result, is colloquially 
known as “Wai 262”. 
78 Ngāti Kuri, Ngāti Wai, Te Rarawa, Ngāti Porou, Ngāti Kahungunu and Ngāti Koata. 
79 Māori traditional knowledge. 
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• Environmental, resource and conservation management - including concerns 
 about bio-prospecting, biotechnological developments involving indigenous 
 genetic material, ownership claims to resources and species, and Māori 
 participation in decision making. 
 These claims are similar to those being asserted by indigenous people around 
the world with regard to intellectual property rights, laws and international 
agreements. These are currently being considered in international fora, including the 
World Trade Organisation, the World Intellectual Property Organisation, and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.  
 The concerns raised in the second category relate to the fundamental 
differences between Western intellectual property rights and traditional knowledge 
protection mechanisms of indigenous peoples. For example, intellectual property 
rights are usually limited in duration and involve disclosure to the public and the 
eventual contribution to the public domain.80 The philosophy is the exploitation, 
rather than protection, of information and innovations. In many cases, indigenous 
peoples seek protection in perpetuity and do not want sacred-secret information to be 
disclosed to the public. 
 Intellectual property rights also do not provide the protections that indigenous 
people seek because of the criterion of novelty and the requirement to identify an 
individual (or commercial entity) as the author/creator of a work or innovation in 
whom to vest intellectual property rights. In comparison, the rights that indigenous 
people assert are collective, not individual, in nature. Traditional knowledge and 
traditional knowledge-based innovations and practices may be developed 
incrementally over generations.81
Māori are seeking a Tikanga Maori Framework of Protection,82 which would 
be owned and controlled by Māori, based on tikanga Māori, reflecting Māori cultural 
values and ethos, and be sufficiently flexible to take into account issues that affect 
Māori at national, regional and local marae levels.83 They are suspicious that their 
biological materials may be used for purposes that benefit neither them, nor Māori as 
a group. This viewpoint may vary according to the proposed uses. For example, 
Mead states that most Māori would distinguish the use of gene therapy to help save 
the life of a critically ill person from uses such as genetic screening.84  
 
                                                          
80 See chapter 7. 
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and A Durie (eds) Mai I Rangiatea: Maori Wellbeing and Development (Auckland University Press & 
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Durie states that, at regional and national hui held to debate genetic 
modification, there was overall distrust in genetic modification. However, he adds: 85   
 
[A]t most hui a few respondents were adamant that Māori had the right to full 
access to medical advancements and new technologies, including those that 
resulted from genetic modification and saw in that process potential health gains 
for Māori. They urged an open mind.  
 
1  Research 
 
Research using Māori  body parts raises key issues, such as: 
 
• Who makes the decisions with respect to medical research? 
• Who controls and plans medical research? 
• Is it possible to structure “group rights” or “group consent”? 
 
Research is carried out for many different purposes. Some of these are aimed 
specifically at saving lives, or easing human distress, but much research is aimed at 
developing new technologies and pharmaceutical products. The aim is often as much 
commercial as compassionate. As stated by Mead:86  
 
Māori and other indigenous peoples have strong cultural traditions which seriously 
question the ethics and protocols governing the profit-making framework in which 
a high proportion of genetic research is currently being pursued. 
 
 She indicates that there is strong suspicion that Māori might be the subjects 
of research from which they experience little advantage. She is also concerned that, 
without adequate safeguards, ethical values and procedures may be disregarded in 
light of commercial benefits flowing from research. In particular, ethical guidelines 
that constrain research in New Zealand may have little effect on overseas research 
partners and may prove impossible to enforce. 
 
The main stages of research are research, process and product. The research 
stage involves the selection of the original or existing material from which the 
inventor intends to derive new genetic components or life-forms. The inventor 
requires access to the original life-form in order to carry out this research. If human 
material is used, this must be obtained from individuals. The Ministry of Commerce 
states that Māori issues at the research stage include: 87
 
• Rangatiratanga. The exercising of the rights and responsibilities to determine 
the use of taonga species according to Māori cultural values; 
• Access. The right to control access to these resources and their use as material 
for research; 
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• Appropriateness and morality. The right to decide what uses and associations 
are acceptable in light of the taonga status of the life-form and Māori cultural 
beliefs about their relationship to natural resources; 
• Informed consent. Ensuring that indigenous people whose genetic material is 
used for research are fully informed about the intentions of the researchers 
and give consent to these purposes; 
• Acknowledgement. Recognition of the origins of the life-forms, the status of 
the iwi with rangatiratanga over them, and the interests Māori have in their 
preservation. 
 
At the process stage, technological processes might be used to alter, extract or 
manipulate the material, with the objective of producing a new life-form, or 
modifying an existing life-form. For example, genetic engineering involves the 
transfer of genes from one organism to another. Māori issues at this stage include: 
 
• Deciding whether the process is appropriate in light of Māori cultural values; 
• Maintaining the whakapapa in ensuring the integrity of ancestral authority 
rights that pass down to descendants; and 
• Protecting Māori traditional knowledge and processes. 
 
At the product stage, the research is applied to produce a newly discovered or 
invented life-form. Such products might include genetically engineered new life 
forms, or genetic components of life forms, such as tissues, cells, genes, or enzymes. 
Issues arising at this stage include: 
 
• Recognition of the origins of the original natural life-forms, the status of iwi 
holding rangatiratanga over them, and the involvement of Māori in their long 
term protection; 
• Equitable sharing of the benefits obtained from commercial use of the new 
product, in light of the initial derivation from the naturally occurring taonga 
owned and cared for by the iwi; 
• Risk to the original life-form, by the release of the modified form; 
• Disruption to traditional knowledge, which may be undermined by the 
introduction of genetic varieties with different properties from the original 
species from which they originated. 
 
Mātauranga Māori have opposed genetic modification, because of risks to the 
environment, human dignity, the special place that humans hold in the wider 
universe and the relationships between people and other forms of life. As stated by 
Durie: “…[I]n the GM debate the concern is that the microscope will fragment 
strands of DNA and in the process lead to a splintering of human inviolability.”88 He 
suggests that there are many parts to the debate, including economic gain, 
opportunities for New Zealand researchers, research credibility, retaining New 
Zealand as a green paradise and maintaining a Treaty conscience.89 He opines that 
the lack of reconciliation of opinions in this area is, to some extent, because there is 
no methodology that can transcend the philosophies inherent in different bodies of 
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knowledge, and that this conflict is unlikely to be fully resolved by way of 
legislation. 
 
2 Genetic modification 
 
Many generic concerns were expressed in the submissions to the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification, but some were specific to Māori. Included in 
these were philosophical objections, such as clashes with Māori world views, 
cultural concepts and tikanga. Treaty of Waitangi issues included intellectual 
property rights and Māori inclusion in decision making. Some Māori perceived 
economic benefits or the possibility of new treatments for particular diseases, such as 
diabetes. 
 
Of the 200 submissions to the Royal Commission relating to Māori, 32 per 
cent focussed on the Treaty of Waitangi and the need for an active role for Māori in 
decision making, 24 per cent related to ownership and intellectual property rights 
over indigenous flora and fauna, while 13 per cent opposed any transfer of genes 
between humans and animals. The greatest number of submissions, 64 per cent, 
submitted that genetic modification was unacceptable, because it was contrary to 
Māori custom and philosophy.90  
 
3  Informed consent 
 
Scientists collecting tissue for research sometimes refer to indigenous people 
as “carriers of genetic information”, “subjects”, or “data sets”, and consider them 
incapable of understanding the reasons for genetic testing, or exercising informed 
choice.91 Researchers have struggled to formulate mechanisms through which 
consent can reasonably be obtained. The individualistic premises underlying the 
concept of informed consent are often difficult to translate to non-western cultures. 
The UNESCO Declaration provides that “The importance of cultural diversity and 
pluralism should be given due regard.”92 It also states that in no case should a 
collective community agreement or the consent of a community leader or other 
authority substitute for an individual’s informed consent.93 These provisions were 
strongly criticised by Māori and Pacific people at a UNESCO conference to consider 
implementation of the Declaration, as imposing a western paradigm on other 
cultures.94
 
As has been seen, the requirement to protect the whakapapa does not rest 
with individuals who may not have the right to give, or sell, biological materials for 
research without the consent of the collective group. If research affects a collective 
hapū, iwi, or Māori grouping, issues arise as to who within that grouping should give 
consent. Decisions made may affect descendants more directly than either the 
participants whose body materials are used for research, or the kaumātua who might 
approve the research. Despite this, this thesis argues that in light of the diversity of 
                                                          
90 Durie, above, 7. Some submissions referred to more than one ground of opposition. 
91 Lori B Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin Body Bazaar (Crown Publishers, New York, 2001) 76. 
92 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 24 June 2005 Article 12. 
93 UNESCO, above, Article 6( c). 
94 UNESCO Ethics of Knowledge Production Conference, Dunedin 12-14 February 2006. 
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Māori and the wide variation of levels of acceptance of traditional beliefs, it is 
inappropriate for the law to restrict individual autonomy.  
 
Mead, while recognising the potential for conflict within communities, states 
that: “The preference should be for mutually agreed consent procedures rather than 
legislation by the Crown.” 95 She asserts that the consent cannot be informed unless 
information on the proposed research is provided in easily understood language, in 
some circumstances in both Māori and English, specifying: 
 
• the purposes of the research; 
• the benefits for the donors/participants and sponsors of the research;  
• the potential risks;  
• any developments during the research that might alter the willingness of the 
subjects to permit the research to continue; 
• the degree to which the research could affect Māori social units beyond those 
consenting; and 
• the procedures for the collection, storage, use, and eventual return, of genetic 
specimens. 
 
There is potential for conflict between Māori individuals and Māori collective 
social units about the acceptable limits of use of body parts.96 Henare has stated that 
this situation is exacerbated by tribal essentialism, the increasing fragmentation of an 
already minority population into tribal groups, which compete with each other for 
limited resources upon which to base economic and cultural development.97 Mead 
states: “Even if an informed consent procedure is developed, there still remains the 
question of who has the right to give consent to research which could affect a wider 
collective.”98 Neo-tribalists claim that tribal knowledge is the property of the tribe, 
asserting:99
 
[O]nly those that belong to that kinship group can access, critique, debate or 
comment upon the tribal knowledge and learning pertaining to that group. Some 
go so far as to assert that the idea of Maori as a collective identity is no longer 
valid, that only the tribal identity matters. 
 
 If an individual chooses to exercise personal autonomy and give consent to a 
procedure, should a collective unit be able to overrule this decision? This thesis 
proposes a property interest in body parts, which is an individualistic concept, 
although it does not constrain the ability of individuals to choose to make collective 
decisions. This individualism is balanced by Māori being involved in review of 
proposed research, as they have a collective interest in research that could impose 
risks on all the members of a socially identifiable group. The process may involve 
                                                          
95 Aroha Te Pareake Mead  “Human Genetic Research and Whakapapa” in P Te Whaiti, M McCarthy 
and A Durie (eds) Mai I Rangiatea: Maori Wellbeing and Development (Auckland University Press & 
Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 1997) 126, 137. 
96 Ella Henry and Hone Pene “Kaupapa Maori: Locating Indigenous Ontology, Epistemology and 
Methodology in the Academy” (2001) 8 Organization 234. 
97 M  Henare “Te tangata, te taonga, te hau: Maori Concepts of Property” (Paper presented to the 
Conference on Property and the Constitution, Wellington, for the Laws and Institutions in a Bicultural 
Society Research Project, Waikato University, 18 July 1998). 
98 Mead, above, 139.  
99 Henry and Pene, above, 240 (emphasis in the original). 
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wananga around the processes and purposes of the research and the acceptable limits 
and controls. 
 
Conflict is less likely if the collective viewpoint is exercised at the level of 
approval of the research, rather than at the point of collection of the research 
materials from individual donors.100 This moves beyond the need for consent from 
the research participants and consideration of individual risk and benefit, to 
consideration of risks to the group as a whole. The problem is devising a mechanism 
by which an entire group can be involved in research review, in a morally 
meaningful way.101 Unless a referendum of the group was conducted, the only 
alternative would be some form of representative involvement. As stated by 
Jeunst:102
 
To seek out representatives of the population group in non-representative ways is 
no better than recruiting stray individuals: it still denies the unconsulted members 
of the group a bona fide voice in the discussion, and opens up the process to 
charges of “forum shopping”– the “morally problematic” practice of seeking out 
population spokespeople and research participants whose positive response to a 
research plan can be predicted in advance. 
 
Māori ethics committee membership does not necessarily resolve this 
difficulty, especially where the committee members are appointed by government. If 
they were selected by their community and required to represent its views then, 
arguably, they are empowered to make decisions on its behalf.103
 
 Dodson and Williamson assert: “History teaches us that the pure fascination 
of science cannot be quarantined from its broader social implications.”104 It may be 
culturally offensive to exploit the biological material of Māori to generate profit for 
multinational corporations, especially if it involves the immortalisation of blood 
cells. The commercial potential must be made clear to the sources at the time of 
consent. Scientists see human tissue as a replenishable resource, while critics see 
people being used as raw materials for commercial products, or as data sets for 
research. Scientists see such research as a means to ensure that non-Caucasian people 
benefit from future biomedical advances, but critics believe it is exploitative of 
indigenous people and appropriates their heritage. For example, in the United States, 
litigation has been commenced by the Havasupai,105 because blood they had donated 
in the 1960’s for diabetes research was allegedly subsequently used for unconsented 
research into schizophrenia, inbreeding and migration.106
                                                          
100 For example, the Foundation of Research, Science and Technology assesses all applications for 
funding for meaningful collaboration with Māori. 
101 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
102 Eric T Jeunst “Commentary: What ‘Community Review’ Can and Cannot Do” (2000) 28 J law med 
ethics 52, 53. 
103 See the discussion on ethics committees in chapter 8. 
104 Michael Dodson and Robert Williamson “Indigenous Peoples and the Morality of the Human 
Genome Diversity Project” (1999) 25 J med ethics 204, 206. 
105 A small Indian nation in Northern Arizona with about 650 members. 
106 Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University  3:04-CV-1494 (D Ariz); Tilousi v Arizona State 
University 3:04-CV-1290. The research suggested that the people had migrated to Arizona from Asia, 
which was offensive to the tribe who believe that the Grand Canyon is the birthplace of the human 
race. Additionally, it is alleged that the schizophrenia research is stigmatising. Paul Rubin “Indian 
Givers” (27 May 2004) Phoenix New Times <http:www.phoenixnewtimes.com> (last accessed 12 
October 2006).   
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V  GENETIC MODIFICATION  
 
As stated, Māori value the potential to develop new medical treatments, but 
some genetic research is culturally offensive. The cases considered below 
demonstrate the difficulty of weighing intangible considerations, such as cultural 
offence, against potential scientific benefit and the difficulties in determining who 
should be consulted and the weight to be given to the views of those consulted.  
 
A The Transgenic Sheep 
 
PPL Therapeutics applied to ERMA107 to field test transgenic sheep with the 
purpose of producing a biopharmaceutical (human alpha-1-antitryspin, hAAT).108 It 
proposed the insertion of an artificial human gene into the mammary glands of sheep, 
in order to produce milk containing sufficient quantities of hAAT to treat cystic 
fibrosis. Māori opposition was based on a concern that mixing genetic material 
between species was an interference with whakapapa.109
 
ERMA decided that the risks to Māori culture and traditions and to their 
taonga were minimised by the satisfactory controls to contain the sheep and thus to 
prevent any affected meat or milk being consumed by humans. It decided that the 
possibility of a biopharmaceutical with the potential to mitigate disease and to accrue 
economic benefits outweighed cultural objections.110
 
B The Transgenic Cow 
 
In 1998, AgResearch lodged an application to field test cattle modified by: 
 
• insertion of extra bovine genes; or 
• insertion of human myelin basic protein gene; or 
• deletion of the bovine beta-lactoglobulin gene. 
 
The intention was to produce milk with enhanced nutritional value that might 
be used as a drug to treat multiple sclerosis.111 A minority report was prepared by 
Ngā Kaihautu, recommending that ERMA engage in wider debate with Māori. 
ERMA had consulted extensively with Ngāti Wairere, the tribe in the immediate 
vicinity of the experimental herd, but the report stated that the issues were relevant to 
all Māori and a comprehensive view on the impacts on Māori values would only be 
possible after the issue had been debated widely.  
 
ERMA approved the human genetic component of the research. Ngāti 
Wairere appealed, arguing that the authority had misdirected itself in law in terms of 
                                                          
107 Environmental Risk Management Authority. 
108 Environmental Risk Management Authority Decision GMF98001 (ERMA, Wellington, 2002). 
109 Mason Durie “Mana Tangata: Culture Custom and Transgenic Research” (Deputy Vice-
Chancellor’s Lecture, Massey University 5 August 2003) 8. 
110 Environmental Risk Management Authority Decision GMF98001 (ERMA, Wellington, 2002). The 
research was abandoned in 2003 and the 3,500 sheep were slaughtered and burned on site, together 
with embryos, semen and ova. Kelly Andrew “Court Rejects Sheep Review” (15 December 2004) The 
Dominion Post  Wellington A2. 
111 Environmental Risk Management Authority Decision GMF98009 (ERMA, Wellington, 2002). 
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the tests under sections 6(d) and 8 of the Act as to taonga, Māori spiritual values and 
the appropriate balance between these matters and other considerations under the 
Act. They claimed ERMA had wrongly interpreted “taonga” as being limited to 
tangible matters and had failed to take into account the relationship of Māori with 
their spiritual taonga, including the spiritual beliefs associated with the land. They 
submitted that the research would desecrate the land and be an offence to the values 
of whakapapa and mauri. The risk of metaphysical imbalance to the environment 
would result in risks to physical and mental health. 
 
 The High Court held that the Treaty of Waitangi imposed on the Crown a 
duty of active protection of taonga, including intangible beliefs. However, such duty 
did not require Crown action beyond what was reasonable in the prevailing 
circumstances. ERMA had not acted wrongfully in deciding that it would be 
unreasonable to give the duty a determinant weight and Māori concerns did not give 
rise to a right of veto. ERMA had applied their best endeavours to understand Ngāti 
Wairere’s spiritual beliefs, even though they were unable “to assess or give weight to 
purely spiritual matters in the same way as they felt able to assess and give weight to 
purely physical matters.”112 Goddard J held that active protection under the Act may, 
in some cases, require decisions to be made according to the tenants of Māori 
spiritual belief, where these are significant, depending on the circumstances and the 
issues arising. 
 
A further application was made in 2002, to develop transgenic cattle that 
could express functional therapeutic foreign proteins in their milk and to study gene 
function and genetic performance.113 The Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao Report raised 
Māori concerns that their advice would be compartmentalised into the domain of 
things cultural, spiritual or intangible.  
 
They considered that a primary issue is the identification of the Māori 
community with whom the authority should consult. Their view was that this is 
wider than that represented by Ngāti Wairere, as manawhenua of the land on which 
the research would be conducted. The issues include the rangatiratanga of Māori to 
choose to accept new knowledge and technology, by encapsulating them in tikanga 
Māori, thus providing for economic, social and cultural advancement, whilst 
remaining in accord with Māori cultural preferences. The report states that 
whakapapa and mauri are taonga that transcend hāpu and iwi boundaries. They apply 
to all living things, irrespective of species, race, ethnicity and communities. It stated 
that there is a need for nation-wide consultation with Māori on genetic modification 
and, in particular, on transgenic organisms involving human genes, in order that such 
decisions could be made in a fully informed manner.114
 
Further, although ERMA believed that the project could potentially benefit 
society, Crown entities have a duty to provide for mutual benefit for Māori in a 
manner that does not subsume Māori rights, culture and values.115 If the anticipated 
benefit was higher health status and longevity, there was a possibility of increasing 
                                                          
112 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213, 286 (HC). 
113 Application number GMD02028. 
114 Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao Report on GMD02028 (Transgenic Cattle) (ERMA, Wellington, 2002) 
7. 
115 Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao, above, 5. 
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acceptance of the technology by Māori. However, pursuit of the project, devoid of 
specific provision for Māori rights, culture and values was said to be a clear Treaty 
breach. The primary recommendation to the authority was that the application not be 
granted, pending further information from the Maori Generic Issues project. 
 
ERMA approved the application, albeit in a limited form, deciding that risk 
of spiritual harm from the research would be low. It formulated an interpretation of 
mauri that differentiated between the mauri of a gene and the mauri of an organism, 
arguing that since the gene could not be said to be the sum total of a human, the 
insertion of a human gene into a cow did not amount to violating the mauri of a 
human, since the gene’s mauri was not a human mauri and so the gene does not 
introduce the mauri of the human into the cow.116
 
Durie disputes this argument:117
 
Quite apart from the dubious hypothesis that a gene can be said to possess a mauri 
that is separable from the mauri of the organism it serves, the ERMA analysis 
overlooked the fundamental starting point upon which Māori world-views are 
built– the relationships that confer coherence within the natural world. While 
scientific method often dissects the whole into smaller parts in order to find the 
truth, Māori philosophical methods work in the opposite direction; truth is a 
function of wider relationships and higher order synergies. If it were to 
contemplate discussion on the mauri of a gene, a Māori analysis would probably 
have been more concerned with the relationship of the gene’s mauri to the host 
organism, rather than its separateness. The mauri of a gene would then be 
contemplated as something that only had meaning within the context of a 
relationship with a higher order entity. As such, it would be an essential part of the 
human dimension. 
 
He suggests that it is unsatisfactory to use a framework devised to assess risk 
management when taking mātauranga Māori into account, and favours a framework 
that is linked to holistic perspectives. 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
 
The collection of tissue for use in the search for genetic information has 
become a lightning rod for broader indigenous concerns about the commercial 
exploitation of resources. It has become a metaphor for the highly resented intrusions 
that fail to respect the social meaning of the human body. The intention may be to 
benefit humankind, but it may also be for the achievement of profits and the 
acquisition of patents. Indigenous people suspect that such research is exploiting 
them and appropriating their property interests.118
 
A New Zealand framework for the control and use of human biological 
materials must respect Māori cultural values. It is necessary to develop an ethical and 
realistic way to negotiate issues such as control over research and ownership of 
                                                          
116 Environmental Risk Management Authority Decision GMD02028 (ERMA, Wellington, 2002) 33—
34. 
117  Mason Durie “Mana Tangata: Culture Custom and Transgenic Research” (Deputy Vice-
Chancellor’s Lecture, Massey University, Wellington, 5 August 2003) 12. 
118 Aroha Te Pareake Mead “Genealogy Sacredness and the Commodities Market” (1996) 20 Cultural 
Survival Quarterly 46, 47. 
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intellectual property. It is impractical to require that Māori be the sole beneficiaries 
of research utilising Māori body parts because, in that case, the resources would be 
unlikely to be available to pursue it, but the potential of research must be assessed 
within a framework encompassing Māori cultural values, as suggested by Durie. This 
means accepting the strong sense of common ownership and cultural identity, which 
may prevent an individual from parting with biological resources without group 
consent.  
 
If the outcome of the research is a commercialised product, the sharing of the 
benefits needs to be addressed.119 Dodson and Williamson consider the relative 
positions of the human sources of the biological materials, the researchers and the 
developers of the product or patent holders and state that all three groups should 
share in the benefits of research.120 The focus to ensure compliance with Māori 
cultural values should be at the stage of approval of a research proposal, involving 
wananga around the research project, rather than at the point of collection of 
samples. Māori members of ethics committees must be selected as representatives of 
the collective group and be required to make decisions in accord with group 
preferences rather than their personal viewpoints.121 If consultation consists of little 
more than understanding the Māori viewpoint, there is a danger that Māori will 
believe that their collective interests have been appropriated.122
 
The Treaty of Waitangi assured a secure place for Māori values within New 
Zealand society, but it requires an ongoing commitment. This necessitates 
understanding of how tikanga Māori is practiced and applied and how integral it is to 
the development of Māori within the dominant European culture. Similarly, Māori 
need to find common ground to protect traditional values, while avoiding being 
sidelined from the benefits of scientific and medical developments.  
 
As Māori are very diverse, this thesis argues that the decision making about 
human body parts should rest with the individual, who could chose to treat this 
property interest as a common asset with others, or deal with it in isolation. This is 
not a decision to be imposed by regulation. The choice of representative and the 
instructions given will be a matter for the individual. If increased rates of organ 
donation are perceived as a collective benefit to Māori then, with the support of 
kaumatua, increased awareness of the benefits may encourage donation. Studies 
show that community building and public education about organ donation in specific 
communities can be successful.123 This may be assisted by endorsement by well-
known and respected persons.124 However, any assumptions about the rationality of 
such world views must be avoided, as rationality is a culture specific notion and the 
rational thought that underlies scientific inquiry is but one form of thought. In light 
of the cultural significance attached to death and dying, this chapter argues that it is 
                                                          
119 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
120 Michael Dodson and Robert Williamson “Indigenous Peoples and the Morality of the Human 
Genome Diversity Project (1999) 25 J med ethics 204, 208. 
121 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
122 However, it is noted that the notion of a single Māori viewpoint is dubious, in light of the diversity 
of Māori and the variation of their level of acceptance of traditional values. 
123 G G Persijn and A R Van Netten “Public Education and Organ Donation” (1997) 29 Transplant 
Proc 1614; P Miles and C O Callender “Community Education and Empowerment Key to Increased 
Minority Donation Rates” (1997) 29 Trans Proc 3756. 
124 Such as the kidney donation by a well-known Māori broadcaster to a sportsman, Jonah Lomu. 
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inappropriate to introduce an organ collection system involving conscription or 
presumed consent in New Zealand. 
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Chapter 6 
 
CONTENTIOUS CLASSES OF DONORS 
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter four concluded that a child is a person once it is “born alive”. Consequently, 
this thesis argues that children have property interests in their excised body parts and, if 
competent, they may pass their interest in their cadaver to their representative at death. In 
general, the parents or guardians would be first in the order of priority to be appointed 
representatives of child who dies while still incompetent.1  
 
The welfare and best interests of the child are paramount when dealing with property2 
and the child must be given a reasonable opportunity to express its views and those views 
must be taken into account.3 No person may be guardian of the property of a child, except 
under an order appointing a named person or a person whom the Court thinks fit as the agent 
of the Court.  
 
 Parents commonly make decisions about medical treatment for their children. 
However, decisions to harvest body parts for transplantation or research are conceptually 
different from treatment, as they are not usually for the therapeutic benefit of the child. 
Parents do not own their children and they have a fundamental obligation to protect the 
child’s interests until it is sufficiently mature to make its own decisions.4
  
Since the earliest days of organ transplantation, small numbers of children and 
incompetent adults have been used as organ donors, although their use is “ethically 
complex”.5 They frequently serve as bone marrow donors, because successful bone marrow 
grafting requires a very compatible tissue match, which may exist between siblings. From a 
Kantian, non-consequentialist perspective, such donations infer the use of the source as a 
means to the ends of others. If consent is given by parents or caregivers the child or 
incompetent adult may be compelled to donate, even though competent adults could not be 
similarly compelled. There is no general common law duty to rescue another, although Ross 
has suggested that there may be an ethical duty on children to undergo invasive procedures in 
certain circumstances, such as to save the life of a sibling.6 It has been argued that, with 
respect to children, a “familial” or “relationship-based” approach is more relevant than the 
traditional individualistic approach. Crouch and Elliott state:7
 
1 See the discussion of representatives in chapter 8.  
2 Care of Children Act 2004, s 14. 
3 Care of Children Act 2004, s 6. 
4 Note that the Trustee Act 1956, ss 41 and 42 provide that trustees may make decisions about the use of 
property for the education, maintenance, benefit and advancement of the minor beneficiary. The Care of 
Children Act 2004, s 14 provides that the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount when dealing 
with property. No person may be guardian of the property of a child, except under an order appointing a named 
person or a person whom the Court thinks fit as the agent of the Court. However, nothing in the Act limits any 
powers of the High Court in relation to, or in relation to the administration of, any property held on trust 
5 Australian Health Ethics Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council Ethical Issues in 
Donation of Organs or Tissues by Living Donors (Draft Discussion Paper 2) (Health and Medical Research 
Council, Canberra, 1996) 11. 
6 Lainie Friedman Ross “Moral Grounding for the Participation of Children as Organ Donors” (1993) 21 J law 
med ethics 251, 258. 
7 C Crouch and C Elliott “Moral Agency and the Family: The Case of Living Related Organ Transplantation” 
(1999) 8 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 275, 275. 
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When it comes to moral decisions about the family, the tools of moral philosophy 
and the law have not always served us well, particularly when the question 
involves exposing one family member to risks for the sake of another. 
 
However, the World Health Organisation Guiding Principles on Organ 
Transplantation state: “No organ should be removed from the body of a living minor for the 
purposes of transplantation.”8 The Law Reform Commission of Canada identified three 
potential objections to the use of minors as organ donors: 
 
• consent is a prerequisite for all bodily intrusions; 
• a balancing of social worth is inevitably implicated in child donation; and 
• donor benefit is illusory. 9
 
Children and mentally impaired adults have widely varying cognitive abilities and the 
concept of incapacity is, to some extent, culture specific. A total prohibition of the use of 
body parts from such groups has the advantage of certainty and ensures the source’s legal 
protection, but fails to reflect the varying levels of competence. Additionally, there are 
circumstances where the transplantation of a body part from a mentally incompetent person 
may be justified, to avoid psychological damage to that person.  
 
This chapter will argue that a competent child may appoint a representative and give 
an effective consent, and although the supporting consent of parents is desirable, it should not 
be required.10 A flexible standard, similar to that proposed in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech AHA (Gillick)11 is appropriate, rather than the selection of a chronological age at 
which consent can be given. However, if parents oppose the child’s decision, independent 
determination of the capacity and consent of the minor should be required. Refusal of consent 
by a competent minor should always be effective.  
 
It is argued that organ harvest from a living child who is not Gillick12 competent 
should not take place without the consent of a court or the Human Tissue Authority.13 
Concerns about the well-being of children who are the sources of body parts must outweigh 
the parental discretion to make the decision most likely to benefit the family unit. If excised 
body parts are property, then the property could only be dealt with by a person appointed by 
the court, acting in the best interests of the child.14
 
It is important to conduct research on children and mentally incompetent adults, but 
there must be protection of their rights and interests. This chapter will consider whether the 
ethical framework required by the Ministry of Health’s Operational Standards for Ethics 
 
8 World Health Organisation “Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation” (1991) 337 Lancet 1470 
Principle 4. 
9 Law Reform Commission of Canada Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissues and Organs Working Paper 
66 (Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1992) 48. 
10 This differs from the Human Tissue Bill, which provides for an approach based on age, not capacity. See the 
discussion in chapter 2. 
11 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 (HL) Lords Fraser, Scarman, Bridge, Templeman 
and Nourse. The House of Lords held that some children are legally competent to consent to some medical 
treatment. They can give an effective consent to medical treatment when they have attained sufficient age and 
understanding to weigh the risks and the benefits of the proposed treatment. 
12 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA, above. 
13 See the discussion in chapter 8 about the jurisdiction of the Authority. 
14 Care of Children Act 2004, s 14. 
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Committees is sufficient protection for incompetent participants.15 It will argue that 
protective mechanisms are required if the incompetent’s property is being taken for a purpose 
that does not provide therapeutic benefit. It is extraordinary that such protections apply to 
other property belonging to or held in trust for an incompetent person, but not for body parts, 
which are substantially more significant for the person’s welfare. 
 
II    CHILDREN 
 
A    Competence 
 
A competent person should be able to donate body parts and appoint a representative. 
However, it is difficult to define the level of understanding necessary before a person is 
competent to make healthcare decisions. The English Court of Appeal has expressed the test 
of competency for adults as:16
 
A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning 
renders the person unable to make a decision whether to consent to or refuse 
treatment. That inability to make a decision will occur when: 
 
 
(a)  the patient is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is 
material to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of 
having, or not having, the treatment in question;  
 
(b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as 
part of the process of arriving at the decision.  
 
A person under the age of 16 years is presumed incompetent, unless the person’s 
competence meets the test in Gillick17 or Re C.18 In Re R (a Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment), Lord Donaldson MR stated that Gillick19 competence requires:20
 
[N]ot merely an ability to understand the nature of the proposed treatment…but a 
full understanding and appreciation of the consequences both of the treatment in 
terms of intended and possible side-effects and equally important, the anticipated 
consequences of a failure to treat.  
 
Thus, a higher standard of competence is required for children than for adults. In Re 
M (Medical Treatment: Consent),21 a 15-year-old girl was in need of an urgent heart 
transplant, without which she was likely to die within one week. She refused to consent. She 
stated that she understood the nature of the operation, the procedure involved, and the post 
operative requirements, which included a lifelong requirement to take drugs. She did not wish 
to undergo this regime, or to survive with another person’s heart. It was held that, in light of 
the fact that events had overtaken her so swiftly, she was unable to come to terms with her 
situation and was deemed incompetent to decide. This decision is apparently based on her 
 
15 Ministry of Health Operational Standards for Ethical Committees (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2002) 
<http://www.moh.govt.nz> (last accessed 1 March 2004). 
16 Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 8 Med.LR 217, 224 (CA) Butler-Sloss, Saville and Ward LJJ; Re C (Adult 
Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 (Fam D) Thorpe J. 
17 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 (HL) Lords Fraser, Scarman, Bridge, Templeman 
and Nourse.  
18 Re C [1997] 2 FLR (Fam D) Munby J 180, 196. 
19 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA,above.  
20Re R (a Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, 26 (CA) Donaldson MR, Staughton and 
Farquharson LJJ. 
21 Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097 (Fam D). 
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status as a child, rather than her actual competence. Such an approach can only be justified if 
it is accepted that minors are different from others and thus deserving of protection, even 
from themselves. If the law accepts the concept of an autonomous minor, then the status-
based approach is inapplicable to competent minors.  
 
In Re E (A Minor: Medical Treatment),22 E was approaching 16 years of age. He 
suffered from leukaemia, but his religious faith precluded a necessary blood transfusion. His 
parents supported his refusal. The Court, while noting his intelligence and appreciation of the 
consequences of refusal, found that E’s understanding did not satisfy the competence test. 
The treatment was authorised. On reaching 16, he again refused treatment and his view was 
accepted. He subsequently died.23 This suggests that immediately prior to his birthday he was 
“incompetent”, and the next day he became “competent” and, consequently, was able to 
effectively refuse treatment. In this case, competency was not stated as the determinant 
factor, but just one component of determining best interests. However, the result appears to 
have been determined by status, rather than competence.  
 
Thus, in English law, ethical principles other than autonomy may prevail, even if a 
person is competent. “Welfare” or “best interests” principles parallel the principles of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence. Mason and McCall Smith argue that this position is 
defensible and state “while consent involves acceptance of an experienced view, refusal 
rejects that experience- and does so from a position of limited understanding.”24 Huxtable, 
however, states that this argument operates under cover of beneficence, but seems to stray 
into paternalistic intervention.25 He opines that most lay people operate from a position of 
limited understanding and states that accepting such an argument necessitates deference to 
medical professionals, ostensibly because they know what is really in the patient’s best 
interests. 
 
In Re W,26 Lord Donaldson MR stated that, at least theoretically, a parent could 
consent to living donation by a competent minor, even if the minor had declined to donate, 
although he considered that from an ethical perspective doctors should not proceed without 
the agreement of the minor. However, he held that, even if a minor was Gillick competent, it 
was inconceivable that a doctor should proceed with tissue harvest without the consent of 
both the young person and the parents. He also suggested that an application to the court 
should be made in the case of disagreement. Nolan LJ stated that where major surgical or 
other procedures are proposed and the parents consent over the child’s refusal, then the 
jurisdiction of the court should be invoked.27  
 
The HTB proposes that a person of or over 16 years will be presumed to be 
competent.28 However, those under the age of 16, person may only consent to matters such as 
genetic testing but, irrespective of competence, cannot make any other decisions under the 
Bill.29 The justification for this rather odd provision relates to the difficulty of assessing 
children’s competence after they have died. No doubt it would be uncommon for children 
 
22 Re E (A Minor: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 (Fam D) Stephen Brown P. 
23 Re S (A Minor) (Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065, 1075 (Fam D) Johnson J. 
24 J K Mason and R A McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics (5 ed, Butterworths, London, 1999) 260. 
25 Richard Huxtable “Case Commentary: Time to Remove the ‘Flack Jacket’? Re M (Medical Treatment: 
Consent)” (2000) 12 CFLQ 83. 
26 Re W (1992) 3 WLR 758, 767F (CA) Lord Donaldson MR, Batcombe and Nolan LLJ. 
27 Re W, above, 779. 
28 Human Tissue Bill, clause 43. 
29 Human Tissue Bill, clause 37. This is justified because, in most cases, the assessment of capacity will take 
place after death. See chapters 2 and 8. 
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under 16 to consent, or appoint a nominee, but those who did so would most likely have 
increased awareness of donation. 
 
A report of the American Medical Association recommends that “[i]f a child is 
capable of making his or her own medical treatment decisions, he or she should be considered 
capable of deciding whether to be an organ or tissue donor.”30 There is no simple answer as 
to when a young person is able to decide for themselves. In one study of 120 children 
undergoing paediatric orthopaedic surgery, the opinions of patients, parents and health 
professionals were canvassed as to the age at which children could decide about non-life 
saving treatment. The children set the highest threshold at 14 years, the parents at 13.9 years 
and health professionals chose the lowest figure of 10.3 years.31
 
B       Best Interests 
 
Donation of body parts is not of therapeutic benefit to the donor but there may be 
psychological benefit arising from the survival of a person of emotional value to the donor, 
such as a sibling, or from having behaved altruistically. In the United States, the Supreme 
Court has demonstrated in several contexts an unwillingness to intervene in the decisions of 
parents regarding their children.32 However, there are limits on parental authority. Rutledge 
J stated: 33
 
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are 
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves. 
 
The best interests test has been applied in the United States to a number of tissue 
donation cases. In Hart v Brown,34 both parents and two guardians ad litem agreed to the use 
of a seven-year-old girl as a kidney donor for her identical twin sister. The Court permitted 
the transplantation, as there was parental consent and a strong identification between the 
donor and her sister, on the grounds that the donor would be better off in a family that was 
happy, than in a family that was distressed. Similar reasoning was applied in Little v Little,35 
a case where a mentally incompetent 14 year old provided a kidney, holding that “there is 
strong evidence to the effect that she will receive substantial psychological benefits from 
such participation.”36 Best interests were interpreted to include both physical and 
psychological benefits.  
 
In contrast, in the case of Curran v Bosze,37 the Court was asked to overrule the 
refusal of the mother of three-year-old twins to allow them to be tested as potential bone 
marrow donors for their older half brother, who was their father’s child by a previous 
relationship. The twins had only met the prospective recipient twice and the father had left 
 
30 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association The Use of Minors as Organ 
and Tissue Donors Report 56 (American Medical Association, Chicago, 1994) 240. 
31 Priscilla Alderson Choosing for Children: Children’s Consent to Surgery (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1990) 9. 
32 Such as Wisconsin  v Yoder (1972) 406 US 205, 220 (Wisc Sup Ct); Pierce v Society of Sisters (1925) 268 US 
510, 534-35 (Sup Ct).  
33 Prince v Massachusetts (1944) 321 U S 158, 170 (Sup Ct) (upholding a state statute prohibiting minors from 
selling in the streets with regard to the distribution of religious literature). 
34 Hart v Brown (1972) 289 A 2d 386 (Ill Sup Ct). 
35 Little v Little (1979) 576 SW 2d 493 (Tex Civ). 
36 Little v Little, above, 500. 
37 Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 NE 2d 1319, 1326 (Ill Sup Ct). 
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the family. The Court declined to order the testing. It held that if there was to be any benefit 
in the cases of donation by children, it would necessarily involve a psychological benefit. 
This was not a benefit from altruism in an abstract theoretical sense and it was to be grounded 
in the fact that the donor and the recipient are known to each other as family, as only in the 
case of an existing relationship could a benefit realistically be found to exist. 
 
 Gillick38 competent persons are able to balance the relevant factors in deciding 
whether to donate, such as the nature of the research or treatment, the chances of success of 
the transplantation and the ongoing consequences that may result, both for them and the 
recipient. If they decide not to donate, compulsion is not in their best interests. Parents may 
argue that the refusal is based on factors such as a dislike of medical procedures and that, as 
the child matures, s/he will come to realise that the benefit of having saved a sibling 
outweighed the short-term discomfort, and that the parents were right to consent. However, it 
is unlikely that a court would order donation in the face of the child’s opposition. 
 
Alternatively, competent children may decide to donate even though the procedure is 
not in their medical best interests, because of psychological and emotional factors. Even if the 
decision is contrary to medical recommendations, it does not necessarily suggest that the 
young person lacked competence, or was so distressed by the illness of a family member that 
a reasoned decision was not possible. Adults’ decisions to donate tissue or organs do not 
typically involve a rational weighing of costs against benefits. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
require competent minor to undertake this weighing exercises. In this context, the best 
interests’ standard may result in a lack of respect for persons, because it fails to allow minors 
to act altruistically. Rather, it permits decision making by minors only when it is in their best 
interests.39
 
Several studies have indicated benefits to donors. Fellner and Marshall studied adult 
kidney donors and found that the psychosocial consequences of donating included increased 
self-esteem, growth as a person, and satisfaction gained from the recovery of the recipient, as 
well as identification of the process as one of the most meaningful events in the donor’s 
life.40 Bernstein and Simmons included a small number of adolescents in their study of 
kidney donors and found that the donors experienced gratitude from the recipients and from 
the rest of the family. These adolescents experienced personal benefits from having saved a 
life and experienced even greater increases in self esteem than adults.41 Freund and Siegel 
found a particular closeness in the relationship between many bone marrow donors and their 
sibling recipients.42 Robbennolt, Welsz and Lawson have suggested that the best interests’ 
standard should be revised to include the wishes of the child and the benefits of acting 
altruistically.43
 
In contrast, researchers at the University of California found that one third of children 
whose siblings were bone marrow recipients suffered from signs of post traumatic stress 
syndrome, whether or not they were the donor, but the negative symptoms were worse in the 
 
38 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112 (HL).  
39 Rachel M Dufault “Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Framework in Light of 
Curran v Bosze” (1991) 24 Connecticut L Rev 211, 237. 
40 C H Fellner and J R Marshall “Kidney Donors: the Myth of Informed Consent” (1970) 126 American Journal 
of Psychiatry 1245, 1245. 
41 D M Bernstein and R G Simmons “The Adolescent Kidney Donor: The Right to Give” (1974) 131 Am j 
psychiatr 1338, 1339. 
42 B L Freund and K Siegel “Problems in Transition Following Bone Marrow Transplantation: Psychosocial 
Aspects” (1986) 56 Am j orthopsychiatr 244, 244. 
43 Jennifer K Robbennolt, Victoria Welsz and Craig M Lawson “Advancing the Rights of Children and 
Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors” (1994) 9 J law health 213, 245. 
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donor children.44 However, this could be a result of the family trauma rather than from 
donation per se. Cheyette states that reliance on assumptions about the lack of risk and 
psychological benefits of donation are misleading.45 Consequently, she argues against 
donation by incompetent donors. She concludes that it is inequitable to protect the competent 
adult’s right to opt out of donation, whilst permitting caregivers to volunteer children and the 
mentally disabled. She questions whether the interests of the donor child are adequately 
protected, in light of the research findings as to the possible adverse psychological effects. 
Thus, best interests are a complex equation, and parents facing the imminent death of a 
family member may be unable to weigh the factors in a dispassionate fashion. 
 
C         Substituted Judgment 
 
The substituted judgment test requires the decision maker to make the choice that the 
incompetent person would have made, if competent. This test has clear advantages if the 
person was previously competent and their views are known. However, if the person has 
never been competent, the test is of limited value.  
 
Some courts and commentators have argued that substituted judgment is not 
appropriate in the context of organ or tissue donation by children. The determination of what 
the minor would do, if competent, is thought to be too uncertain to justify the risk to the 
minor.46 However Robbennolt, Welsz and Lawson suggest that as, in general, people do 
choose to donate to siblings in order to save the sibling’s life, it is reasonable to extrapolate 
that as evidence of what a minor under those same circumstances would choose to do, if 
competent.47 This argument is highly speculative, and is insufficiently convincing to justify 
organ donation by incompetent persons. 
 
D    The New Zealand Legal Position 
 
There is no legislation or case law directly on point and yet it appears that bone 
marrow transplants from and between children take place, without resort to approval by the 
court or independent consideration of the best interests of the donor.  
 
1      The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
 
Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that “everyone has 
the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment.” Section 3 confines the Act to acts done 
by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand, or by 
any person or body in the performance of any public function, power or duty, conferred or 
imposed on that person or body, by or pursuant to law. From this section, it could be argued 
that the Act does not apply to the relationship between a doctor in private practice and 
patient, but would apply to the relationship between a patient and hospital (although not 
private hospitals). In Re J,48 Ellis J stated: “I accept that the Act applies to the actions of the 
Director-General, the police, and the doctors employed by Healthcare Hawkes Bay.” He did 
not consider whether the rights would have a wider application. However, Austin, relying on 
 
44 Philip Cohen “Donor’s Dread: Why do Children who help a Sick Sibling End up Depressed?” (1997) 155 
New Scientist 20, 20.   
45 Cara Cheyette “Organ Harvests from the Legally Incompetent: An Argument against Compelled Altruism 
(2000) 41 Boston College L Rev 465, 469. 
46 David S Lockemeyer “At What Cost Will the Court Impose a Duty to Preserve the Life of a Child?” (1991) 
Clev State L Rev 577, 586. 
47 Robbennolt, Welsz and Lawson, above, 230. 
48 Re J (an infant): Director-General of Social Welfare v B and B [1995] 3 NZLR 73, 80 (HC) Ellis J. 
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the legal duties of doctors, contends that “[u]ntil a New Zealand case arises directly on point 
it needs to be assumed for present purposes that the Bill of Rights Act applies to the 
relationship between doctors and patients and other relationships controlled by section 25 of 
the Guardianship Act 1968.”49 Austin further states: “Though children should be accorded 
the protection of section 11 because they are people,…a New Zealand court might be asked 
to articulate principles that would justify limiting the application of the right to children 
because they are children.”50 Austin argues that children, even if mentally competent, should 
not have an unfettered right to make their own medical decisions. 
 
2     International covenants 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides in article 3: 
 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken in public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is 
necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his 
or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or 
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures. 
 
Article 5 requires states to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents in 
the child’s upbringing. Article 6 recognises the child’s right to life and the State’s duty to 
ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.  
 
3    Health and Disability Commissioners Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers’ Rights 
 
The Code recognises the right to make an informed choice and give informed consent. 
Right 7(2) provides: “Every consumer must be presumed competent to make an informed 
choice and give informed consent, unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
consumer is not competent”. Right 7(7) provides that every consumer has the right to refuse 
services and to withdraw consent to services. The point at which a consumer becomes 
competent is a matter for other enactments and the common law, as is considered later in this 
chapter. However, the clear thrust of the Code is that people should, wherever possible, make 
health-care decisions for themselves.  
 
4 Children of or over the age of 16 years 
 
 Section 36 of the Care of Children Act 2004 provides that a consent, or refusal to 
consent, to any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or procedure, if given by a child of or 
over the age of 16 years, has effect as if the child were of full age. The young person can only 
consent to treatment “for the child’s benefit”. This may prevent consent to organ donation 
and medical experimentation, as these do not medically benefit the young person, although 
there are other types of benefit, such as psychological well-being. Section 36 does not state 
that a child under the age of 16 years cannot give an effective consent or refusal to medical 
procedures.  
 
 
49 Graeme Austin “Righting a Child’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment” (1992) 7 Otago L R 578, 581.The 
Guardianship Act has now been replaced by similar provisions in the Care of Children Act 2004. 
50 Austin, above, 581. 
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A question arises as to whether the legal capacity to refuse consent “as though the 
child were of full age” would operate as a legal veto, should the parents give consent on 
behalf of the child. Although the New Zealand courts have not considered this point, it is 
likely that this would be the case, as there has been general approval of Gillick.  The second 
issue is whether the child’s consent could be overruled by the court. It is likely that they 
would do so, especially with regard to decisions that risk death or serious harm.  
 
The Human Tissue Bill proposes that persons of or over 16 years may give consent 
for the use of body parts and may appoint a nominee to act after their death.51.Children over 
the age of 16 years are able to seek a review of a guardian’s decision.52 The Law 
Commission stated that this does not recognise the received wisdom that children have rights 
independent of their parents, as New Zealand has recognised by ratifying the United Nations 
Convention on the rights of the child. That convention, in articles 5 and 14.2, recognises that 
a legal guardian’s responsibility to provide directions to a child is subject to the child’s 
“evolving capacity”. The Law Commission unsuccessfully recommended that the age at 
which children can apply to the Family Court should be 12 years.53
 
5 Children under the age of 16 years 
 
Children under the age of 16 years will, as they mature, have increased understanding 
and, at some stage, will be able to make an informed decision about collection and use of 
their body parts. This may or may not be in accord with the opinions of their parents. 
 
 Section 36 validates the consent of a guardian to procedures on children under the 
guardian’s care. Even if the child has a right to consent, the section recognises another valid 
consent, which could override a child’s refusal. The alternative interpretation is that section 
36 validates consent by guardians only where the consent of persons other than children are 
“necessary”, and so consent from someone other than the child would be insufficient, if the 
child had refused the procedure. Either way, it is highly unlikely that a court would authorise 
the harvest of body parts without the agreement of the parents and the assent of the child, if it 
is able to express preferences. Section 16(c) includes in the duties, powers, rights, and 
responsibilities of a guardian, the determining for or with the child, or helping the child to 
determine, questions about important matters affecting the child, which includes non-routine 
medical treatment. 
 
 The Human Tissue Bill proposes that children under 16 will be able to consent to 
genetic testing, but will not be able to consent to organ harvest after death or appoint a 
nominee to consent on their behalf.54 That decision will be made by the senior available next 
of kin who are listed as being firstly a parent, then a guardian, then an adult sibling.55
 
6 Children and families  
 
 
51 Human Tissue Bill, clause 37. 
52 Care of Children Act 2004, s46. 
53 Law Commission Submissions to the Select Committee on the Care of Children Bill (Law Commission, 
Wellington, 2004) 18. 
54 Human Tissue Bill, clause 37. 
55 Human Tissue Bill, schedule 2, Part 2. 
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It is unclear whether non-therapeutic medical procedures such as organ donation are 
in an incompetent child’s best interests.56 Benefits may accrue of a non-medical nature, such 
as the virtues of altruism and social obligation, or having saved the life of a sibling. Whether 
these outweigh the harms, risks and detriments depends on how each factor is weighed. 
 
Schoeman argues that intimate relationships transcend the traditional moral 
boundaries that give rigid shape to the self and instead create an environment in which 
mutual purpose and group identity flourish.57 The family requires considerable privacy in 
order to develop this intimacy, so family autonomy should only be interfered with if it can be 
shown that the family’s actions will cause the child serious harm.  
 
Veatch states that intimate guardians ought to be held to a subjective best interests 
standard, which allows them to look beyond the interests of the child concerned, to factor in 
the moral values, religious beliefs and social ideals of the family, as well as the larger 
repercussions the decision is likely to have on both the patient and the family.58   
 
Lanie Friedman Ross argues that:59
 
Viewed from the perspective of family autonomy, the decision to allow one child 
to donate an organ to a sibling can be morally permissible provided that there is an 
ongoing intimate (bonded) relationship between the authorizing parents and the 
child-donor.  
 
 
However, she would prescribe limits on family autonomy, in that parents can only permit 
their child to participate as an organ donor if they are not eliminating the child’s capacity to 
act autonomously and provided that they are promoting the child’s capacity to flourish in 
other ways.60 She asserts that the State should prohibit parents’ consent to child donation if it 
finds the donation incompatible with respecting the child’s personhood.  
 
In Re GWW and CMW,61 an application was made for an order authorising a bone 
marrow harvest from a ten-year-old child for donation to his aunt. The child had an 
understanding of the proposed procedure and did not oppose it, but was not Gillick 
competent. The Court decided that the psychological benefit to the child outweighed the 
minimal risks and consequences of the procedure and therefore it was in his best interests. 
The child was the only fully matched related donor, although a number of potential unrelated 
donors were identified on the Australian Bone Marrow Donor Registry. The aunt’s chance of 
a cure with an unrelated donor was 20–30 per cent, while the chance of survival with the 
child as the donor was 25–40 per cent.  
Hannon J held that it was a special case that required judicial approval, because the 
operation was for the benefit of the third party and, in considering whether to make an order 
 
56A child has a right to expect that guardians will carry out their duties and responsibilities for the child’s benefit 
and welfare. N v D [guardianship] (1993) 11 FRNZ 303, also reported as Neho v Duncan [1994] NZFLR 157, 
160; Nixon v Nixon 10/10/02, Judge Inglis QC, FC Manukau FP048/694/95, para 8. 
57 Ferninand Schoeman “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family” (1980) 91 
Ethics 8, 8. 
58 Robert M Veatch “Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal: A Reasonableness Standard” (1984) 9 Am J L & 
Med 427, 431. 
59 Lainie Friedman Ross “Moral Grounding for the Participation of Children as Organ Donors” (2001) 21 J L 
Med & Ethics 251, 252. 
60 Ross, above, 253. 
61 Re GWW and CMW (1997) FLC ¶92-748 (FCA) Hannon J. 
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relating to the welfare of the child, the court must regard the best interests of the child as the 
paramount consideration.62 It must consider any wishes expressed by the child and any 
factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are 
relevant to the child’s wishes.63  
A further relevant factor is whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between 
the child and the recipient, which is of benefit to the child. In such a case, it is in the best 
interests of the child that the relationship continues and this may be more significant than the 
risk or discomfort of a surgical procedure. The Court permitted the donation even though 
there were potentially suitable adult donors available. 
In many areas of family life, parents set the interests of one child against those of 
other children, or the family unit. It is generally in a child’s best interests to live in a family 
that is allowed flexibility when balancing the interests of family members. This would imply 
that the parents should be free to decide whether a child might donate to a sibling. However, 
protective mechanisms for children are needed. This thesis argues that the decision to consent 
to organ or tissue harvest from an incompetent child should always be made by a court or the 
Human Tissue Authority, because of the risk of parental conflicts of interests, especially 
when the recipient is a sibling, or other relative of the donor child. 
 
E Guidelines 
   
Price argues that a Gillick competent child should be able to decide whether to behave 
in an altruistic manner.64 He suggests a totally flexible standard, based on a determination of 
competence or, alternatively, that such a flexible standard should apply once a threshold age 
has been attained, such as 14 years. 
 
This thesis supports Price’s suggestions, and suggests the Human Tissue Authority 
should determine whether guidelines are necessary to protect the interests of the child, 
recipient and family.65 Among the matters that could be included are: 
 
• Incompetent donors should only be used if there is no suitable competent donor 
available; 
• There must be a high likelihood of significant improvement in the recipient’s 
condition; 
• The donor and the recipient must have a close emotional relationship, which may 
arise without actual family relationship. However, it would exclude donation by 
children who do not live with or have close contact with, the recipient, or donation to 
distant relatives; 
• The child who is sufficiently mature to formulate preferences must be willing to 
participate. A minor should not be permitted to undergo an unreasonably dangerous 
donation and, in light of the potential for family pressure, the child should be 
independently assessed and counselled; 
• In general, only regenerative tissue should be removed from children. Although liver 
donation involves regenerative tissue, the risks of donation are such that it should not 
be permitted; 
 
62 Family Law Act 1975 (Australia), s 67ZC(2). 
63 Family Law Act 1975 (Australia), s 68F(2)(a). 
64 David Price Legal and Ethical Aspects of Organ Transplantation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000) 345. 
65 The guidelines would be constructed by the Human Tissue Authority after a process of public engagement. 
See the discussion in chapter 8. 
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• There should be a presumption against repeated donations; 
• Decisions to donate should not be made by parents, whose judgment may be affected 
by the exigencies of the situation. A court or the Authority, acting within the 
guidelines, should decide.66
 
Although such decisions are usually made within the family, it cannot be said that 
families are necessarily protective or safe places for children. It is proposed that, if a child is 
Gillick competent, then the child must consent to any donation and the parents should not be 
able to overrule any refusal. If the parents believe the competent child’s consent is not in the 
best interests of that child, they should be able to apply to the Authority, which could 
overrule or confirm the decision.67
 
A competent child should be able to make decisions to apply after death, and appoint 
a representative to carry out these instructions.68 It is likely that even if Gillick competent, 
many young people would not appoint a representative, in which case, the parents would be 
first in the priority list of representatives.69 Children who are not Gillick competent should 
have the protection of independent decision making in all cases. The expressed or apparent 
reluctance to proceed of a child should always be respected. 
 
Whilst a property construct is not essential to ensure such protections, the notion of a 
property interest which can be passed to a representative is not incompatible with the interests 
of children and this is a means to ensure that the wishes of competent children are followed. 
 
III ORGAN DONATION BY MENTALLY INCAPACITATED PERSONS 
  
A Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 
 
A welfare guardian appointed under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights 
Act 1988 does not have the power to:70   
 
•  refuse consent to standard medical treatment, or procedures intended to save the 
person’s life, or to prevent serious damage to the person’s health;71 or 
•   consent to medical experimentation other than for the purpose of saving the person’s 
life or preventing serious damage to the person’s health.72  
 
As organ or tissue donations are not standard treatments, the Court must make orders 
under section 10(1)(f) or section 18(2) for harvest to take place. The treatment must be 
necessary in the interests of the disabled person, and the court must make the least restrictive 
intervention possible, so it is unlikely that it would authorise a welfare guardian to consent to 
organ donation on behalf of an incompetent adult. Thus, adults have greater protection than  
incompetent children. 
 
If excised body parts are the incompetent source’s property, then they would have the 
additional protection provided by the property rights part of the Act.73 This provides for the 
 
66 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
67 Alternatively, the role could be within the jurisdiction of the Family Court. 
68 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
69 See the priority list in chapter 8. 
70 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 19(1)(a–f). 
71 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 18 (1)(c). 
72 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 18 (1)(f). 
73 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, Part 3. 
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making of a property order under section 11 or the appointment by the court of a manager74 
to exercise the powers specified in the appointment. Thus, the manager could administer the 
retention and use of body parts, both to ensure that any benefits are preserved for the source75 
and to ensure that the person’s wishes and cultural views are respected, as far as possible. 
Section 54 provides that the existence of such an order does not necessarily mean that the 
person lacks testamentary capacity. The issue of whether the person was able to appoint a 
representative to take the property interest in the body parts after death would fall within this 
section. 
 
The Act emphasises the promotion and protection of the welfare and best interests of 
the incompetent person, while seeking to encourage the person to develop and exercise such 
capacity as that person has to understand the nature and foresee the consequences of 
decisions relating to personal care and welfare, and to communicate such decisions.76
 
1  Best interests 
 
In England, decisions on medical treatment for incompetent adults are made using the 
best interests test, as set out in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation),77 which encompasses the 
protection of the incompetent patient’s contemporaneous welfare. This requires the weighing 
of the benefit and detriment that might flow from the procedure. The English Law 
Commission has stated that organ donation “will only rarely, if ever, be in the best interests 
of a person without capacity, since the procedures and their aftermath often carry 
considerable risk for the donor.” 78
 
However, considerations have moved beyond medical best interests, to include 
psychological and social interests. In Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant),79 
Connell J authorised blood tests and bone marrow harvesting from a mentally incompetent 
woman for transplantation to her sister, based on the best interests of the donor. Y had been 
severely intellectually disabled since birth. She was 35 years old and had lived in a 
“community home” since she was 17 years old. Her sister was aged 36 and had a bone 
marrow disorder for which she had received chemotherapy. Her condition was likely to 
progress to acute myeloid leukaemia within three months. A bone marrow donation from a 
blood relative held a 40 per cent chance of recovery for 18 months, whereas a donation from 
an unrelated donor had, at best, a 30 per cent chance. There were two potential unrelated 
donors in the United Kingdom. The sister successfully applied for a declaration under the 
High Court’s inherent jurisdiction that two preliminary blood tests and a bone marrow 
removal under general anaesthetic could lawfully be taken from Y.  
 
Connell J found that the donation was in Y’s best interests, because the applicant’s 
prognosis without the transplant was poor, and if she were to die this would adversely affect 
the health of Y’s mother, so her ability to visit Y would be restricted. Consequently, Y would 
be harmed by the reduction of contact with her mother. Despite the fact that Y apparently did 
not know that this regular visitor was her mother, he held that the procedures were to Y’s 
 
74 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 31. 
75 See chapter 7 for discussion of benefit sharing in the case of a patent application. 
76 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 18. 
77 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 77(HL) Goff LJ. 
78 Law Commission for England and Wales Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: Medical 
Treatment and Research, Consultation Paper No 129 (Law Commission, London, 1993) 6.5 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk> (last accessed 14 February 2005). 
79 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1996] 2 FLR 787; [1997] 2 WLR 556 (Fam D) Connell 
J. 
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emotional, psychological, and social benefit. Connell J held that the procedure would 
improve Y’s relationship with her mother, who wanted it to take place and would be eternally 
grateful to Y. 
 
The assessment of best interests in this case was largely based on the importance of 
Y’s relationship with her mother and, as the mother was in poor health, anything that might 
exacerbate this and inhibit her frequent visits was considered to be contrary to Y’s best 
interests.  
 
There are two concerns about this decision. Firstly, Y’s relationship, however 
tenuous, was with her mother, not the prospective recipient of the bone marrow. The Judge, 
somewhat speculatively, referred to the possibility that the donor’s relationship with both her 
mother and sister would be likely to improve if the bone marrow transplant went ahead.  
 
Secondly, there were possible competent donors, although the chances of success 
might be lower with an unrelated donor. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of Human Beings with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine 
prohibits the removal of regenerative tissue from incompetent persons, unless there is no 
compatible donor available who has the capacity to consent.80 In this case, the procedure was 
not necessarily in the best interests of Y. 
 
2 Substituted judgment 
 
Substituted judgment is widely used by courts in the United States in decisions about 
life-sustaining treatment, and in the context of organ donation and research participation by 
incompetent persons.81 This test requires the decision to be that which the incompetent 
person would have made, if competent. In Strunk v Strunk,82 an application was made to 
approve the donation of a kidney from a mentally incompetent adult to his brother. The Court 
held that the transplant was in the best interests of the ward, who was emotionally and 
psychologically dependent upon his brother, finding that his well-being would be jeopardised 
more severely by the loss of his brother than by removal of a kidney. It held that renal 
transplants involve minimal danger to both the donor and donee and the doctrine of 
substituted judgment was broad enough to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the 
ward. Although the court discussed the substituted judgment doctrine in some detail, the 
conclusion was based on the benefits that the incompetent donor would derive.  
 
Substituted judgment was rejected in a case relating to a proposed kidney donation by 
an incompetent catatonic schizophrenic to his sister.83 However the dissenting judge, Day J, 
felt that the donor, if competent, would most likely consent, because of the normal ties of 
family. He felt that the best interests test is a selfish test, as it precluded altruistic actions by 
an incompetent person. Rather than focus on evidence of the previously expressed views of 
this particular incompetent person (which did not exist as he had never been competent) the 
judge focussed on a particular view of family relationships, by inferring that if this person 
had ever been competent he would have been likely to consent, because decent people, in 
general, would do so. This is an unwarranted assumption to make, in light of the widely 
 
80 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (4 April 
1997) CETS No 164, Art 20(2)(ii) DIR/JUR (96) 14. 
81 D Wendler “Informed Consent, Exploitation and Whether it is Possible to Conduct Research Without Either 
One” (2000) 14 Bioethics 310, 316. 
82 Strunk v Strunk (1969) 445 SW 2d 145, 148–9(Ky Ct App). 
83 In re Guardianship of Pescinski (1975) 67 Wis 2d 4 (Wisc Sup Ct). 
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varying levels of intimate relationships within families. Additionally, it is doubtful whether 
an incompetent person would have the capacity to appreciate the notion of altruism. 
 
3 Public policy 
 
In light of the difficulty of ethical justification of organ donation by the mentally 
incompetent, an alternative approach may be to justify it as a matter of public policy. If such 
a procedure is perceived as a good, it should be encouraged and enabled. This would require 
the conclusion that, as the procedure is a societal good, it should be lawful, even if it is not in 
the best interests of the incompetent person and there is no evidence of substituted judgment, 
such as an advance directive. A threshold of permissible harm could be established, together 
with a requirement of lack of dissent by the incompetent person.84
 
The Law Commission of England and Wales has proposed a similar approach with 
regard to procedures such as genetic screening.85 It proposed that the Secretary of State be 
empowered to allow certain procedures so long as the procedure does not cause significant 
harm to the person and would be of significant benefit to others. Any objection by the 
incompetent person would disallow the procedure. The Law Commission also recommended 
that non-therapeutic research on incompetent persons be lawful, if the research relates to a 
condition suffered by the research subject and the research does not expose the subject to 
more than a negligible risk.86
 
If incompetent people were required to act for the public good against their individual 
best interests, or at least not for their personal benefit, the same compulsion to donate should 
apply to competent persons as well. Such a suggestion is contrary to the western emphasis on 
individualism and autonomy and unlikely to be adopted. The property construct does not 
necessarily preclude compulsion as, in other contexts; property can be compulsorily acquired 
if the state has a pressing public policy interest in it. However, there seems no justification for 
only applying compulsion solely to incompetent persons. 
 
4 Advance directives 
 
Advance directives are decisions made, while competent; regarding treatment and 
care should the person become incompetent. Such a directive could direct the facilitation of 
organ donation. For example, instead of specifying that in certain circumstances (such as 
becoming brain dead) life support is to be withdrawn, the advance directive might request 
that the person be maintained on life support until the organs and transplantable tissues can 
be harvested. The Code specifically recognises the use of advance directives, or in the 
absence of such a directive, the need to take the decision that the person would have taken, 
based on evidence of the person’s previous wishes, preferences and values.87
No case involving the advance authorisation of medical treatment that is contrary to 
the medical interests of the incompetent person has come before the courts in New Zealand or 
England. However, as a competent adult can consent to such procedures, there seems little 
 
84 Penney Lewis “Procedures That Are Against the Medical Interests of Incompetent Adults” (2002) 22 Oxf j 
leg stud 575, 575. 
85 Law Commission for England and Wales Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: Medical 
Treatment and Research (Consultation Paper no 129, Law Commission, London, 1993) 6.26 
<http://www.lawcom.gov.uk> (last accessed 14 February 2005). 
86 Law Commission, above, 6.34. 
87Health and Disability Commissioner’s Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, Right 7(4) 
and (5). 
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reason why such consent could not be given by way of a valid advance directive. The 
directive must be given by a competent person, who was fully informed and acted 
voluntarily. It must be clearly expressed and intended to apply in the circumstances arising. 
 
Lewis suggests two problems arising from such advance directives.88 The first is that 
some incompetent persons will have lost their personal identity, to the extent that they cannot 
be said to be the same person as the person who made the advance directive.89 The second is 
the conflict between a competent person’s exercise of autonomy and that person’s later 
welfare as an incompetent individual.  
 
People should be able to make effective advance directives, as a reflection of their 
autonomy interests, but it is unlikely that such advance directives will become the panacea 
for the shortage of transplantable organs because, even when the purpose is to limit future 
treatment, advance directives are not made by large numbers of people.90
 
IV INCOMPETENT PERSONS AND RESEARCH  
 
Research upon human subjects has led to substantial health benefits and the 
development of new treatments is largely dependent on the use of human subjects to 
determine their safety and effectiveness.91 Medical research on humans has been divided 
into two categories: 
 
•  Therapeutic research where new, or alternate, techniques are employed to determine 
the most effective treatment for a condition; and  
• Non-therapeutic research, intended to advance medical knowledge rather than provide 
any medical benefit to the research subject.  
 
This distinction has been criticised92 and is no longer included in the latest version of 
the Declaration of Helsinki.93 However, there are some types of research in which there is 
clearly no medical benefit for the research subject. 
 
The Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine states:94  
 
 Were [non-therapeutic research on incompetent persons] to be banned altogether, 
progress in the battles to maintain and improve health and to combat diseases only 
afflicting children, mentally disabled persons or persons suffering from senile 
dementia would become impossible. The group of people concerned may in the 
end benefit from this kind of research.  
 
It requires the research to be potentially beneficial to the health of the person concerned. The 
benefit must be real, follow from the potential results of the research and the risk must not be 
disproportionate to the potential benefit. Also, there must be no possible alternative subject 
 
88 Lewis, above, 575. 
89 See chapter 4 for a discussion of personhood. 
90 K Stern “Advance Directives” (1994) 2 Med L Rev 57, 75. 
91 Kathleen Liddell and others “Medical Research Involving Incapacitated Adults: Implications of the EU 
Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC” (2006) 14 Med L Rev 367, 370—372. 
92 R Gillon “Medical Treatment, Research and Informed Consent” (1989) 15 JME 3, 4. 
93 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Physicians in Biomedical 
Research Involving human Subjects Adopted by the 18th World Medical Assembly, Helsinki, June 1964 and 
amended in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000.  
94 Council of Europe Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(1997) para 107 < http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Htm> (last accessed 3 February 2004). 
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with full capacity. It is not sufficient that there should be no capable volunteers, as research 
on incompetent persons must be the sole possibility. The Report suggests as examples of 
research only able to be carried out on the groups concerned, research aimed at improving 
the understanding of development in children, such as infant diseases, or improving the 
understanding of diseases effecting incompetent people, such as dementia in adults. 
 
It suggests that such research must not be carried out if the subject objects. In the case 
of infants or very young children, it is necessary to evaluate their attitude, taking account of 
their age and maturity. As well as the general conditions for research on persons not able to 
consent, the Report requires that a certain number of supplementary conditions must be 
fulfilled:95
 
• there is neither an alternative method of comparable effectiveness to research on 
humans, nor research of comparable effectiveness on individuals capable of giving 
informed consent;  
• the research has the aim of contributing to the ultimate attainment of results capable 
of conferring a benefit to the person concerned, or to other persons in the same age 
category, or afflicted with the same disease or disorder, or having the same condition, 
through significant improvements in the scientific understanding of the individual’s 
conditions, disease or disorder; 
• the research entails only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual 
concerned; 
• the research project not only has scientific merit but is also ethically and legally 
acceptable and has been given prior approval by  competent bodies;  
• the person’s representative or an authority or a person or body provided for by law 
has given authorisation; 
• the person concerned does not object (the wish of the person concerned prevails and is 
always decisive); 
• authorisation for this research may be withdrawn at any time throughout the research 
project. 
 
Thus, the Convention balances the need for incompetent people to enjoy the benefits 
of science with the individual protection of the research subject. Similarly, the UNESCO 
Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights provides for special protection 
to be given to persons who do not have the ability to consent.96
 
A Children as Research Subjects 
 
Despite the benefits from research conducted on human subjects, there have been 
many examples of abuses, such as the inhumane experiments carried out on non-consenting 
prisoners by the Nazis during World War II, which led to the Nuremberg Code containing 
strict guidelines for the conduct of medical research.  
 
Children have been particularly subjected to abuses by researchers.97 They are 
vulnerable, because they may not be competent to consent to their participation and the 
person giving proxy consent may have motives that go beyond the best interests of the child, 
especially if illness of another family member is involved. The parents may be offered 
incentives for involvement, which may be disguised as reimbursement of expenses and the 
 
95 Council of Europe, above, para 108. 
96 UNESCO Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 24 June 2005, Article 7. 
97 Leonard H Glantz “Research with Children” (1998) 24 Am j law med 213, 215. 
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researcher may have motives other than, or even in conflict with, the welfare of the child. 
The legal authority of parents to volunteer the child for non-therapeutic research is unclear.98
  
However, to exclude children from participating in health research has lead to 
children being excluded from the benefits of that research.99 Peart notes that 81 per cent of 
the drugs listed in the 1991 Physicians’ Desk Reference included a disclaimer for use with 
children, or lacked dosage information, because the studies required, in order to ascertain the 
necessary information, had not been carried out.100
 
In the United States, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the Commission) considered whether it is morally 
justifiable for children to be research subjects. The Commission favoured restricted 
participation on utilitarian grounds. Jonas expressed the argument as:101  
 
Progress is by our choosing an acknowledged interest of society, in which we have 
a stake in various degrees; science is a necessary instrument of progress; research 
is a necessary instrument of science; and in medical science experimentation on 
human subjects is a necessary instrument of research: Therefore, human 
experimentation has come to be a societal interest.  
 
 This societal interest necessarily includes research into mental illness and the illnesses 
afflicting children, and those groups’ participation in research into such conditions is 
necessary to progress towards cures, treatments and disease prevention. The use of the body 
materials of the Canavan children to research the genetic component of the condition was 
unlikely to benefit the children concerned, but did hold the hope of producing a predictive 
test to prevent further children being born with the condition.102 The parents stood to gain, as 
did potential future children, but the existing children did not. 
 
The Maryland Court of Appeals considered two separate negligence actions 
involving children who allegedly developed elevated levels of lead dust in their blood, 
while participating in a research study.103  The Court held that researchers cannot avoid 
liability by relying on consents, or by institutional review board approval, especially when 
incomplete information is given to the party consenting. The duty to a vulnerable research 
subject is independent of consent, particularly with research on children, although consent 
must be obtained. Such legal duties arise because of the likely conflict of interests between 
the goals of the researchers and the health of the human subjects, especially when such 
research is commercialised.  
 
The Court stated that the best interests of the child is the overriding concern and it is 
not in the best interest of a specific child in a non-therapeutic research project, to be placed 
in a research environment that might possibly be hazardous to the child’s health.  Despite 
the interests in fostering research for the good of all children, the court’s concern for the 
 
98 The Care of Children Act 2004 does not refer to medical procedures for research purposes and the Code in 
Right 7.4 provides that if a child is not competent, any treatment must be in the best interests of the child and the 
person administering the treatment must take reasonable steps to ascertain the child’s views but can take into 
account the views of other suitable persons interested in the child’s welfare. 
99 Nicola Peart “Health Research with Children: The New Zealand Experience” (2000) 3 Current Legal Issues 
421, 425. 
100 Peart, above, 425. 
101 H Jonas “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects” (1969) 98 Daedelus 219, 230. 
102 Referred to in chapter 3. 
103 Ericka Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc, Myron Higgins a minor etc  et al v Kennedy Krieger Institute 
Inc  (2001) 366 Md 29; 782 A 2d 807 (Ct App Maryland).  
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particular child over-arches all other interests. It held that it is not in the best interest of any 
healthy child to be intentionally put in a non-therapeutic situation where his or her health 
may be impaired, in order to test methods that may ultimately benefit all children. 
 
Consequently, a parent or guardian may not consent to have a child submit to painful 
or potentially life-threatening research procedures, with no prospect of benefit for the child. 
The court did not limit a parent or legal guardian’s right to consent to a child’s participation 
in therapeutic research that may be the functional equivalent of treatment. The no-risk 
standard led the defendants to ask the Court to reconsider its decision, arguing that the 
strict standard would prohibit important research. The motion was denied. 
 
The difficulty that arises from this decision is how to determine the permissible 
“minimal harm”. A report by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended 
that “minimal risk should be defined as the probability and magnitude of harms that are 
normally encountered in the daily lives of the general population.”104 However, this is not 
particularly helpful, as it was difficult to determine the risk of lead paint exposure in the 
daily lives of the general population. 
 
In New Zealand, the Operational Standard for Ethics Committees (the Standard)105 
outlines the minimum requirements to be met by ethics committees. With respect to 
research involving children, it states:106  
 
The special vulnerability of children makes consideration of involving 
them as research participants particularly important. To safeguard their 
interests and to protect them from harm, special ethical considerations 
should be in place for reviewing research with children.  
 
The Standard states that such research should not be undertaken unless it is ensured 
that: 
 
• Children will not be involved in research that might equally be carried out with 
adults; 
• The purpose of the research is to obtain knowledge relevant to the health needs of 
children; 
• Older children are used in preference to younger; 
• The researchers are experienced in working with children; 
• The number of children involved is no more than that which is scientifically and 
clinically essential. 
 
If the research is intended to provide direct therapeutic benefit to the child, then the 
risk must be justified by the anticipated benefit, and any relation of the anticipated benefit to 
the risk must be likely to be at least as favourable to the child as any available alternative. If 
the research is not intended to benefit the child participant, but is likely to yield generalisable 
knowledge about the child’s disorder of vital importance to understand or ameliorate the 
condition, then it may be undertaken if any risk represents a minor increase over minimal 
risk. The research must present experiences to the child participants that are reasonably 
 
104 National Bioethics Advisory Commission Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human 
Participants Volume 1 (National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Virginia, 2001) <http://www.ntis.gov> (last 
accessed 1 March 2004). 
105 Ministry of Health Operational Standards for Ethical Committees (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2002) 
<http://www.moh.govt.nz> (last accessed 1 March 2004). 
106 Ministry of Health, above, 57. 
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commensurate with those inherent in their actual or expected medical, psychological, social 
or educational situations. Any other research involving children may only be undertaken if 
the risk is minimal and commensurate with the importance of the knowledge gained. 
 
In many cases, children will be unable to assess whether research participation will be 
distressing until they have experienced it. Consequently, a requirement that children make 
prospective decisions as to whether they wish to participate as research subjects does not 
effectively protect them, especially as they might not wish to disappoint the researchers or 
their parents, should they wish to withdraw. Children may find research protocols difficult to 
understand and may not benefit from the experience of being required to make decisions in 
such circumstances, especially if their parents are supportive of participation. 
 
With young children, any distress evoked by the research may well be non-verbal and 
subject to various interpretations. All reasonable steps should be required to be taken to 
alleviate observed distress, and if the distress cannot be eliminated, indications of any more 
than minimal distress should be respected, even if the result is the removal of the child from 
the research. The requirement that researchers be experienced in working with children 
should increase the likelihood of their being able to recognise an unacceptable level of 
distress. 
 
The Standard requires the data obtained from the research on children to be retained 
for 10 years, unless the child, on reaching the age of 16, withdraws consent to the continued 
use or retention of personally identifiable health research data. Thus, the issue of ownership 
and control of samples and information may arise once the child is competent.107 The 
Standard does not specifically address the retention or further use of body materials or 
samples, as distinct from the information ascertained from them, although the participants do 
have the right to withdraw from the research at any time. Children may have an interest in 
participating in the economic benefits from research on their body parts and, as with adults, 
contractual arrangements may be appropriate to ensure this. Any financial benefits should be 
retained in statutory trusts until the child attains majority.108
 
 
B Incompetent Adults as research subjects 
 
Incompetent adults have the same rights as anyone else to choose whether their body 
parts will be utilised in research and to be protected from undue risks arising from 
participation. Similarly, they should be entitled to participate in profits arising from 
patenting of inventions based on their property.109 However, difficulties may arise in 
obtaining informed consent as they may have varying levels of mental impairment, or may 
lack the ability to express their preferences. The Standard appropriately focuses on the 
continuum of capacity levels, and the need to involve such persons in decisions affecting 
them to the fullest extent possible. 110
 
As well as the positive utility to be gained from such research, a net gain in utility is 
required. Thus, the research must be scientifically sound and of sufficient scientific 
importance to justify the risk and burden imposed on the research subjects.  
 
107 Ministry of Health, above, 60; See Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future 
Unspecified Research Purposes: Discussion document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006) discussed in 
chapters 3 and 8. 
108 See the discussions in chapters 3 and 7. 
109 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
110 Ministry of Health, above, 62—65. 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis proposes that incompetent persons have property interests in their excised 
body parts. Consequently, existing legislative property protection regimes will apply. Parents 
or caregivers have surrogate decision-making authority in some circumstances, but this does 
not extend to acquisition of property in the incompetent person or the excised parts. Thus, 
they have a duty to preserve the property interest, rather than being able to consent to actions 
that would cause another to obtain the benefit of the body part. Harvest should only proceed 
if a court or the Human Tissue Authority decides it is in the best interests of the incompetent 
person. In general, competent children should have the same decision-making powers as 
adults, with the court or authority having the power to intervene in limited circumstances, if 
the decision is not in the best interests of the young person.  
 
This approach focuses on the interests and welfare of incompetent persons, rather than 
on the family unit as a whole, to ensure that such sources are not subjected to greater risks of 
exploitation and utilitarianism than competent persons. They should be given as much 
information about the proposed procedure as they are able to understand and, if they indicate 
opposition, proxy consent should not prevail.  
 
Children may find it difficult to refuse to donate in highly charged emotional 
situations, so they should be separately counselled by persons experienced in interpreting the 
reactions of children. It is important to divorce this decision-making from the emotions of 
those closely involved with the family concerned and concentrate on a detached medical and 
psychological evaluation.111 This is not to assume that children will necessarily accept the 
decisions of the court or authority as to their best interests. However, to be divorced from the 
decision-making process may help the parents to maintain familial relationships that will best 
enable them to support all their children through the ensuing processes.   
 
This chapter argued that protection of incompetent persons’ property interest in their 
excised body parts should fall within the legislative provisions of the Care of Children Act 
2004 and the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. However, as the property 
interest does not arise until excision or death, additional protection is necessary, if organs are 
proposed to be harvested from incompetent persons, or such persons are proposed to be the 
subjects of non-therapeutic research. The guidelines for such decisions would be  made by 
the Human Tissue Authority and the decision made by an independent agency, rather than 
the source’s family. Any advance directive made prior to incompetence would be 
respected.112
 
 The proposed framework would provide for a priority list of representatives to deal 
with the body after death,113 which would apply if the incompetent person had never been 
able to appoint a representative. The representative would be required to decide on the basis 
of any expressed preference by the source prior to incompetence, or if none was expressed, 
based on the representative’s own preference. 
 
111 R Dressler “Feeding the Hunger Artists: Legal issues in Treating Anorexia Nervosa” (1984) Wisconsin L 
Rev 297, 328—339.  
112 Alasdair R Maclean “Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-Making” (2006) 14 Med L Rev 292, 
303—304. 
113 See chapter 8. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
PATENTING OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS 
 
How does it feel to be patented? To learn all of a sudden, I was just a piece of 
material?....There was a sense of betrayal…. They owned a part of me that could 
never be recovered. 1
 
I       INTRODUCTION 
 
Concerns about commercialisation are the basis of most objections to a 
property interests in human body parts. As has been argued,2 sources have many of 
the “sticks” of the bundle of rights that comprise a property interest, but the sale of 
organs and tissue by the source is likely to be politically unattractive, and thus, 
unlikely to form part of public policy.  
 
An additional concern is that property rights would allow the source to claim 
an interest in patented inventions arising from research utilising their body parts. 
Although biotechnology promises great benefits to humanity, the industry is profit 
orientated, spending upwards of US$100 million annually to secure profits through 
the use of intellectual property law,3 leading to a danger that safety and respect for the 
sources of the tissue will not be paramount considerations.  
    
Once replenishing tissue is no longer able to carry out its prescribed function, 
it is biologically valueless to the host organism and diseased tissue, such as Moore’s 
spleen, may have to be removed. However, this does not mean that such tissue has no 
monetary value once it has fulfilled its biological function, as discovery of new uses 
for that which was once considered waste may confer commercial meaning to it. In 
light of this inherent value of body tissue, it is unfair to assert that the commercial 
biotechnology industry should be provided with its raw materials at no cost.  
 
Additionally, tissue contains genetic information, which is potentially of 
ongoing value to the source and its unconsented publication may be objectionable. 
Traditional medicine has traditionally treated patients in a remedial manner, whereas 
genetic technologies have potential effects on succeeding generations and may alter 
future persons, through germ-line therapies. Additionally, they may result in genetic 
enhancement and the creation of new beings, such as animals containing human genes 
and vice versa. This potential causes public disquiet and raises concerns about the 
control of genetic technology. 
 
Many countries grant patents on genes. The United States is dominant in this 
practice, but Commonwealth countries, such as Canada and Australia as well as most 
                                                 
1 B Burrows “The Thoughts of a Patented Man” (1996) Earth Island Journal 27, 27: Reported 
comments of John Moore. 
2 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
3 C Roberts “The Prospects of  Success of the National Institute of Health’s Human Genome 
Application” (1994) 1 EIPR 30, 30.                                                                                                                                                  
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Pacific Rim, African and Asian countries also grant such patents.4 They are also 
permissible in European countries that follow EC Biotechnology Directive No 
98/44/EC. Article 5(2) provides: 
An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may 
constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to 
that of a natural element. 
The idea of patenting genes and gene sequences seems counter-intuitive to 
many people, in part because genes are living material.5 This point was demonstrated 
in 2000, when application GB 0000180.1 was filed in the British Patent Office. The 
applicant was attempting to patent her own genetic sequence, in order to protect it 
from unauthorised exploitation, whether genetic or otherwise.6 The intention was to 
protest the granting of gene patents, which appeared to allow companies to own parts 
of people. 
There are arguments for and against gene patents. Without patent protection, 
pharmaceutical companies will not undertake the research to develop genetically 
based drugs, as they would have no guarantee that they could recoup the enormous 
costs involved. However, such protection inhibits research, because of the licensing 
fees that would be involved for non-proprietary agencies.7 Restrictive use of patents 
can result in products or processes embodying the subject of the patent being 
unavailable to the public, with consequential healthcare harm. The challenge from 
South Africa to the pharmaceutical patents cartel relating to AIDS drugs demonstrates 
the political unacceptability of overly aggressive use of patents. The actions of the 
drug companies were legally permissible and yet point to the ethical issues arising 
from such patents.8
This chapter will consider the appropriateness of applying patent law to 
biotechnology, given that the rights that are protected by patents usually exclude the 
person central to the whole enterprise–the human source of the material, who, it is 
argued, has a property interest in the material once it is excised from the body.  
Mechanisms to protect this interest and to enable the human sources to obtain a share 
in the profits made from the utilisation of their property will be considered. 
II     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A    Techniques Used in the Manipulation of Living Organisms. 
Human cells were successfully grown outside the body for the first time in 
1951.9 The cell line continued to grow and divide indefinitely, providing a constant 
supply of source material. Since then, many cell lines have been established, with the 
                                                 
4 Eike-Henner W Kluge “Patenting Human Genes: When Economic Interests Trump Logic and Ethics” 
(2003) 11 Health care anal 119, 120. 
5 Andrew Sheard “Patenting human genes: Reflections on the public debate” (2002) 8 J Commercial 
Biotechnology 235. 
6 Patent available at <http://blather.newdream.net/p/patent.html> (last accessed 1 March 2004). 
7A R Williamson “Gene Patents: Are They Socially Acceptable Monopolies, Essential for Drug 
Discovery?” (2001) 6 Drug Discovery Today 1092, 1092. 
8 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698, 702. 
9 G O Gey, W D Coffman and M T Kubicek “Tissue Culture Studies of the Proliferative Capacity of 
Cervical Carcinoma and Normal Epithelium” (1952) 12 Cancer Research 264, 264. 
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benefit that all the cells have the same genetic makeup and thus permit accurate 
comparison of test results. Hybridoma technology was developed to produce a 
limitless supply of a particular antibody for use in immune system research. 
Recombinant DNA technology is commonly referred to as genetic engineering. Such 
technology involves the manipulation of matter at the sub-cellular level. Genetic 
disorders occur when a gene sequence has bases, as represented as “letters” misplaced 
or missing. The identification of dysfunctional genes is the first step to curing or 
preventing such conditions. 
 
There are four broad types of application of DNA sequences, with respect to 
patent claims: 
 
· The presence of a faulty gene can be detected by techniques based on 
knowledge of the structure of the gene; 
· Knowledge of DNA sequences can help identify potential targets in the design 
of drugs and vaccines; 
· Gene therapy can enable the replacement of a faulty gene in the body with a 
normal gene; 
· Therapeutic proteins can be used as medicines, such as human insulin. 
 
B    Patent Requirements 
 
In New Zealand, patents are governed by the Patents Act 1953, as interpreted 
by the Courts and the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ). The 
basis of the patent system is that whoever has created a novel “invention” that is a 
“manner of new manufacture”, which is of perceived benefit to the community, is 
granted a monopoly to exploit the creation for a maximum of 20 years. In return for 
the grant of a patent, the owner must make public a complete description of the 
invention, so the community can make use of it on the expiry of the monopoly. The 
system is intended to reward the inventor, while providing for a future benefit to the 
community. Additionally, it provides incentives to others to invent and innovate. 
 
An innovation will be considered a genuine innovation if it meets the 
following criteria: 
 
· It is new and is a “manner of manufacture”.10 An invention is considered new 
if a description of it has not been published, or the invention has not been 
publicly used before the filing date of the application to patent the invention;11
· The process must be shown to have a relation, directly or indirectly, to the 
production or manufacture of a vendible product;12
· It is an invention.  
The scope of “invention” has been widened over time, to include technologies 
that did not exist when the Patents Act was passed. This extension has been achieved 
by interpreting “invention” from a policy perspective, rather than by analysis of the 
                                                 
10 Patents Act 1953, s 2(1). 
11 Patents Act 1953, s 13. 
12 Swift and Company v Commissioner of Patents [1960] NZLR 775, 779—780 (SC) Barrowclough CJ. 
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actual words of the statute. The High Court of Australia held that “vendible” equated 
to a requirement of “utility in practical affairs.” 13 A similar approach was adopted in 
New Zealand.14 Thus, a naturally occurring substance is not an invention, but the 
discovery of a product of nature and an industrial application of that product is. 
 
A patent will be revoked if: 
· it lacks an inventive step, as it must not have been obvious to an appropriately 
skilled person;15 or 
· it lacks utility, as the inventor must have identified a practical use for the 
invention.16
In addition: 
 
· there must be adequate disclosure of the invention;17 and 
 
· it must not breach any of the exceptions that exclude patentability.18
 
New Zealand is a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property. Through this convention, the patent system must offer international 
equivalence in basic rights and protection and Party States must grant the same scope 
of intellectual property protection to the nationals of other member states as they 
provide to their own nationals. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPS 
agreement requires New Zealand to have a patent system that provides certain 
minimum levels of patent protection.19 Member countries are obliged to provide for 
biotechnology patents, if patent eligibility criteria are met, with certain exceptions. 
Articles 27.2 and 27.3 allow parties to exclude from patentability: 
· inventions whose commercial exploitation must be prevented for the 
protection of ordre public or morality, including the protection of human, 
animal, or plant life or health, or to avoid serious harm to the environment; 
· diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals;20 and 
· plants and animals (other than micro organisms) and biological processes for 
the production of plants and animals. 
C Review of the Patents Act  
                                                 
13 NRDC v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 (HCA).
14 Swift and Company v Commissioner of Patents, above.
15 Patents Act 1953, s 21. 
16 Patents Act 1953, s 41. 
17 Patents Act 1953, s 41. 
18 Patents Act 1953, s 41. 
19 World Trade Organisation Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Annex 1C to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm> (last accessed 14 February 2005). 
20 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited v Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 529 
para 16 (CA) Richardson P, Gault, Keith, Blanchard and Tipping JJ. The prohibition on patenting 
methods of medical treatment in New Zealand rests solely upon policy and ethical grounds. 
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The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification was established in 2000 in 
response to concerns about the potential effects of genetic modification. The 
Commission presented its report in 2001.21  Recommendation 10.2 provides:  
That the Patents Act 1953 be amended by adding a specific exclusion of the 
patentability of human beings and the biological processes for their generation in 
line with s18 of the Patents Act 1990 (Commonwealth). 
The Government agreed that this amendment should be made.22 Such 
exclusion would not prevent research taking place in these areas, and any such 
restriction would require specific legislation.  
Following a review of the Patents Act, the Ministry of Economic 
Development, did not support the exclusion of genetic material from patentability, 
because of:  
· the large number of genetic material patents that have already been granted;  
· the difficulty in defining genetic material;  
· the likelihood of inconsistency with New Zealand’s international obligations; 
and  
· possible negative effects on the research community.23
In this context, “genetic material” includes whole genomes, single genes, or 
gene fragments. Where gene patents claim isolated genetic materials, the genetic 
sequences of that material are part of the description of the invention. It does not refer 
to whole organisms. The focus of the review was on the suitability of genetic material 
as a patentable subject matter and whether patents on such subject matter are overly 
broad, rather than the issue of ownership of genetic material. 
The Report noted that there are two vehicles for influencing the effects of 
genetic material patents. The first is to change patent law and the second is to 
influence how the law is applied. It recommended that the focus should be on the 
second and stated that more stringent application of the criteria for granting a patent 
would, in part, address concerns around the patenting of genetic material.  
The grant of patents over genetic material was not specifically dealt with in the 
review, although some of the amendments to the Act agreed to by Cabinet may 
address some of the concerns. These changes include a stricter utility requirement, by 
requiring examination for inventive step or obviousness. The Commissioner of 
Patents will have greater powers to refuse a patent, on a case-by-case basis, if 
commercial exploitation of the invention would be contrary to morality. The amended 
Patents Act will expand on the current exclusion of inventions whose commercial 
                                                 
21 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, Wellington, 2001) 
<http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz> (last accessed 10 March 2004). 
22 Ministry of Economic Development Review of the Patents Act 1953 Stage 3: Boundaries to 
Patentability (MED, Wellington, 2003) para 142 <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 17 
September 2004). 
23 Ministry of Economic Development Memorandum to Cabinet Policy Committee: Report Back with 
Recommendations and Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents (MED, Wellington, 2004) 
available at <http://www.med.govt.nz>  (last accessed 15 September 2004). 
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exploitation would be contrary to morality or “ordre public”, to include “where the 
prevention of such exploitation is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”24 It will also be possible to 
revoke a granted patent on this ground. This exclusion could be invoked where the 
Patents Commissioner felt there were strongly held ethical or moral objections to the 
commercial exploitation of a particular gene, or application involving a gene.  
There has been much discussion as to whether human DNA patents are 
contrary to public morality and whether the Commissioner of Patents should 
determine matters of morality in a pluralistic society.25 Examination for obviousness 
will reduce the likelihood of patents being granted over genetic material or 
applications of genetic material that are no more than obvious variations on what is 
already known. Changes to the utility requirement mean that patents will not be 
granted unless the invention is shown to have a “substantial, credible and specific” 
use. This makes it less likely that patents will be granted over genetic material that has 
no demonstrated “real world” use. The patent will still cover all uses to which the 
patented gene can be put, even though the patent application may have identified only 
one use for the genetic sequence. 
1      Human being 
If patenting humans is to be prevented, the definition of a human being is a 
major issue.26 The definition would need to specify the stage of development at which 
a human being comes into existence, and whether parts of the body, such as organs, 
cells and cell lines are patentable. MacBean argues: 27
If a definition of human being is adopted that restricts the meaning of the term to 
an organism at birth and beyond, then public access to the widest range of 
technologies is more likely to occur. 
This thesis proposes that personhood commences when a child is “born 
alive”.28 This would allow the patenting of biological material, such as DNA 
sequences, and encourage the development of techniques and products using such 
material.  
A broad definition of a human being would include human biological material 
including cells, genes and gene fragments and the like, as well as human beings as 
entire organisms. Such a view was advanced by Mosk J, in his dissenting opinion in 
Moore,29 when he stated that no physical distinction existed between Moore’s cells 
and the cell-line, as the cell line merely extended the life of the cells.30 In the human 
body, the components of the functional genetic units are all integral parts of the same 
biological mechanism that interacts with other gene products. If the DNA sequences 
                                                 
24 Ministry of Economic Development Review of the Patents Act 1953 Stage 3: Boundaries to 
Patentability (MED, Wellington, 2003) para 50 <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 17 
September 2004). 
25 R Crespi “An Analysis of Moral Issues Affecting Patent Inventions in the Life Sciences: A European 
Perspective” (2000) 6 Science and Engineering Ethics 157, 157. 
26 See the discussion of personhood in chapter 4. 
27 Alexandra MacBean “The Patentability of Human Beings: The Effect of a Proposed Exclusion in the 
Patents Act 1953” (2002) 33 VUWLR 379, 380. 
28 As discussed in chapter 4. 
29 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 P 2d 479, 494 (Sup Ct Cal).
30 Moore v Regents of the University of California,  above, 511
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of all components are separately patented, any useful product is likely to cross the 
boundaries of several patents and thus, reduce the cost effectiveness of the product. 
As stated by MacBean, the fundamental issue is whether the inventor’s intellectual 
property rights should extinguish whatever proprietary rights a donor retains in 
donated body parts.31
D      Opposition to Patenting of Genes 
The reasons that are commonly advanced to oppose the patenting of genes 
include: 
· As a gene exists in nature, it is not novel and, consequently, not patentable; 
· The isolation of a gene does not involve inventing or discovering anything; 
· Determining the structure of a gene is, at most, a discovery, rather than an 
invention; and 
· Sequencing a gene has become a routine automated process that is not 
inventive.  
1  Inventive step 
It has been suggested that a researcher who isolates a genetic compound has 
not taken any inventive step. The Human Genetics Society of Australasia stated that 
the initial premise that DNA sequences may be patented is flawed, because human 
genetic material is a naturally occurring substance, present in all human beings, and 
has evolved over many generations.32 It accepted that a process to discover or isolate 
a sequence of DNA may be novel and inventive, but questioned how this can apply to 
the structure itself. It pointed to an inconsistency if the law does not allow the 
patenting of a human being, yet it would be feasible to acquire from the patent holders 
all patents for all existing genes in the entire human genome. The purchaser would 
then hold the “blueprint” of a human being. 
  As stated by Kluge:33
To grant a patent for a human gene is not to grant a right to the material substance 
that was extracted from the original DNA and amplified by polymerase chain 
reaction. It is to grant a right to the pattern, nature or code of the material 
substance itself….while it may be appropriate to recognize private ownership of 
the material quantities of genes that have been isolated through a particular 
process, and while it may be appropriate to permit someone to patent the particular 
isolating process itself, this is quite different from recognizing intellectual or other 
property rights in the individual genes as pieces of structural biology code. 
At present, a wide variety of genetic material is patentable, but a revised 
definition of inventorship might resolve many of the concerns of the contributors of 
biological material, who argue that identifying the chemical sequence of the isolated 
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32 Human Genetics Society of Australasia Response to ALRC: Issues Paper 27 Gene Patenting and 
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compound is no more inventive than their contribution of the biological raw materials 
used in the research process.  
The definition of a patentable invention in section 2 of the Patents Act 1953 
does not specifically exclude biotechnological inventions, although IPONZ does have 
a practice of refusing patents that would include human beings within their scope, on 
the grounds that such applications do not constitute a “manner of manufacture”.34 
However, patents with respect to animals have been granted.35 Both gene sequences 
and non-human living organisms are patentable.36 At present, Australian and New 
Zealand law allows the patenting of genes and gene sequences when specific criteria 
have been met, and patents have been awarded for complete genes of known function 
and usefulness.  The Ministry of Economic Development agreed with the 
recommendations of the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, that a gene sequence should only be patentable in the context of a 
specific utility, and that the same sequence should be available for further patents by 
others in the context of other utilities, rather than conferring rights over the gene 
itself.37 This was because granting of excessively broad patents may give undue 
reward for small contributions, inhibit the speed of exchange of basic knowledge and 
prevent the development of useful products.  
2   Novelty 
The requirement of novelty is intended to ensure that a patent is not granted 
over anything that is already in the public domain. This is ascertained by an 
examination of current knowledge–the state of the art. If the invention has been 
anticipated by publication of its contents, then no patent will be granted. Additionally, 
the invention must not be obvious to a person skilled in the particular art, in that it 
must not be an example of the normal progress of knowledge that does not 
demonstrate particular skill on the part of the inventor. The invention must be of 
practical application or benefit to the community and must be disclosed in such a 
manner that allows repeatability by someone with skills in the appropriate art. 
The patent on breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 has been revoked by 
the European Patent Office.38 Women who have specific faults in the genes, about 
five per cent of the population, are especially prone to breast cancer. Screening tests 
can identify the faults, but a payment to the patent holder, Myriad Genetics, was 
required. The decision will enable cheaper screening in Europe, as Myriad can no 
longer levy a licence fee for screening tests that use the gene. 
The primary reason for the decision was that the application was not deemed 
“inventive.” Opponents of the patent had discovered discrepancies of about 10 DNA 
letters between the BRCA1 gene sequence described in Myriad’s patent, which was 
                                                 
34 Ministry of Economic Development Review of the Patents Act 1953 Stage 3: Boundaries to 
Patentability (Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, 2003) 30 <http://www.med.govt.nz> 
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36 Ministry of Economic Development, above, 34. 
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issued in 2001, and the sequence in Myriad’s original 1994 patent application. In 
1995, Myriad submitted an updated sequence, exactly matching the one in the issued 
patent. By then, the crucial sequence had already been published openly elsewhere, 
which made it unpatentable because of lack of inventiveness. This decision is 
significant as, apart from the economic implications for breast cancer screening in 
Europe, it could increase pressure on the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
to reject or revoke “obvious” gene patents.  
3   Usefulness 
A requirement for an invention to be “useful” before a patent was able to be 
granted would restrict the present practice in the United States of granting patents for 
large numbers of gene sequences without describing any uses for them, in the hope 
that anyone who devised a use would be required to pay royalties.  In most cases, it is 
the protein products and their derivatives and antagonists, rather than the encoding 
DNA, that hold the promise of medical benefits.39 A patent is not required to be 
useful, although the patent can be denied if the application identifies no use at all for 
the invention.40 Lack of usefulness is a ground for revoking a patent,41 but there are 
costs involved in attempting to have a patent revoked, which may exceed the costs of 
accepting the patent and paying a licence fee to the patent holder. 
4   Products of nature 
Biotechnical inventions create difficulties in the areas of patenting “products 
of nature” and disclosure. This broadly means that nothing that occurs in nature 
should be the subject of a patent application, because an invention should be more 
than a discovery. The patent system is intended to reward skill, effort and endeavour. 
Cornish states: “Discovery is the unearthing of causes, properties or phenomena 
already existing in nature; invention is the application of such knowledge to the 
satisfaction of social needs.”42
A further argument is that products of nature are the property of all mankind 
and, as such, should not fall into the ownership of any one individual or group.43 If 
applied strictly, this argument would prevent the patenting of biotechnology 
inventions, as they involve the manipulation of naturally occurring organisms. 
However, it has long been possible to obtain patents for chemical substances that 
occur in nature, because such patents only relate to the substance when isolated and 
purified, and the substance does not exist in nature in the purified form. Once purified 
and isolated, it is then in a useful form.  
Patents on genes, genetic sequences and genetically engineered organisms 
have generated controversy since the United States Supreme Court allowed the 
patenting of a genetically engineered micro-organism to degrade petroleum spills.44 
This was the first case in which a living organism was the subject of a patent. Since 
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41 Patents Act 1953, s 41(1)(g). 
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then there have been a variety of other such patents, such as the patenting of the 
Harvard oncomouse in 1987, the cell line from John Moore, and patents on genes and 
cell lines of various indigenous peoples.45  
Proponents of gene patents point to the statement in Diamond v Chakrabarty46  
that “anything under the sun that is made by man” can be patented.47 However, the 
Court qualified the statement by reiterating the statutory requirements for a gene 
patent, and stated that manifestations of nature were not patentable. Applicants for 
gene patents assert that they have isolated and purified genes, because genes in the 
body have both coding and non-coding regions, whereas the patented genes have been 
manipulated to eliminate the non-coding region, while still performing the same 
function as a naturally occurring gene. Thus, as a gene is a chemical substance in the 
form of a DNA molecule, an isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same 
sequence as a naturally occurring gene is patentable, because the DNA molecule does 
not exist in nature in an isolated and purified form.48
5    Analogy with drug patenting 
Patents have been essential for drug development, to attract the capital 
necessary for the expense involved in the creation and testing.49 The discovery of a 
gene does not require these incentives. There are no expensive clinical trials required, 
as knowledge about the sequence of the gene is used to identify whether an individual 
has a mutation of that gene.  
As stated by Andrews: “Gene patents do not seem necessary to encourage 
technology transfer in the move from gene discovery to the availability of a genetic 
diagnostic test.”50 She gives, as an example, the experience of the hemachromatosis 
gene. Once the gene was discovered, laboratories began testing for mutations. 
However, once a patent on the gene was granted 17 months later, 30 per cent of the 
laboratories discontinued testing, or did not develop a test for the disease. The patent 
holder was asking a fee of $US25,000 from academic laboratories, plus a fee of $20 
per test. The patent interfered with the clinical adoption of the test and potentially, 
affected the quality of the testing, by limiting the development of better quality, or 
lower cost, alternative tests.51 Furthermore, although researchers can invent 
alternative drugs or medical devices, there are no alternatives to using the patented 
human genes in genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. 
 It has been argued that there is more justification for patent protection in the 
area of identification of genes used to diagnose or predict the occurrence of common 
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diseases.52 Many genes, each exerting a small effect, may be involved. As such 
research is more expensive than research into conditions associated with a single 
gene, it is suggested that without patent protection, private investment into such 
research will abate, resulting in the failure to develop diagnostic tests. The alternative 
point of view is that such diagnostic tests involve multiple analyses of many genes, or 
marker regions of DNA, that are closely associated with genes. Such research may be 
obstructed by the grant of numerous patents claiming DNA sequences and lead to a 
requirement to negotiate licenses to enable simultaneous testing for more than one 
disorder. The effect is to inhibit, rather than facilitate, the development of tests. The 
Nuffield Council recommended that the criteria of inventiveness be stringently 
applied to applications for product patents which assert, inter alia, rights over DNA 
sequences for use in diagnosis. 53
III    PROFIT 
Patent protection is intended to support and increase investment in the 
development of new therapies. The investment is premised on profitability, which in 
turn leads to health gains. One effect of patent enforcement is that the resultant 
products or processes may be kept out of the marketplace or may be excessively 
expensive, thus denying them to the public, or the patent holder may refuse to allow 
access. This is apparent in countries such as New Zealand, with publicly funded 
health systems, where budgetary constraints may preclude the payment of the 
monopoly price. Patents can have a profound effect on health policy and access to 
genetic services.  
Priorities in healthcare research will be directed toward profitable areas that 
relate to the more common conditions, as the resultant products are likely to have a 
large market. Such conditions may be related more to consumer desires than to health 
outcomes, resulting in the more obscure conditions receiving little research attention. 
Once a patent is held on a gene, other researchers and biotechnology companies will 
be deterred from product development relating to that gene and so development is 
dependent on the institution or scientist holding the patent. Such decisions are likely 
to be made on economic, rather than health grounds. 
IV     MULTIPLE PATENTS 
By early 2000, Incyte Pharmaceuticals Inc had filed applications on 1.2 
million partial gene fragments.54 The patenting of small sections of genes, such as 
Express Sequence Tags (ESTs), results in a need to negotiate with the holders of 
multiple patents before research is able to proceed, and so discourages innovation. 
The hurdles of novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness were countered by asserting 
that partial gene sequences could be useful as a marker to locate the full gene, or as a 
unit of analysis to understand evolution.  
Broad patent rights are said to foster innovation, but in this case the effect has 
been to stifle competition, with a deleterious effect on innovation. As stated by Heller 
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and Eisenberg: “A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be 
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and 
product development.”55 The Nuffield Council recommended that when rights are 
asserted in terms intended to cover all sequences that contain the EST that is the 
subject of the original patent, no patent should be granted.56 The Council welcomed 
the Utility guidelines for DNA sequences introduced by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office which have, in effect, been endorsed by the European Patent 
Office.57
The Ministry of Economic Development has recommended that a gene 
sequence should only be patentable in the context of a specific utility, and that the 
same sequence should be available for further patents by others, in the context of 
other utilities, rather than conferring rights over the gene itself.58 It states that the 
granting of excessively broad patents may give undue reward for small contributions 
and inhibit the speed of exchange of basic knowledge and the development of useful 
products. Thus, it suggests clearly defining the patentable subject matter, to exclude 
broad-based genetic patents covering multiple potential uses and limiting patents to 
clear and well-defined specific uses. 
V  RESEARCH OR TREATMENT USE 
A researcher seeking a cure for breast cancer would be required to negotiate 
not only with the patent holder for the full BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but also with 
all the other patent holders who had discovered and patented any of the other of the 
hundreds of mutations in that gene, with the risk of any one patent holder being able 
to veto any negotiation. The United States does not have an explicit research 
exception in its patent law, to enable research to proceed without patent permissions, 
but European patent law allows researchers in commercial and non-commercial 
environments to use a patent invention in their research without violating the patent. 59  
In Japan, the broad exemption has not impeded its strong biotechnology industry.60  
A patent is not infringed by the making of the patented articles for a bona fide 
experiment to make improvements, but making for the purpose of sale or other use 
would infringe the patent. The Human Genetics Society of Australasia recommended 
that the Patents Act be amended to allow a defence for research use.61 They stated that 
such defence should be limited to research on an invention claimed in a gene patent. 
                                                 
55 Michael A Heller and Rebecca S Eisenberg “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698, 701. 
56 Nuffield Council on Bioethics The Ethics of Patenting DNA (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London, 
2002) 58 <www.nuffieldbioethics.org> (last accessed 1April 2004).  
57 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines Fed. Reg. 66:1093 5 Jan 2001 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf> (last accessed 2 April 2004). 
58 Ministry of Economic Development Memorandum to Cabinet Policy Committee: Report Back with 
Recommendations and Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents (Ministry of Economic 
Development, Wellington, 2004) para 44 <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 15 September 
2004). 
59 Rebecca S Eisenberg “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use” 
(1989) 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1018–1019. 
60 Janice M Mueller “No ‘Dilettante Affair’: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools” (2001) 76 Wash L Rev 1. 
61 Human Genetics Society of Australasia Response to ALRC: Issues Paper 27 Gene Patenting and 
Human Health (Human Genetics Society of Australasia, Victoria, 2003) <www.hgsa.com.au> (last 
accessed 1 April 2004). 
 196
The reason was the difficulty in determining whether uses are truly research uses, or 
whether they have commercial implications. They suggested that it might be more 
appropriate to limit a research defence and use other defences instead, such as a 
clinical use defence. This would allow claimed inventions to be used in clinical 
research, without infringing the patent.  
The Ministry of Economic Development has recommended that a clearly 
defined research exemption be added to the Patents Act and Cabinet has agreed that 
an experimental use exception will be incorporated into the Patents Bill.62 The 
circumstances in which the exemption may be used will be clearly defined to provide 
certainty for researchers and patent owners. The exemption will have to be consistent 
with New Zealand’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, in particular Article 
30.63
Exclusion of diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical methods of treatment from the 
scope of patents would create definition difficulties in determining whether medical 
treatment includes diagnosis and treatment. A test to determine whether a person is 
predisposed to future manifestation of illness is not medical treatment, in the sense of 
ameliorating an existing condition in the patient, although it may fall within the ambit 
of preventative medicine, as the patient may adopt practices to minimise the 
likelihood of the diseases developing, or seek early treatment.  
Cabinet has agreed to an exclusion from patentability for “diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans.”64 Internationally, 
courts and patent examiners apply a narrow, technical interpretation of such 
exclusions, because they constitute an exception. Thus, diagnosis that takes place 
outside the body, for example, a blood or genetic test, is treated as patentable.  
VI   POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A     Licensing 
Once patents have been granted, others may purchase a licence to use the 
patented invention. Patent holders may refuse a licence, or may propose an excessive 
licence fee. The Nuffield Council suggested that, as genetic information cannot 
readily be “invented around”, compulsory licensing may be justifiable if the 
monopoly enjoyed is such that an important diagnostic tool is not practically 
available.65 The Government could override the patent holder’s complete control by 
compulsory licensing, if a patent holder refuses to license on reasonable terms.66 The 
policy question is whether the disadvantages of reducing patent protection outweigh 
the beneficial effects.  
                                                 
62 Expected to be introduced in Parliament in late 2006. 
63 Ministry of Economic Development Memorandum to Cabinet Policy Committee: Report Back with 
Recommendations and Options for Addressing Genetic Material Patents (Ministry of Economic 
Development, Wellington, 2004) para 44 <http://www.med.govt.nz>  (last accessed 15 September 
2004). 
64 Cabinet Minute “Granting patents Over Genetic Material” 2003 CAB Min (03) 25/4. 
65 Nuffield Council on Bioethics The Ethics of Patenting DNA (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London, 
2002) 55 <www.nuffieldbioethics.org> (last accessed 1April 2004).  
66 Patents Act 1953, s 46. 
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  The Human Tissue Authority could set the price, allowing for a reasonable fee 
to be paid to the patent holder and, in certain circumstances, to the original source of 
the body samples. As stated by Caulfield:67  
Such an approach provides policy makers with an explicit tool to balance the goal 
of stimulating innovation and controlling the impact of patents on health care 
policy. Patent holders would still retain a right to profit and a limited monopoly 
control over the ‘genetic invention’ but the government could ensure that the 
needed genetic service was accessible within the health care system at a reasonable 
price. 
The TRIPS Agreement allows compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. It 
provides for flexibility, including members’ rights to grant or determine the grounds 
for granting compulsory licences, and to define a condition of national emergency, or 
other circumstance of extreme emergency. The declaration also called for the TRIPs 
Council to address the problems that WTO members with restricted manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector may have, in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under TRIPs. 
B      Inventorship 
If the human sources of biological research materials wish to control the 
subsequent uses of their contributions, inventorship is a primary issue. If they were 
the inventors, or joint inventors, of the invention, they could issue licences to use it, 
even over the objections of other joint inventors. They could thereby defeat the ability 
of the other joint inventor to sue for patent infringement, or charge excessive licensing 
fees. In the Canavan case, if the contributors were joint inventors, they could have 
provided licences to the laboratories wishing to use the patented genetic test and, 
thereby, protect the laboratories from being sued for patent infringement.  
The first step in invention is conception, which is the intellectual component. 
It involves the formulation of a mental picture of the invention, which is sufficiently 
definite that another, adequately skilled person could understand the invention. It 
involves more than a general intention or research plan. Although the human source 
of the materials may have been vital to the research enterprise, invention does not 
relate to those who assist. The person who provides the genetic raw material fails to 
satisfy the requirement of novelty and would lack the requirement for the conception 
of the chemical components of the isolated genetic material. Thus, the scientists 
created the cell line based upon Moore’s cells, but the artificially created cell line was 
not a function of Moore’s own mental processes. Additionally, the patent did not 
claim Moore’s cells, because discoveries of naturally existing compounds would fail 
to meet the novelty requirement. Thus, a claim by Moore to have invented the cell 
line, or to have a patentable invention in his cells, would fail. Similarly, the families 
involved in the Canavan research could not claim inventorship of the patent, nor did 
they attempt to do so.68
C     Joint inventorship 
In light of present patent law, it is unlikely that the contributors of biological 
material have contributed sufficiently to be entitled to joint inventorship. In Brown v 
                                                 
67 T A Caulfield and others “Genetic Technologies, Health Care Policy and the Patent Bargain” (2003) 
63 Clin genet 15, 17. 
68 See the discussion in chapter 3. 
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Regents of the University of California,69 Brown claimed to be the co-discoverer of 
the feline FIV virus that was used to develop patented diagnostic methods for FIV. 
She claimed that her contribution was observing that her cats had symptoms similar to 
those in human AIDS and bringing them to researchers for study. The Court 
concluded that Brown “at most played a substantial role in the discovery of FIV”,70 
but discounted her role for patent purposes. The patents not only claim discovery of 
the FIV virus but claim “isolation and substantial purification of the virus, as well as 
methods for diagnosing the virus by detecting the presence of the virus itself….” 
Brown’s role in the patented product was minimal, and she had not contributed to the 
conception of the inventions covered by the patents.  
In Moore,71 Mosk J argued that the spirit of joint inventorship should apply to 
persons such as Moore, whether or not they fell literally within patent law.72 He 
suggested that “the joint invention provision guarantees that all who contribute in a 
substantial way to a product’s development benefit from the reward that the product 
brings.”73 Whilst accepting that the provider of the biological materials did not further 
the invention in any intellectual or conceptual sense, he stated: 74
What the patients did do, knowingly or unknowingly, is collaborate with the 
researchers by donating their body tissue. By providing the researchers with 
unique raw materials, without which the resulting product could not exist, the 
donors became necessary contributors to the product. 
Although reflecting a common public perception of the source’s role, this 
argument fails to take into account the necessity that joint inventors participate in the 
actual invention itself.  
D     Causation 
The people who provide the research materials could argue that they were the 
factor that lead to the patented invention, or that the inventor would not have been 
possible without their contribution. However, the counter to this argument is that the 
biological materials are not patented. That which is claimed under the patent is 
different from that which they contributed. 
VII     PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Patients and research subjects should have the right to determine whether or 
not their genes are patented and what uses are made of them. In the United States, the 
American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics requires that the consent of a patient 
be obtained before products developed from their genetic material can be 
commercialised.75 The European Parliament’s Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions states that if a patent application uses material of human 
origin, the source must have had the opportunity to give informed consent and so, has 
                                                 
69 Brown v Regents of the University of California (1994) 866 F Supp 439 (DN Cal). 
70 Brown v Regents of the University of California, above, 445. 
71 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120 (Cal Sup Ct). 
72 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 168–69. 
73 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 169. 
74 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above. 
75 American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Code of Medical Ethics: 
Current Opinions with Annotations (American Medical Association, Chicago, 2000) 25–26 
<http://www.ama-assn.org> (last accessed 12 February 2005). 
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the right to refuse to have genes patented.76 The Netherlands77 brought an action78 
seeking annulment of Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions.79 One of the grounds for the application was that the Directive breaches 
fundamental rights, by failing to provide for the free and informed consent of the 
donor of human biological material, prior to an application to patent inventions that 
have been developed from, or using, such material. Although the Directive requires 
patent examiners to satisfy themselves that proper informed consent was obtained, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that such requirements, although involving matters of 
fundamental right, do not fall within patent law, as rigorous scrutiny of informed 
consents within the patent system would be a burden for the system and inconvenient 
for researchers. 
The House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research stated that it is 
not good policy to introduce commercialisation upstream from the point at which the 
inventive research work takes place.80 The Committee reasoned:81
It has been suggested that those who donate an embryo for stem cell research 
might subsequently expect a share in any benefits accruing from commercial 
exploitation of research on stem cell lines derived from it. In our view it would be 
undesirable for legislation to permit such claims: any commercial benefits will 
have come about as a result of the research and subsequent development rather 
than any intrinsic quality of a particular embryo donated. However, it makes it 
even more important that potential donors should fully understand the implications 
if embryos they are donating may be used for the production of stem cell lines, and 
in particular that the material donated may be used for a purpose other than the 
immediate one. 
The Committee’s position implies that the gamete providers have an interest in 
the embryo.82 Additionally, it accepts that research will lead to commercial 
exploitation and, as in Moore,83 is concerned to ensure that the gamete sources do not 
profit from such commodification. The Committee recommended that the 
implications of stem cell line immortality should be made clear to donors and 
donations should be free of specific constraints, by the giving of blanket consents.84 A 
person cannot give informed consent to processes and uses not yet in existence, and 
perhaps not even within the contemplation of present researchers, so this amounts to 
uninformed consent, or an unconditional transfer of the property. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics suggests that the law has tended to be 
generous in granting patents relating to DNA sequences, because of the broad scope 
of many of the patents and the weak application of the criteria for inventiveness and 
                                                 
76  European Parliament Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Directive 
98/44/EC (European Parliament, Strasbourg, 1998) <http://www.europarl.eu.int> (last accessed 1 April 
2005). 
77 Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union case C-
377/98 [2000] ECR I-6229. 
78 under article 230EC (ex Article 173EC) 
79 European Parliament, above. 
80 Stem Cell Research HL Paper 83(i) (Report) and 83(ii) (Evidence) (HMSO, London, 2002). 
81 Stem Cell Research, above, para 8.32. 
82 See the discussion in chapter 4. 
83 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120 (Cal Sup Ct). 
84 Stem Cell Research, above, para 8.33. 
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utility.85 Similarly, Frankel and McLay note that IPONZ registers patents, even if 
registerability is in doubt, applying the rule that a patent application should only be 
refused if it could not be patentable on any reasonable interpretation of the law.86  
Gene patenting appears to legitimise ownership and control over something 
that was not created by the claimant–no work went into the construction of the gene 
itself, it was merely removed from the DNA matrix in which it naturally occurs. A 
successful patent of a DNA sequence provides broad protection on all uses of the 
DNA and sometimes the proteins that the DNA produces, because inventors are 
entitled to property rights, not only to the uses of the invention that they anticipated or 
predicted, but to any new uses that are developed. 
However, to state that the source of the biological materials has a property 
interest in the resulting patent may not entirely resolve the problems of biological 
patents. Only in very infrequent circumstances will a person have a unique biology, as 
did Moore, necessitating the acquisition of materials from a particular individual. In 
common complex genetic diseases, many people are likely to have the particular 
mutation. The researchers will not need to collect DNA from individual donors if they 
are able to access samples that are retained in biobanks. However, this thesis argues 
that such collections should not be available for unconsented research, at least with 
regard to future collection of samples.87  
A    Contribution approach 
Joint ownership of patents could be refined to include the sources of the 
biological materials. Ho suggests differing ownership interests, based on the amount 
of contribution. She states: 88
[I]f all contributors were provided partial ownership interests, rather than the 
current control provided to joint inventors, patients may have less control over the 
total outcome than under the traditional joint inventorship and ownership model. 
Nonetheless, a modified contribution standard may be a much more realistic 
option.  
Joint inventorship is a difficult threshold for sources to meet, but a 
contribution standard might be more easily satisfied. Partial ownership rights would 
not give total control to sources, but providing limited rights would begin to address 
some of the current problems of public distrust of science. 
B    Patent unenforceability 
Legislation should specify that, if a patent was obtained without the proper 
informed consent of the contributors, the patent, as a matter of equity, is 
unenforceable. Such a suggestion was mooted by Mosk J, when he stated that a patent 
is not a licence to defraud.89 However, most contributors are aware of their 
                                                 
85 Nuffield Council on Bioethics The Ethics of Patenting DNA (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, London, 
2002) <www.nuffieldbioethics.org> (last accessed 1 April 2004).  
86 S Frankel and G McLay Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 327. 
87 See the discussion in chapter 3 about rule 7(10) and the proposals in chapter 8. 
88 Cynthia Ho “Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry into the Proper Inventorship of 
Patient Based Discoveries” (2002) Hous J Health L & Pol’y 107, 159. 
89 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 168 (Cal Sup Ct). 
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involvement in the research but fail to understand the patent implications, as happened 
with the Canavan research. Unenforceability may be particularly justified where there 
has been an element of fraud in the obtaining of the research materials. 
C    The Shop Right Doctrine 
Pennisi suggests that the shop right doctrine may provide a solution.90 This 
doctrine provides that an employee who makes an invention on the employer’s time, 
using the employer’s resources, implicitly grants the employer a limited non-exclusive 
royalty-free licence to use, make and sell that invention, which continues for the entire 
term of the patent, even if the employee leaves the employment. The employee retains 
all other aspects of the patent’s right to exclude, including ownership, licensing, and 
the right to sue for infringement. This is not dependent on a pre-existing contract to 
this effect and the extent of the right is dependent on the degree of the employer’s 
contribution, in terms of labour and capital. 
Pennisi envisages that the doctor/researcher would assume the role of the 
employee, with the extent of the right limited by the degree of inventive effort 
required to transform the human source’s tissue into the invention, balanced against 
the rarity of the cells. The shortcomings of this model are that there is no analogue to 
the usage of an employer’s tools or physical plant, and the human source bears none 
of the financial risks of the inventive process. Even a limited shop right in a patented 
cell line is, potentially, a lucrative intellectual property holding. However, the human 
source is unlikely to have the ability or facilities to make and use the invention.  
The shop right doctrine was traditionally associated with inventions related to 
the employer’s business. So, unless it was accepted that a person’s desire to profit 
from bodily tissues is a business interest, a person in Moore’s position will be 
unlikely to be able to share in the profits, in the absence of a contract for limited rights 
in any inventions made at the pre-invention stage.  However, in the Canavan families’ 
situation, there was a nexus between their approach to the researcher and the actual 
inventive process.  
D    Contract 
An alternative construct to obtain rights for the contributors of genetic 
materials is to use the law of contract. Human sources could contract for partial 
assignment of ownership rights, even if they cannot successfully assert joint 
inventorship. Attempts by human sources to protect their position by way of 
contractual negotiations face difficulties, as the parties are not negotiating on an equal 
footing, and  sources have no way of realistically assessing the potential value of the 
materials.91 There have been suggestions that there should be a global bio-collecting 
organisation to integrate such efforts at negotiation and enhance bargaining power 
                                                 
90 Christopher S Pennisi “More on Moore: A Novel Strategy for Compensating the Human Sources of 
Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based on Existing Law” (2001) 11 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent 
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91 Contractual arrangements are expanded later in this chapter. 
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during contractual negotiations.92 The Convention on Biological Diversity promotes 
the sharing of research results, stating that member States should take: 93
[L]egislative, administrative or policy measures…with the aim of sharing in a fair 
and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising 
from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the 
Contracting Party providing such resources. 
 Similarly, the Human Genome Organisation has stated that researchers should share 
the benefits of their research with the research subjects who have assisted in the 
enterprise. 94
Some groups are particularly valuable, in that they may contribute unique 
genetic material. Researchers have sought out isolated populations because of their 
limited genetic diversity, in order to accelerate the process of research.95 For example, 
the discovery of the breast cancer gene BRCA-1 was achieved after a decade of 
sampling and testing Mormon families in Utah, who had genetic commonality and 
extensive genealogical records.  
Hanson argues that these concerns can be addressed by informed consent.96 
However, the Canavan situation suggests that greater controls are necessary to protect 
the interests of groups providing materials for research.97 Human sources are 
generally unaware of the potential for commercial gain and, even if they are aware, 
they are usually unsuccessful in obtaining a share of the benefits. If they contribute 
genetic material for altruistic reasons, such as accelerating the discovery of a 
diagnostic test, treatment, or cure, and a patent is subsequently obtained, they may be 
precluded from accessing the results of their contributions. This is because a patent 
owner has the right to prevent others from encroaching on the patented invention and 
may charge high prices for access to products or tests. 
As was considered in chapter 3, the patient-based group, PXE International, 
set up a bank of biological material and requires any researchers wishing to access 
that resource to agree, before accessing the material, to share any resulting patent 
rights. However, it is likely that this is an exceptional situation that is only likely to 
arise where there is an organised group for individual contributors to join, and 
sufficient numbers of similarly afflicted individuals to negotiate together.  
In a contract system, physicians would be required to inform a patient about 
the potential value of cells or tissues, in addition to the risks and benefits of removing 
the materials for health treatment. They might be required to advise patients to seek 
legal advice or register their interests with the Authority, before consenting to the use 
of the tissue.  
                                                 
92 Peter Drahos “Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-
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Contractual negotiations could be burdensome for individuals and discourage 
contribution by people who might otherwise have been prepared to be involved in 
research. Most individual contributors would not recognise the potential value of their 
biological specimens. If they need medical treatment, they are more likely to be 
focussed on their condition, and would be unlikely to refuse treatment, even if they 
were fully informed about potential future research use of their tissues. Negotiations 
with individual contributors may have a deleterious effect on research, because it 
would add to the existing complexity arising from the need to negotiate numerous 
patent rights before research is able to proceed. However, legislation could provide a 
formula for compensation of contributors, to avoid the need for individual 
negotiations. The Authority could oversee the negotiation of group compensation.98
VIII    GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is an additional complicating factor when reforming patent law. 
The rapid dissemination of scientific knowledge and the international nature of the 
biotechnology industry suggest that the world community should co-ordinate 
regulatory policy, to minimise forum shopping and enable a rapid response to ethical 
and legal concerns. New Zealand is a net importer of technology, with most New 
Zealand patents being granted to non-residents.99  
Most of the benefits of New Zealand patents flow overseas, or the benefits 
occur even if there were no patent system, because the overseas patent holders would 
apply for patents overseas and details of the inventions would be published by 
overseas patent offices. This suggests that the criteria should be as strict as possible. 
However New Zealand needs to provide adequate levels of patent protection to ensure 
that overseas inventions are able to be exploited here. As stated by Thurow: 100
The knowledge-based economy is fundamentally transforming the role of the 
nation-state. Instead of being a controller of economic events within its borders, 
the nation-state is increasingly having to become a platform builder to attract 
global economic activity to locate within its borders. 
New Zealand is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO), which is working on a Substantive Patent Law Treaty. The aim is to 
harmonise substantive international patent law, dealing with such things as threshold 
tests for patentability. The problems of international harmonisation are formidable, in 
light of differing cultural and socio-political positions about matters such as the 
concept of human dignity and the value, role, and impact of gene patents. 
Additionally, existing international trade agreements, such as TRIPs, have the 
potential to create trade barriers for those seeking to unilaterally alter established 
patent rules.  
Intellectual property is closely tied to the broader political goal of economic 
development and restrictions may prove unattractive, both politically and within 
                                                 
98 See the discussion in chapter 8. 
99 Ministry of Economic Development Review of the Patents Act 1953Stage 3: Boundaries to 
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industry. The most influential factor is the United States’ strong pro-patent policy, as 
much of the biotechnology industry is located there.101
Caulfield suggests that countries with modest economic influence can either 
move forward with patent reform, such as compulsory licensing, and accept the 
backlash from the global economy, or make minor revisions within existing patent 
rules, with little effect on commercialisation, such as applying the utility requirement 
more stringently.102 Alternatively, they can “work with the world community with a 
goal of developing an international patent policy that is more sensitive to the needs of 
public health care goals.”103
IX    CONCLUSIONS 
The present patent system impedes research, as patents that are overly broad 
may lead to excessive licensing requests. A genetic material patent only needs to 
identify one utility, to obtain a patent over the gene itself. The patent holder will then 
hold a broad patent that would cover any subsequent use of that gene for a period of 
20 years. This allows the patent holder to have rights over any subsequent research, or 
use, of the patented genetic material.  
Whatever ethical stance is taken to the patenting of life, many patents have 
been granted and the effects cannot readily be undone. More stringent application of 
the criteria for granting a patent may partially address concerns around the patenting 
of genetic material. However, they do not resolve the need to protect the position of 
the sources of the biological material, or the potential for cultural offence. 
Consultation is valuable, but it is of limited effectiveness, as it does not necessitate 
acceptance of the views expressed.104 There is a tension between the altruism required 
of sources and the patent system, which permits companies to enforce lucrative 
property claims over the outcomes from that research.  
Moore105 demonstrates the inadequate protection of research subjects in the 
world of rapidly developing biotechnology. Although the Court was prepared to 
expand the law of informed consent, it did not resolve the issue of rights in inventions 
based on a person’s tissue. Greenberg106 shows that informed consent is not a 
solution if the donor of the material is not receiving medical treatment, or if a patient 
gives consent to the collection of the research materials, without appreciation of the 
commercial potential.  
Human sources should be able to control, and profit from, patents based on 
their DNA. The refusal to grant such rights undervalues their contributions to the 
inventive process. The effect is likely to be a loss of trust and a reluctance to be 
involved in research. The recognition that human sources have property rights in 
                                                 
101 Timothy Caulfield “Gene Patents, Human Clones, and Biotechnology Policy: The Challenges 
Created by Globalization” (2003) 41 Alberta L Rev 713, 719.  Of the human gene patents filed between 
1996 and 1999, 62 per cent were filed by organisations in the United States, 20 per cent in the 
European Union, and 10 per cent in Japan. 
102 Caulfield, above, 720. 
103 Caulfield, above, 720. 
104 See the discussion relating to consultation with Māori in chapter 5 and consultation by national 
ethics committees in chapter 8. 
105 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 168 (Cal Sup Ct). 
106 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others (2003) 264 F Supp 2d 1064, 
1070 (SD Fla). 
 205
excised tissue could increase the costs of biological research, by expanding the 
administrative costs, and the costs of compensation. However, that, in itself, does not 
justify the exploitation of human sources, by denying any rights in the tissue once a 
so-called “informed” consent has been given.  
If the sources’ property interests in their excised tissue were recognised, 
contractual arrangements could grant compensation in proportion to their contribution 
to the invention. Individuals could choose whether to negotiate on their own behalf, 
through a patient group or through the Human Tissue Authority.  
Groups in the position of the Canavan families would gain the power to 
control the licensing of genetic tests, to ensure that tests are freely available. If the 
property was patented without consent, conversion claims would arise and the patent 
would be unenforceable. As stated by Dickenson: “The problem lies not with erecting 
fences, but with whom they enclose: not those with power, but those without.”107
 
                                                 
107 Donna Dickenson “Commodification of Human Tissue: Implications for Feminist and Development 
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Chapter 8 
 
FRAMEWORK 
 
“Every public action which is not customary either is wrong or, if it is right, it is a 
dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever be done for the first 
time.”1
 
  I  INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis proposes a legislative framework for the retention and use of body 
parts. Such regulation, in the form of prescriptive rules, is the most common response 
to a policy problem and the state has interests in this area if there are demonstrable 
harms or negative impacts on society or regulation is necessary to ensure high 
standards of treatment. As technology is moving faster than the development of 
societal views and public policy, policy gaps are constantly arising. Consequently, it 
is difficult for the law to provide a framework for principled decision making with 
respect to complex biotechnological and medical issues.  
 
The effect of scientific development has been to present the achievable as the 
acceptable, and so changes to natural processes, such as reproductive technologies, 
have been normalised. Debates over new developments tend to arise only after reports 
of their invention; consequently, the law is always attempting to catch up with 
technologies that are already in existence. There are differing views as to how the law 
should respond to these challenges. One view is that regulation of genetic technology 
is an oxymoron, because technology is out of control.2 However, this thesis suggests 
the law can develop in a coherent manner if a property interest in body parts is the 
conceptual basis of the law combined with autonomy, informed consent and privacy.  
 
Science is not easily presented to the public through the readily available fora, 
such as the media. The House of Lords observed that “society’s relationship with 
science is in a critical phase.”3 It noted that, although issues involving science are in 
the forefront of public attention, such interest is offset by “public unease, mistrust and 
occasional outright hostility.”4 This thesis has argued that such views are exacerbated 
by concerns about commercialisation of biotechnology. 
 
Consequently, issues relating to biotechnology should be the subject of wide 
ethical debate, as they are often highly significant to an individual’s world view and 
the decisions made have the potential to significantly affect future human progress. In 
recognition of this necessity, following the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification, the New Zealand government established the 
Bioethics Council.5  
                                                 
1 F M Cornford Microcosmographica Academica, (Bowes and Bowes, Cambridge, 1908) as referred to 
in Stafford Beer Decision and Control (Wiley, London, 1966) 33.  
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4 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, above. 
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Such matters can also be debated by way of the legislative processes, and 
through the decisions of the courts. Hon Michael Kirby, when referring to intellectual 
property and the genome stated:6  
 
It is essential to realise that, in these fields, not to do anything is effectively to 
make a decision. It is to accept that science and technology ma[y] take our 
societies where they will. 
 
He considered that such matters should not be left to the courts as it is preferable that 
Parliament should devise broad guidelines for policy. However, if legislation is not 
passed, the judiciary will “fill the legal gap by analogical reasoning from earlier broad 
principles of the common law.”7 The modern trend favours legislation incorporating 
broad principles, in which much decision making is delegated to ethics committees. 
Kirby supports such delegation, explaining:8
 
Keeping the law in a good state in a world of so many complex problems is a 
major challenge for global and national institutions. Indeed, it is a major challenge 
to democracy. The likely institutional solution, as it seems to me, will be the 
delegation of law-making detail to expert bodies, acting in conformity with very 
broad guidelines endorsed by Parliament.  
 
 Although prescriptive legislation is unsuitable in this area, because it would 
require frequent amendment, the need for flexibility must be balanced against 
arguments that public policy should not be established by unelected groups, such as 
ethics committees. As ethics committees are often constituted pursuant to legislation, 
it could be argued that this is a democratic process, but legislation should set the 
parameters within which such committees operate and the issues they should consider, 
in addition to the methods of selection of committee members.9  
 
This chapter suggests a legislative framework in light of the defects in the 
present human tissue legislation discussed in chapter 2. It argues that the approach 
suggested is preferable to that proposed in the Human Tissue Bill (HTB), because it 
provides a conceptually coherent approach to the collection and use of body parts, 
enables remedies if the parts are misappropriated and allows source to negotiate a 
share in profits from inventions utilising their body parts.10 This chapter includes 
selected draft sections incorporating the property construct.11 It identifies the nature 
of the property interest and its application to deceased persons and excised parts of 
living persons, including living organ donation, and concludes that a Human Tissue 
Authority would be necessary to oversee the legislation and produce guidelines. 
II PROPERTY INTEREST   
                                                                                                                                            
dialogue on cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects of biotechnology, and enable public participation in 
the Council’s activities and provide information on the cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects of 
biotechnology. <http://www.bioethics.org.nz> (last accessed 21 September 2006). 
6 Michael Kirby “Genomics and Democracy- A Global Challenge” (2003) 31 WALR 1, 1. 
7 Kirby, above, 18. 
8 Kirby, above, 18. 
9 As in the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, ss37—41.These sections provide a 
structure for the Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology when developing 
guidelines.  
10 The Human Tissue Bill is discussed in chapter 2. 
11 This chapter does not contain an entire statute- only selected sections for demonstrative purposes.   
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 This thesis proposes that cadavers and body parts excised from living persons 
are property. Property in the cadaver arises at death and passes to the representative of 
the deceased person. The legislation, like the HTB, would exempt embryos and 
gametes, as they fall within the HART Act. The HTB generally excludes cell lines 
and the UKHTA also exempts hair and nails from the body of a living person, 
presumably because these are commonly discarded. Sources commonly abandon other 
bodily products, such as urine or tissue removed during surgery, in which case a 
person who obtains possession may acquire property rights. However, such products 
should fall within the proposed framework as they may be valuable for research.12 
Accordingly, the interpretation section would include: 
 (1)  In this Act, except as provided in subsection (2) “material from a human 
body” means material, which consists of or includes human cells. 
(2)  In this Act, references to material from a human body do not include 
embryos or gametes outside the human body.  
(3)  In this Act references to material from the human body are to material 
separated from a person’s body whether the person was alive or dead at the time of 
separation. 
(4)  “Embryo” and “gamete” have the same meaning as in section 5 of the 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004.  
(5)  Except as provided for in this Act,  
 
(a)      material from a human body has the status of property 
(b)      the body of a dead person has the status of property 
III    NON-THERAPEUTIC USE OF TISSUE 
A  Living Sources 
 
The Code states that consumers must be informed of any proposed 
participation in teaching or research, including being informed whether the research 
requires and has received ethical approval.13 It also requires that consent to participate 
in research, as part of a health care procedure, must be informed consent, and must be 
given in writing.14 However, Right 7(10) permits unconsented research use, utilising 
samples that are not necessarily anonymised, with ethics committee approval.15
 
 Parry suggests that tissue samples could be regarded as abandoned by the 
patient, thus res nullius and available for any legitimate purpose such as research.16 If 
generic consent is not sufficient to permit the future use of surplus tissue for research, 
then further consent to each use would be required.17 Parry argues that this would be 
                                                 
12 As was John Moore’s diseased spleen. See chapter 3. Also note the cultural significance of such 
materials to Māori- see chapter 5. 
13 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, Right 6 (1)(d).  
14 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, Right 7(6). 
15 Discussed in chapter 3. 
16 Bronwyn Parry “From Bodies to Technological Artefacts: To What Does the New Human Tissue Bill 
apply? Categorization issues and their Implications” (Draft Paper prepared for Human Tissue 
Conference, 2004) <http://cgkp.org.uk> (last accessed 14 May 2004). 
17 The Ministry of Health favours individuals being able to consent to their tissues being used for future 
unspecified research so long as that consent is distinct from the consent to collect the sample and any 
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undesirable, as such consent “would be extraordinarily time consuming and expensive 
to obtain, have a profoundly constraining effect on research and be very trying, if not 
also distressing for donors.”18  
During the debates about the UKHTA, doctors argued that it would be 
impossible to take and record consents19 and that specific consent is unnecessary, as 
most patients are happy to have tissue used for research and teaching.20 However, if 
consent is easily acquired, requiring it would not impede research and would respect 
the rights of those who object. Alternatively, to record and respect the small number 
of dissents, rather than consents, may be a less cumbersome alternative. 
Despite this willingness, it appears that attitudes to tissue samples are 
changing, as awareness of the information that might be obtained from them 
increases. This is demonstrated by the numbers of people requesting the return of the 
“Guthrie test” samples.21 If a generic consent at the time of excision is sufficient to 
permit any future uses, this is likely to result in a consent form with another box to 
“tick” by patients. They may have little knowledge of potential uses, some of which 
might be offensive to them. Although blanket consent is not inconsistent with the 
property construct, sources should be informed before making this choice, which 
involves more than just deciding “yes” or “no”. If samples are to be used without 
consent, they should be anonymised. Consequently, Right 7(10) should be amended to 
read as follows: 22  
10) No body part or bodily substance removed or obtained in the course of a health 
care procedure may be stored, preserved, or used otherwise than 
(a) with the informed consent of the consumer; or 
(b) For the purposes of research that has received the approval of an ethics 
committee and is carried out in circumstances such that the person carrying it out is 
not in possession, and not likely to come into possession, of information from which 
the person from whose body the material has come can be identified; or 
(c) For the purposes of 1 or more of the following activities, being activities that are 
each undertaken to assure or improve the quality of services: 
(i) a professionally recognised quality assurance programme: 
(ii) an external audit of services: 
                                                                                                                                            
consent for use in specified research. Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for 
Future Unspecified Research Purposes: Discussion document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006) 
para 6.1. 
18 Parry, above, para 7. 
 19 The NHS processes almost 150 million tissue specimens from living patients each year. One study 
found that 99 per cent of 3,000 patients gave consent for their tissue to be used for research. Kirsty Scott 
“The Tissue Issue” (29 April 2004) The Guardian London <http://www.guardian.co.uk/life> (last 
accessed 14 June 2004). 
20 Scott, above. 
21 As discussed in chapter 3. 
22 The amendment is shown in bold. 
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(iii) an external evaluation of services 
1    Incompetent adults 
 The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 provides a protective 
framework for incompetent adults.23 If excised body parts are the property of the 
source, this would widen the protection available to persons who wholly or partly lack 
the ability to manage their property affairs.24 If the source had not created an enduring 
power of attorney prior to incompetence arising, the Court would appoint a property 
manager, whose role is governed by the Court order. The property does not vest in the 
manager, but the manager is entitled to possession of it and can make appropriate 
decisions in accordance with the terms of the order.25 
The Code provides that if the consumer is not competent to give consent and 
there is no one else entitled to make the choice on the consumer’s behalf, Rights 7(4) 
and 9 apply so that:  
• The provider may collect and use tissue where it is in the best interests of the 
consumer; and 
• Reasonable steps must be taken to ascertain the views of the consumer; and 
• If the consumer’s views have been ascertained, the provider must assess 
whether the provision of services is inconsistent with the informed choice the 
consumer would make if competent; or 
• If it is not possible to ascertain the views of the consumer, the provider must 
take into account the views of other suitable persons who are interested in the 
welfare of the consumer and who are available to provide such advice. 
The Code is based on the concept that consumers have the right to complain, 
but it is unlikely that many complaints would be received from persons with reduced 
capacity. Decisions that are not for the medical benefit of the incompetent person, 
such as involvement in non-therapeutic research, or organ donation, should continue 
to be made by the court or by the Authority, especially if family members, or other 
“suitable” persons, have conflicts of interests.26 The present emphasis on only giving 
approval to such procedures in exceptional circumstances should remain, to avoid 
results such as that in Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant).27
Consequently, the use of the body parts of living incompetent adults should 
continue to fall within the Code and the Protection of Personal and Property Rights 
Act 1988. Living organ donation should be overseen by the Family Court or the 
                                                 
23 This Act is proposed to be amended by the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Amendment 
Bill. See chapter 6 for consideration of the roles of the welfare guardian and the property manager. 
24 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 25. 
25 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, ss 35(2) and 36. Re Smith [1927] GLR 274, 
where Skerrett CJ said that “the management of the patient’s affairs and the administration of his 
property is undertaken by the Public Trustee in the interests of the patient and not for the benefit of his 
creditors, his presumptive next of kin, or his heirs. The primary consideration must always be the 
interests of the patient, and care must be taken to ensure that that he will be provided in his helpless 
condition with sufficient maintenance”.
26 See the suggested functions of the Human Tissue Authority later in this chapter. 
27 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1996] 2 FLR 787; [1997] 2 WLR 556 (Fam D) 
Connell J. This case is discussed in chapter 6. 
 211
Authority. The property interest in the cadaver of an incompetent adult would pass to 
the person highest on the priority list, unless the incompetent person had appointed a 
representative prior to the incompetence arising.28
2    Children and consent 
Under the proposed framework, parents or guardians would be the 
representatives for incompetent children. Gillick competent children could give 
consent and appoint representatives, or else the priority list would apply.  
(1)  Subject to subsection (2), if the child concerned is alive and is competent to 
give consent “appropriate consent” means the child’s consent. 
(2)  Where- 
(a)    the child concerned is alive, and 
(b)  either the child is not competent to deal with the issue of consent in 
relation to the activity or  though competent to deal with that issue fails to do 
so, “appropriate consent” means the consent of a parent or guardian of the 
child 
(3)  Where-  
(a) the child concerned has died, and  
(b)  prior to death the child was competent to give consent 
 "appropriate consent" means the child’s consent in writing which was in force 
prior to the death of the child.  
( 4)  Consent in writing for the purposes of subsection (3) is only valid if- 
(a)  it was signed by the child concerned in the presence of at least one 
 witness who attested the signature, or 
(b)  it was signed at the direction of the child concerned, in the child’s 
 presence and in the presence of at least one witness who attested the 
 signature. 
(5)  Where the child concerned has died and immediately prior to death either 
the child was not competent to deal with the issue of consent in relation to the 
activity or  though competent to deal with that issue failed to do so, 
“appropriate consent” means  
(i)  the consent of a parent or guardian of the child, or 
                                                 
28 See the jurisdiction of the Human Tissue Authority later in this chapter.  
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 (ii)  the consent a person of the highest priority in the priority list. 
  
 
(6)  Consent may be revoked at any time prior to death by the same means as 
 the consent may be given. 
 
If parents or guardians consent to the use of living children’s tissues for either 
specified or unspecified future research,29 it is unclear whether the children may 
withdraw that consent once they are competent. The Operational Standard affirms the 
right to withdraw consent.30 The Ministry of Health states that this, together with the 
Code’s emphasis on consent, results in an expectation that those whose tissues were 
donated for research purposes should have the right to withdraw that consent, once 
competent.31
 
 If the child can withdraw, there are the following consequences: 
•  Tissues could not be absolutely anonymised until the child reached  
  competence and gave consent, or had died. The tissues could not be included 
  in studies necessitating anonymised or de-linked samples; 
•  Processes would be needed to ensure the child was aware of the need to give 
  or withdraw consent, or to ensure that the institution approached the child for 
  re-consent;32  
•  Researchers could be excluded from international collaborations in which  
  samples are sent overseas. 
 
 If the child cannot withdraw once competent, the proxy consent would remain 
in force indefinitely.  
 
 The welfare and best interests of the child are the first and paramount 
consideration in proceedings relating to the administration of property belonging to a 
child.33 Consequently, if the research relates to a condition affecting the child and 
could lead to a treatment, it is reasonable to permit parents or guardians to consent to 
future unspecified research use of an incompetent child’s tissues, without a need for 
the child to re-consent once competent. However, if the research has no potential 
benefit for the particular child, the ethics committee must weigh the welfare of the 
child against the public good.  
 
 The Operational Standard provides that an ethics committee may permit 
research without consent where it is not practicable to seek consent from an individual 
and a potential public good can be weighed against the right of an individual to give 
                                                 
29 See the discussion of the Canavan children and PXE International in chapter 3. 
30  Ministry of Health Operational Standard for Ethics Committees (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 
2002) para 29. 
31 Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research 
Purposes: Discussion document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006) para 4.6. 
32 If the institution were required to re-contact the child it would need current contact information. 
33 Care of Children Act 2004, s 14 (1).  
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consent.34 The Human Tissue Authority should oversee practices and formulate 
guidelines with respect to incompetent children.35
B    Powers to Dispense with the Need for Consent  
1  Public interest 
There are limited circumstances in which the public interest might outweigh 
the individual’s property interest and unconsented use would be justifiable without 
anonymisation. Such provisions are not incompatible with the framework, as 
compulsory acquisition of private property in the public interest occurs in other 
contexts.36 In exceptional cases, such as where a person has died of a new virus and a 
representative cannot be found to give consent to take tissue for testing, approval by 
the Authority would be required.  
 
(1) Where no refusal of consent has been made by the source prior to death and  
no representative can be found to give consent, the Human Tissue Authority may 
determine that appropriate consent exists for an activity consisting of-  
 
(a) the storage of the body of a deceased person for the purpose of 
 research in connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the human 
 body, 
 (b) the use of the body of a deceased person for that purpose, 
(c) the removal from the body of a deceased person, for use for that purpose, 
 of any relevant material of which the body consists or which it contains, 
(d) the storage for that purpose of any relevant material which has 
 come from a human body,  
(e) the use for that purpose of any relevant material which has come from a 
 human body. 
 
2 Third parties 
 
On occasion, a source may be untraceable, but not known to be dead or 
incompetent and use of their stored material is necessary to obtain scientific or 
medical information in the interests of another person. This might arise if analysis of a 
sample is necessary to treat a relative, but no prior decision had been made by the 
untraceable source. The Authority should be able to give the required consent, on the 
basis either that the human source has abandoned the sample, or that the public 
interest justifies such a power.  
 
(1)  If the Human Tissue Authority is satisfied: 
 
(a)  that relevant material has come from the body of a living person 
(“the  source”), and 
(b)  it is not reasonably possible to trace the source, and 
                                                 
34 Ministry of Health Operational Standard for Ethics Committees (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 
2002) para 35. 
35 See the jurisdiction of the Authority, below. 
36 Such as under the Public Works Act 1981. 
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(c)  it is desirable in the interests of another person (including a future 
 person) that the material be used for the purpose of obtaining scientific  or 
 medical information about the source, and 
(d)  there is no reason to believe- 
 (i) that the source has died, 
 (ii) that the source has refused to consent to the use of the material 
  for that purpose, or 
 (iii) that the source lacks capacity to consent to the use of the  
  material for that purpose, 
 
it may direct that subsection (2) apply to the material for the benefit of the 
 other person. 
 
(2) Where material is the subject of a direction under subsection (1) the 
source’s consent is deemed for the use of the material for the purpose of obtaining 
scientific or medical information about the source  which  may be relevant to the 
person for whose benefit the direction is given. 
 
C Research Use of Existing Holdings 
 Researchers argue that to require informed consent for new research utilising 
previously collected samples will usually make the research unfeasible and would 
lessen the scientific quality of large databases. However, abandoning the consent 
requirement would violate the subject’s interest in controlling medical records and 
tissues. As Greely states: “One can imagine an unconsenting subject of such research 
exploding with: “It’s my blood, damn it. How can they use it without my 
permission?”37
One argument for unconsented research on extant samples is the notion of 
community consent. If the community is well-informed and polls indicate wide-
spread support for research, then it is fair to presume consent, with ethics committee 
approval providing adequate controls. This is a dubious argument in light of the 
frequent lack of scientific knowledge and the limitations of polls as a form of public 
engagement. If most people approve of the research use of their samples, then 
unconsented use is not justified, as consent should be readily available. In light of the 
wide and increasing variety of potential uses for such material and the potential 
commercial ramifications, it is inadequate to delegate the decision-making solely to 
ethics committees.38 In particular, once the material becomes a commodity, exploited 
by a private corporation for commercial profit, the context differs substantially from 
traditional healthcare research. 
As was discussed with respect to the “Guthrie” samples,39 use of samples 
without consent risks the integrity of screening programmes. To ensure minimum 
intrusion into personal interests and autonomy, consent should be sought if the 
                                                 
37 Henry T Greely “Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen 
Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information” (1999) 34 Wake Forest L Rev 737, 
758. 
38 As in Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, Right 7(10). 
39 Discussed in chapter 3. 
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sources or representatives are able to be traced, as the human source, personal 
representative of a deceased source or family members may have ongoing interests in 
the uses of samples, including cultural concerns.40
Only samples collected many years ago, where there is no potential harm to 
sources and the research is not sensitive, might justifiably be used for public health 
research without consent. The samples should be anonymised and ethics committee 
approval obtained. This could be justified on the basis that the source’s failure to 
request the return of the samples amounts to abandonment of them, or that this is a 
situation where public policy overrides the property interest of the human source. 
Existing holdings 
(1)  In this section, “existing holding” means: 
(a)  the body of a deceased person, or 
(b)  relevant material which has come from a human body, 
held, immediately before the day on which this section comes into force.  
(2)  No existing holding may be stored, preserved, or used otherwise than: 
 (a) with the informed consent of the source or the representative of a dead 
 source; or 
 (b) If the Human Tissue Authority is satisfied that it is not reasonably 
practicable to trace the source or the source’s representative it may direct 
that the source’s consent is deemed for the purposes of research in 
connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the human body that has 
received the approval of an ethics committee and is carried out in 
circumstances such that the person carrying it out is not in possession, and 
not likely to come into possession, of information from which the person 
from whose body the material has come can be identified.  
D    Future Unspecified Research 
 
The term “biobank” refers to collections of various kinds of genetic samples 
and health information, such as the heel prick sample collection.41 Recently, 
biobanks have been established for use in prospective research, based on informed 
consent being given by the sources for broadly defined future research purposes.42  
 
Greely proposes a framework for the collection of research materials for 
future unspecified research, requiring “permission” for research use, arguing that it is 
not possible to give informed consent to future, as yet unknown, research purposes as 
it is not possible to be fully informed.43 He also suggests extra protections, 
                                                 
40 Discussed in chapter 5. 
41 See the discussion in chapter 3. 
42 Such as the UK Biobank. 
43 Greely, above, 764. 
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implemented through additional disclosures, or through ethics committee 
considerations, in an effort to compensate for the research subject’s own inability to 
impose conditions, or to refuse to participate after the initial permission. The result is 
a compromise. Some data and samples will not be available for research, because the 
source refuses to grant unrestricted research permission. However, some will be used 
for research under such a general permission, although the sources may have refused 
consent if they were aware of the actual research proposal.44
 
This thesis argues that sources should be able to authorise the use of their 
tissues for future unspecified research, so long as they intend to unconditionally 
transfer their interests in the material to the biobank. A person can agree to transfer a 
property interest absolutely, without any knowledge or control of the future use of 
the item.  
 
However, in most cases where biological samples are provided for medical 
tests, there is no agreement to retention after the primary purpose is completed or to 
transfer ownership to a biobank. The samples are held akin to a bailment or trust, 
with the holder only having the right to use them for the agreed testing or screening. 
Consequently, before providing samples, human sources must decide whether they 
are agreeing to future secondary use of them. If so, is the agreement unconditional, 
or subject to conditions?  
 
Sources should be advised of the potential for samples to be used for future, 
as yet undetermined research, and, if they refuse consent to research use, have that 
refusal recorded and respected. Commercial interests and options concerning re-
contact should be disclosed and agreement reached. An example where re-contact 
would be relevant is if the research discovered clinically significant information 
about the source. Sources might wish to limit the types of research, or exclude 
certain types of research. There might be a time limit on the use of the materials, as 
many people would be concerned about their body parts being used indefinitely for, 
as yet unimagined, purposes or the infinite replication of cell lines. The agreement 
would determine the ultimate disposition of the samples, such as destruction, return 
to the source, or agreement for ongoing use, either with or without conditions.  
 
In order to avoid situations such as in Catalona,45 the ownership of the 
samples must be explicitly agreed, together with any rights to withdraw from the 
research. Unless the samples are unconditionally transferred, sources should be able 
to withdraw their biological material from the research database at any time. This is 
required pursuant to the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights, which states that consent for scientific research should include the modalities 
for withdrawal of consent and that the consent may be withdrawn at any time and for 
any reason, without disadvantage or prejudice. Some exceptions are permitted, but 
the general thrust is that, despite the potential logistical difficulties, consent may be 
withdrawn.46  
                                                 
44 This is similar to the proposals of the Ministry of Health, although they refer to “consent” rather than 
“permission”.  Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified 
Research Purposes: Discussion document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006) para 6.1. 
45 Washington University v Catalona (2006) US Dist LEXIS 22969 Limbaugh J. See the discussion in 
chapter 3. 
46 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights Paris 24 June 2005, Article 6 (b). 
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Ethics committees would still need to consider research proposals, to ensure 
they provide for appropriate information and choices to be given to the sources. 
Additionally, they have a role to ensure that the research as a whole is ethical, as 
research potentially affects the wider community and it may be sensitive because of 
its nature, or because of its impact on particular groups. 
 Although such proposals might be criticised in light of the record keeping 
required, they are generally in line with international trends.47 In New Zealand, 
guidelines are proposed to deal with consent for the retention of human tissue in 
biobanks for use in future unspecified research.48 They propose that individuals be 
able to consent to their tissues being used for future unspecified research and that 
consent forms should allow the imposition of restrictions and conditions.49  
 
E    Anonymisation 
 
Anonymisation of data is commonly considered to be sufficient protection of 
the interests and rights of the sources of the tissue, as they cannot be harmed by 
information or samples that cannot be linked to them. 
 
Greely states 50
 
Anonymity is not such a panacea, however. For one thing, as the stored tissue 
samples controversy shows, the term is ambiguous. Are data or samples 
anonymous if the researcher’s copy contains no identifying information, even if a 
key to identities exists somewhere? Are data or samples anonymous if the only key 
is buried in computer software and not easily accessible to any human? Are data or 
samples anonymous only if no possible link can be made between them and the 
identity of their source?    
 
The information itself can be identifying, as computerised databases can link 
information. Researchers could restrict the amount of data accessed, but every 
characteristic omitted from the database is one more factor, or confounding variable, 
that cannot be analysed.  
 
Absolute anonymity may not necessarily protect the donor’s interests, as 
people may be offended on ideological or religious grounds if their records or tissue 
samples are used for some types of research, even if completely anonymised. The 
                                                 
47 Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences and World Health Organization The 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects ( CIOMS, 
Geneva, 2002) Commentary on Guideline 4: Waiver of the consent requirement; National Health 
Medical Research Council, Australian Research Council and Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee 
Draft of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research: Second consultation draft 
(2006) <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au> (last accessed 14 May 2006); Medical Research Council 
Operational and Ethical Guidelines: Human Tissue and Biological Samples for Use in Research  
Clarification Following Passage of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (MRC, London, 2005) para 4.4;  
National Bioethics Advisory Commission Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human 
Participants (National Advisory Commission, Maryland, 2001) Recommendation 8. 
48 Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research 
Purposes: Discussion Document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006). 
49 Ministry of Health, above, section 6. 
50 Henry T Greely “Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen 
Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information” (1999) 34 Wake Forest L Rev 737, 
759. 
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harm arises from the use, not from knowledge of the use, or identification of the 
source.51
 
If absolute anonymity exists, no additional information can be linked to the 
samples, beyond that available at the time of unlinking. If it is later discovered that 
additional information is essential to interpret the data or the samples, they become 
useless. If the required additional information relates to matters specific to the human 
source, such as response to treatment, adverse reaction, cure, or death, it is not 
possible to seek consent to link the data to the patient’s existing records or samples. 
Additionally, if analysis of unlinked data or samples results in information of great 
importance to the health status of the human source, that information cannot be 
communicated to the person.  
 
However, despite these issues, this thesis proposes that if samples are used 
for unconsented research, anonymisation should be required, as it reduces the risk of 
harm to the source.52
 
IV DEAD  BODIES 
  
  This section outlines the proposals for both therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
use of cadavers. It argues that the suggested framework id preferable to that proposed 
in the Human Tissue Bill.53 It provides that the property interest in the body would 
arise at death, then pass to the representative. The issues to be covered in the 
legislation would include: 
 
A Appointment of Representative 
 
The role of the representative would be to carry out the wishes of the 
deceased, where these were known.54 Competent living persons could choose any 
person or persons to be their representative/s after their death. If two or more persons 
are appointed in relation to the same activity, they would act jointly and severally 
unless the appointment provides that they are appointed to act jointly. That person 
could be the same person as the executor in the donor’s will, or any other competent 
person. In light of the potentially distressing and contentious decisions to be made, the 
framework specifies a minimum age of 18 years for the representative.  
 
An appointment could be general or limited to consent in relation to one or 
more activities, as specified in the appointment. For example, the person may wish to 
limit the power to consent to organ donation only and not research use of the cadaver. 
 
The appointment could be made orally or in writing. An oral appointment 
would only be valid if made in the presence of two witnesses, not being the 
representative or a spouse of the representative. A written appointment would be 
required to be signed by the appointer in the presence of at least one witness who 
attests the signature or be contained in a will. An appointment of a representative 
                                                 
51 See the discussion of whakapapa in chapter 5. 
52 See the proposed amendment to Right 7(10) above. 
53 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
54 As contrasted with the Human Tissue Bill where there is no such requirement that the nominee 
follow the instructions of the deceased. See chapter 2. 
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could be revoked at any time prior to the death of the source and a person appointed 
as representative who did not wish to act could renounce the appointment.55
 
(1)  A competent person “the appointer” may appoint one or more persons to be 
the representative of the appointer in all dealings with the interests in the 
appointer’s  body or body parts after the appointer’s death including giving consent 
to any use of the body after death.  
 
(2)  An appointment under this section may be general or limited to consent in 
relation to one or more activities as may be specified in the appointment. 
 
(3)  An appointment under this section may be made orally or in writing. 
 
(4)  An oral appointment under this section is only valid if made in the presence 
of at least two witnesses present at the same time neither of whom may be the 
representative or a spouse or partner of the representative. 
 
(5)  A written appointment under this section is only valid if-  
 
(a)  it is signed by the appointer in the presence of at least one 
witness who attests the signature and who is not the representative or 
a spouse or partner of the representative; or 
(b)  it is signed at the direction of the appointer, in the presence 
of the appointer and in the presence of at least one witness who 
attests the signature and who is not the representative or a spouse or 
partner of the representative; or 
(c)  it is contained in a will of the appointer, being a will which is 
made in accordance with the requirements of section 9 of the Wills 
Act 1837. 
 
(6)  The appointer may revoke an appointment under this section at any time. 
 
(7)  Where an appointer appoints two or more representatives under this section 
in relation to the same activity, they are regarded as appointed to act jointly and 
severally unless the appointment provides that they are appointed to act jointly. 
 
(8)  Subsections (3) to (5) apply to the revocation of an appointment under this 
section  
 
(9)  A representative may renounce the appointment at any time after the death 
of the appointer. 
 
(10) A representative may not act under an appointment unless the representative 
is of or over the age of 18 years. 
 
B  Title 
 
                                                 
55 The recommended procedure would be that a copy of the appointment would be given to the 
proposed representative-see below. 
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At death, title to the cadaver will pass to the representative, who must put into 
effect the expressed wishes of the deceased.56  
 
(1)  Immediately upon the death of the appointer, all legal interests in the body 
of the appointer vest in the representative. 
  
(2)  The title of the representative relates back to and is deemed to have arisen 
immediately upon the death of the appointer. 
 
 
C Information to be Provided at the Time of Appointment 
 
Unlike the HTB, this framework considers that the wishes of the previously 
living person are of utmost importance, which necessitates that they have sufficient 
information about alternatives to make informed decisions. In addition to the general 
effect of the document, the source must be advised that the appointment may either be 
general, or limited to specified uses. The source should be given an opportunity to 
indicate any conditions on the type of use of the cadaver. It should be made clear 
whether the source intends to overrule the opinions of relatives or whether the 
document is merely an expression of lack of objection, with the final decision to be 
made by the representative either with or without consultation with family. This could 
be achieved by prescribing the form of appointment, incorporating the options.57 The 
form should recommend that a copy be given to the representative, a copy retained 
with the source’s papers58 and that the appointer discuss the appointment with the 
proposed representative. 
 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of this section, an appointment of a representative 
will be effective if the instrument that creates the power is in a form set out in 
Schedule 1 to this Act. 
 
(2)  An appointment of a representative has effect notwithstanding that it is in a 
form different from a form set out in Schedule 1 to this Act, if, but only if  the 
differences are immaterial. 
 
D Point at which Appointment is Effective 
 
The appointment will be effective at the point of death, which is an 
irreversible cessation of all of a person’s brain functions, assessed by ordinary 
standards of current medical practice.59 So long as the appointment was made as 
above it will be immediately effective, with no requirement to obtain authorisation, 
such as probate. 
 
E          Duties of Representative 
 
                                                 
56 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
57 Similar to the forms specified in Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, Schedule 3. 
58  See below for consideration of the establishment of a national register of appointments. 
59 See the discussion in chapter 4. Note that the Human Tissue Bill contains no definition of death, 
although clause 50 provides that the qualified person collecting tissue must be satisfied that life is 
extinct. 
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The representative would be required to carry out the wishes of the deceased 
relating to the use of the body or, in the absence of any expressed wishes, would have 
the power to make the decision. This should apply in the same manner to the whole 
body, parts of the body such as organs, or tissue samples. For the sake of consistency, 
the Administration Act 1969 should be amended to state that the representative is 
responsible for the ultimate disposition of the body, rather than the administrator of 
the estate and that the representative must comply with funeral directions in the will, 
so long as the estate has sufficient funds.  
 
F   Priority List 
 
The legislation should contain a priority list of persons who could act as 
representative, in the absence of an express appointment or if the representative was 
unavailable. The executor(s) named in the will60 or the administrator of an intestate 
estate should deal with all property of the deceased. However, as the delay in 
obtaining a grant of administration would limit the use of organs, the priority list 
would apply until the grant; thereafter the administrator would assume the ongoing 
role as representative. The hospital would be entitled to seek consent from the person 
appearing to be qualified under the list and would not be liable if acting in good faith. 
                                                                                                                                
 If there was more than one person of the same priority, the consent of any 
would be valid, even if other persons on the same priority level disagreed. The 
representative would be able to consent to any use of the cadaver.  
 
(1) The qualifying relationships for the purposes of this Act are ranked in the 
following order: 
(a) executor named in the will of the deceased; 
(b) administrator as defined in section 2(1) of the Administration Act 
1969. 
 
(2)  In the case of a person who died without having named an executor, 
qualifying relationships prior to a grant of administration in accordance with 
subsection (1)(b) shall be ranked in the following order:  
(a)  spouse; 
(b)  parent or guardian; 
(c)         child; 
(d)   sibling; 
(e)   grandparent; 
(f)         grandchild; 
(g)  niece or nephew; 
(h)   step parent; 
(i)  half-sibling; 
(j)   friend of longstanding. 
 
(3)  A person on the priority list may not act as representative unless that person 
is of or over the age of 18 years. 
                                                 
60 Note that if the will cannot be located in time, the hospital will be entitled to obtain consent from the 
next person on the list without liability, so long as it acts in good faith. 
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(4) Spouse or partner includes husband or wife, civil union partner and persons  
who live in a relationship as defined in section 2D of the Property (Relationships) 
Act 1976.  
 (5)  Consent should be obtained from the person whose relationship to the 
person concerned is accorded the highest ranking in accordance with subsections 
(1)(2) and (4). 
 
(6)  If the relationship of two or more persons to the person concerned is 
accorded equal highest ranking in accordance with subsections (1)(2) and (4), it is 
sufficient to obtain the consent of any one of them. 
 
(7) If it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with the person whose 
relationship to the person concerned is accorded the highest ranking in accordance 
with subsections (1),(2) and (4) it is sufficient to obtain the consent of the person 
with the next highest ranking. 
 
G Consent 
 
The representative could agree to transfer the whole cadaver to researchers or 
only transfer organs intended for transplantation to a hospital or recipient. If the 
deceased had so instructed, the representative might retain ownership of the cadaver 
but allow researchers or others to have possession of it under specified conditions. 
Consent to use the body would be as follows: 
 
• If the deceased had, prior to death, consented to the particular use, or declined 
to consent to it,61 that decision will apply;62  
• If the deceased had appointed a representative to deal with the issue of consent 
after death in relation to the use in question, the representative may consent; or 
• If neither applies, an executor named in the deceased’s will may consent, with 
no requirement to first obtain probate of the will; 
• If the deceased died intestate or the will did not appoint an executor, the 
person highest on the priority list will act as representative until an 
administrator obtains a grant of administration. Thereafter, the administrator 
may consent. 
• If the appointed representative is unavailable to give consent, the priority list 
will apply; 
• If it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with the representative or 
the person highest on the priority list within the time in which it is possible to 
use the body parts, that person will be treated as though he or she was not able 
to give consent and the next person on the priority list will give consent.  
 
(1) Where the appointer has died, “appropriate consent” means-  
                                                 
61 Note that the Human tissue bill does not refer to refusal of consent, whereas this thesis argues that 
both consent and dissent should be respected. 
62 Health and Disability Commissioner’s Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
Regulation 1996 Right7(6) consent is only required to be in writing if it relates to research, the 
procedure is experimental, the consumer will be under general anaesthetic; or there is a significant risk 
of adverse effects. 
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(a) if a decision of the appointer whether or not to consent to the 
activity, as required by the Health and Disability Commissioner’s 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
Regulation 1996 was in force immediately before the appointer died, 
the appointer’s consent; 
(b)  if- 
  (i)  paragraph (a) does not apply, and 
(ii)  the appointer has appointed a representative or 
representatives to take the legal interest in the body after the 
death of the appointer, the representative’s consent; 
(c) if- 
(i)  the representative was, prior to the death of the appointer, 
made aware of the appointer’s views, the representative must 
consent only to actions that the representative believes, on 
reasonable grounds, are consistent with the wishes of the 
appointer; or 
(ii) the views of the appointer are unknown the representative 
may give a valid consent; 
(d)  if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies, the  
   consent of a person who stood first in a qualifying   
   relationship to the appointer immediately before the appointer 
   died. 
 
(2) Where the appointer has appointed a representative or representatives the 
appointment must be disregarded for the purposes of subsection (1) if no one is able 
to give consent under it. 
 
(3) If it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with a person appointed as 
representative within the time available in order for the activity to be carried out the 
appointment must be disregarded for the purposes of subsection (1). 
 
H Preservation of the Body 
 
It is necessary to take immediate steps following death to ensure the body is 
preserved in a suitable condition for organ harvest. The institution holding the body 
should be authorised to take the steps necessary to preserve the body for that purpose. 
This authority would cease to apply once it has been established that consent has not, 
and will not, be given. The institution will be able to proceed with organ harvest, 
without risk of liability, if the deceased, the representative or a person appearing to be 
the highest on the priority list has given consent. 
 
(1)  Where a body is lying in a hospital, or other institution and a part of that 
body is or may be suitable for use for transplantation, it is lawful for the person 
having the control and management of the institution- 
(a) to take steps for the purpose of preserving the part for use for 
transplantation, and 
(b) to retain the body for that purpose. 
(2)  Authority under subsection (1)(a) extends only- 
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(a) to the taking of the minimum steps necessary for the purpose mentioned 
in that provision, and 
(b) to the use of the least invasive procedure. 
(3)  Authority under subsection (1) ceases to apply once it has been established 
that consent making removal of the part for transplantation lawful has not been, 
and will not be, given. 
(4)  The person having the control and management of the institution may 
arrange for the removal and use of any part from the body if that person, having 
made such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable, believes in good faith that 
appropriate consent has been given. 
 
I Sanctions for Breach 
 
Under the proposed scheme, a representative will have the power to grant 
possessory rights in the body parts to the hospital or researcher, subject to any 
conditions. Once organs have been transplanted into recipients they become 
reintegrated into those persons’ bodies and no longer the subject of property rights. 
Consequently, if the hospital misused the organs or parts there would be no ability to 
recover them from the recipient, but the representative could bring an action in 
conversion against the hospital.63 Additionally, such misappropriation would be an 
offence, the penalty including the forfeiture of any profits, for example, from a 
patented invention. It would be the researcher, doctor or hospital who would have 
civil and criminal liability, rather than recipients of organs, although it would be a 
defence if they acted in good faith, believing on reasonable grounds that the required 
consents had been given.  
 
Civil liability would arise as a consequence of the provision that cadavers and 
excised body parts are property, thus potentially allowing civil claims such as 
conversion if, for example, a kidney donated to one recipient was transplanted into 
another person.64
 
(1)  A person commits an offence if, without appropriate consent, that person 
does an activity that requires consent under this Act unless that person reasonably 
believes- 
(a)   that the person does the activity with appropriate consent, or 
(b) that what the person does is not an activity which requires 
 consent. 
 
(2)  A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable- 
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
 maximum;  
(b) on conviction on indictment- 
 (i) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, or 
 (ii) to a fine, or 
                                                 
63 The proposed legislation has not included the right to take civil action as this would arise naturally 
from the existence of the property interest. 
64 Note that this ability to bring civil actions is a major advantage from the framework. The Human 
Tissue Bill provides for criminal liability only.See the discussion in chapter 2 of Colavito v New York 
Organ Donor Network Inc (2006) 438 F 3d 214 (US App) Sack J. 
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 (iii) to the forfeiture of any profits made as a consequence of 
   the activity or 
 (iii) to each of the above 
 
(3)  Subject to subsection (1), a person commits an offence if that person 
(a) uses donated material for a purpose which is not a qualifying  
  purpose, or 
(b) stores donated material for use for a purpose which is not a  
  qualifying purpose. 
 
(4)  Subsection (3) does not apply where the person reasonably believes that 
what the person uses, or stores, is not donated material. 
 
(5)  In subsection (3), references to a qualifying purpose are to- 
(a) Anatomical examination,  
(b) Determining the cause of death,  
(c) Medical diagnosis or treatment,  
(d) Establishing after a person’s death the efficacy of any drug or 
  other  treatment administered to that person,  
(e) Obtaining scientific or medical information about a living or  
  deceased person which may be relevant to any other person  
  (including a future person), 
(f) Public display,  
(g) Research in connection with disorders, or the functioning, of the 
  human body,  
(h)Transplantation, 
   (i) Decent disposal.  
 
(6)  In this section, references to donated material are to-  
(a) the body of a deceased person, or 
(b) material which has come from a human body 
 
V    ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 
 
 The current proposals for legislation in New Zealand are generally directed 
towards increasing the rate of organ donation, especially from deceased donors. As 
was considered in chapter 2, the shortage of organs in New Zealand appears to relate 
more to a low number of intensive care beds together with a lack of suitable donors, 
than to refusals by family members. Proposals to increase the donation rate were 
considered and it was concluded that presumed consent, required decision and 
required request would not provide a satisfactory solution to the current conceptual 
and practical problems. 
 
A    Enforcement of the Wishes of the Deceased 
 
 The framework proposed in this thesis would result in the wishes of the 
deceased justifiably “trumping” opposition by relatives, as would the HTB, although 
it would also allow relatives to consent even if this was contrary to the wishes of the 
deceased.  
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 The proposed framework is conceptually sound as there is no proxy consent 
power exercisable in respect of competent living adults, and so, no basis for allowing 
family members to overrule the expressed wish of the deceased. A person can 
delegate the power to deal with other property to another, by way of appointment of a 
power of attorney, but this power is not assumed merely because of the existence of a 
relationship. The discussion document recommended that the consent to donate 
should apply despite opposition from relatives, if:65
 
• there is support from the general public and health practitioners; 
• the decision made by the living person was fully informed;66
• the recorded wish of the deceased was current at the time of death. 
It suggested that this approach might result in a lower rate of donation than at 
present, because around 43 per cent of people who hold a driver’s licence have 
indicated a wish to be a donor, whereas in an audit of intensive care units 55 per cent 
of families consented to donation. However, that assumes that people who take no 
action when they obtain their licences are refusing consent. They may not have 
considered the matter, but later make a decision and advise their families of their 
decision. This is suggested by the 7 per cent of people who change from “no” to “yes” 
when renewing their drivers’ licences.67
The framework suggested in this thesis would require the representative to 
carry out the wishes of the deceased, irrespective of the family’s opinions. A family 
member would often be chosen to be the representative, but in any event, the family 
would not be able to overrule the decision of the representative. This is similar to the 
approach suggested in the Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill 2006,68 
although the HTB makes the families’ views paramount.69  
B    Person Lawfully in Possession 
Under the Human Tissue Act 1964, the “person lawfully in possession of the 
body” has the discretion to authorise the use of the body, after first ensuring that an 
inquest or coronial post mortem is not required.70 While the authority of the person 
lawfully in possession of the body ensures that responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with the statute rests on an identified person, this legal construct appears incongruous 
in a scheme based on the concept of donation.71 It has however been repeated in the 
Human Tissue Bill, with provision for a “responsible person” being the “person 
lawfully in possession of the body”.72
As the representative would be responsible for carrying out the expressed 
wishes of the deceased, the notion of a person lawfully in possession would be 
unnecessary. However, steps would be necessary to ensure that the body was 
                                                 
65 Ministry of Health, above. 
66 See chapter 3. 
67 Ministry of Health, above, 67. 
68 A Member’s Bill introduced by Dr Jackie Blue on 22 March 2006. New Zealand Parliamentary 
Library Bills Digest No 1350. 
69 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
70 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 3. 
71 P Matthews “Whose Body? People as Property” (1983) 36 CLP 193, 228. 
72 Human Tissue Bill, clause 8(1). 
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preserved while the person with decision-making authority was identified.73  The 
institution or hospital would be able to harvest organs, if it reasonably appeared that 
consent had been given.  
 
Consent to organ donation must be given promptly after death and it has been 
suggested this would be facilitated by establishing an organ donor register.74 The 
HTB does not prevent information such as consents being recorded in the register, but  
effective consent does necessarily have to be recorded in the register.75 It is unclear 
whether refusals can be recorded.76 There are difficulties arising from a register:77
•  it is difficult to justify the cost given the small number of potential donors78 
  and the limited potential for a register to increase donation rates;  
•   donor rates may drop in the short term as the absence of an entry on the  
  register may be taken as an indication that the person did not wish to donate;   
•  there is scant evidence from international literature that registers improve the 
  donation rate;  
•  medical professionals are likely to continue to consider it unreasonable to  
  retrieve organs without family consent.  
Despite these problems, it is government policy to create a register and the 
Ministry of Health is implementing this.79 However, this thesis argues that a register 
is not necessary, as the suggested procedures would ensure that the representative was 
aware of the appointment and able to demonstrate it. If the delay in locating the 
representative was likely to be fatal to the use of the organs, the priority list would 
apply.80
C    Relatives 
The Human Tissue Act 1964 refers to “surviving spouse” “surviving de facto 
partner” “surviving civil union partner” and “any surviving relative”.81 The discussion 
document suggested that these terms are inadequate, in light of the complexity of 
family relationships, and preferred the wider definition of family suggested in the 
review of the Coroner’s Act.82 That review did not address the issue of the priority of 
these various persons, or how to assess who had “the responsibility for, or an interest 
                                                 
73 See the suggested provision above, regarding the preservation of the body. 
74 The Human Tissue (Organ Donation) Amendment Bill proposes to amend the Human Tissue Act 
1964 by establishing a register on which anyone could register their legally binding wish to be an organ 
donor or state their objection to being an organ donor and registration could not be overridden by 
relatives. 
75 Human Tissue Bill, clause 41. 
76 Human Tissue Bill, clause 5: “Other donor information” includes a request that the body be used. It 
is silent as to whether it also includes a request that it not be used. 
77 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
78 There are only around 100 potential deceased donors in New Zealand each year and around 40 of 
those become cadaveric organ donors.   
79 It is intended to include the register in the Human Tissue Bill, which is likely to be introduced in late 
2006. 
80 See above- if the representative was not able to be located the next person on the priority list would 
be able to give consent. 
81 Human Tissue Act 1964, s 3(2). 
82 Law Commission Coroners: A Review  (NZLC R62 Law Commission, Wellington, 2000) 
Preliminary Paper 365<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz> (last accessed 27 April 2004). 
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in, the welfare of the deceased.” The delays involved in searching out such persons 
could be fatal to the utilisation of the organs of a person who had not appointed a 
representative. The preferred approach is that of the UKHTA, which provides a 
ranking list83 and, if more than one person is equally ranked, it is sufficient to obtain 
consent from one of them.84
As the property interest in the body passes to the representative following 
death, there would be no need to ascertain how close the relationship must be in order 
to have decision making power. If no appointment was made, the priority list would 
apply.85
It is possible that a representative’s consent to donate organs might be 
distressing to Māori families, however if the deceased wished his or her bodily 
property to be dealt with according to tikanga Māori, it is likely the representative 
would be chosen and instructed accordingly.86 An advantage of the property construct 
is the flexibility to reflect cultural values, if that is wished. 
VI    LIVING DONOR TRANSPLANTATION 
This thesis argues that the property interest in body parts arises once they are 
excised from a living person. As such, at the time of consent to collection of an organ 
from a living donor, there is no property in existence. Despite this, it is relevant to 
consider whether the suggested framework provides adequate protection of the rights 
of such donors. In light of the low cadaveric rates of organ donation and the steadily 
increasing waiting lists, living donor transplantation (LDT) has social value and 
should be facilitated.87  
Many jurisdictions have legislation specifying that procedures that place the 
donor at unacceptable risk should not be undertaken,88 but as is discussed in chapter 
6, there is no empirical evidence that the ethical standards of the medical 
professionals involved are inadequate, thus necessitating legislative intervention. 
In New Zealand there is no explicit statement in law that living organ donation 
is legitimate, but it is commonly accepted that the source has the right to make such a 
decision. The HTB will amend the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 to 
clarify that organ harvest from a living donor is a health treatment so the Code applies 
to it.89
Commentators have argued that there are issues relating to the maxim primum 
non nocere, and the need to ensure that decisions to donate are made autonomously. 
Processes and procedures to ensure that the welfare of all participants in LDT is 
                                                 
83 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 27(4). 
84 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 27(7). 
85 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 27. See the priority list above. 
86 See the discussion in chapter 5. 
87 The Code provides in Right 6 the right to be fully informed and in Right 7 the right to make an 
informed choice and give informed consent.  
88 Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin  ETS no 186 (Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, 2001) art 11 <http://www.coe.int> (last accessed 27 April 2004). 
89 Human Tissue Bill, clause 89. 
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appropriately safeguarded are essential, as this is an area where property interests, in 
conjunction with informed consent, may be insufficient to protect donors.90 Sources 
who are considering undergoing a procedure with substantial potential risks, for the 
benefit of another, should be informed about more than just the nature and risks of the 
medical procedure. The issues encompass familial, social, and economic factors. Price 
suggests that legislation should require that the donor has understood the information 
provided,91 although this thesis argues that this is an unreasonable requirement, as 
indicating understanding does not necessarily mean that the person fully understands 
all the ramifications, or even cares about them, as many people have decided to 
donate well before any counselling is provided. 
Such safeguards do not weaken the arguments in favour of recognition of 
property interests in body parts, because the law controls dealings with property, to 
protect vulnerable persons in other contexts, such as remedies for undue influence, or 
consumer legislation. The hospital or doctor would obtain possession of the organs 
only for the purpose in the consent and the living donor retain title until the organs 
were transplanted into the recipient. The Authority would oversee the retention and 
use of human tissue, including living organ donations, but unlike the UKHTA,92 prior 
permission of the Authority is not suggested, unless examples of egregious conduct 
arise.93  
 (1)  The Human Tissue Authority has the following functions: 
(a)  to issue guidelines and advice to ethics committees on any matter 
relating to living donor transplantation and to keep such guidelines and 
advice under review: 
(b)  to provide the Minister with advice on aspects of, or issues arising 
out of, kinds of living donor transplantation and advice as to whether  this 
Act or another enactment should be amended to prohibit or provide for any 
kind of living donor transplantation. 
In light of the multiplicity of family and other relationships in society, the 
legislation should not draw any distinction between related and unrelated living 
donors and should not restrict stranger and paired donations, so long as any 
requirements in the guidelines were satisfied.  
A Children 
This thesis argues that parents may have conflicting interests, particularly with 
respect to sibling transplantation, so deference to parental decision-making should be 
curtailed and such decisions made by the Family Court, or the Human Tissue 
Authority. Children should be protected from multiple procedures, as may be required 
from a “saviour sibling” who is HLA matched to an ill family member.94 They should 
                                                 
90 See the discussion in chapter 3. 
91 David Price “From Cosmos and Damian to Van Velzen: The Human Tissue Saga Continues” (2003) 
11 Med L Rev 1, 22. 
92 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s33. 
93 In Germany, legislation has established a Commission that is required, inter alia, to decide whether 
there are grounds for believing the donor’s consent is not being given freely, or that the organ is the 
object of trade. Act of 5 November 1997, No 74, s 8(2). 
94 C Thomas “Pre-Implantation Testing and the Protection of the ‘Saviour Sibling’” (2004) 
9 Deakin L Rev 119. 
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be independently represented and relevant factors would include the child’s 
psychological and emotional well-being, as well as physical health.95 Recognition of 
property interests in body parts would enable the property provisions in the Care of 
Children Act 2004 to further protect the interests of children.96
VII    POST-MORTEMS AND RETENTION OF TISSUE 
Non-coronial post-mortems are conducted to provide information about the 
cause of death of a person. Such examinations can be of benefit to the family of the 
deceased and may lead to improvements in healthcare delivery. The HTB provides 
that collection or use of tissue is lawful for the purposes of a lawful post-mortem.97 
Unconsented secondary use is also permitted if the tissue was from a post-mortem 
ordered under the Coroners Act 1988 or the Health Act 1956. Otherwise express 
consent is required.98 The retention of tissue from such examinations has caused 
concerns, such as the retention of children’s hearts by Greenlane Hospital.99  
The person giving consent for such a post-mortem should be informed which 
tissue is to be retained for the purposes of the post-mortem, the reason for the 
retention, and the time for which it will be retained. If the tissue is to be retained for 
any purpose other than the post-mortem, additional consent for that retention should 
be obtained. This is consistent with the suggested framework, as the representative 
would give the consent for the post-mortem and give binding instructions as to the 
ultimate disposition of the tissue, including restricting the types of use and placing 
time limits on the retention.  
VIII    FUTURE-PROOFING 
The regulatory framework could include an embargo of any novel process 
while the regulatory response is determined. This would allow an immediate 
response, and halt the new development, as an interim measure, while guidelines or 
legislation were developed. The HART Act provides that an Order in Council could 
be made imposing a moratorium on any kind of assisted reproductive procedure, or 
human reproductive research, while advice is developed, for up to two periods of 18 
months.100
 
In contrast, the UKHTA gives the Human Tissue Authority the power to 
license activities relating to the removal, use and storage of human organs and 
material from a human body.101 A variety of activities must be licensed and the 
Secretary of State may, by regulation, add to, remove, or alter the activities to which 
the section applies.102 This allows for relatively rapid changes; however, there may be 
a lack of Parliamentary, and thus public, scrutiny of many of the key aspects of the 
legislation and subsequent changes.  
                                                 
95 See the discussion in chapter 6. 
96 Care of Children Act, ss6 and 14.  
97 Human Tissue Bill, clause 12. 
98 Human Tissue Bill, clause 22. 
99 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
100 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 24. 
101 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 16(2)(e). 
102 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 16(4). 
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In light of the strong cultural and personal views held about the human body, 
it is important that the framework be incorporated in legislation and not be able to be 
amended by way of regulation. In light of the delays likely while policy is developed, 
a provision similar to that in the HART Act is recommended. The Human Tissue Bill 
does not contain similar provisions. 
IX    COMMERCIALISATION 
A thriving market for human body parts has developed as new technologies, 
such as gene sequencing and DNA fingerprinting, have increased the economic value 
of human tissue.103 The UKHTA prohibits the trafficking in human material intended 
for the purposes of transplantation,104 unless the person engaging in the activity is 
designated by the Human Tissue Authority as a person who may lawfully engage in 
the activity.105 It does not impose a broader prohibition on commercial dealings in 
bodily material and it exempts gametes, embryos,106 hair and nails from a living 
person, and material that is the subject of property, because of an application of 
human skill.107  
A Work and Skill 
Human organs and tissue are frequently processed in complex ways, requiring 
the investment of work and skill. The UKHTA exempts such products from 
regulation, as they are the property of the scientist or technician who has applied skill 
in the manufacture. Thus, histopathological slides, which have been selected, stained, 
and mounted, are the property of the pathologist who prepared them. However, it is 
not specified how much, or how little, skill has to be applied to human tissue to make 
it the subject of property rights.108
 
There seems little conceptual basis to continue this dubious construct which 
has its basis in the common law.109 The sources of the cells used to develop cell lines 
produced by a technological process retain an interest in the cells. If it is unacceptable 
for the human sources to profit from their cells, then it is equally unacceptable for 
others to profit from commercial uses of their cloned cells. Such a view was the basis 
of the claim made in conversion in Moore.110  
 
The provision in the UKHTA, that material might be the subject of property 
because of an application of human skill, will not, of itself, prevent unethical conduct 
of commercial companies or remove the contradictions within the common law as to 
the status of body parts. The UKHTA provides that material shall not be regarded as 
                                                 
103 Emily Waltz “News Feature: The Body Snatchers” (2006) Nature Medicine Online 
<http://www.nature.com/news/2006> (last accessed 30 May 2006). 
104 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32. 
105 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32(3). 
106 Gametes and embryos are regulated under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK). 
107 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 32(a). 
108 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
109 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
110 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120, 125 (Cal Sup Ct). See the 
discussion in chapter 3. 
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from a human body if it is created outside the human body. 111 Thus, once a cell line 
is created, it appears to be exempt from the provisions of the Act, although the human 
source would have had to consent to use of the tissue. The point at which sufficient 
work and skill has been applied to transmute the possessory right in the cells into a 
property right in the cell line is unclear. An alternative interpretation of the UKHTA 
is that, as the cell line was created outside the body, the Act does not apply. The 
human source will only be able to recover expenses, but the material will be able to be 
sold by research institutes, subject to the permission of the Authority.  
 
Chapter 1 argued that excised body parts are property because they assume a 
character which is different from being part of an entire person. It also argued that 
donation causes a living donor inconvenience and discomfort. Thus this labour creates 
a new object, which is the source’s property. The actions of doctors or researchers are 
as agents of the source, so that they do not become the owners unless the source 
agrees to transfer title or abandons the body part. 
B  Sale of Organs  
Commentators argue in favour of allowing individuals to sell organs, as this 
would result in a greater supply and would respect property rights and autonomy.112 
However, an organ market is unlikely to be politically attractive and it is not proposed 
in the HTB or in this thesis. Not every “stick” in the bundle of rights needs to exist for 
a property interest to arise so prohibiting the sale of organs does not necessarily 
prevent the existence of property rights. As was discussed in chapter 3, there seems 
scant reason to prevent patient groups or individuals from negotiating contracts with 
researchers, to provide for payment for research materials or a share of the profits 
from a patent. 113
Commercial supply of material from the human body for transplantation 
 
(1) No person may give or receive, or agree to give or receive, valuable 
consideration for the supply of any material which: 
 
(a)    consists of or includes human cells, and 
(b)   is, or is intended to be, removed from a human body, and 
(c)   is intended to be used for the purpose of transplantation. 
  
(2)  Every person commits an offence who contravenes subsection (1) and is 
liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a 
fine not exceeding $100,000, or both. 
C  Tissue 
Body tissue should not, in general, be used for research purposes unless the 
human source has agreed to transfer the property interest, or to give a right of 
possession to the researcher for specified purposes. To give informed consent, the 
source must be aware of the potential for profit and should be able to enter into 
                                                 
111 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s4 (7). 
112 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
113 See the discussion of PXE International in chapter 3. 
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contractual profit-sharing arrangements. Patient groups are already negotiating the 
terms and conditions of research into specific disorders.114 People in the position of 
the Greenbergs115 may justifiably wish to ensure that tests and treatments remain 
accessible to patients with particular disorders, by making contractual arrangements 
with researchers.  
If each research participant individually negotiated a price for each use of the 
biological material provided to a biobank, this could impede research. However, if the 
property approach was accepted, the consent form would most likely include any 
conditions and also a statement that individuals would be paid a predetermined 
amount for their contribution, or that no payment was offered. Additionally, there 
would often be a condition that sources thereby gave up any further rights to benefit, 
should a patent be obtained for an invention.116 Ownership in the samples would pass 
to the biobank.  
Sources who did not accept such conditions would refuse to participate. An 
individual would not usually have attributes that are vital to the research, so individual 
refusals would not impair the research. If however, the individual contribution is 
essential, or many prospective participants decline to participate, the offer would need 
to be amended. Thus, individual negotiations are unlikely in most cases. Only in 
exceptional situations, such as that of Moore, would an individual be vital for the 
research and directly contribute to a valuable product. If he had been fully informed, 
he would have been able to negotiate, or to refuse to participate. 
As discussed in chapter 7, patent law should respect the property interest 
people have in the parts of their bodies and sources should be able to use contractual 
arrangements to achieve a share relative to their contribution. Patenting of human 
genes and gene fragments should be restricted, either because it is not an invention or, 
in light of automated sequencing, because it is “obvious”. If patents are allowed for 
products based on genes, such as diagnostic tests, then licensing should be employed 
to prevent the restriction of access to tests or treatment to those individuals or States 
who can afford them.  
D Reimbursement of Expenses 
The UKHTA allows recovery of expenses or loss of earnings incurred by the 
person from whose body the material comes, so far as reasonably and directly 
attributable to supplying the material from the person’s body.117 In New Zealand 
people who donate a kidney or liver tissue are eligible for between $164 and $290 a 
week for up to three months after surgery, as a contribution toward lost income. 
Donors are also be given help with additional childcare costs, and do not have to use 
their sick or annual leave when they take time off work to recover from the 
operation.118
                                                 
114 See the discussion of PXE International in chapter 3. 
115 See the discussion in chapter 3. 
116 As with UK Biobank. 
117 Human Tissue Act 2004 (UK), s 37(7)(c). 
118 Hon Steve Maharey “Financial Assistance for Live Organ Donors” 28 January 2005.                  
 Ministerial Press Release. See the discussion in chapters 1 and 3.                 
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In light of the preponderance of women donors,119 who are more likely than 
men to not be in paid employment, it would be unfortunate if such a scheme did not 
include domestic support for such donors and compensate for loss of income of 
partners who take time off work to care for donors, or their children.  As the cost of 
maintaining a person on dialysis is $60,000 to $80,000 per year, donors should 
receive full compensation for their expenses. It is also reasonable to guarantee priority 
treatment for living donors should they suffer deleterious medical consequences as a 
result of having donated. The payment of a funeral benefit to the estate of a person 
who had made provision for the donation of organs after death is also justifiable, as 
recognition of a socially beneficial act and to encourage procrastinating persons to 
make decisions. 
IX   INSTITUTIONS 
 
The legislation proposed in this thesis specifies the acceptable parameters for 
the retention and use of human tissue, including an authority to provide oversight and 
sanctions for violation of the law. The advantages of this approach are that it creates 
clear, legally enforceable, rules and that the process of creating legislation engages the 
public in the development of policy. The disadvantages are the difficulty of defining 
acceptable and unacceptable uses, inflexibility, and the argument that the state should 
not intrude into the private domain unless there is empirical evidence of an 
unacceptable level of harm.  
 
A    Ethics Committees 
 
 There is a range of national and local ethics committees in New Zealand, 
involved in governing the use of tissue obtained from live and deceased human 
sources. Their roles, which include scrutinising health and disability support research 
proposals and proposals for innovative practice, would continue under the proposed 
framework. The Human Tissue Authority would have an overarching role similar to 
the role of ACART.120 It would develop guidelines, which ethics committees would 
be required to apply to their deliberations, but would not generally undertake case-by-
case consideration of research proposals.  
 
B Constitutional Justification 
 
The ethics review process by ethics committees has come to be viewed as a 
surrogate for a comprehensive ethical approach to research involving human subjects. 
The deliberations of ethics committees may result in limits on research, on a case-by-
case basis. Such ad hoc public policy may lead to inconsistent decisions because of 
differences in the way research proposals are presented, or the surrounding 
circumstances. McDonald has expressed concern that it only covers a narrow time 
slice of the research.121 It involves predicting whether, with the information provided, 
subjects would be able to make an informed judgment about participation in research 
and about the potential benefits and harms of research. There is no mechanism to 
attempt to verify these predictions, to check whether the research proceeded according 
                                                 
119 As discussed in chapter 6. 
120 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 36—41. 
121 Michael McDonald “Anybody Minding the Store?” (2001) 9 Health Law Journal 1, 9. 
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to the research proposal, whether there was genuine informed consent, and whether 
the benefit/harm ratio was actually within ethical parameters. McDonald expresses 
this as a lack of “virtuous learning loops.”122  
 
 The Operational Standard requires ethics committees to monitor approved 
research proposals and researchers to provide progress reports during the research and 
a final report on completion.123 However, committees do not have any powers of 
enforcement, apart from the ability to withdraw the approval in certain circumstances. 
In contrast, the HART Act provides considerable enforcement powers to ensure that 
the Act has been complied with, including that the approval of the ethics committee 
was obtained for the performance of an assisted reproductive procedure or the conduct 
of human reproductive research, and that any conditions included in the approval 
were complied with.124
 
In the absence of public policy about the direction of, or limits to, new 
technologies, ethics committees must make decisions. One view is that such 
committees have no right to be restricting the rights of researchers, pending the 
development of public policy. The alternative view is that no research should be done 
until public policy is developed. This latter view would delay research that might 
reduce human suffering and, in any event, public policy cannot be developed until it is 
known to what it will relate. The most practical view is that, in the absence of public 
policy, research be permitted to proceed, subject to ethical review by an ethics 
committee, on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Each application for a grant submitted to the Health Research Council must 
have an independent ethical assessment of the proposed research.125 Section 16 of the 
HART Act makes it an offence to perform an assisted reproductive procedure, or 
conduct human reproductive research, without the prior approval in writing of the 
ethics committee. The legislation prescribes the procedures to be undertaken by the 
Advisory Committee, including giving interested parties and members of the public a 
reasonable opportunity to make submissions and taking such submissions into 
account.126 However, it does not prescribe the decision making process. It is 
suggested that the Human Tissue Authority should be similarly constituted. 
 
The Operational Standard, which is only a guideline, states that health and 
disability research proposals and innovative treatment protocols should not proceed 
without ethics committee approval. However, despite the non binding nature of the 
Operational Standard, it is generally treated by ethics committees as if it were 
binding, thus assuming the status of “soft law”, made by the Ministry of Health and 
not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. Use of such de facto regulation has been 
common recently, for example with regard to the importation of human embryonic 
stem cell lines127 and future research on biobanked material.128
                                                 
122 McDonald, above, 11. 
123 Ministry of Health Operational Standards for Health and Disability Ethics Committees (Ministry of 
Health, Wellington, 2002) 47 < http://www.moh.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 April 2004). 
124 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, ss 67—75. 
125 Health Research Council Act 1990, s 25. 
126 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, s 39. 
127 Ministry of Health Guidelines on Using Cells from Established Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines 
for Research (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006). 
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Ethics committees appear to dominate ethical debate. Committees with  
prescribed procedures, such as ACART, still have a wide discretion to determine the 
ethical precepts they will apply. If members of the public oppose the stance taken by 
an ethics committee, there is no obvious avenue to action such a grievance, other than 
through the media. Although interested parties may seek a second opinion from the 
National Advisory Committee, or seek judicial review, such processes are not 
available to the public. 
Ethics committees have been accepted internationally as an acceptable way to 
oversee and control research and innovative practice. This trend is likely to continue. 
Despite the above concerns, this thesis proposes the establishment of a Human Tissue 
Authority with to give advice to the Minister if it determines that regulation is 
necessary and to prepare binding guidelines for ethics committees.  
Human Tissue Authority  
 
(1) The Minister must establish a committee to be known as the Human Tissue 
 Authority. 
 (2) The Human Tissue Authority has the following general functions- 
(a) maintaining a statement of the general principles which it considers should 
be followed- 
(i )  in the carrying-on of activities in schedule 2, and 
                  (ii)  in the carrying-out of its functions in relation to such activities; 
 
(b) providing in relation to activities in schedule 2 such general oversight and 
guidance as it considers appropriate; 
 
(c)  superintending, in relation to activities within schedule 2, compliance with- 
(i) requirements imposed under this Act, and 
(ii) codes of practice under this Act; 
 
(d) providing to the public, and to persons carrying on activities within schedule 
2, such information and advice as it considers appropriate about the nature 
and purpose of such activities; 
 
(e) monitoring developments relating to activities within schedule 2  and          
advising the Minister on  issues relating to such developments 
Schedule 2 would include matters such as the collection of body parts from 
children and incompetent adults, living donor transplantation, and unconsented use of 
extant and future biobanked samples. In particular, the role of the Authority would be 
to increase the protection of vulnerable participants and protect the public interest. 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
                                                                                                                                            
128 Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research 
Purposes: Discussion Document (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2006). Guidelines on the future use 
and retention of the heel prick samples are presently being prepared and will include the use of the 
samples for research. 
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 The framework proposed is based on the concept that research on human 
tissue and organ donations are social goods and that the public should be encouraged 
and enabled to permit the use of their body parts. It is argued that the public 
involvement will increase if there is trust that the sources are able to control and 
restrict the uses of body parts. This necessitates an ability to take action should the 
body parts be misappropriated and an ability to enter into contractual arrangements to 
share in the resultant profits. There is no such power arising from the HTB.  
 
 This chapter has demonstrated selected parts of a legal framework 
incorporating the property structure. Despite concerns about the increasing reliance on 
ethics committees, it acknowledges there are aspects of the framework that would 
require oversight, such as living organ donation and some that require case-by-case 
consideration, such as sibling living organ donation. As such, the establishment of an 
overarching Human Tissue Authority is recommended. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
One’s own dead are more than cadavers, they are place holders for the living. They 
are a focus, a receptacle, for emotions that no longer have one. The dead of science 
are always strangers.1
This thesis argues that organ transplantation and research depend on the 
ongoing willing involvement of the public which, in turn, requires public trust in the 
processes involved. The Medical Research Council’s public survey into perceptions 
of the collection of human biological samples2 found evidence of public cynicism 
towards the medical profession generally, but most people continued to find medical 
research to be worthy and worthwhile.3 There was, however, disparate knowledge and 
understanding of the meaning and goals of research and, where understanding was 
lacking, there was considerable evidence of negative associations with the research.4 
This general atmosphere of mistrust is compounded by the increased role of the 
private sector in undertaking and financing research, including obtaining intellectual 
property rights over discoveries and products.  
 Autonomy, which is the dominant ethical precept in western bioethics has, in 
practice, been taken to mean informed consent. However, autonomy is a universal 
ethical good, reflecting various different aspects of personhood that are worthy of 
respect, such as choice, independence, freedom of action, self-governance and 
control. Consent does not have ethical value in itself, but it does indicate the power to 
control the body, which is a property-orientated concept and implies and supports an 
underlying property right.  There are various means to respect individuals in a passive 
sense, including doing no harm and respecting individual privacy. Informed consent 
has come to be seen as the primary and, arguably, only legitimate way of giving 
individuals power and control in their dealings with medical professionals and 
researchers. The thesis has argued that the focus on consent renders the participatory 
process disempowering, in that it fails to recognise that:  
• If a person gives consent to participate in research, he/she thereafter has no 
control, unless further consent is required. However, the consent to participate 
in research can be withdrawn at any time and, if the research reaches a new 
stage, there has to be another informed consent;  
• Sources are interested parties in the overall research enterprise and its 
 commercial applications; 
• Sources retain an interest in their biological samples; 
• There is a need to reconcile conflicts between the interests of previously 
 living donors and their families; 
• There is a need to reconcile cultural values regarding collective interests. 
                                                 
1 Mary Roach Stiff: The Curious Life of Human Cadavers (W W Norton & Co, New York, 2003) 12.  
2 Medical Research Council, Public Perceptions of the Collection of Human Biological Samples 
(Medical Research Council, London, 2000). 
3 Medical Research Council , above, para. 2.1. 
4 Medical Research Council , above, para. 2.2. 
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 Individual choices impact on the wider community, particularly in the context 
of genetic research, which may have repercussions within families or communities. 
The “communitarian” nature of information from body parts has been recognised in 
the collective claims of Māori to their genetic heritage. However, the thesis signals 
the weakening of informed consent in New Zealand with regard to biobanked 
samples.5
American jurisprudence generally uses utilitarian considerations to support the 
property rights of the recipients of body parts. Moore suggests such rights are 
necessary to protect researchers, ensure that there are sufficient samples available, 
provide economic incentives, encourage research, and provide certainty of title.6 This 
thesis argues that there is a lack of empirical evidence of these assertions7 and that the 
further argument that the free exchange research culture might be harmed without 
such an interest can also be disputed in light of existing commercialisation of 
research. Economic and certainty of title arguments were countered by suggesting that 
if sources have property interests, such interests can be transferred by sale or gift. 
Even if sources may, in some cases, negotiate compensation, this does not necessarily 
undermine the economic basis of research and adequate record keeping would enable 
the resolution of issues of title.8
 
The cases tend not to specifically rely on potentially relevant theories of 
property, such as first occupancy, which is based on the premise that excised body 
parts are res nullius and ownership is acquired by the first person to take possession. 
It depends on the source having no rights over the body parts. If it is accepted that 
sources have an ongoing interest, as is demonstrated by the ability of living organ 
donors to specify the recipient, then for first occupancy to apply, it would have to be 
established that the source had abandoned that interest prior to excision.  
 
As this is a difficult argument to sustain, an alternative approach is that the 
property rights arise because of the labour of the claimant. None of the cases 
considered apply such an argument to body parts from the living, although it has been 
applied to cadavers, if work or skill has given the body or parts features beyond their 
mere existence.9  Case law has long stated that there is no property in a dead body, 
but it was argued that times have changed and there is now ample justification for 
recognising property interests in a cadaver.  
 
The cases considered do not apply the work and skill exemption to body 
samples or cell lines, although there is potential for such an argument if it can be 
shown that the sample has acquired different attributes and that the source had no 
                                                 
5 See the discussion in chapter 3 of the amendment to Right 7(10) in the Code, in chapter 2 the 
provisions of the Human Tissue Bill and in chapter 8 the Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Use of 
Human Tissue for Future Unspecified Research Purposes: Discussion document (Ministry of Health, 
Wellington, 2006). 
6 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1988) 249 Cal Rptr 494 (Cal SC). 
7 Medical Research Council Human Tissue and Biological Samples for Use in Research (Medical 
Research Council, London, 1999) par 2.4; Australian Law Reform Commission Protection of Human 
Genetic Information  (Discussion Paper 66) (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 
2002) paras 17.36—17.37. 
8 Such record keeping forms part of good research practice, in any event. 
9 Doodewood v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406 (HCA); Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1997] 1 
WLR 596 (CA) R v Kelly [1999] QB 621 (CA). These cases are discussed in chapter 2. 
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underlying property right. Clearly, a cell line is different from the source cells, but in 
Moore, Mosk J noted that if the source had a property right in his cells, the patenting 
of the cell line would not extinguish his proprietary interest.10  
 
This thesis argued that the work and skill exemption supports the proposed 
framework, as a living source suffers inconvenience and discomfort when parts are 
excised and the work of the doctor is undertaken as agent for the source. The body 
part then assumes a different character than it had as part of an entire body. 
Consequently, this forms the basis for the argument that the parts are the source’s 
property. 
 
The proposed Human Tissue Bill was considered and it was concluded that it 
is inadequate to protect the interests of the source and couldl result in familial conflict 
and delays. It is essential that sources have confidence that their values and wishes 
will be respected. Consequently, both dissent and consent should be enforced, despite 
any conflicting views of family members. The legislation proposed is intended to 
protect these values, to ensure that sources have confidence that the processes will not 
override their wishes. 
 
The cases considered in chapter 3 show acceptance of a source’s property right 
in some circumstances, such as Catalona,11 where it was accepted that there was such 
a right initially, which had been gifted to the university. As in Moore, the court was 
greatly influenced by public policy considerations. In Greenberg,12 the claim was 
based on an assertion that the children owned their tissues. The court held that there 
was no property interest retained in body tissue and genetic information once it was 
given voluntarily to the researchers. It did not deny that there was a property interest 
prior to donation.13 This could either be interpreted as an inference that they owned 
their entire bodies, a proposition not argued in this thesis, or alternatively, that they 
owned the tissues after excision, at the point of donation. The latter interpretation is in 
accord with the proposed framework. 
 Rather than explicitly utilising self ownership to justify property rights, the 
courts have tended to use autonomy and personal rights.14 This thesis argued that 
legislation incorporating the property construct would promote autonomy, as sources 
would be able to protect their personal and cultural values and enforce restrictions and 
limits on the use of their property. This would empower sources to take a more equal 
role in the partnership that they form when they participate in research. Informed 
consent has practical limitations and often amounts to little more than a choice 
between the alternatives on offer.15 Property and consent need not be mutually 
exclusive, as they should operate in tandem to ensure full and proper respect for 
individual and collective rights. Sources or representatives would only be able to 
transfer the property interests by giving informed consent. 
                                                 
10 Moore v Regents of the University of California, above, 511. 
11 Washington University v Catalona (2006) US Dist LEXIS 22969 Limbaugh J. 
12 Greenberg and others v Miami Hospital Research Institute and others (Greenberg) (2003) 264 F 
Supp 2d 1064 (SD Fla).  
13 Washington University v Catalona , above. 
14 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 808 (HL); Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins [2001] 
Fam 147 (CA) 176. See the discussion in chapter 4. 
15 As discussed in chapter 1. 
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 The gift model has traditionally governed the collection of body parts for 
transplantation or research. The notion of a “gift” has strong normative appeal, 
because it is seen as a laudable act, demonstrating the virtues of altruism and 
beneficence, untainted by self-interest or exploitation. Donation is beneficial for 
recipients if gifts are treated as unconditional16 and future use or disposal of the gift is 
allowed.17 In public interest terms, unconditional gifting can serve a number of 
valuable social ends, including advances in medical research and organ 
transplantation.  
However, in the current “no property” regime, such a concept of gift is 
incongruous, because it presupposes underlying property rights or interests in the 
subject of the gift. There is no clear prohibition on ownership of body parts and there 
are examples of a property model being applied to human tissues as they can form the 
basis of patentable inventions, become the property of those who do work on them, be 
stolen and be subject to criminal law. 
Arguments against allowing sources to have a property interest were considered. 
Two principle concerns are: 
• Property interests would hinder research. In the scheme of relative powers, 
sources are currently disadvantaged and it is not an established fact that 
research would be obstructed if sources had increased bargaining power. In 
most cases, their property is likely to be of little economic significance to 
researchers. Research may be furthered, rather than hindered, by the 
recognition of property rights, because those previously reluctant to contribute 
tissue would have an incentive to do so.  
• Commercialisation of body parts could lead to exploitation. Although this is 
true, that prospect is not a sufficient reason to refuse to recognise property 
rights. Exploitation can be guarded against and, in any case, a black market in 
body parts already exists. Additionally, this argument is open to challenge 
from an autonomy perspective, on the grounds of paternalism.  
The framework proposed combines a property interest with existing processes, 
such as informed consent. It provides that a property interest in a cadaver arises 
briefly at the point of death and living persons would be able to make binding 
dispositions providing for their interest in their bodies to pass to their representative 
on death. The duty of that person would be to carry out the wishes of the deceased. 
The representative would either transfer the material unconditionally to the 
institutions carrying out transplantation or research or permit them to possess the 
material until the permitted use is complete. In the latter case, the hospital or 
researcher would obtain possessory rights to the materials, subject to conditions, and 
the representative, could take action if the materials were misused. Once organs were 
transplanted to another, they would become part of that person and no longer subject 
to property interests. An essential aspect is that that the property interest is only part 
of the larger medico-legal structure, rather than a total solution. 
                                                 
16 Although it is accepted that living donors may specify the recipient of the organ. 
17 As was the basis of the decision in Washington University v Catalona (2006) US Dist LEXIS 22969 
Limbaugh J. 
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In the research context, there would be a distinction made between those 
samples previously collected and future collection of samples. With respect to 
samples collected in the past, it is accepted that it may be impractical to obtain 
consent from the sources, as they may be difficult to trace, or dead. There are 
potential public health benefits from utilising biobanked material, so legislation would 
permit the use of material collected prior to a specified date, for purposes approved by 
an ethics committee. The proposed Human Tissue Authority would provide oversight 
and produce guidelines for ethics committees. Ownership of the extant samples would 
pass to the researcher as if the samples had been abandoned, subject to the conditions 
imposed by the ethics committee. Ethics committees could only approve the research 
use of extant samples if they were anonymised and  the committee was satisfied that 
the research was not of a sensitive nature or culturally offensive. Sanctions would 
apply if the conditions imposed by the committee were breached, the approval would 
be revoked and all material and information would be returned to the biobank or 
destroyed. 
At the time of consent to the future collection of samples, the source or the 
representative of a deceased person could specify the ongoing status of the property 
interest. Either the property would be unconditionally transferred or limited 
possessory rights would be authorised, with remedies available for breaches. If the 
research purpose was unknown at the time of collection, generic consent would be 
necessary. The source could impose conditions, such as restricting the types of 
research, putting a time limit on use, reserving the right to withdraw permission at any 
time, requiring the return or destruction of the samples and specifying re-contact if the 
research revealed relevant medical information. This is not informed consent, because 
the person consenting is not able to be informed in advance about the specific nature 
of the research, but it does overcome the problem of repeatedly requiring renewed 
consents for different projects once generic consent has been given.  
Although there are arguments in favour of permitting the sale of organs, such 
commercialisation is politically unattractive and the framework would prohibit it, 
while allowing living donors to recover reasonable expenses and the estates of 
deceased sources to be paid a funeral benefit. Prohibiting the sale of organs would not 
exclude property interests, as not all of the incidents of property must be present for 
the assertion of ownership rights.  
As stated, the primary objections to a property-based approach relate to 
concerns that the source might profit, as other parties, such as patent holders and 
operators of commercial bio-banks, already profit from body parts. It was argued that 
sources should be able to control, and profit from, patents based on their body parts. 
The refusal to grant such rights undervalues their contributions to the inventive 
process. Contractual arrangements could provide for compensation in proportion to 
the contribution to the invention. Some contractual negotiations could be undertaken 
by the Human Tissue Authority, rather than by individual sources, to avoid multiple 
negotiations by researchers and the imposition of a burden on sources. However, 
individuals or patient groups would be able to elect to negotiate on their own behalf.  
This thesis recognises that body parts and corpses have cultural significance. 
A New Zealand framework must respect Māori cultural values, and comply with 
Treaty obligations. As Māori are very diverse, the property interest in human body 
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parts would rest with the individual, who could choose whether or not to engage in 
collective decision making. This decision would not be imposed by regulation. 
Compliance with Māori cultural values should be focussed on the approval of 
research proposals,18 rather than at the point of sample collection. 
 
Existing statutory property protection regimes would apply to the property 
interests of incompetent sources. The Human Tissue Authority would decide whether 
to authorise living organ donation, rather than the source’s family. Although 
competent living organ donors may experience pressures to donate, it is suggested 
that this should be addressed by way of robust consent procedures, rather than 
legislative intervention. The Human Tissue Authority would be required to oversee 
LDT practices and, should the need for additional controls become apparent, provide 
advice accordingly to the Minister. 
This thesis expresses disquiet about the increasing tendency to delegate 
decision making to ethics committees. This provides flexibility but if ethics 
committees are empowered to make policy there is a risk that the democratic process 
will be usurped. However, even more concerning is the common practice of 
government departments that produce “soft law” by developing “guidelines”, which 
are treated as though they are binding.  
Ethics committee appointment processes should be more transparent, to avoid 
capture by interest groups. Members who are appointed to represent specific interest 
groups, such as Māori, should be required to reflect the views of a reasonable member 
of that group, rather than their personal viewpoints.  
This thesis recommends the creation of a Human Tissue Authority to ensure a 
rapid response to technological developments and to provide oversight and 
promulgate guidelines in areas where a property interest alone cannot ensure 
appropriate protection for vulnerable persons. Ethics committees would consider case-
by-case applications within the guidelines produced by the Authority.  
As stated by Charo:19
Ultimately the debate is less about whether the management of human tissue 
should be governed by property laws or by a more robust regulatory scheme 
than about the proper balance between respect for persons and the collective 
interest in promoting research involving human tissue. 
An adequate legal and ethical framework for the retention and use of human 
body parts must ensure respect for, and protection of, sources while encouraging 
participation in research and organ donation. The framework should also protect the 
interests of researchers, health professionals and organ recipients. These interests may 
at times be in opposition, but a workable solution is necessary, in light of the long 
waiting lists for organs and the potential to reduce human suffering through research 
                                                 
18 Before ethics committees approve research using Māori tissue, wānanga (discussions) should 
undertaken with the whānau (family) or iwi (tribe) involved in the research, to discover whether there 
are culturally acceptable processes or practices that will enable the research to be undertaken. See 
chapter 5. 
19 R Alto Charo “Body of Research- Ownership and Use of Human Tissue” (2006) 355 N Engl J Med 
1517, 1519. 
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outcomes. This thesis sets out a legislative framework with demonstrative examples 
of suggested legislation that incorporates property interests in body parts. It argues 
that this approach would yield ethical goods, as it would encourage participation in 
transplantation and research and thus, reduce mortality and suffering. 
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